Aristotle

Rhetoric

Translated
With Introduction and Notes
By

C. D. C. Reeve

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For

Amélie Rorty

&

Jonathan Lear

The question is not one of misrepresentation, but of adjusting fact, so as to raise it to the power of evidence.

—George Eliot, *Felix Holt, the Radical*

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I 2 Formal definition of rhetoric; means of persuasion that are inside and outside the province of rhetoric; persuasion through character, through listeners, and through argument; paradigm, enthymeme, apparent enthymeme; rhetoric's province; likelihoods, signs, and proofs; enthymemes in accord with rhetoric vs. in accord with a definite science or craft; common and special topics.

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{xi} Preface

A worthwhile translation of the *Rhetoric* must be accurate and consistent and accompanied by sufficient annotation to make it accessible. Some of this annotation can consist, as it does here, of texts selected from other works of Aristotle, so that, while traveling through the region of the Aristotelian world the *Rhetoric* describes, the reader can also travel through other regions of it, acquiring an ever-widening and deepening grasp on the whole. But much of it must simply be explanatory, clarificatory, and interpretative. To make the journey as convenient as possible sequentially numbered endnotes take the place of footnotes and glossary entries, so that the information most needed at each juncture is available in a single location. The non-sequential reader, interested in a particular passage, will find in the detailed Index of Terms a guide to places where focused discussion of a term or notion occurs. The Introduction describes the book that lies ahead, explaining what it is about, what it is trying to do, and how it goes about doing it. It is not a comprehensive discussion of all the important subjects discussed in the *Rhetoric*, nor is it an expression of scholarly consensus on those it does discuss, but rather my own take on them. The same is true of many of the more interpretative notes. They are a place to start, not a place to finish—a first step in the vast dialectical enterprise of coming to understand Aristotle for oneself. The place of the *Rhetoric* in the history of rhetoric is itself a large and complex subject, and one best explored in works, necessarily substantial, devoted to it. Some of these are mentioned in the section on Further Reading.

Some readers will, I have assumed, be new to the *Rhetoric*, so I have tried to keep their needs in mind. But it is resolute readers Aristotle most repays, and it is these, whatever their antecedent level of knowledge or sophistication, that my edition is intended to serve.

I have benefited from the work of previous translators and commentators, especially Edward Cope, John Freese, William Grimaldi, George Kennedy, and Christof Rapp, and from essays in the collections edited by David Furley and Alexander Nehamas and by Amélie Rorty. It was Amélie, indeed, who first encouraged me to work on the *Rhetoric* by

commissioning a paper for her collection. For that and for her many kindnesses in the forty years we have been friends I thank her warmly.

I come now to my greatest debt, which, as in the case of my - *Nicomachean Ethics*, is to Pavlos Kontos, who read carefully every line, correcting errors, {xii} suggesting improvements, indicating the need for additional notes (for example, those mentioning the anonymous Byzantine commentator), and carefully recording more differences between the Oxford Classical Texts (OCT) edition and that of Kassel than I had initially done. For each hour spent on this labor of love, and there must have been hundreds, I and all my readers have good reason to be grateful.

I renew my thanks to ΔΚΕ, the first fraternity in the United States to endow a professorial chair, and to the University of North Carolina for awarding it to me. The generous research funds, among other things, that the endowment makes available each year have allowed me to travel to conferences and to acquire books, computers, and other research materials and assistance, without which my work would have been much more difficult.

I renew them also to Deborah Wilkes who encouraged me to undertake the mammoth task of translating and overseeing the translations of all of Aristotle's works for the New Hackett Aristotle series, and for her support and that of her colleagues helping me carry it out.

Finally, and very warmly, I thank my graduate student Philip Bold for his generous help with correcting the page proofs.

{xiii} Abbreviations

Aristotle

Citations of Aristotle's works are made to Immanuel Bekker, *Aristotelis Opera* (Berlin: 1831 [1970]), in the canonical form of abbreviated title, book number or letter (when the work is divided into books), chapter number, page number, column letter, and line number. In the case of the *Rhetoric*, however, the title of the work is usually omitted. An * indicates a work whose authenticity has been seriously questioned; ** indicates a work attributed to Aristotle but generally agreed not to be by him. The abbreviations used are as follows:

APo.	*Posterior Analytics*
APr.	*Prior Analytics*
Ath.	*Constitution of Athens*
Cael.	*De Caelo (On the Heavens)*
Cat.	*Categories*
DA	*De Anima (On the Soul)*
Div. Somn.	*On Divination in Sleep* (Ross)
EE	*Eudemian Ethics*
GA	*Generation of Animals*
GC	*On Coming to Be and Passing Away (De Generatione et*

	Corruptione) (Rashed)
HA	*History of Animals (Balme)*
IA	*Progression of Animals (De Incessu Animalium)*
Insomn.	*On Dreams*
Int.	*De Interpretatione*
Juv	*On Youth and Old Age, Life and Death, and Respiration (Ross)*
LI	*On Indivisible Lines***
{xiv}	
Long.	*On Length and Shortness of Life (Ross)*
MA	*Movement of Animals (Nussbaum)*
MM	*Magna Moralia*
Mem.	*On Memory (Ross)*
Met.	*Metaphysics*
Mete.	*Meteorology*
NE	*Nicomachean Ethics*
PA	*Parts of Animals*
Ph.	*Physics*
Po.	*Poetics*

Pol.	*Politics*
Pr.	*Problems**
Rh.	*Rhetoric*
Rh. Al.	*Rhetoric to Alexander*** *(Fuhrmann)*
SE	*Sophistical Refutations*
Sens.	*Sense and Sensibilia*
Somn.	*On Sleep*
Top.	*Topics*

I cite and translate the Oxford Classical Texts (OCT) editions of these works, where available, otherwise Bekker or the editions noted:

Balme, D. *Aristotle: Historia Animalium* (Cambridge, 2002).
Fuhrmann, M. *Anaximensis Ars Rhetorica* (Leipzig, 1966)
Mayhew, R. *Aristotle: Problems* (Cambridge, MA, 2011).
Nussbaum, M. *Aristotle's De Motu Animalium: Text with Translation, Commentary, and Interpretative Essays* (Princeton, 1978).
Rashed, M. *Aristote: De la Génération et la Corruption* (Paris, 2005).
Rose, V. *Aristotelis Fragmenta*, 3rd ed. (Leipzig, 1886).
Ross, D. *Aristotle Parva Naturalia* (Oxford, 1955).

{xv} Plato

Alc.	*Alcibiades*
Ap.	*Apology*
Chrm.	*Charmides*
Crat.	*Cratylus*
Euthd.	*Euthydemus*
Euthphr.	*Euthyphro*
Grg.	*Gorgias*
Hp.	*Hippias*
Ma.	*Major*
La.	*Laches*

Lg.	*Laws*
Ly.	*Lysis*
Men.	*Meno*
Mx.	*Menexenus*
Phd.	*Phaedo*
Phdr.	*Phaedrus*
Phlb.	*Philebus*
Prm.	*Parmenides*
Prt.	*Protagoras*
Rep.	*Republic*
Smp.	*Symposium*
Tht.	*Theaetetus*
Ti.	*Timaeus*

Translations of Plato in the notes are based on those in J. Cooper, ed., *Plato: Complete Works* (Indianapolis, 1997) and on my *Trials of Socrates* - (Indianapolis, 2002) and *Plato: Republic* (Indianapolis, 2004).

{xvi} Other Abbreviations and Symbols

Allen, J. *Inference from Signs: Ancient Debates About the Nature of Evidence* (Oxford, 2001).

Athenaeus = Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae*.

Barnes = J. Barnes, *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation* (Princeton, 1984).

Bowra = C. M. Bowra, *Pindari Carmina* (Oxford, 1947).

Burkett = J. Burkett, *Aristotle,* Rhetoric III: *A Commentary* (Ph.D. diss., Texas Christian University, 2011).

CAG = M. Hayduck, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* (Berlin, 1882–1909).

Campbell I–V = D. Campbell, *Greek Lyric*, 5 vols. (Cambridge, MA, 1991–1993).

Cope = E. Cope, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle with a Commentary*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1877).

Diodorus = Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History.*

DK = H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker,* 6th ed. (Berlin, 1951).

DL = Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* (Cambridge, 2013).

Dufour = M. Dufour, *Aristote Rhétorique*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1931–1973).

Edmonds I–IIIa, b = J. Edmonds, *The Fragments of Attic Comedy*, 4 vols. (Leiden, 1961).

Freese = *Aristotle: The "Art" of Rhetoric* (Cambridge, MA, 1926).

Gagarin & Woodruff = M. Gagarin and P. Woodruff, *Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to the Sophists* (Cambridge, 1995).

Grimaldi = W. Grimaldi, Aristotle, *Rhetoric I: A Commentary* (New York, 1980), *Aristotle Rhetoric II: A Commentary* (New York, 1988).

Henderson = J. Henderson, *The Maculate Muse: Obscene Language in Attic Comedy* (New Haven, 1975).

Herodotus = Herodotus, *Histories.*

Homer, *Il.* = Homer, *Iliad*.

Homer, *Od.* = Homer, *Odyssey*.

Janko = R. Janko, *Aristotle on Comedy: Towards a Reconstruction of "Poetics II"* (Berkeley, 1984).

{xvii} Kaibel = G. Kaibel, *Epigrammata Graeca: Ex Labidus Conlecta* (Berlin, 1878).

Kassel = R. Kassel, *Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica* (Berlin, 1976).

Kennedy = G. Kennedy, *Aristotle on Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse* (Oxford, 1991).

Kinkel = G. Kinkel, *Epicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* (Leipzig, 1878).

Kock = T. Kock, *Comicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* (Leipzig, 1880–1888).

MacDowell = D. MacDowell, *The Law in Classical Athens* (Ithaca, 1978).

Nauck = A. Nauck, *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, 2nd ed. (Leipzig, 1889).

Page = D. Page, *Poetae Melici Graeci* (Oxford, 1962).

Prince = S. Prince, *Antisthenes of Athens: Texts, Translations, and Commentary* (Ann Arbor, 2015).

Quint. = Quintilian, *Instituto Oratoria*.

R^3 = V. Rose, *Aristotelis Fragmenta*, 3rd ed. (Leipzig, 1886).

Rapp = C. Rapp, *Aristoteles Rhetorik I, II* (Berlin, 2002).

Richards = H. Richards, *Aristotelica* (London, 1915).

Roberts = W. Rhys Roberts, *Aristotle Rhetorica*, in D. Ross, *The Works of Aristotle*, Vol. VI (Oxford, 1930).

Roisman = J. Roisman, I. Worthington, and R. Waterfield, *Lives of the Attic Orators: Texts from Pseudo-Plutarch, Photius, and the* Suda (Oxford, 2015).

Sauppe = H. Sauppe, *Oratores Attici* (Zurich, 1845–1850).

SSR = G. Giannantoni, *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae* (Naples, 1990).

Striker = G. Striker, "Emotions in Context: Aristotle's Treatment of the Passions in the *Rhetoric* and His Moral Psychology," in A. Rorty (ed.), *Essays on Aristotle's* Rhetoric (Berkeley, 1996), pp. 286–302.

Tarán = L. Tarán, *Speusippus of Athens* (Leiden, 1981).

TEGP = D. W. Graham, *The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy: The Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of the Major Presocratics* (Cambridge, 2010).

{xviii} Thucydides = Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War.*

Welldon = J. Welldon, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle* (London, 1886).

West = M. L. West, *Delectus ex Iambis et Elegis Graecis* (Oxford, 1980).

A = B = A is identical to (equivalent to) B.

A ≈ B = A is roughly the same as or roughly equivalent or analogous to B.

A ⊃ B = If A then B, or A implies B.

{xix} Introduction

Life and Works

Aristotle was born in 384 BC to a well-off family living in the small town of Stagira in northern Greece. His father, Nicomachus, who died while Aristotle was still quite young, was allegedly doctor to King Amyntas of Macedon. His mother, Phaestis, was wealthy in her own right. When Aristotle was seventeen his guardian, Proxenus, sent him to study at Plato's Academy in Athens. He remained there for twenty years, initially as a student, eventually as a researcher and teacher.

When Plato died in 347, leaving the Academy in the hands of his nephew Speusippus, Aristotle left Athens for Assos in Asia Minor, where the ruler, Hermias, was a patron of philosophy. He married Hermias' niece Pythias and had a daughter by her, also named Pythias. Three years later, in 345, after Hermias had been killed by the Persians, Aristotle moved to Mytilene on the island of Lesbos, where he met Theophrastus, who was to become his best student and closest colleague.

In 343 Aristotle seems to have been invited by Philip of Macedon to be tutor to the latter's thirteen-year-old son, Alexander, later called "the Great." In 335 Aristotle returned to Athens and founded his own institute, the Lyceum. While he was there his wife died and he established a relationship with Herpyllis, also a native of Stagira. Their son Nicomachus was named for Aristotle's father, and the *Nicomachean Ethics* may, in turn, have been named for him or transcribed by him. In 323 Alexander the Great died, with the result that anti-Macedonian feeling in Athens grew stronger. Perhaps threatened with a formal charge of impiety (*NE* X 7 $1177^{b}33$), Aristotle left for Chalcis in Euboea, where he died twelve months later, in 322, at the age of sixty-two.

Legend has it that Aristotle had slender calves, small eyes, spoke with a lisp, and was "conspicuous by his attire, his rings, and the cut of his hair." His will reveals that he had a sizable estate, a domestic partner, two children, a considerable library, and a large circle of friends. In it Aristotle asks his executors to take special care of Herpyllis. He directs that his slaves be freed "when they come of age" and that the bones of his wife, Pythias, be mixed with his "as she instructed."

{xx} Although the surviving writings of Aristotle occupy almost 2,500 tightly printed pages in English, most of them are not works polished for publication but sometimes incomplete lecture notes and working papers. This accounts for some, though not all, of their legendary difficulty. It is unfair to complain, as a Platonist opponent did, that Aristotle "escapes refutation by clothing a perplexing subject in obscure language, using darkness like a squid to make himself hard to catch," but there is darkness and obscurity enough for anyone, even if none of it is intentional. There is also a staggering breadth and depth of intellect. Aristotle made fundamental contributions to a vast range of disciplines, including logic, metaphysics, epistemology, psychology, ethics, politics, rhetoric, aesthetics, zoology, biology, physics, and philosophical and political history. When Dante called him "the master of those who know," he was scarcely exaggerating.

What the Rhetoric Is

One thing we might mean by the *Rhetoric* is what we now find inscribed on the pages that make up David Ross's OCT edition of the Greek text, first published in 1959, which is the basis of the present translation, and which the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* uses. This is the descendant of texts derived—via manuscripts copied in the Byzantine period (from the tenth to the fifteenth centuries AD)—from manuscripts that derive from the edition of Aristotle's works produced by Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century BC. Ross's edition, like most other modern editions, records in the textual apparatus at the bottom of the page various manuscript readings alternative to the one he prints in the body of his text. In quite a few cases, I have preferred one of these readings and have indicated so in the notes, often relying on the generally superior, but less readily available, edition of Kassel. Divisions of the text into books and chapters are the work of editors, not of Aristotle himself. Also present in Ross's text are the page numbers of Bekker, *Aristotelis Opera*. These appear here in the margins of the printed version and enclosed in vertical lines (| |) in the electronic one. Occasional material in square brackets in the text is my addition.

The second thing we might mean, and are perhaps more likely to mean, by the *Rhetoric* is the work itself—that more abstract thing that is embodied in a good Greek text and (ideally) in any translation of it. Aristotle identifies its subject matter as "a sort of offshoot of dialectic and

of work in ethics, which it is right to call politics" (I 2 1356^{a}25–27), and it itself as "composed of the science of analytics and the [part of] politics concerned with ethics, and is like dialectic on the one hand and sophistical arguments (*logos*) on the other" (4 1359^{b}9–12). It is, he says, "a capacity {xxi} to get a theoretical grasp on what is possibly persuasive in each case" (2 1355^{b}25–26). We need to determine, therefore, what this craft is, what evidence it is answerable to, and how its success or failure is to be determined. To do this we need to begin with Aristotelian sciences generally, before turning to politics, which is the science most pertinent to rhetoric. Then it will be time to discuss rhetoric itself, its differences from dialectic, and the contribution that dialectic and analytics make to it.

Aristotelian Sciences

Aristotle usually divides the bodies of knowledge that he refers to as "sciences" (*epistêmai*) into three types: theoretical, practical, and productive (crafts). But when he is being especially careful, he also distinguishes within the theoretical sciences between the *strictly theoretical* ones (astronomy, theology), as we may call them, and the *natural* ones, which are like the strictly theoretical ones in being neither practical nor productive but are unlike them in consisting of propositions that—though necessary and universal in some sense—hold for the most part rather than without exception:

> If all thought is either practical or productive or theoretical, natural science would have to be some sort of theoretical science —but a theoretical science that is concerned with such being as is capable of being moved and with the substance that in accord with its account holds for the most part only, because it is not separable. But we must not neglect to consider the *way* the essence or its account is, because, without this, inquiry produces no result. Of things defined, however, that is, of the "whats" that things are, some are the way the snub is, others the way the concave is. And these differ because the snub is grasped in combination with the matter (for the snub is a concave *nose*), whereas the concavity is without perceptible matter. If, then, all natural things are said the way the snub is (for example, nose, eye, face, flesh, bone, and, in general, animal, and leaf, root, bark, and, in general, plant—for the account of none of these is

without [reference to] movement, but always includes matter), the way we must inquire into and define the what-it-is in the case of natural things is clear, as is why it belongs to the natural scientist to get a theoretical grasp even on some of the soul, that is, on as much of it as is not without matter. That natural science is a theoretical science, then, is evident from these considerations.

{xxii} Mathematics too is a theoretical one, but whether its objects are immovable and separable is not now clear; however, it is clear that *some* parts of mathematics get a theoretical grasp on their objects insofar as they are immovable and insofar as they are separable. But if there is something that is eternal and immovable and separable, it is evident that knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science—not, however, to *natural* science (for natural science is concerned with certain moveable things) nor to mathematics, but to something prior to both. . . . If, then, there is no other substance beyond those composed by nature, natural science will be the primary science. But if there is some immovable substance, this will be prior and will be primary philosophy. (*Met*. VI 1 $1025^{b}25$–$1026^{a}30$)

When we hear, as we soon do in the *Rhetoric*, that "while some of the premises on the basis of which enthymemes [rhetorical demonstrations] are stated will be necessary, the majority will hold for the most part" (I 2 $1357^{a}30$–32), we should bear in mind that all the natural sciences—which for us are the paradigm cases of science—are in a similar boat.

When science receives its focused discussion in the *Ethics*, however, Aristotle is explicit that if we are "to speak in an exact way and not be guided by mere similarities" (*NE* VI 3 $1139^{b}19$), we should not call anything a science unless it deals with eternal, entirely exceptionless facts about universals that are wholly necessary and do not at all admit of being otherwise:

> What admits of being known scientifically is by necessity. Hence it is eternal. For the things that are unconditionally necessary are all eternal, and eternal things cannot come to be or pass away. (*NE* VI 3 $1139^{b}22$–24)

Since he is here explicitly epitomizing his more detailed discussion of science in the *Posterior Analytics* ($1139^{b}27$), we should take the latter too

as primarily a discussion of science in the exact sense, which it calls *epistêmê haplôs*—unconditional scientific knowledge. It follows—and we should acknowledge this—that only the strictly theoretical sciences are sciences in the exact sense. Hence rhetoric is not such a science and neither is physics or biology or any other natural science.

Having made the acknowledgment, though, we must also register the fact that Aristotle himself mostly does not speak in the exact way but instead persistently refers to bodies of knowledge other than the strictly theoretical sciences as *epistêmai*. His division of the *epistêmai* into theoretical, {xxiii} practical, and productive is a dramatic case in point. But so too is his use of the term *epistêmê* within the *Rhetoric*, which we encounter being applied to rhetoric itself: "one person is an orator (*rhêtôr*) in virtue of his scientific knowledge, another in virtue of his deliberate choice" (I 1 $1355^{b}19$–20). Even boxing and wrestling are classed as *epistêmai* (*Cat.* 8 $10^{b}3$–4).

So the interesting question is not whether rhetoric is a science, since the answer to that is obvious: it is not a science if we are being absolutely exact about the matter, but it is a science if we allow ourselves to be guided by Aristotle's own general use of the term *epistêmê*, on the assumption that it was itself guided by the similarities between the things he applies it to and the strictly theoretical sciences. The interesting question is, what are these similarities? Just how like a canonical or theoretical science is rhetoric?

An Aristotelian science of any sort is a state of the soul, not a body of propositions in a textbook—although the state does involve having an affirmational grasp on a set of true propositions:

> Let the states in which the soul grasps the truth by way of affirmation and denial be five in number: craft knowledge, scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, theoretical wisdom, and understanding. (*NE* VI 3 $1139^{b}14$–16)

Some of these propositions are indemonstrable starting-points, which are or are expressed in definitions, and others are theorems demonstrable from them. We can have scientific knowledge only of the theorems, since —exactly speaking—"what is scientifically known is demonstrable" (*NE* VI 6 $1140^{b}35$). Yet—in what is clearly another lapse from exact speaking —Aristotle characterizes "the most exact of the sciences," which is theoretical wisdom (*sophia*) or primary philosophy, as also involving a

grasp by understanding (*nous*) of the truth where the starting-points themselves are concerned:

> A theoretically-wise person not only must know what follows from the starting-points but also must grasp the truth where the starting-points are concerned. So theoretical wisdom must be understanding plus scientific knowledge. (*NE* VI 7 $1141^{a}16$–20; compare *Rh*. I 11 $1371^{b}28$)

He does the same thing in the *Metaphysics*, where theoretical wisdom is the *epistêmê* that provides "a theoretical grasp on the primary starting-points and causes"—among which are included "the good or the for-the-sake-of-which" (I 2 $982^{b}7$–10). Indeed, the grasp a person has of such starting-points must result in their being "better known" than the theorems {xxiv} he demonstrates from them if he is to have any scientific knowledge of the exact sort at all: "if they are not better known than the conclusion, it is in a coincidental sense that he will have scientific knowledge" (*NE* VI 3 $1139^{b}34$–35).

How like that is rhetoric? Are there starting-points there too and things demonstrable from them? We might think this is an easy question to answer. After all, the methodical inquiry the *Rhetoric* itself exemplifies (I 1 $1355^{b}22$, III 10 $1410^{b}8$–9) does not seem to include any demonstrations whatsoever, and neither do the *Ethics* or *Politics* on which it draws (I 2 $1356^{a}25$–27). For a demonstration is, among other things, a deductively valid argument that is syllogistic in form, and deductions of any sort are scarcely to be found in the *Ethics*, *Politics*, or *Rhetoric*. This is also a problem with the vast majority of Aristotle's works, even those that are usually classed as "scientific treatises"—for example, *Meteorology* and *Parts of Animals*. For none of them seems to fit the description of a science as developed in the *Posterior Analytics*. Attempts have certainly been made to find elements of demonstration and axiomatic structure in these treatises, but the results are somewhat underwhelming. In large part, this is because the search seems misconceived from the outset.

If we think of a science in the exact sense as consisting exclusively of what is demonstrable, as we have seen that Aristotle himself sometimes does, we will be right to conclude that a treatise without demonstrations in it cannot be scientific. But if, as he also does, we include knowledge of starting-points as parts of science, we will not be right: a treatise could contribute to a science not by demonstrating anything but by arguing to

the starting-points themselves—an enterprise that could not possibly consist of demonstrations from those starting-points, since these would be circular. We might reasonably infer, therefore, that the rhetoric is a sort of science—a craft (*Rh*. I 4 1359^{b}6)—just because it contributes to the correct definition and secure grasp on starting-points without which no science can exist. The same idea might be employed in the case of many of Aristotle's other treatises. They too, we might suppose, are scientific in just this sense.

But even if rhetoric does have starting-points, it will not be a science unless it is also possible to demonstrate things from these. Yet here too we seem to face an obstacle. For Aristotle tells us that we cannot demonstrate things that admit of being otherwise:

> Things whose starting-points admit of being otherwise cannot be demonstrated (for all of them also admit of being otherwise). (*NE* VI 5 1140^{a}33–35)

{xxv} And this seems to include much of the subject matter of rhetoric:

> Few of the premises from which rhetorical deductions are composed are necessary (for most of the things that judgments and investigations are concerned with admit of being otherwise). (*Rh*. I 2 1357^{a}22–24)

Elsewhere, though, he allows that there can be demonstrations of what admits of being otherwise provided it holds for the most part:

> What admits of being otherwise is spoken of in two ways: in one, it means what holds for the most part, that is, when the necessity has gaps (*dialeipein*)—for example, a man's turning grey or growing or decaying, or, in general, what belongs to something by nature (for this does not belong by continuous necessity, since a human being does not exist forever, although if a human being does exist, it belongs either necessarily or for the most part); in the other, it means what is indeterminate, which is what is capable of being thus or not thus—for example, an animal's walking or an earthquake's taking place while it is walking, or, in general, what is the result of luck (for it is not more natural for it to be that way rather than the opposite). . . . Science and demonstrative deductions are not concerned with things that are indeterminate, because the

> middle term is irregular, but there is scientific knowledge of what happens by nature, and argument and investigations are pretty much concerned with things that are possible in this way. (*APr.* I 13 $32^{b}4$–21)

Apparently, then, the notion of a demonstration is a bit like that of a science. Speaking exactly, there are demonstrations only in the theoretical sciences, since—speaking exactly again—these alone are sciences. Speaking less exactly, though, there are also demonstrations in other bodies of knowledge. Thus we find Aristotle referring to "rhetorical demonstration" (*Rh.* I 1 $1355^{a}6$), "rhetorical deductions" (I 2 $1357^{a}22$–23), and to their starting-points (II 21 $1394^{a}27$, III 17 $1418^{a}27$). Indeed, if we do not allow there to be demonstrations of what admits of being otherwise in the sense of holding for the most part, it is not only rhetoric that will lose its putative scientific status; natural science will too.

A penultimate problem. Scientific knowledge seems to be exclusively about universals—about what is common to many particulars: "every account and every science is of universals" (*Met.* XI 1 $1059^{b}25$–26); "scientific knowledge is supposition about universals and things that are by {xxvi} necessity" (*NE* VI 6 $1140^{b}31$); "no craft investigates what is particular" (*Rh.* I 2 $1356^{b}30$). Yet rhetoric must clearly also deal with particulars and particular cases: it is this individual who is to be accused or defended, praised or blamed, this particular situation that needs to be deliberated about, and, moreover, in this political community with this sort of constitution. Again, it seems an easy inference that rhetoric cannot be a science.

The first point to make in response is that even theoretical sciences, though they deal with eternal and unchangeable necessary truths about universals, can be "coincidentally useful to us where many of the necessities of life are concerned" (*EE* I 6 $1216^{b}15$–16). Knowledge of astronomy, for instance, helped Thales to make a killing in the olive business (*Pol.* I 11 $1259^{a}5$–33). The second point is that Aristotle allows that sciences dealing with universals can also deal—albeit coincidentally—with (perishable) particulars:

> There is neither demonstration nor unconditional scientific knowledge of what is subject to passing away, but only the coincidental sort, because it does not hold of this universally,

but at some time (*pote*) and in some way (*pôs*). (*APo*. I 8 75^{b}24–26)

The scientific theorem that all light meats are healthy (*NE* VI 7 1141^{b}18–19) may enable me to infer that this meat is healthy now, but it does not tell me whether it will still be healthy tomorrow (it may have rotted in the meantime) or whether, though it is healthy for most people, it is healthy for me (I may have a fever that makes meat of any sort a bad choice). It does not even tell me either whether the meat will so much as exist tomorrow (it might have been eaten in the meantime). Similarly, while "rhetoric does not get a theoretical grasp on a particular reputable belief either (for example, one persuasive to Socrates or to Hippias)," it does get one on "people of such-and-such a sort" (*Rh*. I 2 1356^{b}33–34), and this has obvious application to the particulars that are of this sort.

While each of these points does something to take the edge off our problem, even collectively they do not seem to go quite far enough. And the reason is this. It is quite possible to have craft knowledge or scientific knowledge of universals without knowing how to apply it in particular cases, but it is not possible to have a grasp on political science—which is in a way the same state of the soul as practical wisdom (*NE* VI 8 1141^{b}23–24)—without knowing this. In fact, it is almost the other way around:

> Nor is practical wisdom knowledge of universals only. On the contrary, it must also know particulars. For it is practical, and action is concerned with particulars. That is why, in other areas {xxvii} too, some people who lack knowledge—most of all, those with experience—are more effective *doers* of action than are others who have knowledge. For if someone knows that light meats are digestible and healthy but is ignorant about which sorts of meat are light, he will not produce health; but someone who knows that bird meats are healthy will produce health more. But practical wisdom is practical, so one must possess both sorts of knowledge—or this one more. (*NE* VI 7 1141^{b}14–21)

At the same time, knowledge of universals is a crucial part of politics. This emerges most clearly in the final discussion in the *Ethics*, where we learn not only about the importance of experience of particulars to politics but also about the need to "take steps toward the universal" (X 9

1180^{b}21), on the grounds that "the best supervision in each particular case" will be provided by the person who has "knowledge of the universal and knows what applies in all cases or in these sorts (since the sciences are said to be—and actually are—of what is common)" (1180^{b}13–16).

Once we register the fact that politics must include both a scientific knowledge of universals and an experience of particulars that enables us to apply those universals correctly to them, we can see that something similar must apply to rhetoric, since it is partly composed of politics. Rhetoric, in other words, is something like an applied science as opposed to a pure one. And this seems to be what Aristotle has in mind by classifying it as a craft that deals with, or "get[s] a theoretical grasp on (*theôrêsai*) what is possibly persuasive (*pithanon*)," possibly productive of conviction, "in each case" (*Rh*. I 2 1355^{b}25–26). When we look for the similarities that may justify him in classifying it as a productive *science*, then, we must look not at its particularist component but at its universalist one, since a science, as we saw, is always of what is universal. A productive *science*, then, might to some extent be usefully thought of as a combination of something like a theoretical science (in any case, in the sense in which natural science is theoretical) and the experience-based knowledge of how to apply it.

Legislative Science

What the universalist component of politics consists in is uncontroversial, since Aristotle tells us plainly that it is *nomothetikê*, or legislative science:

> Maybe, then, someone who wishes to make people—whether many or few—better because of his supervision should also try to acquire legislative science, if it is through laws that we {xxviii} can become good. For producing a noble disposition in anyone whatever—in anyone put before him—is not a matter for some random person, but if indeed anyone can do it, it is a person who knows, just as in medicine and in all other matters that involve a sort of supervision and practical wisdom. (*NE* X 9 1180^{b}23–28)

What legislative science does, as its name suggests, is produce a set of universal laws—for "all law is universal" (*NE* V 10 1137^{b}13)—that will "make citizens good by habituating them" (II 1 1103^{b}3–4). Thus one very important subset of these laws bears on education, since "what produces

virtue as a whole are the actions that are ordained by the laws concerned with education that looks to the common good" (V 2 1130^{b}25–26). Another subset, however, governs the actions of already educated adults:

> It is not enough, presumably, that when people are young they get the correct nurture and supervision. On the contrary, even when they have grown into manhood they must continue to practice the same things and be habituated to them. And so there will need to be laws concerning these matters as well, and, in general, then, concerning all of life. (*NE* X 9 1180^{a}1–4)

The phrase "concerning all of life" nicely captures the ideal extent of the laws: "it is fitting for laws that are correctly laid down to define everything themselves, wherever possible, and leave the fewest things up to the jurors" (*Rh*. I 1 1354^{a}31–33), since "the wish of human beings . . . is not a safe standard" (*Pol*. II 10 1272^{b}6–7).

We are now able to solve a final problem. Theorems in canonical theoretical sciences are not just universal, they are also necessary: they are about relations between universals that do not "*at all* admit of being otherwise" (*NE* VI 3 1139^{b}20–21). The theorems of natural science too, although not as strictly necessary as this, also describe relations between universals that are far from simply being matters of luck or contingency. Were it otherwise, there would, as we noticed, simply be no such thing as natural *science*. Obviously the theorems of politics, which are universal laws, are not like either of these, since they govern voluntary action, which, as something whose starting-point is in us, is up to us to do or not to do (III 5 1113^{b}7–8). This difference, however, is due to a difference in direction of fit. Theorems of a theoretical science *describe* how things must be; practical laws *prescribe* how they must be. Thus when Aristotle gives an example of an ethical proposition, it is this: "whether we *should* obey our parents or the laws, if they disagree" (*Top*. I 14 105^{b}22–23). What practical laws prescribe {xxix} will be correct, if it is what the virtues require of us (*NE* V 2 1130^{b}22–24), and it will be what the virtues require of us if it is what the practical wisdom they presuppose would prescribe, and it will be what practical wisdom would prescribe if it is what best furthers happiness or the human good, not some random apparent good (VI 9 1142^{b}31–33, 10 1143^{a}8). For the law owes its compulsive force to the fact that it is "reason that derives from a sort of practical wisdom and understanding" (X 9 1180^{a}21–22).

Although it is through laws that we can "become good" (*NE* X 9 1180^{b}25), it is not just through any old laws. Rather, we need *correct* laws —laws that really do further genuine happiness by inculcating genuine virtues. The question arises, therefore, of how such laws are to be found. A good place to start, Aristotle thinks, is by collecting the laws and constitutions that are in use in different places, as well as those ideal ones suggested by wise people, such as Plato, who have thought a lot about the issue. But this by itself will not be enough, since selecting the best ones from these requires "correct discernment" (X 9 1181^{a}17), correct judgment, based on knowledge of what virtue and vice really are. In Aristotle's view, there is only one such constitution:

> [The constitution] consisting of the those who are unconditionally best in accord with virtue, and not those who are good men relative to a hypothesis, is the only constitution that it is just to call an aristocracy. For only in it is the same person unconditionally a good man and a good citizen, whereas those who are good in the others are so relative to their constitutions. (*Pol.* IV 7 1293^{b}3–6; compare *NE* V 7 1135^{a}5)

Thus when the subject of the best constitution is taken up in the *Politics*, Aristotle begins by noting that "anyone who is going to make an inquiry into the best constitution in the appropriate way must first determine what the most choiceworthy life is" (VII 1 1323^{a}14–17), referring us for a fuller discussion to "external accounts," whose subject areas significantly overlap those of the *Ethics*. Other constitutions, however—and this is a point that we shall return to in a moment—can come close enough to the best one that something approximating full virtue can be acquired in them; these are the non-deviant constitutions (kingship, aristocracy, and polity) described in the relevant parts of the *Politics*.

It is scarcely a step at this point to see what the *Ethics* contributes to legislative science. After all, the *Ethics* is devoted in large part to defining the virtues of character, which are starting-points of politics (*Met.* XIII 4 1078^{b}17–30, quoted below), as well as to correctly and clearly defining the fundamental starting-point, happiness, which is the end or target that {xxx} politics aims at (*NE* I 2 1094^{a}26–^{b}7, *Pol.* VII 1 1323^{a}15–21). It is a contribution to the philosophy of human affairs, as we saw, and "the political philosopher is the architectonic craftsman of the end to which

we look in calling each thing unconditionally bad or good" (*NE* VII 11 1152^{b}1–3)—namely, happiness.

This helps us to understand something that is much more mysterious than is usually recognized, namely, how it is that Aristotle can do the following three things: First, characterize the *Ethics* as "not undertaken for the sake of theoretical knowledge . . . but in order to become good people, since otherwise there would be nothing of benefit in it" (II 2 1103^{b}26–29; also I 3 1095^{a}5–6). Second, insist that we become good in large part through habituation, not through reading books (II 2 1103^{b}23–25). And, third, that we must already have been "nobly brought up if, where noble things, just things, and the things belonging to politics as a whole are concerned, we are to be an adequate audience" (I 4 1095^{b}4–6). For "argument and teaching . . . do not have strength in everyone," but only in those whose souls have been "prepared beforehand through habits to enjoy and hate in a noble way, like earth that is to nourish seed" and may not even be comprehensible to anyone else (X 9 1179^{b}23–31). The heavy lifting of the *Ethics*' practicality is done, then, not so much by the book itself, which presupposes an already existing noble condition in a comprehending reader, but by the contribution it makes to legislative science, ensuring that the laws it selects will habituate people in genuine virtues that have happiness correctly conceived and clearly defined as their end. The *Politics* comes into play at this point to actually find those laws and the constitution to which they belong.

Because the heavy lifting is done by legislation and habituation, it matters enormously that the legislation and habituation in question are not required to be of the ideal or very best sort available only in a true aristocracy of virtue. For such a constitution does not exist, and never has existed. But even if it had, Aristotle was not brought up in it—Stagira and Athens were certainly not such true aristocracies—and his audience and fellow Lyceum members were not brought up in it either. What *is* required, though, is that we not be "disabled in relation to virtue" (*NE* I 9 1099^{b}19), that we have the natural resources needed to develop it—which may include possession of the so-called natural virtues (VI 13 1144^{b}5–6), that we have been sufficiently well brought up that we do not, like children, pursue each thing in accord with our feelings, but rather form our desires and perform our actions to some extent at least "in accord with reason" (I 3 1095^{a}4–11), and that we have "sufficient

experience of the actions of life," since "the arguments are in accord with these and concerned with these" (1095^{a}3–4). Aristotle does not go into detail in the *Ethics* about just how {xxxi} much experience of just what sorts of actions we need, but there is clear evidence in the *Rhetoric* that we may not have it until we have reached the age of around forty-nine (II 14 1390^{b}9–11; compare *Pol.* VII 9 1328^{b}34–1329^{a}17). Because our nature, upbringing, and experience are unlikely to have been ideal, moreover, we must not expect too much, but rather "be content if, when we have all the things through which it seems we become decent people, we achieve some share of virtue" (*NE* X 9 1179^{b}18–20).

The bearing of all this on rhetoric, given its defining aim of getting a theoretical grasp on what is possibly persuasive in each case, is made plain in the following three texts:

> With a view to safety, it is necessary for [a deliberative speaker] to be capable of getting a theoretical grasp on all these things, but not least to have knowledge of legislation. For it is in the laws that the preservation of the city is based. So it is necessary to know how many kinds (*eidos*) of constitution there are, and what sorts of things are advantageous for each, and by what sorts—whether proper to it or the contrary—it is naturally destroyed. (*Rh.* I 4 1360^{a}18–22)
>
> In relation to legislation it is useful for the person who has a theoretical grasp on the matter not only to get knowledge of what constitution is advantageous on the basis of its past but also to know the constitutions present in others, that is, which ones are fitting for which sorts of people. So it is clear that in relation to legislation reports of world travelers are useful (for there one can get hold of the laws of [foreign] nations), and in relation to political deliberations, the researches of those writing about actions. (*Rh.* I 4 1360^{a}30–37)
>
> The greatest and most controlling of all things as regards being capable of persuading and giving good advice is to get a grasp on all constitutions and to distinguish the characters, customs, and advantages of each. For all people are persuaded by what is advantageous, and what preserves the constitution is advantageous. (*Rh.* I 8 1365^{b}21–25)

But rhetoric itself does not have to develop these resources. Instead, just as it draws on the *Analytics* for its knowledge of deduction, on the *Topics* and *Sophistical Refutations* for its knowledge of dialectic, so it draws on the *Ethics* and *Politics* for its knowledge of constitutions and laws and the different sorts of characters that go along with each: "All these are a function {xxxii} of politics, however, not of rhetoric" (*Rh.* I 4 $1360^{a}37$). When we see that honest practitioners of rhetoric subject themselves to ethical norms, the bearing of politics on rhetoric will acquire yet another dimension.

Deliberation

We turn now to the particularist part of politics, which is concerned with deliberation:

> The part concerned with particulars has the name common to both—"politics." This part is practical and deliberative, since a decree is doable in action, as the last thing. (*NE* VI 8 $1141^{b}25$–28)

Just because this part is particularist, it cannot itself be a science, since —to repeat—sciences are always (anyway non-coincidentally) about universals. Nonetheless, it is some sort of knowledge or ability that makes its possessor a competent deliberator—someone who is reliably able to deliberate correctly by working out the best means to the best end (*NE* VI 9 $1142^{b}28$–33), this being happiness or the human good. Since only a practically-wise person is in this position and since practical wisdom is as much if not more concerned with particulars than with universals, the function of such a person is "most of all . . . to deliberate well" (VI 7 $1141^{b}9$–10).

Now the sphere of deliberation is the part of what admits of being otherwise that deliberators can change through their own actions:

> We do deliberate, though, about things that are up to us and doable in action. . . . For the causes of things seem to be nature, necessity, luck, and, furthermore, understanding and everything that comes about through a human being. Among human beings, however, each group deliberates about what is doable in action through itself. (*NE* III 3 $1112^{a}30$–34)

Hence it is also the sphere of the practical and productive sciences, such as rhetoric, which helps deliberators make good choices within that sphere. But once these sciences are factored into the equation, the scope

of deliberation within the sphere is affected, so that as their scope expands, that of deliberation contracts:

> There is no deliberation, however, where sciences that are both exact and self-sufficient are concerned—where writing the letters of the alphabet is concerned, for example, since we have {xxxiii} no hesitation about what way to write them. We do deliberate, however, about those things that come about through ourselves, but not always in the same way (for example, about the things that medicine or moneymaking deals with). And we deliberate more about navigation than about athletic training, insofar as navigation is less exactly developed. Further, deliberation is involved in a similar way where the rest are concerned, but more where crafts are concerned than sciences, since we are more hesitant about them. (*NE* III 3 $1112^{a}34$–$^{b}9$)

As Aristotle succinctly puts it at one point: "Craft does not deliberate" (*Ph.* II 8 $199^{b}28$). He means, as we see, that a craft, insofar as it is exact, fully developed, and self-contained, does not do so.

Even when the productive sciences are less exact or developed, however, as is true, for example, of medicine and wealth acquisition, their universal laws should generally be followed:

> Those who think it advantageous to be ruled by a king hold that laws speak only of the universal, and do not prescribe with a view to particular circumstances, so that it is foolish to rule in any craft in accord with what is written down. And so it is a good thing that in Egypt the doctors are allowed to change the treatment [prescribed by the manuals] until after the fourth day —although, if they do so earlier, it is at their own risk. It is evident, therefore, that the best constitution is not one that is in accord with what is written down and laws, due to the same cause. But then, the rulers should possess the universal account as well. And something to which the passionate element is wholly unattached is better than something in which it is innate. This element does not belong to the law, whereas every human soul necessarily possesses it. But presumably it should be said, to balance this, that a human being will deliberate better about particular cases. That he must, therefore, be a legislator is clear, and that laws must be laid down, but they must not be in

> control insofar as they deviate from what is best, although they should certainly be in control everywhere else. (*Pol.* III 15 $1286^{a}9$–25; also 16 $1287^{a}33$–$1287^{b}5$)

It is when the universal laws fail us—as the Egyptian doctors imagine them doing by the fourth day of a patient's unresponsiveness to the prescribed treatment—that deliberation comes into play. It is then that the practical wisdom possessed by the better practitioners of the science becomes {xxxiv} important. We "speak of people as practically-wise *in some area*, when they rationally calculate well about what furthers some excellent end, concerning which no craft [prescription] exists" (*NE* VI 5 $1140^{a}28$–30).

The element in practical wisdom particularly involved in the kinds of cases where the end is "living well as a whole" (*NE* VI 5 $1140^{a}27$–28) is decency (*epieikeia*):

> All law is universal, but about some sorts of things it is not possible to pronounce correctly in universal terms. . . . So whenever the law makes a universal pronouncement and a particular case arises that is contrary to the universal pronouncement, at that time it is correct (insofar as the legislator has omitted something, and he has made an error in pronouncing unconditionally) to rectify the deficiency—to pronounce what the legislator himself would have pronounced had he been present and would have put into his law had he known about the case. . . . And this is the very nature of what is decent—a rectification of law insofar as it is deficient because of its universality. For this is also the cause of not everything's being regulated by law—namely, that there are some cases where it is impossible to set up a law, so that decrees (*psêphismata*) are needed. For the standard of what is indeterminate is itself indeterminate, just like the lead standard used in Lesbian building. For the standard is not fixed but adapts itself to the shape of the stone and a decree adapts itself to the things themselves. (*NE* V 10 $1137^{b}13$–32)

Though this comment applies primarily to the context of political deliberation by members of a city's ruling deliberative body, it is the model for Aristotle's account of an individual agent's deliberation as well. This is particularly clear when an individual's action-controlling beliefs—

the guiding premises of his deliberative reasoning—are analogized to decrees (*NE* VII 9 1151^{b}15, 10 1152^{a}20–21). But it is similarly in operation when the last thing reached in deliberation is identified as a decree (VI 8 1141^{b}26–28). Practical wisdom is prescriptive (VI 10 1143^{a}8) indeed because it issues in decrees which, like laws, have prescriptive force.

The picture that finally emerges of politics, therefore, is of a science that has three elements. The first is legislative science, which, since it issues universal laws that have the right sort of modal status (allowing for differences of direction of fit), makes politics similar enough to a canonical theoretical science to justify its classification as a science. The second is deliberative ability (*bouleutikê*), which is particularistic enough to justify its classification as practical. The third is the judicial science (*dikastikê*), which is {xxxv} primarily exercised in the administration of legal justice (*dikê*) (*NE* VI 8 1141^{b}33, *Pol.* I 2 1253^{a}36–38). But this is a picture of politics that has, as it were, a concealed element, which is the one providing an argument for the starting-points—happiness, the virtues—that are crucial to it. These, as we learned, it is the job of the methodical inquiry of the *Ethics* to provide.

The Foundations of Politics

We know that scientific starting-points cannot be demonstrated: they are what we construct demonstrations from, not to. Of scientific starting-points, therefore, we have understanding, not scientific knowledge (*NE* VI 6 1141^{a}7–8). How, then, do we get this understanding? Where do we start the process? "We must," Aristotle says, "start from things that are knowable. But things are knowable in two ways, since some are knowable to us, some unconditionally. So presumably we should start from things knowable to us" (I 4 1095^{b}2–4). For the sake of clarity, let us call these *raw starting-points*. They are what we start from when we are arguing to *explanatory scientific starting-points*. It is important not to confuse the two.

In the case of the methodical inquiry of the *Ethics*, we are told that a raw starting-point is "the fact that something is so" (*NE* I 4 1095^{b}6; also I 7 1098^{b}2–3) and that this fact concerns "noble things, just things, and the things belonging to politics as a whole" (I 4 1095^{b}5–6). But since no explicit examples are given of these starting-points, we need to do some detective work to get a better understanding of what exactly they are.

An important clue to their nature derives from the way that we gain access to them: "it is virtue, whether natural or habituated, that teaches correct belief about the starting-point" (*NE* VII 8 1151^{a}18–19). Hence Aristotle's insistence on the importance of being well or nobly brought up: "it makes no small difference whether people are habituated in one way or in another way straight from childhood; on the contrary, it makes a huge one—or rather, *all* the difference" (II 1 1103^{b}23–25). Equally important is the account of the way that failure to be brought up well affects or blocks our access to raw starting-points:

> Ordinary people naturally obey not shame but fear, and abstain from base things not because of their shamefulness but because of the sanctions involved. For living by feeling as they do, they pursue the pleasures that are properly their own as well as the things through which these come about, and avoid the opposing pains. Of what is noble and what is truly pleasant, however, they have no understanding at all, not having tasted it. What {xxxvi} sort of argument, then, could reform such people? For it is not possible—or not easy—to alter by argument what has long since been locked up in traits of character. (*NE* X 9 1179^{b}11–16)

By being habituated badly where pleasures and pains are concerned, people are prevented from experiencing what is noble and truly pleasant. When such people read in the *Ethics* that we should sacrifice wealth, power, honor, the satisfaction of their appetites, and other such so-called external goods (*Rh*. I 5 1360^{b}25n) in order to gain what is noble for ourselves, they should disregard it:

> The truth in practical matters must be discerned from the facts of our life, since these are what have the controlling vote. When we examine what has been previously said, then, it must be discerned by bringing it to bear on the facts of our life, and if it is in harmony with the facts, we should accept it, but if it clashes, we should suppose it mere words. (*NE* X 8 1179^{a}18–22)

After all, their own life experience, which is what casts "the controlling vote," tells them in no uncertain terms that words is all it is. For ordinary people "judge by external goods, since these are the only ones they can perceive" (*NE* X 8 1179^{a}16), and so when they see

someone who lacks these, they cannot see how he could be happy, and when they see him sacrifice these for the sake of what is noble, they cannot do otherwise than take him to be sacrificing his self-interest for an empty dream. An orator speaking to an audience of such people will need to keep this in mind if his speech to them is to prove persuasive.

One kind of raw political starting-point, then, is a belief about the sort of value that noble things (as well as just things) have. People who have been correctly habituated to enjoy and hate in a noble way see correctly that these things are intrinsically valuable or choiceworthy for their own sake and that they are more valuable than external goods. People who have been inadequately habituated cannot see this, and so reject one of the raw starting-points of politics right off the bat. When they read the *Ethics* and *Politics*, therefore, they simply cannot see the truth in them, and so these works are of no practical value. They do what virtue requires of them from fear of penalties rather than for the sake of what is noble: "ordinary people obey force rather than argument; and they obey penalties rather than what is noble" (*NE* X 9 $1180^{a}4$–5).

Happiness is also a raw starting-point of politics (*Pol.* VII 1 $1323^{a}15$–21, *NE* I 12 $1102^{a}2$–4), about which people quite reasonably get "their suppositions . . . from their lives" (*NE* I 5 $1095^{b}15$–16). Hence happiness too can {xxxvii} seem as variable as good things generally (I 3 $1094^{a}16$–17). As a result, ordinary people—anyway "the most vulgar ones"—suppose that happiness is bodily pleasure, since their bad habituation, especially where bodily pleasures and pains are concerned, leads them exclusively to pursue "money, honors, and bodily pleasures . . . on the supposition that they are the best goods" (IX 8 $1168^{b}16$–18). Yet, as Aristotle points out, they "have an argument for their choice," since people in positions of power, like Sardanapalus, who are able to do what they want, pursue these goods (I 5 $1095^{b}18$–22). It is this argument that makes their views worth examining (I 4 $1095^{a}28$–30). The same goes for people whose upbringings have led them to pursue honor as if it were the best good.

Raw political starting-points, we now see, are socially mediated and -language-mediated facts (or putative facts) that are accessible only to properly socialized subjects and so only to subjects who are members of societies—that is, groups that socialize or habituate their members into some common form of life. Here is Aristotle himself on the subject:

> The voice is a signifier of what is pleasant or painful, which is why it is also possessed by the other animals (for their nature does extend this far, namely, to having the perception of pleasure and pain and signifying them to each other). But speech is for making clear what is advantageous or harmful, and so too what is just or unjust. For this is special to humans, in comparison to the other animals, that they alone have perception of the good and the bad, the just and the unjust, and the rest. And it is community in these that makes a household and a city. (*Pol.* I 2 1253^{a}10–18)

It follows, then, that the beliefs of properly socialized subjects—or the way things noble, just, and so on appear to them as a result of such socialization—are the rawest data available. It is to these that politics is ultimately answerable.

It is useful to juxtapose this picture of politics to a picture Aristotle gives of the canonical sciences and of the importance in them of experience and ultimately of perception:

> The cause of our being incapable of taking a comprehensive view of the agreed-upon facts is lack of experience. That is why those who are at home among natural things are better able to posit the sort of starting-points that can collect together a good many of these, whereas those who from their many arguments do not get a theoretical grasp on the facts, but look at only a {xxxviii} few, make their declarations too recklessly. One can see from this too how much difference there is between investigating in the way appropriate to natural science and in a logico-linguistic one. (*GC* I 2 316^{a}5–11)

We might advisedly see "those who are at home among natural things," in other words, as the equivalent in a canonical science of the well brought up or properly socialized and habituated subjects of the *Ethics* and *Politics*, who, "because they have an eye formed from experience, . . . see correctly" (*NE* VI 11 1143^{b}13–14). And one reason we might do so is that canonical scientists too are socialized subjects, albeit of a somewhat specialized sort. For it is only within scientific communities or communities of knowledge that, through complex processes of habituation and teaching, canonical scientists are produced: we learn science from other scientists (X 9 1180^{b}28–34). But

communities of knowledge, both in Aristotle's view and in reality, are parts of the political community and are regulated and sustained by it. When we first meet politics, indeed, it is as an architectonic science that oversees the others, ensuring that all sciences work together to further human happiness:

> Politics seems to be [the most architectonic science], since it is the one that prescribes which of the sciences need to exist in cities and which ones each group in cities should learn and up to what point. Indeed, we see that even the capacities that are generally most honored are under it—for example, generalship, household management, and rhetoric. And since it uses the other practical sciences and, furthermore, legislates about what must be done and what avoided, its end will circumscribe those of the others, so that it will be the human good. (*NE* I 2 $1094^{a}26$–$^{b}7$)

As he moves from a city with one constitution to a city with another, this too is something a speechwriter or speechmaker will need to keep in mind, since not every sort of speech is permitted in every one (*Rh*. I 1 $1354^{a}18$–23).

Because the things that appear to be so to appropriately socialized subjects are the raw starting-points in canonical sciences just as much as in politics, the only difference between them lying in the sort of socialization involved, we must be careful not to think of an appeal to "the things we say (*ta legomena*)" (*NE* I 8 $1098^{b}10$, VII 1 $1145^{b}20$) as an appeal to evidence of a sort quite different from the sort appealed to in a canonical science. We are not in the one case appealing to conceptual considerations or intuitions {xxxix} and in the other to empirical facts or findings. We are not looking at analytic matters as opposed to synthetic ones. Instead, what we have in both cases are socially mediated facts, some closer to the conceptual or the analytic, some closer to the empirical or synthetic. Political subjects who disagree about the intrinsic choiceworthiness of what is noble, for example, are not disagreeing about a concept or about the meaning of a word but about a substantive issue concerning how to live. Aristotle's account of happiness and his definition of virtue of character as a sort of medial state are to be evaluated not by appeal to our intuitions but, as we saw, by appeal to the facts of our lives (X 8 $1179^{a}18$–22 above).

The significance of these conclusions about raw political starting-points and the kinds of subjects who can detect them is most easily seen when we run across—as readers of the secondary literature on the *Ethics* and *Politics* inevitably will—discussions related to the "foundations" of Aristotle's ethics and politics. Often a central exhibit in these is the famous function (*ergon*) argument (*NE* I 7 $1097^{b}22$–$1098^{a}20$), where it is thought that the notion of a function is introduced into politics as something already grounded in the facts (or putative facts) of Aristotle's biological or metaphysical investigations and that politics then inherits these grounds and becomes hostage to these facts—facts that are not themselves political facts or putative facts. Another frequent exhibit is the use Aristotle makes, at various junctures, of his own account of the soul —an account supported not by political facts or putative facts, apparently, but by biological or psychological ones (*NE* I 13 $1102^{a}14$–26, *Pol.* I 5 $1254^{a}34$–$^{b}4$, 13 $1260^{a}4$–14).

What these discussions fail to give proper weight to is the difference between *empirical* foundations, or the facts to which politics or any other body of knowledge is ultimately answerable, and *explanatory* foundations, or the explanatory notions that politics makes use of in explaining those facts. To be sure, these notions may also often play explanatory roles in various other Aristotelian bodies of knowledge, including various theoretical sciences, and may for that reason recommend themselves to Aristotle for use elsewhere. It would be strange if it were otherwise. These notions may well, then, also be epistemically sanctioned within these other bodies of knowledge providing correct explanations of the relevant sorts of facts. But this does not mean that politics must be committed to them as fixed points of its own explanatory enterprise. Rather, it takes them on board wholly and entirely as answerable to raw political starting-points and must reject them if they prove inadequate for those purposes. In the only really important sense, then, politics has political facts as its sole foundations. Biology, metaphysics, and other bodies of knowledge have no foundational role in politics whatsoever. When rhetoric draws on politics, therefore, it {xl} is ultimately on political facts that it draws, and less ultimately on what political science does by way of explaining those facts.

When such knowledge enters rhetoric, however, it undergoes some pruning in the process, which fit it to serve the persuasive functions

definitive of rhetoric. Aristotle tells us about this at the very start of the *Rhetoric*:

> Rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic. For both are concerned with such common things as are in a way known to all and belong to no definite (*aphôrismenês*) science. (*Rh*. I 1 $1354^{a}1–3$)

These common things stemming in part from politics are grouped for the purposes of rhetoric into so-called *topoi*, or topics (*Rh*. I 2 $1358^{a}12–21$). The concept of a topic, like that of an enthymeme or rhetorical demonstration or deduction (1 $1355^{a}6$, 2 $1356^{b}4–5$), is thus belonging to rhetoric, and is important, as we shall see, to understanding the sort of craft or science rhetoric is.

Explanatory Starting-Points and Dialectic

In the case of canonical sciences, the most important explanatory - starting-points consist of definitions that specify the genus and differentia of the real (as opposed to nominal) universal essences of the beings with which the science deals:

> Since a definition is said to be an account of what something is, it is evident that one sort will be an account of what its name, or some other name-like account, signifies—for example, what triangle signifies. . . . Another sort of definition is an account that makes clear why it exists. So the former sort signifies something but does not show it, whereas the latter will evidently be like a demonstration of what it is, differing in arrangement from a demonstration. For there is a difference between saying why it thunders and saying what thunder is. In the first case you will say: because fire is being extinguished in the clouds. And what is thunder? The loud noise of fire being extinguished in the clouds. Hence the same account is given in different ways. In one way it is a continuous demonstration, in the other a definition. Further, a definition of thunder is a noise in the clouds, and this is a conclusion of the demonstration of what it is. The definition of an immediate item, though, is an indemonstrable positing (*thesis*) of what it is. (*APo*. II 10 $93^{b}29–94^{a}10$)
>
> {xli} The definitional account must not only make clear "the that," which is what most definitions state, but must also

include the cause and make it evident. As things stand, though, definitional accounts are like conclusions. For example, What is squaring? Making an equilateral rectangle equal to one that is not equilateral. But such a definition is an account of the conclusion, whereas the one that says that squaring is the finding of the mean proportional states the cause of the thing. (*DA* II 2 $413^{a}13$–20)

Since scientific definitions must be apt starting-points of demonstrations, this implies, Aristotle thinks, that the "extremes and the middle terms must come from the same genus" (*APo*. I 7 $75^{b}10$–11). As a result, a single canonical science must deal with a single genus (I 28 $87^{a}38$–39)—a fact to which we shall be returning.

The question is, how do we arrive at these definitions by beginning from raw starting-points. Well, first we have to have the raw starting-points ready at hand. Aristotle is clear about this, as he is indeed about what is supposed to happen next:

> The way [of inquiry] (*hodos*) is the same in all cases, in philosophy as well as in the crafts or any sort of learning whatsoever. For one must observe for both terms what belongs to them and what they belong to, and be supplied with as many of these terms as possible. . . . When it is in accord with truth, it must be from the terms that are catalogued (*diagegrammennôn*) as truly belonging, but in dialectical deductions it must be from premises that are in accord with [reputable] belief. . . . Most of the starting-points, however, are special to each science. That is why experience must provide us with the starting-points where each is concerned—I mean, for example, that experience in astronomy must do so in the case of astronomical science. For when the appearances had been adequately grasped, the demonstrations in astronomy were found in the way we described. And it is the same way where any other craft or science whatsoever is concerned. Hence if what belongs to each thing has been grasped, at that point we can readily exhibit the demonstrations. For if nothing that truly belongs to the relevant things has been omitted from the collection, then, concerning everything, if a demonstration of it exists, we will be able to find it and give the demonstration, and if it is by nature

> indemonstrable, we will be able to make that evident. (*APr.* I 30 $46^{a}3$–27)

{xlii} So once we have a catalogue of the raw starting-points, the demonstrative explanation of them from explanatory scientific starting-points is supposedly fairly routine. We should not, however, demand "the cause [or explanation] in all cases alike. Rather, in some it will be adequate if the fact that they are so has been correctly shown (*deiknunai*)—as it is indeed where starting-points are concerned" (*NE* I 8 $1098^{a}33$–$^{b}2$). But what exactly is it to show a starting-point correctly or adequately? It can't be to demonstrate it, we know that.

Aristotle categorizes what he is undertaking in the *Ethics* as a "methodical inquiry (*methodos*)" that is "a sort of politics" (*NE* I 2 $1094^{b}11$), and categorizes rhetoric as a "methodical inquiry that is within the province of craft (*entechnos methodos*)" (*Rh.* I 1 $1355^{a}4$; also $1355^{b}22$). And to the explanatory scientific starting-points of such inquiries, he claims, there is a unique route:

> Dialectic is useful in the philosophical sciences because the capacity to go through the puzzles on both sides of a question will make it easier to discern what is true and what is false in each. Furthermore, dialectic is useful as regards the primary [starting-points] (*ta prôta*) in each science. For it is impossible to say anything about these based on the starting-points properly belonging to the science in question, since these starting-points are, of all of them, the primary ones, and it is through reputable beliefs (*endoxa*) about each that it is necessary to discuss them. This, though, is a task special to, or most characteristic of, dialectic. For because of its ability to examine (*exetastikê*) it has a route toward the starting-points of all methodical inquiries. (*Top.* I 2 $101^{a}34$–$^{b}4$)

Prima facie, then, the *Politics*—and also the *Rhetoric* to the extent that it involves new starting-points—should correctly show the explanatory starting-points of politics or rhetoric by going through puzzles and solving them by appeal to reputable beliefs.

Now Aristotelian dialectic is recognizably a descendant of the Socratic elenchus, which famously begins with a question like this: *Ti esti to kalon?* What is the noble? The respondent, sometimes after a bit of nudging, comes up with a universal definition: what is noble is what all the gods

love, or whatever it might be (I adapt a well-known answer from Plato's *Euthyphro*). Socrates then puts this definition to the test by drawing attention to some things that seem true to the respondent himself but that conflict with his definition. The puzzle, or *aporia*, that results from this conflict then remains for the respondent to try to solve, usually by reformulating {xliii} or rejecting his definition. Aristotle understood this process in terms that reveal its relationship to his own:

> Socrates . . . busied himself about the virtues of character, and in connection with these was the first to inquire into universal definition. . . . It was reasonable, though, that Socrates was inquiring into the what-it-is. For he was inquiring in order to deduce, and the what-it-is is a starting-point of deductions. . . . For there are two things that may be fairly ascribed to Socrates—inductive arguments and universal definition, both of which are concerned with a starting-point of scientific knowledge. (*Met.* XIII 4 $1078^{b}17$–30; also I 6 $987^{b}1$–4)

In Plato too dialectic is primarily concerned with scientific starting-points, such as those of mathematics, and seems to consist in some sort of elenchus-like process of reformulating definitions in the face of conflicting evidence so as to render them puzzle free (*Rep.* VII 532a1–533d1). Aristotle can reasonably be seen, then, as continuing a line of thought about dialectic which, in the *Topics* and the *Sophistical Refutations*, he explores, systematizes, and elaborates.

Think now about the respondent's first answer, his first definition: what is noble is what the gods love. Although it is soon shown to be incorrect, there is something quite remarkable about its very existence. Through experience shaped by acculturation and habituation involving the learning of a natural language, the respondent is confident that he can say what nobility is. He has learned to apply the word "noble" to particular people, actions, and so on correctly enough to pass muster as knowing its meaning, knowing how to use it. From these particular cases he has reached a putative universal, something the particular cases have in common. But when he tries to define that universal in words, he gets it wrong, as Socrates shows. Here is Aristotle registering the significance of this:

> What is knowable to each person at first is often knowable to a very small extent and possesses little or nothing of what is real [or true]. All the same, we must start from what is but badly knowable to us and try . . . to proceed through this to a knowledge of what is entirely knowable. (*Met.* VII 3 $1029^{b}8$–12)

The route by which the respondent reaches the universal that he is unable to define correctly is what Aristotle calls "induction" (*epagôgê*), or that variant of induction, which also involves the shaping of feelings and the development of character, namely, habituation (*ethismos*).

{xliv} Induction begins with (1) perception of particulars, which leads to (2) retention of perceptual contents in memory, and, when many such contents have been retained, to (3) an experience, so that for the first time "there is a universal in the soul" (*APo.* II 19 $100^{a}3$–16). The universal reached at stage (3), which is the one the respondent reaches, is described as "indeterminate" and "better known by perception" (*Ph.* I 1 $184^{a}22$–25). It is the sort of universal, often quite complex, that constitutes a nominal essence corresponding to the nominal definition or meaning of a general term. Finally, (4) from experience come craft knowledge and scientific knowledge, when "from many intelligible objects arising from experience one universal supposition about similar objects is produced" (*Met.* I 1 $981^{a}5$–7).*

The *nominal* (or analytic, meaning-based) definition of the general term "thunder," for example, might pick out the universal *loud noise in the clouds*. When science investigates the things that have this nominal essence, it may find that they also have a real essence or nature in terms of which their other features can be scientifically explained (*APo*. II 10 $93^{b}29$–$94^{a}10$, quoted earlier). A real (or synthetic, fact-based) definition analyzes this real essence into its "constituents (*stoicheia*) and starting-points" (*Ph*. I 1 $184^{a}23$), which will be definable but indemonstrable. It makes intrinsically clear what the nominal definition made clear only to us by enabling us to recognize instances of thunder in a fairly—but imperfectly—reliable way. As a result, thunder itself, now clearly a natural and not just a conventional kind, becomes better known not just to us but entirely or unconditionally (*NE* I 4 $1095^{b}2$–8). These analyzed universals, which are the sort reached at stage (4), are the ones suited to

serve as starting-points of the sciences and crafts: "People with experience know the fact that but not the explanation why, whereas those with craft knowledge know the explanation why, that is, the cause" (*Met.* I 1 $981^{a}28–30$).

Socrates too, we see, wanted definitions that were not just empirically adequate but also explanatory. Thus in telling Euthyphro what he wants in the case of piety, he says that he is seeking "the form itself *by dint of* which all the pieties are pieties" (*Euthphr.* 6d10–11). That is why he rejects {xlv} the definition of piety as being what all the gods love. This definition is in one way correct, presumably, in that if something is pious, it is necessarily loved by all the gods, and vice versa, but it is not explanatory, since it does not tell us what it is about pious things that makes all the gods love them, and so it does not identify the form by dint of which, or because of which, they are pious (9e–11b).

Let us go back. We wanted to know what was involved in showing a scientific starting-point. We were told how we could *not* do this, namely, by demonstrating it from scientific starting-points. Next we learned that dialectic has a route to it from reputable beliefs. At the same time, we were told that induction has a route to it as well—something the *Ethics* also tells us: "we get a theoretical grasp on some starting-points through induction, some through perception, some through some sort of habituation, and others through other means" (I 7 $1098^{b}3–4$). This suggests that induction and dialectic are in some way or other the same process. It is a suggestion to keep in mind.

What shows a Socratic respondent to be wrong is an example that the respondent's definition does not fit. The presentation of the example might be quite indirect, however. It might take quite a bit of stage setting, elicited by the asking of many questions, to bring out a puzzle. But if the example is one the definition does not fit, it shows that the universal grasped by the respondent and the definition he produces are not entirely or unconditionally knowable and that his state is not one of clear-eyed understanding:

> A puzzle in thought reveals a knot in its subject matter. For thought caught in a puzzle is like people who are tied up, since in either case it is impossible to make progress. That is why one must get a theoretical grasp on all the difficulties ahead of time, both for these reasons and because those who inquire without

> first going through the puzzles are like people who don't know where they have to go, and, in addition, don't even know whether they have found what they were inquiring about, since the end is not clear to them. But to someone who has first gone through the puzzles it is clear. (*Met.* II 1 $995^{a}30–^{b}2$)

But lack of such clear-eyed understanding of a scientific starting-point has serious downstream consequences:

> If we are to have scientific knowledge through demonstration, . . . we must know the starting-points better and be better persuaded of them than of what is being shown, but we {xlvi} must also not find anything more persuasive or better known among things opposed to the starting-points from which a contrary mistaken conclusion may be deduced, since someone who has unconditional scientific knowledge must be incapable of being persuaded out of it. (*APo.* I 2 $72^{a}37–^{b}4$; also *NE* VI 3 $1139^{b}33–35$)

If dialectical examination reveals a puzzle in a respondent's thought about a scientific starting-point, then, he cannot have any unconditional scientific knowledge even of what he may well be able to demonstrate correctly from it. Contrariwise, if dialectical examination reveals no such puzzle, he apparently does have clear-eyed understanding, and his route to what he can demonstrate is free of obstacles.

At the heart of dialectic, as Aristotle understands it, is the dialectical deduction (*dialektikos sullogismos*). This is the argument lying behind the questioner's questions, partly dictating their order and content and partly determining the strategy of his examination. In the following passage it is defined and contrasted with two relevant others:

> Dialectical arguments are those that deduce from reputable beliefs in a way that reaches a contradiction; peirastic arguments are those that deduce from those beliefs of the respondent that anyone must know (*eidenai*) who pretends to possess scientific knowledge. . . . Contentious (*eristikos*) arguments are those that deduce or appear to deduce from what appear to be reputable beliefs but are not really such. (*SE* 2 $165^{b}3–8$)

If we think of dialectical deductions in this way, a dialectician, in contrast to a contender, is an honest questioner, appealing to genuinely reputable beliefs and employing valid deductions. "Contenders and

sophists use the same arguments," Aristotle says, "but not to achieve the same goal. . . . If the goal is apparent victory, the argument is contentious; if it is apparent wisdom, sophistic" (*SE* 11 $171^{b}27$–33). Nonetheless, he does also use the term *dialektikê* as the name for the craft that honest dialecticians and sophists both use:

> In dialectic, a sophist is so called in virtue of his deliberate choice, and a dialectician is so called not in virtue of his deliberate choice, but in virtue of the capacity he has. (*Rh*. I 1 $1355^{b}20$–21)

{xlvii} If dialectic is understood in this way, a dialectician who deliberately chooses to employ contentious arguments is a sophist (*Rh*. I 1 $1355^{a}24$–$^{b}7$).** We need to be careful, therefore, to distinguish *honest dialectic* from what we may call *plain dialectic*, which—like all crafts—can be used for good and evil (*NE* V 1 $1129^{a}13$–17). In an exactly parallel way we will need to distinguish *honest rhetoric* from *plain rhetoric*—an honest orator from a plain one: "in the case of rhetoric, however, one person is an orator in virtue of his scientific knowledge, another in virtue of his deliberate choice" (*Rh*. I 1 $1355^{b}18$–20).

The canonical occasion for the practice of the Socratic elenchus, obviously, is the examination of someone else. But there is nothing to prevent a person from practicing it on himself: "How could you think," Socrates asks Critias, "that I would refute you for any reason other than the one for which I would refute myself, fearing lest I might inadvertently think I know something when I don't know it?" (*Chrm*. 166c7–d2). Dialectic is no different in this regard:

> But the philosopher, who is investigating by himself, does not care whether, though the things through which his deduction proceeds are true and knowable, the answerer does not concede them, because they are close to what was proposed at the start, and he foresees what is going to result, but rather he is presumably eager for his claims to be as knowable and as close to it as possible. For it is from things of this sort that scientific deductions proceed. (*Top*. VIII 1 $155^{b}10$–16; compare *Ph*. VIII $263^{a}15$–23)
>
> An inquiry with another person is carried out by means of words (*logôn*), whereas an inquiry by oneself is carried out no

less by means of the things at issue themselves. (*SE* 7 169^{a}38–40)

What we are to imagine, then, is that the political philosopher, to focus on him, surveys the raw political starting-points (the empirical foundations of politics), constructing detailed catalogues of these. He then tries to formulate definitions of the various universals involved in them that seem to be candidate scientific starting-points (virtue, happiness, and so {xlviii} on), testing these against the raw political starting-points by trying to construct demonstrations from them. But these definitions will often be no more than partial; our political philosopher is on his way to complete definitional starting-points, just as the demonstrations will often be no more than proto or nascent demonstrations. The often rudimentary demonstrations that we find in Aristotle's scientific treatises are parts of this process of arguing *to*, not demonstrating *from* starting-points: we argue to them in part by seeing whether or to what extent we could demonstrate from them.

So, first, we have the important distinction between dialectic proper, which includes the use of what appear to be deductions from what appear to be reputable beliefs, and honest dialectic, which uses only genuine deductions from genuine reputable beliefs. Second, we have the equally important distinction between the use of dialectic in examining a potentially hostile respondent and its use by the philosopher in a perhaps private pursuit of the truth. Third, we have an important contrast between honest dialectical premises and philosophical ones or scientific ones. Honest dialectical premises are reputable beliefs; philosophical and scientific premises must be true and knowable. Fourth, we have two apparently equivalent routes to scientific starting-points, one inductive, which starts from raw political starting-points, and the other dialectic, which starts from reputable beliefs.

According to the official definition, genuine reputable beliefs are "things that are believed by everyone, by the majority, or by the wise—either by all of them, or by most, or by the most notable and most reputable" (*Top*. I 1 100^{b}21–23). Just as the scientist should have a catalogue of scientific truths ready to hand from which to select the premises of his demonstrations, so a dialectician ought also to select premises "from arguments that have been written down and produce catalogues (*diagraphas*) of them concerning each kind of subject, putting

them under separate headings—for example, 'Concerned with good,' 'Concerned with life'" (*Top.* I 14 105^{b}12–15). We should be reminded of the collections of laws and constitutions that enjoy "a good reputation (*eudokimountas*)," from which the legislative scientist selects the best ones (*NE* X 9 1181^{a}12–^{b}12, *Pol.* II 5 1263^{a}39).

Clearly, then, there will be considerable overlap between the scientist's catalogue of raw starting-points and the honest dialectician's catalogue of genuine reputable beliefs. For, first, things that are believed by reputably wise people are themselves reputable beliefs, and, second, any respondent would accept "the beliefs of those who have investigated the subjects in question—for example, on a question of medicine he will agree with a doctor, and on a question of geometry with a geometer" (*Top.* I 10 104^{a}8–37).

{xlix} The catalogues also differ, however, in that not all reputable beliefs need be true. If a proposition is a reputable belief, if it would be accepted by all or most people, it is everything an honest dialectician could ask for in a premise, since his goal is simply this: to reveal by honest deductions that a definition offered by any respondent whatsoever conflicts—if it does—with other beliefs that the respondent has. That is why having a complete or fairly complete catalogue of reputable beliefs is such an important resource for a dialectician. *** It is because dialectic deals with things only "in relation to belief," then, and not as philosophy and science do, "in relation to truth" (I 14 105^{b}30–31) that it needs nothing more than reputable *beliefs*.

Nonetheless, the fact that all or most people believe something leads us "to trust it as something in accord with experience" (*Div. Somn.* 1 426^{b}14–16), and—since human beings "are naturally adequate as regards the truth and in most cases hit upon it" (*Rh.* I 1 1355^{a}15–17)—as containing some truth. That is why, no doubt, "true and better [things] are always by nature more easily deduced and unconditionally more persuasive" (1355^{a}37–38). But it is in any case why, having catalogued some of the things that people believe happiness to be, Aristotle writes:

> Some of these views are held by many and are of long standing, while others are held by a few reputable men. And it is not reasonable to suppose that either group is entirely wrong,

but rather that they are correct on one point at least or even on most of them. (*NE* I 8 $1098^{b}27$–29)

Later he generalizes the claim: "things that seem to be so to everyone, these, we say, are" (*NE* X 2 $1172^{b}36$–$1173^{a}1$). Raw starting-points are just that—raw. But when refined, some shred of truth is likely to be found in them. So likely, indeed, that if none is found, this will itself be a surprising fact needing to be explained: "when a reasonable explanation is given of why an untrue view appears true, this makes us more convinced of the true view" (VII 14 $1154^{a}24$–25). It is in the perhaps mere grain of truth enclosed in a reputable belief that a philosopher or scientist is interested, then, not in the general acceptability of the surrounding husk, much of which he may discard.

The process of refinement in the case of a candidate explanatory - starting-point is that of testing a definition of it against reputable beliefs. {l} This may result in the definition being accepted as it stands or in its being altered or modified: when a definition is non-perspicuous, Aristotle tells us at *Top*. VI 13 $151^{b}7$–8, it must be "corrected and reconfigured (*sundiorthôsanta kai suschêmatisanta*)," until it is made clear. The same process applies to the reputable beliefs themselves, since they may conflict not only with the definition but also with each other. Again, this may also result in their being modified, often by uncovering ambiguities within them or in the argument supporting them or by drawing distinctions that uncover complexities in these. Thus Aristotle's view that it is "from oneself that all the features fitted to friendship also extend to others" is in accord with the reputable beliefs embodied in "all the proverbs" (*NE* IX 8 $1168^{b}5$–10). But both conflict with the view that there is something shameful about being a self-lover, since a base person "does all his actions for the sake of himself," whereas a decent one "seems to act because of what is noble . . . and for the sake of a friend, disregarding his own interests" ($1168^{a}31$–35). As a result, "it is reasonable to be puzzled . . . as to which side we should follow, since both carry conviction." Hence, to ease our puzzlement not just in this case but in all others like it, "we need to draw distinctions in connection with the arguments and determine to what extent and in what ways they grasp the truth. If, then, we were to find out what those on each side mean by 'self-love,' perhaps this would be clear" ($1168^{b}10$–15). By the end of the chapter, this is just what has been accomplished. If, as ordinary people do, we think of self-lovers as

those who gratify the non-rational part of their soul (as if it were their true self) with money, honors, and bodily pleasures (as if these were the greatest goods), we can see why they are right to think that "self-love" is a term of reproach. But if we recognize that noble things are better than these other goods, and that the true self is the understanding, we will also see what is wrong in their view and what is right in the opposing one, and agree that we should be "self-lovers" in that sense of the term.

A more extreme possibility, as we saw, is that a reputable belief is not modified at all but is rejected entirely and has its appearance of truth explained away. This is what happens in the case of bodily pleasures. These are not more choiceworthy, Aristotle argues, yet they appear to some people to be more choiceworthy. So we must explain away their false appearance of choiceworthiness, one source of which is that they "knock out pain," and "get their intensity (which is why they are pursued) from the fact that they appear alongside their contrary" (*NE* VII 14 $1154^{a}26$–31). Sometimes all the reputable beliefs on a certain subject stemming from a certain group can be excluded en masse:

> {li} To investigate all the beliefs about happiness held by different people is superfluous, since little children, sick people, and lunatics apparently have many views, but no one with any understanding would go through these. For these people need not arguments but, in some cases, time in which to mature, in others, medical or political correction [or punishment]—for a drug is no less correctional than a flogging. Similarly there is no need to investigate the beliefs of the majority, since they speak baselessly on pretty much every subject but most of all this one. On it, only the beliefs of wise people need be investigated. (*EE* I 3 $1214^{b}28$–$1215^{a}2$)

We might see Aristotle's account of the distorting effects on beliefs about happiness of inadequate habituation where pleasures and pains are concerned as the justification of this bold claim. Readers who think that Aristotle gives the life of enjoyment shrift that is much too short (*NE* I 5 $1095^{b}19$–22, X 6 $1176^{b}9$–$1177^{a}1$) should not overlook its bearing on their concern.

The canonical occasion for the use of honest dialectic, as of the Socratic elenchus and plain dialectic, is the examination of a respondent. The relevant premises for the questioner to use, therefore, are the

reputable beliefs in his catalogue that the respondent will accept. Just how wide this set of beliefs is in a given case depends naturally on how accessible to the untrained subject the subject matter is on which he is being examined. In this regard our target candidate science, politics, is in a somewhat special position, since all adequately socialized subjects have access to the relevant subject matter and are even likely to have received some—however vestigial—training in politics itself. That is no doubt why Socrates' respondents are so confident, prior to examination, that they do know how to define the virtues. We might usefully compare the case of religious beliefs about the nature of human beings and the origins of life and cosmos in a society where all the citizens practice the same religion and all the schools teach it. In other more esoteric areas the class of reputable beliefs may be substantially narrower. We may all have some beliefs about thunder and other phenomena readily perceptible to everyone, that are—for that very reason—reputable. But about Mandelbrot sets, Bell's theorem, or messenger RNA we may have none at all. We can already see, then, why an orator, facing an audience of non-experts, or a mixed audience, will not be able to draw on them, and why rhetoric is an offshoot of ethics and politics, not of physics.

When a scientist is investigating by himself, the class of premises he will select from is the catalogue of *all* the raw starting-points of his science, despite a natural human inclination to do otherwise:

> {lii} People seem to inquire up to a certain point, but not as far as it is possible to take the puzzle. For it is customary for all of us to make our inquiry not with an eye to the thing at issue but with an eye to the person who says the contrary. For a person even inquires within himself up to the point at which he is no longer able to argue against himself. That is why a person who is going to inquire well must be capable of objecting by means of objections proper to the relevant genus, and this comes from having a theoretical grasp on all the differentiae (*Cael.* II 13 $294^{b}6$–13)

Hence our scientist will want to err on the side of excess, adding any reputable belief that appears to have any relevance whatsoever, to his catalogue. When he formulates definitions of candidate scientific starting-points from which he thinks he can demonstrate the raw ones, he must then examine himself to see whether he really does in this case have the

scientific knowledge he thinks he has. If he is investigating together with fellow scientists, others may examine him: we all do better with the aid of co-workers (*NE* X 7 1177^{a}34), among whom time figures as one (I 7 1095^{a}23–24). What he is doing is using honest dialectic on himself or having it used on him. But this, we see, is little different from the final stage—stage (4)—of the induction we looked at earlier. Induction, as we might put it, is, in its final stage, (possibly self-directed) honest dialectic.

In a famous and much debated passage Aristotle writes:

> We must, as in the other cases, set out the things that appear to be so and first go through the puzzles, and, in that way show preferably all the reputable beliefs about these ways of being affected, or, if not all of them then most of them, and the ones with the most control. For if the objections are refuted and the reputable beliefs are left standing, that would be an adequate showing. (*NE* VII 1 1145^{b}1–7)

The specific focus of the comment is "these ways of being affected," which are self-control and its lack as well as resilience and softness. Some people think that the comment applies only to this and should not be generalized, even though "as in the other cases" surely suggests a wider scope. And as we can now see, that scope is in fact entirely general, since it describes the honest dialectical or inductive route to the starting-points of *all* the sciences and methodical inquiries, with *tithenai ta phainomena* ("set[ting] out the things that appear to be so") describing the initial phase in which the raw starting-points are collected and catalogued.

{liii} Rhetoric as a Transgeneric Science

An Aristotelian science, we have just seen, must deal with a single genus: the nature of definition and demonstration mandates as much (*Rh*. I 1 1354^{a}3n(5)). Yet rhetoric, though a productive science or craft, "does not deal with a definite (*aphôrismenou*) genus" (I 1 1355^{b}8–9), and so is not itself a "definite (*aphôrismenês*) science" (1354^{a}3; also 2 1355^{b}33–34). Once again, then, its scientific status seems in jeopardy.

It is a cliché of the history of philosophy that Aristotle is an empiricist. And like all clichés there is some truth in it. But he is not just an empiricist at the level of the definite, genus-specific sciences; he is an empiricist at all levels. To see what I mean, think of each of the definite sciences as giving us a picture of a piece of the world, a region of being—a definite first-order genus. Then ask, what is the world like that these

sciences collectively portray? For precision (and concision) focus on the part of it that the mathematical sciences—arithmetic, geometry, and so on—collectively portray. What does mathematical reality as a whole look like?

Many theorems in mathematics are of course special to some branch of it, and describe only the correlative first-order genus. But there are also "certain mathematical theorems of a universal character" (*Met*. XIII 2 $1077^{a}9$–10):

> That proportionals alternate might be thought to apply to numbers qua numbers, lines qua lines, solids qua solids, and times qua times, as used to be demonstrated of these separately, although it is possible to show it of all cases by a single demonstration. But because all these things—numbers, lengths, times, solids—do not constitute a single named [genus] and differ in form from one another, they were treated separately. But now it is demonstrated universally: for what is supposed to hold of them universally does not hold of them qua lines or qua numbers but qua this [unnamed genus]. (*APo*. I 5 $74^{a}17$–25)

But "it is impossible that what is shown should cross from one genus to another" (*APo*. I 23 $84^{b}17$–18). Hence the reason why the theorem about proportionals holds in the case of lines and also in that of numbers, which is what the demonstration reveals, "is different" in each case (II 17 $99^{a}8$–9), so that separate demonstrations seem to be needed for each. Yet, "qua such-and-such an increase in quantity" (*APo*. II 17 $99^{a}9$–10), the demonstration is the same, so that the theorem "holds in common of all quantities" (*Met*. XI 4 $1061^{b}19$–21). For "while the genera of the beings are different, some {liv} attributes belong to quantities and others of qualities alone, with the help of which we can show things" (*APo*. II 32 $88^{b}1$–3).

The universal theorem not only holds of all quantities, however, it does so in a distinctive way:

> Of the items used in the demonstrative sciences some are special to each science and others common—but common *by analogy*, since they are only useful in so far as they bear on the genus falling under the science. Proper—for example that a line is such-and-such, and straight so-and-so. Common—for

example, that if equals are taken from equals, the remainders are equal. (*APo*. I 10 76^{a}37–41)

Thus the genus to which lines, numbers, and so on belong, which is the ontological correlate of any theorem of universal mathematics, is not a first-order genus, but an analogical unity—a quantity. And about quantities as such there is much to say—enough indeed to suit them for explanatory scientific purposes in mathematics (*Cat*. 6). Indeed, Aristotle often refers to quantity, as to the other so-called categories, as genera: things are "one in kind (*genos*), those whose figure of predication [= category] is the same" (*Met*. V 6 1016^{b}33–34).

Something similar, we must suppose, is true of topic, enthymeme, and the other such notions that rhetoric needs for its explanatory purposes. They too are not first-order genera, but higher-order ones—analogical unities that have sufficient foundation in sciences that are themselves based on first-order genera to support a genuine science. If quantity can do this for mathematics, topic and enthymeme can surely do it for rhetoric. As universal mathematics is a transgeneric science, so too is rhetoric. The difference is that one is theoretical, the other productive.

The Definition of Rhetoric

We have seen in passing that rhetoric is "a sort of offshoot of dialectic and of work in ethics, which it is right to call politics" (*Rh*. I 2 1356^{a}25–27), and that it is "the capacity to get a theoretical grasp on what is possibly persuasive in each case" (1355^{b}25–26). We have explored in some detail what evidence politics is based on and noticed in a cursory way why it is the sort of evidence that a speaker might draw on. Our task now is to explore rhetoric itself and to see why Aristotle defines it as he does.

He starts in his usual way with an implicit nominal definition of rhetoric as what is involved when people defend or accuse someone {lv} (*Rh*. I 1 1354^{a}5–6). Extemporaneously or by habit, ordinary people do this, but it is possible to get a "theoretical grasp on the cause due to which some succeed because of habit and others because of chance" (1354^{a}10–11), which "all would immediately agree, is the function of a craft" (1354^{a}11). Hence it is this grasp that constitutes the explanatory foundation of rhetoric as a craft. It enables us to say not just that certain means of persuasion succeed in persuading people, but also—and this is

the mark of a craft or science—to explain why they do. Thus if "only the means of persuasion (*pisteis*) are within the province of craft" (1354^{a}13), anything that fails to focus on them will fail to have the real essence that constitutes something as genuine *rhetoric*.

This, Aristotle claims, is in fact pretty much the lot of those who have previously written about the subject:

> Now as things stand those who have put together works on the craft of speeches [= rhetoric] have provided (one might almost say) no part of it. For only the means of persuasion (*pisteis*) are within the province of craft; the other things are appendages. But these writers say nothing about enthymemes, which just are the body of the means of persuasion, but mostly busy themselves with matters that are outside the thing at issue. (*Rh*. I 1 1354^{a}11–16)

What gives means of persuasion their special salience to rhetoric, we see, is that they alone focus on the thing at issue. **** And what makes previous works on rhetoric largely irrelevant to the craft is that they have not focused on it. If we ask what, in turn, gives the thing at issue its special salience, it is to the nominal essence of rhetoric that we are returned: "all try . . . to defend someone and accuse someone (*apologeisthai kai katêgorein*)" (*Rh*. I 1 1354^{a}5–6). So all bring in the thing at issue—did he do it or didn't he, should it be done or shouldn't it, and so on.

The thing at issue is the pertinent thing and the means of persuasion bear on it. But other things, such as narratives, stories, poems, and the like, might surely bear on it too. So why of all these is it the means of persuasion that are alone relevant to the craft of rhetoric? The answer is determined by the end or goal of speaking, which is to *persuade* the listener of something. Thus a craft that aims to achieve this end or goal will need to take not just any means to it, but the best possible one. And this is just what a means of persuasion is:

> {lvi} A means of persuasion is a sort of demonstration (for we are most persuaded when we take something to have been demonstrated). (*Rh*. I 1 1355^{a}4–6)

So if we want to be better at persuading people than those who do so extemporaneously or by habit, it is the means of persuasion we will want

to learn how to produce.

Aristotle has now explained what previous writers did not focus on, but when he turns to explain what they did focus on, we encounter an apparently difficult problem. For what they focused on, he says, is "accusation (*diabolê*), pity, anger, and such feelings of the soul [that] do not have to do with the thing at issue, but are related to the juror" (*Rh*. I 1 $1354^{a}16$–18). And this is strange on two different fronts. First, accusation is not a feeling of the soul, and strife (*eris*), which is substituted for it later on (III 19 $1419^{b}25$–27), is not one either. Second, when Aristotle tells us what the means of persuasion are, he includes those that depend on "disposing the listener in some way" (I 2 $1356^{a}3$), and defines them as follows:

> Persuasion is through the listeners whenever they are led to feel things by the speech. For we do not give the same judgments pained and pleased, or loving and hating. It is with this, and only with this, we say, that those people busy themselves who now treat the subject as within the province of craft. (*Rh*. I 2 $1356^{a}14$–17)

So aren't these means of persuasion just what Aristotle should *not* be including within the province of craft?

The fact that accusation and strife—*diabolê* and *eris*—are not feelings indicates that the issue is not so much feelings themselves as how people are led to them: the verb *diaballein* means, among other things, "to make hostile, to engender a mutual dislike between two parties." When they are led to them by the argument, which is about the things at issue, it is one thing, however, when they are led to them by other means it is another. What Aristotle says in further criticism of his predecessors explains why:

> If all trials were conducted as they now are at any rate in some cities, especially those that are in good legislative order, these writers would have nothing to say. For everyone thinks that the laws should proclaim this way of doing things, and some even make use of such laws and prohibit speaking of matters outside the thing at issue, as they in fact do in the court of the Areopagus, which correctly legislates against this. For {lvii} one should not distort [the judgment of] the juror by arousing anger, fear, or pity in him, since this would be as if

someone who is going to use a standard, made it crooked. (*Rh*. I 1 1354^{a}18–26)

But the explanation needs some unpacking.

What the standard is that feelings distort or make crooked is identified for us this way:

> Each state [of character] has its own special set of things that are pleasant or noble, and an excellent person is perhaps distinguished most by his seeing what is true in each case, since he is like a standard and measure of them. In the case of ordinary people, however, deception seems to come about because of pleasure, which appears to be a good thing when it is not. So they choose what is pleasant as good and avoid what is painful as bad. (*NE* III 4 1113^{a}31–^{b}2)

Pleasure and pain, then, are the culprits. But the feelings relevant to rhetoric involve these:

> The feelings are those things due to which people, by undergoing a change, differ in their judgments, and that entail pain and pleasure—for example, anger, pity, fear, and other such things, and their contraries. (*Rh*. II 1 1378^{a}19–21)

So when speakers arouse these feelings, pleasure or pain go along with them, and these influence judgment:

> The assemblyman and the juror are actually judging about present and definite issues, in relation to which they already feel both love and hatred, and with which their own private advantage is already knitted together, so that they are no longer capable of adequately seeing the truth, but instead their own private pleasure or pain overshadows their judgment. (*Rh*. I 1 1354^{b}6–11)

Fair enough. But are enthymemes—the very body of the means of persuasion that are rhetoric's stock in trade—supposed then to influence feelings in a way that is not distorting of judgment? Here is Aristotle's incisive answer:

> When you are trying to arouse feelings, do not speak in enthymemes. For an enthymeme either knocks out feeling or {lviii} is spoken pointlessly, since simultaneous movements knock out each other and either extinguish each other or make each other weak. Nor, when the speech is expressive of

> character, should you look for an enthymeme at the same time. For demonstration involves neither character nor deliberate choice. (*Rh*. III 17 1418^{a}12–17)

It is not to the enthymeme, therefore, that we should look for an effect on feeling—but then there is more to a means of persuasion than an enthymeme.

Large questions arise at this point about the nature of feelings but we can keep them in check by narrowing our attention to just one problematically "negative" feeling, namely, anger. Aristotle defines it this way:

> [Anger is] desire, involving pain, for apparent revenge (*timôrias phainomenês*), because of apparent contempt (*phainomenên oligôrian*) on the part of someone unfitted to treat the person himself, or one of those close to him, with contempt. (*Rh*. II 2 1378^{a}30–32)

Anger, like other relevant feelings, we see, is aroused not by how things actually are (real contempt) but by how they appear to us (apparent contempt). Here is Aristotle himself making the point in speaking explicitly about definitions:

> Further, in the case of desires, and in the case of any other things where it is fitting, look to see whether he [namely, the one giving the definition] has not added "apparent"—for example, in saying that wish is a desire for good, or appetite a desire for pleasant, instead of for apparent good or pleasant. For often the thing that is good or pleasant escapes the notice of those who feel desire, so that what they desire is not necessarily good or pleasant but only apparently so. He should, then, have made [the definition] he assigns in this way. (*Top*. VI 8 146^{b}36–147^{a}5)

But how things do in fact appear to us is affected by our feelings:

> We are easily deceived by our perceptions when we are in the grip of feelings (*en tois pathesin*), some when in the grip of one, others in the grip of others (for example, the coward when in the grip of fear, the lover when in the grip of passion), so that even from a very slight resemblance the coward thinks he sees {lix} his enemy and the lover his beloved, and the more in the grip of the feeling he is, the smaller is the similarity required to

> produce the appearance. In the same way both in fits of anger (*en orgais*) and in the grip of all appetites, everyone is easily deceived, and the more easily, the more they are in the grip of the feelings. (*Insomn*. 2 460^{b}3–11)

As a result, means of persuasion that aim to get us to see things as they actually are may have to so influence how they appear to us as to bring appearance (perhaps distorted by feeling) into congruence with reality. We might remember in this regard what Thucydides said about Pericles:

> Whenever he perceived that the majority were in any way over confident in their wanton aggression beyond what the situation justified, he shocked them into a state of fear by his speaking, and again, when they were unreasonably afraid, he restored them to confidence. (II.65.9)

A means of persuasion can arouse anger or other feelings, then, not in order to distort judgment, but to un-distort it.

When, as a result of the feelings that a speaker's means of persuasion has aroused in them, listeners' judgment is other than the one that excellent (or virtuous) people would make, the speaker is guilty of distorting the very standard of judgment that a constitution in good legislative order, aiming at wise deliberative decisions and just judicial judgments, would seek to inculcate in its citizens. By the same token, when a speaker's means of persuasion arouses feelings that so influence judgment that it becomes congruent with that of an excellent person, it is not distorting the measure but preserving it, if it is already correct (as it will be if the listeners are excellent), or un-distorting it—straightening it out—if it is crooked. For "it is characteristic of virtue to be pleased and pained at the things we should and in the way we should" (*NE* IV 1 1121^{a}3–4).

Though this is and will remain the solution to the problem of feelings and their place in means of persuasion, there is more to the story. For when Aristotle again characterizes the errors made by his predecessors, he adds an apparently problematic detail, which I have italicized:

> If this is so, however, *it is evident that those who define the other things are attempting to treat matters outside the thing at issue as being within the province of craft—for example, what the introduction or the narration should contain, as well as each of the*

> *other parts. For they busy themselves only with how to produce a* {lx} *certain quality in the judge*, whereas about the means of persuasion that are within the province of craft they show nothing, but it is on the basis of these that one would become enthymematically competent. (*Rh*. I 1 1354^{b}16–22)

And the reason it is problematic is this: Aristotle himself discusses what the introduction and the narration should contain, as well as each of the other parts (III 13–19). Why is it all right for Aristotle to do this but not all right for his predecessors?

The solution to the problem, though not presented as such (the problem is ours, not Aristotle's), lies in the difference between things that are inside or outside the province of craft and things that are inside or outside the thing at issue. Consider the case of the means of persuasion (*pisteis*). Only these are within the province of craft (*Rh*. I 1 1354^{a}13). But what this amounts to, we soon discover, is not that all the means of persuasion are inside it, but that nothing except a means of persuasion is inside it:

> Of the means of persuasion, though, some are outside the province of craft, whereas others are within the province of craft. By outside the province of craft I mean those that are not provided by ourselves [as orators] but are there at the start—for example, witnesses, results of torture, contracts, and the like. And by within the province of craft I mean those capable of being furnished by the methodical inquiry and ourselves. (*Rh*. I 2 1355^{b}35–39)

Now turn to Aristotle's predecessors and ask, which means of persuasion did they fail to discuss—those that are inside or those that are outside the province of craft? Again Aristotle is clear: "about the means of persuasion that are within the province of craft they show nothing" (*Rh*. I 1 1354^{b}21). Since these are the ones on the basis of which one would become competent with enthymemes (1354^{b}21–22), their silence about them amounts to a silence about the things that "just are the body of the means of persuasion" (1354^{a}14–15).

Now turn to the thing at issue and to the parts of the means of persuasion in a speech that bear on it:

> There are two parts to a speech. For it is necessary to state the thing at issue and also to demonstrate it. . . . The necessary

> parts [of a speech], therefore, are the statement of the case and the {lxi} means of persuasion. These, then, are its special ones, and the most it has are: introduction, statement of the thing at issue, means of persuasion, and epilogue. For the replies to the opponent belong to the means of persuasion, and the reply by comparison is amplification of one's own case, so that it is a part of the means of persuasion. For one who does this demonstrates something, whereas the introduction does not and neither does the epilogue, but rather serves as a reminder. (*Rh*. III 13 $1414^{a}31–^{b}13$)

Thus:

> What one should in fact do [in the introduction] is state the thing at issue, in order that it not escape notice what the judgment is about, whereas in the epilogue one should speak in summary form (*kephalaiôdôs*) of the things through which the conclusion has been shown. (III 19 $1419^{b}30–33$)

In ignoring enthymemes, Aristotle's predecessors ignored the body of the means of persuasion—the demonstration of the thing at issue—and focused instead on the introduction and the other ancillary parts in isolation from that body: the adverb *kephalaiôdôs*, which derives from *kephalê* ("head"), preserves the metaphor. But if the introduction should state the thing at issue and the epilogue should summarize the enthymematic demonstration, which is alone within the province of the craft, any attempt to discuss the contents of these in isolation must result in "attempting to treat matters outside the thing at issue as being within the province of craft" (*Rh*. I 1 $1354^{b}16–18$). However, when the function of these parts is properly understood to be that of "appendages (*prosthêkai*)" (I 1 $1354^{a}14$), they are properly treatable as within the province of craft—which is precisely the way Aristotle does treat them in III 13–19.

An important case in point is that of so-called remedies (*iatreumata*):

> The other kinds (*eidos*) of introduction that are used are remedies and are common [to all the kinds of speeches]. These say things based on the speaker, the listener, the thing at issue, and the opponent. *Those based on the speaker himself and the opponent are all those concerned with refuting or making an accusation* (*diabolên*). But these are not done in the same way.

> For in the defendant's case things having to do with the accusation {lxii} come first, whereas in the accuser's they come in the epilogue. Why this is so is quite clear. For the defendant, when he is about to introduce his own case must do away with any hindrances to it, and so must first refute the accusation. But the one attacking him should put his accusation in the epilogue in order that the listeners may remember it better. (*Rh.* III 14 1415[a]25–34)

Again, I have italicized the crucial element. For what it shows—and shows unequivocally—is that what defendants and accusers say about each other (to stick to judicial examples), whether in the introduction (defendant) or epilogue (accuser), is not separate from the enthymematic body of the means of persuasion, but serves rather to clear away the sorts of prejudicial beliefs that are likely to prevent enthymemes from having their proper weight with judges. This, for example, is what Plato presents Socrates doing in his speech of defense:

> The first thing justice demands, then, men of Athens, is that I defend myself from the first false accusations made against me and from my first accusers, and then from the later accusations and the later accusers. You see, many people have accused me in front of you, and for very many years now—and nothing they say is true. And I fear them more than Anytus and the rest, ***** though the latter are dangerous too. But the earlier ones, gentlemen, are more dangerous. They got hold of most of you from childhood, and persuaded you with their accusations against me—accusations no more true than the current ones. (Plato, *Ap.* 18a–b)

Remedies thus serve the enthymeme, and are not, as in the sort of introductions favored by Aristotle's predecessors, an independent alternative to it, biasing the listeners one way or the other in total disregard of the thing at issue. But they are sufficiently important—people being what they are—that Aristotle devotes an entire chapter to the topics appropriate to them, mentioning twelve (*Rh.* III 15).

{lxiii} With all this behind us we are in a position to understand the following text in the correct way:

> But since rhetoric is for the sake of judgment (for people judge deliberations and a trial is a judgment), it is necessary for

> the speaker to look not only to the argument, that it be demonstrative and persuasive, but also to himself, that he be of a certain quality, and to the judge, to produce a certain quality in him too. For it makes a great difference with a view to persuading—especially in deliberative speeches, but next in judicial ones—both that the speaker appear to be of a certain quality and that his listeners take him to be disposed in a certain way toward them, and if, in addition, they too will be disposed in a certain way. (*Rh*. II 1 1377^{b}20–28)

The argumentative body of a speech is a dispassionate demonstration, involving neither the character of the speaker nor the feelings of the judges. But for this to do its work successfully other elements in the speech, which do relate to feelings and character, will need to do theirs. And the greater the external political disorder, the more debased the listeners, the more extravagant the lies and accusations, the greater their work will be: "For it is not possible—or not easy—to alter by argument what has long since been locked up in traits of character" (*NE* X 9 1179^{b}16–18).

This provides a nice point of transition into another important element in Aristotle's account of rhetoric, I mean the distinction, already noticed, between honest rhetoric and plain rhetoric:

> It is evident that it is a function of the same craft to see what is persuasive and what is apparently persuasive, just as in the case of dialectic it is to see the deduction and the apparent deduction. For sophistic is what it is in virtue not of the capacity but of the deliberate choice. Here, in the case of rhetoric, however, one person is an orator in virtue of his scientific knowledge, another in virtue of his deliberate choice, whereas there, in dialectic, a sophist is so called in virtue of his deliberate choice, and a dialectician is so called not in virtue of his deliberate choice, but in virtue of the capacity he has. (*Rh*. I 1 1355^{b}15–21)

So when we discuss what is inside and what is outside the province of the craft of rhetoric, we need to be clear about what we have in mind. For while an honest orator, possessed of the plain craft, must know about apparent enthymemes and the topics they are based on, so as to better detect and {lxiv} refute them when other less scrupulous orators use them

against him, and so as to persuade non-virtuous audiences to do what is in fact best, he will not use them himself to achieve bad ends:

> One should be capable of persuading people of contraries, just as in the case of [dialectical] deductions, not so as to do both in action (for one should not persuade people of base things), but in order that it not escape our notice how things stand, and, if someone else uses arguments (*logos*) in an unjust way, so as to be able to refute them for ourselves. (*Rh*. I 1 $1355^{a}29–33$)

A plain orator, by contrast, will use whatever craft resources he needs to persuade his listeners of whatever end he happens to have, whether virtuous or vicious. When in II 24 we find Aristotle discussing apparent enthymemes and the topics on which they are based, then, we should not be surprised.

In addition to the arguments we have been considering, Aristotle also gives a number of others in support of his claim—on which his (real) definition of rhetoric will be based—that rhetoric is concerned exclusively with means of persuasion (*Rh*. I 1 $1355^{a}3–4$, 4 $1359^{b}9–16$). One of these, we noticed, is that the rhetoric of his predecessors, since it is focused almost entirely on something else, would be useless in cities that are in good legislative order (I 1 $1354^{a}18–24$). Another focuses on the fact that in judicial cases, "the task of the opponent is nothing at all outside of showing that [the thing at issue] is or is not the case, or did or did not occur" ($1354^{a}26–31$). Another focuses on the nature of good legislation itself, arguing that "it is fitting for laws that are correctly laid down to define everything themselves, wherever possible, and leave the fewest things up to the jurors" ($1354^{a}31–^{b}16$). Rhetoric that focuses on the jurors, therefore, independently of the enthymeme, is for this reason too focusing on the wrong thing.

With rhetoric's goal now established, Aristotle turns to the question of utility. He does the same thing in the *Topics*, where dialectic is concerned:

> Our next task . . . is to say how many areas, and also of what sorts, our work is useful in. It is useful, then, in three: in training, in argumentative encounters, and in the philosophical sciences. (*Top*. I 2 $101^{a}25–28$)

The four uses of rhetoric he mentions (*Rh.* I 1 1355^{a}21–^{b}7) are discussed in the associated notes and need not further detain us here. What is important to register, however, is the relevance of utility to rhetoric, since its {lxv} aim, as a productive science, is not theoretical knowledge, but usable knowledge.

Aristotle is now ready to give not merely the nominal but the real definition of rhetoric. He does this by first specifying its function (*Rh.* I 1 1354^{a}11), which is "not to persuade but to see the persuasive factors belonging in each case, just as in all the other crafts" (1355^{b}10–12). Armed with these, like a chef with a good universal recipe, a speaker is then able to produce a particular speech that—everything else being equal—will persuade his audience. Next, the definition itself is stated as a conclusion of the preceding critique of his predecessors: "Let rhetoric, then, be a capacity to get a theoretical grasp on what is possibly persuasive in each case" (I 2 1355^{b}25–26)—that is to say, on the possibly persuasive means of persuasion. Aristotle does not describe this critique as dialectical in nature, or represent it as going through and resolving puzzles, but it is not difficult to recast it as such.

Means of Persuasion, Enthymemes, and Topics

To get a grip on what a *pistis* ("means of persuasion" in the translation) is it is useful to begin with a text that we have already looked at for other purposes:

> Of the means of persuasion, though, some are outside the province of craft, whereas others are within the province of craft. By outside the province of craft I mean those that are not provided by ourselves [as orators] but are there at the start—for example, witnesses, results of torture, contracts, and the like. And by within the province of craft I mean those capable of being furnished by the methodical inquiry and ourselves. (*Rh.* I 2 1355^{b}35–39)

Focus first on those outside the province of craft. They are special to judicial oratory and there are just five of them: "laws, witnesses, contracts, [results of] torture, and oaths" (*Rh.* I 15 1375^{a}22–25). What they have in common with things that are within the province of craft is what makes "means of persuasion" a good translation of both, namely, that they are probative items—items productive of persuasion, or conviction (I 1 1354^{a}13n). And a witness, a contract, or an oath (anyway in places where

oaths are taken seriously) can be as probative as an argument. What puts these outside the province of craft is that the craft of rhetoric is not in a position to {lxvi} provide them: they are either there at the start or they are not. Having said that much about them, then, we may leave them aside, and restrict the rest of our discussion to those that are within the province of rhetoric.

Beginning again, then, let us ask what a means of persuasion is in that narrower sense. And here we may distinguish the logical aspects of a means of persuasion from other aspects. From the logical point of view a means of persuasion is a certain sort of deduction or demonstration, and, as such, is no different from any other deduction or demonstration. That is why rhetoric is in part "composed of the science of analytics" (*Rh*. I 4 $1359^{b}9$–10): it draws its logic from there. What makes a demonstration or deduction a peculiarly rhetorical one—an enthymeme (I 1 $1355^{a}6$, 2 $1256^{b}4$–5)—is not its logic, therefore, but something else, namely, the shape the deduction takes and what it is based on, both of which are dictated by the special goals or purposes of rhetoric.

We may begin, then, with the first of these factors and with the notion, characterized in the following text, of a primary deduction:

> It is possible, though, to deduce and draw conclusions either from previous deductions or from things that are not deduced, but which are in need of being deduced because they are not reputable beliefs. The former, however, are of necessity not easy to follow due to their length (for the judge is assumed to be a simple person), while the latter are not persuasive because they are not drawn from things that are agreed nor from reputable beliefs. So it is necessary for both an enthymeme and a paradigm to be concerned with things that for the most part admit of being other than they are (a paradigm being an induction, an enthymeme being a deduction), and to be composed of few premises and fewer often than those that compose the primary deduction. For if one of these is known, there is no need to state it, since the listener himself supplies it. (*Rh*. I 2 $1357^{a}7$–19)

The primary deduction, then, is the analogue of a dialectical syllogism: as the latter lies in the background guiding in the one case the questioner's questions, in the other the answerer's answers, so the primary

deduction lies in the background guiding the speaker's enthymeme. And, again like a dialectical deduction, a primary deduction is a syllogistic deduction, or chain of such deductions. By contrast, the enthymeme that the speaker actually presents to his listeners is sculpted in accord with their beliefs (if they know a premise, there is no need to state it), with their capacity to follow long chains of deductions, their level of education, and so on:

> {lxvii} Now, that the enthymeme is a deduction was stated earlier, and in what way it is a deduction, and in what respect it differs from those in dialectic. For it should not draw its conclusion from far back, nor by necessarily including everything, since the former is not perspicuous because of length, while the latter amounts to babbling, because what is said is evident. This is the cause of the uneducated being more persuasive than the well-educated in front of crowds of people —as the poets tell us, the uneducated are "more accomplished at speaking before a crowd." For the well-educated say the common things and universals, while the uneducated say things on the basis of what they know and things close at hand. So one should not speak on the basis of all the things that seem to be so but on the basis of definite ones—for example, those accepted by the judges or of those they approve. And in fact it should be clear that what is said appears so to all or to most. And one should not only draw the conclusion from what is necessary, but also from what holds for the most part. (*Rh.* II 22 $1395^{b}23$–$1396^{a}3$)

In this regard enthymemes are no different from deductions used for other productive or practical purposes:

> As sometimes happens in asking [dialectical] questions, however, so here [in practical deliberation] thought does not stop to consider the other premise, the one that is clear. For example, if taking walks is good for a man, he does not linger over the thought that he is a man. (*MA* 7 $701^{a}26$–29)

An actual enthymeme, then, is always the tip of a deductive iceberg, just enough of which it exposes to achieve its end. But while a speaker "should compress enthymemes as much as possible" (III 18 $1419^{a}19$), that does not mean that he will never have to expose the whole iceberg.

None of this need imply, either, that primary deductions are always explicitly articulated by speakers, or that speakers work from them, as from an explicit recipe, to which they have access. They may be—and no doubt usually are—further removed from actual practice than that. What they do is make fully explicit to students of rhetoric what is needed in order to rationalize or make fully intelligible what skilled speakers are doing when they argue as they do. They articulate part of the craft knowledge—the competence—of a skilled speaker but not necessarily by giving the protocols he actually follows.

{lxviii} Though their logic is that of deductions generally, enthymemes, like dialectical deductions, are not categorical ones, of the sort found in the sciences (*Rh*. I 1 1354^{a}3n(6)), which prove their conclusions unconditionally, but so-called hypothetical ones:

> In every case the deduction leads up to the substituted - ******
> premise, but what follows from the starting-point is concluded through an agreement or through some other hypothesis. (*APr*. I 23 41^{a}38–^{b}1; also 29 45^{b}17–19)
>
> An enthymeme suited to showing draws its conclusion from what is agreed to. (*Rh*. II 22 1396^{b}25–26)

But as with their length or degree of compression, this seems to be typically, rather than essentially, true of them. In any case, that seems to be the message of the following text:

> The better someone is at selecting premises, [the more] he will—without noticing it—produce a science that is distinct from dialectic and rhetoric. For if he hits upon starting-points, it will no longer be dialectic or rhetoric, but instead will be that science whose starting-points he possesses. (*Rh*. I 2 1358^{a}23–26)

Thus, while the premises of enthymemes may be scientific starting-points, rhetoric does not select them as such (which is why the speaker who selects them is unaware of the fact that he is doing a bit of science), but on other grounds altogether.

Before turning to what these grounds are, which was our second factor, we should also notice that enthymemes, understood in the way we have been discussing, are further divided into two kinds:

> One lot are suited to showing that something is or is not the case, while another lot are refutative, and the difference is like

that in dialectical ones between refutation and deduction. (*Rh*. II 22 1396^{b}23–25)

But while these differ in their popularity—

> {lxix} Refutative enthymemes are more popular than demonstrative ones because a refutative enthymeme is a bringing together of contraries in a small space, and when these are set side by side they are more evident to the listener (*Rh*. II 23 1400^{b}26–29)

—they are not two distinct species, but rather the very same one used for distinct purposes:

> Nor are refutative enthymemes some one species (*eidos*) of enthymemes. For it is clear that one refutes by showing something or by bringing an objection. In the first case they show the opposite in reply—for example, if he showed that something happened, the other shows that it did not. So this is not a differentiating feature (*diaphora*), since they both use the same [topics]. For they bring in enthymemes to show that something is not the case or that it is the case. (*Rh*. II 26 1403^{a}24–29)

There is nothing formally or logically distinctive about them, therefore, that requires special notice or discussion.

What is true of them formally or logically is also true of what they are based on, to come now to that factor, and this we learn in the very opening (Greek) sentence of the *Rhetoric* consists of "such common things as are in a way known to all and belong to no definite science" (I 1 1354^{a}1–3). Later these are identified as including topics:

> Dialectical and rhetorical deductions are those concerned with what we call topics, which are common when they concern what is just, what is natural, what is political, and many things that differ in species (*eidos*)—for example, the topic of the more and the less. (*Rh*. I 2 1358^{a}10–14)

Then topics themselves are identified with (1) elements of enthymemes:

> Let us now speak of the elements of enthymemes. And by element (*stoicheion*) and topic, I mean the same thing. (*Rh*. II 22 1396^{b}20–21)

Then, in what looks like a definition, both elements and topics are described as (2) items "into the province of which many enthymemes fall (*eis . . . empiptei*)" (*Rh*. II 26 1403^{a}17–18).

Now an enthymeme has two sorts of things in it that we might intuitively call elements: premises and a logical form determinative of its {lxx} syllogistic mood (*Rh*. I 1 1354^{a}3n[3])—which is something like a rule of inference. And in fact common things seem to include such rules or premises expressing them:

> By the starting-points of demonstration I mean the common beliefs (*koinas doxas*) on the basis of which we all prove things, such as that in every case it is necessary either to affirm or deny, and that it is impossible for something at the same time to both be and not be, and any other propositions like that. (*Met*. III 2 996^{b}27–29)

And this makes perfect sense. For if an enthymeme is to persuade listeners it must at least appear valid to them (*Rh*. II 24 1401^{b}20–28). This does not mean, though, that the proposition expressing the rule need be a premise in the demonstration. Instead, the belief in it disposes a person having it to accept demonstrations or deductions exemplifying the rule. It is an element in that sense.

In keeping with the idea in (1) that topics are elements of enthymemes—propositions expressing common beliefs—is the implication that they are themselves reputable beliefs:

> It is clear that it is possible to produce the stating of a counter-deduction on the basis of the same topics [as a deduction]. For the deductions are based on reputable beliefs, and many things that seem to be so are contrary to one another. (*Rh*. II 25 1402^{a}32–34)

And this too makes perfect sense. For reputable beliefs must be, or must include, common ones—ones that apply transgenerically. But if that is what a topic is, what could it possibly mean to say that (2) many enthymemes *fall into the province* of an element or topic? Here the following provides the essential clue:

> One must also try to get possession of the [headings] into the province of which many arguments fall (*eis . . . empiptousin*). For just as in geometry it furthers the work to be trained in the elements (*stoicheia*), and in arithmetic to have the

> multiplication table up to ten at one's fingertips (*kephalismous*) (it makes a great difference also to knowing the multiples of the other numbers), so likewise in arguments too does having
>
> *******
>
> things {lxxi} at hand about starting-points. For just as in mnemonics, the mere mention of their places (*topoi*) straightaway makes the things themselves be remembered, so these [headings] will make one more capable at deducing (*sullogistikôteron*) because one sees these items defined and numbered. And a common (*koinên*) premise should be committed to memory rather than an argument. For to be well-equipped with a starting-point—that is, a hypothesis—is [only] moderately difficult. (*Top*. VIII 14 163^{b}22–33)

A common premise (for a dialectical deduction), we now see, is also something that can serve as a mnemonic device—a *topos*—for arguments, and as such is an item into the province of which these arguments fall. It is this, surely, that allows Aristotle to speak of topics in the two ways we distinguished. In (1) they are common propositions; in (2) they are common propositions serving as reminders of correlative arguments. They are thus at once headings in those catalogues of evidence we looked at that are all important in any science and items falling under them.

Though these two features are possessed by topics in both dialectic and rhetoric, the topics they are possessed by typically differ and have different purposes. Rhetoric is the "counterpart (*antistrophos*)" (*Rh*. I 1 1354^{a}1) of dialectic; it is not dialectic itself. Thus:

> Someone who is about to ask [dialectical] questions (*erôtêmatizein*) must first find the topic from which he must make his attack; second, formulate them [the things in the province of the topic] as questions (*erotêmatisai*) and arrange them (*taxai*) each by each for himself; thirdly and lastly he must go on to address them to the other party [the answerer]. (*Top*. VIII 1 155^{b}4–7)

A speechmaker, by contrast, is typically not going to be asking questions, though in some cases he might (*Rh.* III 18). Consequently, he is typically not going to be formulating what is in the province of his topic as questions, or addressing them to anyone. What a speechmaker needs to find in the province of his mnemonic topics are the bases, not for attacking or defending a proposition, but for arguments that his

audience should find persuasive. (That the two may overlap goes without saying.)

{lxxii} I have thus far been understanding the notion of a *stoicheion*, in the way Aristotle himself usually does, as an element in the intuitive sense of an elementary component. It is also possible to understand it, however, not as explaining what a topic is by adding a semantic contribution of its own to the mix, but simply as meaning what *topos* does. This is the sense one gets from, for example, the following texts:

> Again, for [getting people] to say contradoxical things, look to see what school (*genos*) the one arguing dialectically belongs to, and then question him on something it says that to most people is contradoxical. For in the case of each school there is something of this sort. A *stoicheion* in these cases is having the theses of each school among the premises one has hold of. (*SE* 12 $172^{b}29–32$)

> With a view to refutation, one thing is length. For it is difficult to keep many things in view at the same time. And to produce length the *stoicheia* that have been mentioned must be used. One is speed. For when people are left behind they see less far ahead. Further, there is anger and rivalry. For when people are agitated they are all less capable of being on their guard. - *Stoicheia* having to do with anger are: making it evident that one wishes to act unjustly and to be altogether shameless. (*SE* 15 $174^{a}21–23$)

But, as in the case of *topos* itself, there is nothing to prevent us from taking a leaf from both books. The *stoicheia* of anger, like the *stoicheion* that consists in having theses of the various schools among the premises from which one constructs one's enthymemes or dialectical deductions, are things one is to remember and have ready at hand when one wishes to produce anger in an opponent so as to agitate him and put him off his guard. But it is equally true that just as these premises will be elementary constituents of one's deductions, so what produces anger relies on what the elementary constituents of anger itself actually are. It is because anger is "desire, involving pain, for apparent revenge, because of apparent contempt on the part of someone unfitted to treat the person himself, or one of those close to him, with contempt" (*Rh*. II 2 $1378^{a}30–32$) that it can be aroused by an evident intention to act unjustly and shamelessly.

A final point. Topics fall, Aristotle claims, into two kinds: so called species or special topics, which are "premises special to a given genus" (*Rh*. I 2 1358^{a}31); and common ones, which "will not make someone wise about {lxxiii} any genus" (1358^{a}21–22), since they are transgeneric. The latter on one occasion actually usurp the name "topics": "by topics [I mean] those equally common to all" (1358^{a}32). But the predominant and clearer nomenclature is that of special and common topics, so I shall stick to that. Perhaps the use of the term *eidos* for the former derives from the fact that species generally—including canonical biological species—are special to their genus. Be that as it may, the fact that special topics are explicitly stated to be premises further supports our view of them.

There is more to a means of persuasion, as we saw, than its enthymematic body; there is also, for example, its typically non-enthymematic introduction and epilogue. When, as a result, we ask what rhetorical topics—whether special or common—are, we need to keep in mind that some of these will be topics for enthymemes proper, while others will be topics for other parts of the means of persuasion. Thus while Aristotle speaks of topics "concerning each of the kinds (*eidos*)" of enthymemes (*Rh*. II 22 1396^{b}28–29) and for apparent enthymemes (II 24 1401^{a}1), he also speaks of topics that "those who wish to make their listeners mild-mannered should speak from" (II 3 1380^{b}31–32), topics from which one should establish that someone is excellent or base (III 19 1419^{b}18–19), and, of course, topics related to accusation, which bear exclusively on the introduction and epilogue (II 23–24). While many enthymemes do fall into the province of a topic, then, they are not the only contents of a means of persuasion to do so.

Consider in this regard the topic of anger. Aristotle's discussion of it begins with a definition:

> Let anger be desire, involving pain, for apparent revenge, because of apparent contempt on the part of someone unfitted to treat the person himself, or one of those close to him, with contempt. (*Rh*. II 2 1378^{a}30–32)

We might think of this as falling under the rhetorical analogue of the dialectical maxim that "one should be well-equipped with definitions. . . . For it is through these that deductions come about" (*Top*. VIII 14 163^{b}20–22). But we should notice what sort of definition it is. And here we are helped by the following contrast:

> A natural scientist and a dialectician would define each of these [affections of the soul] differently—for example, what anger is. For a dialectician it is a desire for retaliation or something like that, whereas for a natural scientist it is a boiling of the blood and hot stuff around the heart. Of these, the natural scientist {lxxiv} gives the matter, whereas the dialectician gives the form and the account. (*DA* I 1 403^{a}29–^{b}2)

Focus on the final clause: "the dialectician gives the form and the account." No doubt this implies that the definition is based on reputable beliefs, which are the dialectician's ground-level evidence. But because dialectic is also "useful as regards the primary [starting-points] in each science" (*Top*. I 2 101^{a}36–37), and because reputable beliefs about things like anger and the raw starting-points of scientific psychology (or the science of soul) overlap, we cannot cavalierly assign the definition to popular thought rather than to science. And indeed Aristotle goes on in the *De Anima* to assign to the natural scientist knowledge of both the form and the matter of those affections of the soul that, like anger, are inseparable from the body (I 1 403^{b}9–19).

That the definition, which is clearly Aristotle's own, is scientific is evidenced by its very content, which is hardly what untutored popular thought would come up with, but also—and more importantly—by the fact that it must be a scientific one if indeed rhetoric is to get a theoretical grasp on "the *cause* (*aitian*) due to which some succeed [in persuading] because of habit and others because of chance," in the way requisite in a genuine craft, a genuine productive science (*Rh*. I 1 1354^{a}10–11). For it is clear that rhetoric will not specify the cause of a speaker's arousing anger in his listeners if it does not have a correct (real) definition of anger available to it. To know which reputable beliefs are true, we must know the truth of the matter:

> It belongs to the same capacity [= craft] to see the truth and what is like the truth. . . . That is why the capacity to aim at and hit upon the reputable beliefs belongs to the person who has a similar one with regard to the truth. (*Rh*. I 1 1355^{a}15–18)

But this does not mean, of course, that rhetoric establishes such scientific definitions for itself: it is exclusively "a capacity to get a theoretical grasp on what is possibly persuasive in each case" (I 2 1355^{b}25–26). Instead, it derives these from the associated sciences.

Politics, for example, which Aristotle names as one of these (*Rh*. I 4 1359^{b}9–12), must itself know quite a lot about the soul:

> A politician must in a way know about what pertains to the soul, just as someone who is going to take care of people's eyes must know about the body generally—more so, indeed, to the extent that politics is more estimable and better than medicine —and that doctors (the ones who are more sophisticated) occupy themselves greatly with knowing about the body. It is also for {lxxv} a politician, then, to get a theoretical grasp on what concerns the soul. But his theoretical grasp should be for the sake of the things in question and of an extent that is adequate to the things being looked for, since a more exact treatment is perhaps harder work than the issues before us require. (*NE* I 13 1102^{a}18–26)

We might say the same sort of thing about rhetoric itself.

The second point we should notice about the definition of anger, related to the first, is that it is not intended to figure as a premise in a speaker's enthymeme: he is not giving a scientific lecture on anger, aimed at teaching the truth about it (*Rh*. I 1 1355^{a}24–26). Instead, it is serving as a topic, telling or reminding him of what anger is in such a way as to have bearing on how to arouse or quiet it by means not of his enthymeme but of the other parts of his means of persuasion. Thus when anger is relevant to his rhetorical purposes, the topic comes immediately to his mind, and with it the argument-relevant definition.

By and large, then, one should cast a cautious eye on claims that the sorts of, for example, definitions found in the *Rhetoric* are loose and popular rather that strict or scientific. The truth is more nuanced. Whatever actually appears in a rhetorical argument must, of course, be accessible to the audience, and so must be based on common and reputable beliefs. But when, as in the case of anger, it guides the speaker's persuasive strategy, it must be based on scientific knowledge of genuine causes. Even then, however, whatever scientific bells and whistles it contains must be justified by its contribution to crafting persuasive arguments. ******** Moreover, many of the elements in a topic, though themselves based on causes, are clearly selected for their special relevance to rhetoric, rather than because of their importance to the sort of

scientific psychology we find in *De Anima*. The following remarks about anger are a case in point:

> It is already evident from these considerations by being disposed in which way people are angry, at whom they are angry, and because of what sorts of things. For they are angry when they are pained; for the one who is pained seeks something. If, then, anyone in any way directly obstructs, for example, a thirsty man from drinking, or if he does not do so directly, appears to be doing the same thing, or if he acts against him or does not assist him in acting, or annoys him in some other respect when he is so disposed [namely, seeking something], at all such people he is angry. That is why those who are ill, poor, {lxxvi} at war, in love, thirsty—in general, those with an appetite and not successful in satisfying it—are irascible, that is, easily provoked to anger, especially toward those who show contempt for their present condition. For example, the one who is ill is easily provoked because of things related to his illness, the poor one because of things related to his poverty, the one at war because of things related to the war, the one in love because of things related to his love, and likewise too in the other cases. For each is prepared by his present feeling to follow the path toward his particular anger. (*Rh*. II 2 $1379^{a}10$–24)

These astute remarks begin with, and rely upon, the scientific definition of anger, and are themselves causal in nature. But what they go on to say about it is pertinent especially to rhetoric, as something a competent speaker needs to know.

Turn back now to enthymemes themselves. They are based on topics, and many of the things that fall into the province of these are reputable beliefs. Many reputable beliefs, like the propositions of natural science, hold for the most part, many are likelihoods (*Rh*. I 2 $1357^{a}30$–$^{b}1$). Few are—though some may be—the unconditionally necessary starting-points of theoretical sciences. But none occurs in enthymemes because it is such. Persuasion not demonstration is rhetoric's aim. Nonetheless its own enthymemes do state causes:

> A maxim is an affirmation, not though about particulars . . . but about universals, and not about all of them . . . , but about

> the objects of actions, and with things that are to be chosen or avoided with a view to doing an action. So, since the [relevant] enthymemes are pretty much a deduction about such things, [maxims are pretty much] the conclusions of the enthymemes or their starting-points, the deduction being omitted. . . . But if the cause and the why are added, the whole thing is an enthymeme. (*Rh*. II 21 1394^{a}21–32)

Thus enthymemes are best suited to judicial speeches because "what has happened, because of its lack of perspicuousness, is most of all receptive of a cause and a demonstration" (*Rh*. I 9 1368^{a}32–33). Though some of the scientific knowledge manifest in enthymemes is surely borrowed from other sciences, in selecting the ones that will be maximally persuasive for these listeners, in this political constitution, a speaker is clearly drawing on causal knowledge special to rhetoric itself. It is, after all "a capacity to get a theoretical grasp on what is possibly persuasive in each case" {lxxvii} (2 1355^{b}25–26). And what is possibly persuasive is what can or should *cause* conviction in the listeners.

Likelihoods

Enthymemes are based on reputable beliefs—common things. But these themselves are of importantly different sorts. Some are likelihoods, some signs, some proofs, and some paradigms, all of which are "rhetorical premises" (*Rh*. I 3 1359^{a}7–8). Now, a likelihood (*eikos*) is:

> [1] What comes about for the most part (*hôs epi to polu*), not however simply so, as some people define it, but rather [2] when it concerns things that admit of being otherwise, [3] standing in relation to that in relation to which it is a likelihood as the universal stands to the particular. (*Rh*. I 2 1357^{a}34–^{b}1)

APr. II 27 gives the following examples: "[a] 'people hate those they envy' or [b] 'people love those they sexually desire'" (70^{a}5–6). [2], as it seems, is intended to exclude the possibility that [a] or [b] holds for the most part because it is in fact unconditionally necessary. [3] is a bit more complex. It, it seems, is intended to address cases like this: some people both envy and feel sexual desire. So in determining whether it is likely that they hate or likely that they love in the relevant circumstances, we must determine whether the relevant universal is the one in likelihood [a] (envy) or the one in likelihood [b] (sexual desire), and then make use of the correlative likelihood.

But what about [1]? What does it mean to say that something holds for the most part? We have already noticed some pertinent facts: propositions in many demonstrative sciences, including all natural ones, hold for the most part, so that while such propositions (provided they are not starting-points) admit of demonstration, the necessity involved in them "has gaps" (*APr.* I 13 $32^{b}6$). Now we must probe a bit deeper. For failure to grasp this part of Aristotle's thought makes it impossible to understand fully his thoughts—most pertinently—on signs (which are the subject of the next section), and arguments based on them, but on much else too.

Aristotle associates what holds by necessity with what holds always: "*necessary* and *always* go together (since what is necessary cannot not be)" (*GC* II 11 $337^{b}35$–36). And he associates what holds for the most part with what rarely fails to happen: "the contrary of what holds for the most part is always rather rarely said of things" (*Top.* II 6 $112^{b}10$–11). It might seem, then, that what holds for the most part is to be understood in terms of {lxxviii} relative frequency, so that, at a first pass, to say that "for the most part all crabs have the right claw bigger and stronger than the left" (*HA* IV 3 $527^{b}6$–7) is to say that *most* crabs do. One obvious problem with this proposal is that the statement about crabs will now involve two potentially inconsistent quantifiers, "all" and "most." A second problem with it pertains to validity. On Aristotle's view, syllogisms with universal premises and conclusions remain valid even when these hold for the most part:

> One must take also the for-the-most part things that follow (*ta hôs epi to polu hepomena*) and the ones they follow from; for in the case of problems about what holds for the most part, deductions depend on premises that, either all or some of them, hold for the most part (for the conclusion of each deduction is similar to its starting-points). (*APr.* I 27 $43^{b}32$–36)

The corresponding syllogisms with "most" (**m**) in place of "all" (**a**), on the other hand, are not always valid. For example, all syllogisms of the form, **a**AB, **a**BC | **a**AC (all As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore, all As are Cs), are valid. But this is not true of all syllogisms of the form, **m**AB, **m**BC | **m**AC (most As are Bs, most Bs are Cs, therefore, most As are Cs): most centenarians are women; most women are under seventy; but no centenarians are under seventy. Similarly, if something is a centenarian, it

is rare that it is not a woman; if it is a woman, it is rare that it is not under seventy; but it does not follow that, on the condition that something is a centenarian, it is merely rare that it is not under seventy. Thus if propositions that hold for the most part are of the form **m**AB or the like, the logic Aristotle provides for them is inconsistent.

Besides associating what holds for the most part with a notion of relative frequency, Aristotle also associates it with what holds "provided there is no impediment" (*Ph.* II 8 $199^{b}18$). It might seem, then, that propositions that hold for the most part might be transformed into propositions that hold necessarily and always by incorporating an explicit reference to the conditions under which the impediments are missing, so that **m**AB would then be analyzed as, **a**AB on condition C. The problem with this suggestion is that the conditions under which **a**AB holds need not be the same as those under which **a**BC does. And when they are not, the validity of what holds for the most part deductions is again compromised. For **a**AB on condition C_1, **a**BC on condition C_2 | **a**AC on condition C_x, is not generally valid.

Since what holds for the most part rarely fails to occur, it seems that whatever impediments prevent something that does hold for the most part from holding always must themselves occur rarely. Yet this Aristotle seems to deny:

> {lxxix} Nature tends, then, to measure the coming to be and end of animals by the regular movements of these bodies [the sun and moon], but nature cannot bring this about exactly because of the indefiniteness of matter, and because many starting-points exist which impede coming to be and passing away from being according to nature, and often (*pollakis*) cause things to occur contrary to nature. (*GA* IV 10 $778^{a}4$–9)

But since the "indeterminateness of matter" seems to be a standing condition, while the many starting-points that impede do not, we should presumably divide things up as follows. The indeterminateness of matter explains why propositions hold for the most part, and so have contraries that are rarely true, while impediments explain why what otherwise would occur rarely may occur quite often. All human beings are quadrupeds, and this would remain true even if some freak accident or genetic disorder resulted in all or most human beings having only one

leg. Nonetheless, absent impediments, frequency is a good guide to holding for the most part, and for the most part does imply frequently.

If we want to explain what it is for a proposition to hold for the most part, then, it is useful to begin not with the propositions themselves but with their ontological correlates or truth-makers—with the state of affairs A*B that makes **a**AB true rather than with **a**AB itself. Whenever we have a true proposition **a**AB, whether holding always or for the most part, the fact that A (the thing) and B (the thing) are related by the relation * is what makes it true. If, as we may suppose, * is transitive, the states of affairs A*B and B*C cannot obtain unless A*C does, the corresponding deduction, **a**AB, **a**BC | **a**AC, is valid. That is step one. The second step brings in the indefiniteness of matter. It is a standing and unchangeable condition. It is also one that cannot be captured in universal terms, which might then be used to transform what holds for the most part into something that holds always and without exception. The effect of introducing the indefiniteness of matter is not to threaten the existence of A*B, the transitivity of *, or the validity of the corresponding deduction. Instead, it explains why, even though the indefiniteness of matter does not threaten them, the proposition **a**AB can be false because of it: the necessity in it is gappy.

Take away from this discussion just these two things: gappy necessity of the sort involved in what holds for the most part is not the same as contingency; and this gappy necessity is first and foremost a feature of propositions, not of deductions—a deduction holds for the most part if and only if one of its constituent premises does. Now ask, what is it to refute a likelihood, or an enthymeme based on one? Here is the key text:

> {lxxx} It is not enough, then, to refute it by showing that it is not necessary, rather one should refute it by showing that it is not likely. And this will result if the objection holds to a higher degree for the most part. And an objection of this sort can be brought in two ways: either by the time or by the things at issue —but in the most controlling way, if by both (for if things are more often thus, this is more likely). (*Rh.* II 25 $1402^{b}33$–$1403^{a}1$)

So: what is to be refuted, we may suppose, is,

(1) p, q | r (p and q, therefore r),

—which is claimed to hold for the most part. This means that at least one of its constituent premises must hold for the most part. Let it be p. We cannot refute (1) by showing that p admits of a counterexample, since that would simply show that (1) is not unconditionally necessary, not that it is not gappily necessary, and so true for the most part. Instead what we have to do is show that not-p holds to a higher degree for the most part than p does. And this we do by showing, for example, that not-p is more often true than p. Everything else being equal that will be enough.

The logic of arguments employing premises holding for the most part is deductive logic—syllogistic, in Aristotle's view. We object to them by objecting to a premise in them, not by accepting the premises and conclusion while objecting to the logical relation holding between them: the importance of things that hold for the most part—the importance of likelihoods—is their importance as premises in enthymemes, not of their signaling some new sort of logic, neither deductive nor inductive. Aristotle is insistent that there is no such thing:

> I call a rhetorical deduction an enthymeme, and a rhetorical induction a paradigm. And everyone produces means of persuasion through showing something by means either of paradigms or of enthymemes, and of nothing beyond these. So if indeed it is, in general, necessary to show anything whatsoever either by deduction or by induction (and this is clear to us from the *Analytics*), it necessarily follows that enthymemes and paradigms are, respectively, the same as deductions and inductions. (*Rh*. I 2 1356^{b}4–11)

But the importance of likelihoods as premises is due to their gappy necessity and to the corresponding difficulty involved in objecting to them, and {lxxxi} so in refuting the deductions—in the case of rhetoric, the enthymemes—of which they are a part.

Signs, Proofs, and Paradigms

Enthymemes, to repeat, are "based on likelihoods (*eikotôn*) and signs (*sêmeiôn*)" (*Rh*. I 2 1357^{a}31–32), and signs, to come now to them, are divided into proofs (*tekmêrion*) and a nameless sort that Aristotle refers to simply as signs—and we shall now follow him in this. Proofs, for their part, are necessary signs, that is to say, "those from which a deduction comes about," and which, as such, are irrefutable, if true (I 2 1357^{b}5–9,

II 25 1403^{a}10–12). Thus proofs are reasonably easy to understand, given what we have already said about enthymemes: they are rhetorical premises that hold "necessarily and always" (II 25 1402^{b}18–19), and so can be parts even of demonstrations (1403^{a}14–15). We may reasonably conclude that their role in rhetoric is a minor one. For "while some of the premises on the basis of which enthymemes [rhetorical demonstrations] are stated will be necessary, the majority will hold for the most part" (I 2 1357^{a}30–32). It is on signs proper, then, and not on proofs, that rhetoric should more particularly focus.

Signs are of two sorts: related as (1) particular to universal or (2) as universal to particular (*Rh*. I 2 1357^{b}1–3). An example of (1): "if someone were to say that since Socrates is wise and just it is a sign that the wise are just" (1357^{b}11–13); an example of (2): "if someone were to say that there is a sign that a person is feverish, since he is breathing rapidly" (1357^{b}18–19). Both of these are refutable (1357^{b}13, 19–20). Yet, as Aristotle puts it in the *Prior Analytics*, "truth may be found in signs whatever their sort" (II 27 70^{a}37–38). The question is what sort of truth? Not necessary truth, we know that: signs are not proofs. But is it contingent truth or the sort of gappy necessary truth characteristic of likelihoods? And if it is the latter, are signs distinct from likelihoods or the very same thing?

It is useful in this regard to turn first to paradigms, which are rhetorical inductions (*Rh*. I 2 1356^{b}5–6). A paradigm involves showing "on the basis of many similar cases that things are a certain way" (1356^{b}14–15):

> It is not the relation of part to whole, of whole to part, or of whole to whole, but of part to part, and like to like—and it is a paradigm when both fall under the same kind (*genos*), but one is more knowable than the other. For example, [someone might claim] that Dionysius is aiming at tyranny in demanding a bodyguard, since Pisistratus too, when aiming at tyranny {lxxxii} previously, demanded a bodyguard and, having got one, made himself tyrant, and Theagenes did the same in Megara. (*Rh*. I 2 1357^{b}27–33)

How, then, should a paradigm be refuted? Here is the answer:

> The refutation of enthymemes based on paradigms is the same as that of likelihoods. For if we have one case that is not

> so, there is a refutation, because the argument is not a necessity, even if more cases on more occasions are otherwise, but if more cases or more occasions are that way, we should contend that his present one is not like them, or not like them in the relevant way, or at least has some differentiating feature (*diaphora*). (*Rh.* II 25 1403^{a}6–10)

An enthymeme based on an induction is a putative deduction with a premise based on an induction. Dionysus is aiming at tyranny in demanding a bodyguard. Why should we believe that? Answer: Pisistratus aimed at tyranny in demanding one. Dionysus is relevantly like Pisistratus. Therefore, Dionysius is aiming at tyranny in demanding one. This can be refuted by presenting the case of X who demanded a bodyguard but did not try to establish a tyranny. If more favorable cases than just Pisistratus are presented, what we should do to refute the argument is establish a relevant lack of similarity between these cases and Dionysus, or some differentiating feature that provides grounds for thinking that inductively-supported claim that people who demand bodyguards aim at tyranny does not apply to him. What we do not have to do—but which we do have to do to refute a likelihood—is to show that it is not *likely* that Dionysius in demanding a bodyguard is aiming at tyranny. That, as we have seen, is much harder to do.

With the difference between signs and paradigms clear in our minds we can turn to our second question, which is that of the relationship between signs and likelihoods. And there is a text that seems to tell us the answer in no uncertain terms:

> A likelihood and a sign are not the same, but rather a likelihood is a premise that is a reputable belief. For what people know happens or does not happen for the most part, or is or is not for the most part, is a likelihood—for example, "people hate those they envy" or "people love those they sexually desire." A sign, on the other hand, is meant to be a demonstrative premise, whether a necessity or a reputable belief. (*APr.* II 27 70^{a}2–7)

{lxxxiii} What is difficult about the answer, though, is that it seems to treat signs as if they were proofs (necessary signs), whereas the *Rhetoric* is careful to distinguish the two. What it tells us, in other words, is just that proofs are not likelihoods. But we already knew that.

To some extent, then, we must go part way back to the drawing board. A likelihood is something that holds for the most part: the *Rhetoric* and the *Analytics* are united on that front. So ask yourself this: what sort of proposition holds for the most part? The answer is obvious: a universally quantified one, like the one we encountered about crabs. For it certainly cannot hold for the most part that *some* crabs have their right claw bigger than their left. Their right claw is either bigger than the left or it isn't. The same goes for any particular crab. With signs, by contrast, there are some that are related as particular to universal, as the fact that Socrates is wise and just is a sign that the wise are just. Therein lies the difference we were looking for between likelihoods and signs. A sign can be a particular proposition; a likelihood cannot. At the same time, though, a sign is not just one of a bunch of similar things in a rhetorical induction, or paradigm. For it is not just a contingent fact that Socrates is both wise and just, as it might be that he was married to Xanthippe, but something (putatively) more robust than that, namely, a particular

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instance of a likelihood, or gappy necessity.

What rhetoric itself is, then, and what its distinctive starting-points—means of persuasion, enthymeme, topic, likelihood, sign, proof, and paradigm—are have now been, if not determined, at least discussed and explored. It is an appropriate moment, therefore, for a backward look.

The Shadow of Plato

The soul, whether divine or human, Socrates claims in the *Phaedrus*, is like "the natural union of a team of winged horses and their charioteer" (246a6–7). But whereas in a divine soul all three elements are "good and come from good stock," in a human soul the white horse (familiar from *Republic* IV as the honor-loving spirited part) is "beautiful and good, and of similar stock," while the black one (the *Republic*'s appetitive element) is "the opposite and of the opposite stock," so that "the driving in our case is necessarily difficult and troublesome" (246a7–b4). When spirit together with the charioteer (the *Republic*'s rational element, there too identified with what is truly human rather than bestial in us [588b10–589a4]) {lxxxiv} "leads us towards what is best and is in control," we possess moderation (*sôphrosunê*) (237e2–3). But when "appetite drags us irrationally towards pleasures and rules in us, its rule is called excess or lewdness (*hubris*)" (238a1–2). Of this excess, gluttony is one species, but

erotic love another (238b7–c4). This is the bad kind of love—Pandemotic in the *Symposium*—that Lysias rightly disparages in the speech Phaedrus admires and reads to Socrates (230e6–234c5).

In Socrates' view, however, there is also another kind of love, namely, "the madness of a man who, on seeing beauty here on earth, and being reminded of true beauty, becomes winged, and fluttering with eagerness to fly upward, but unable to leave the ground, looks upward like a bird, and takes no heed of things below—and that is what causes him to be regarded as mad" (249d5–e1). This madman is the philosopher of the *Symposium*, who when he falls in love with a boy is led by his love to ascend by stages to the Platonic form of the beautiful. What makes his madness a divine gift, however, is that the ascent is now revealed as involving recollection of a prior pre-natal ascent taken in the company of a god.

The love that is divine madness is a good thing, then, especially when, "accompanied by philosophical discussions (*erôta meta philosophôn logôn*)" (257b6). The question is what makes a discussion philosophical? What makes it of the sort to be included in the true art of love that the philosopher who loves the beautiful itself practices? The answer proposed is that it must be a craft—a *technê*—and so must have the defining characteristics of one. As applied to love itself, for example, it must begin with a definition of love, and reach its conclusions by ordering its discussion in relation to it (263d5–e3). And this definition, in turn, must be established by what Socrates refers to as collection and division (266b3–4).

Collection is a process of "perceiving together and bringing into one form items that are scattered in many places" (265d3–4). It is a process that we, unlike other animals, are able to engage in, because our souls include a rational element that has prior acquaintance with forms: "a soul that never [prenatally] saw what is true cannot take a human shape, since a human being must understand what is said by relation to a form that is reached from many sense-perceptions being collected into one by reasoning" (249b5–c1).

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Once a form has been reached in this way, division begins. This is a matter of "cutting the form up again, by relation to [sub-]forms, by relation to its natural joints" (265e1–2). As an example, Socrates cites the case of love itself:

> {lxxxv} Just as a single body naturally has its parts in pairs, with both members of each pair having the same name, and labeled respectively left and right, so the two speeches regarded madness as naturally a single form in us. The one [Socrates' reorganized version of Lysias' attack on love] cut off the part on the left side, then cutting it again, and not giving up until it had found among the parts a love which is, as we say, "left-handed," and abused it with full justice, while the other speech [Socrates' own defense of love] led us to the parts of madness on the right-hand side, and discovering and exhibiting a love which shares the same name as the other, but is divine, it praised it as a cause of our greatest goods. (265e4–266b1)

Thus, while each speech tells only half the story, the two together show how correct division should proceed. The goal is not just truth or correctness, however, but explanatory adequacy. Thus if the form in question "is simple, we should consider . . . what natural capacity it has for acting and on what, or for being acted upon and by what," and if it is complex, we should count its sub-forms, and consider the same things about them as about the simple ones (270d3–7). That Socrates—the archetypal searcher for explanatory definitions (*Euthphr.* 6d9–e6)—should pronounce himself "a lover of these divisions and collections" is no surprise (266b3–4).

Philosophy aims at true definitions and true stories based on them. But it also aims at persuasion, since the philosophical lover wants to persuade his boy to follow him on the path to the forms. Philosophy and rhetoric must go together, therefore, which means that rhetoric too must be developed as a craft. It must, first, distinguish and give definitions of the various kinds of souls and kinds of speeches, revealing their respective capacities and susceptibilities, and, second, "coordinate each kind of soul with the kind of speech appropriate to it, explaining why one kind of soul is necessarily convinced by one kind of speech, while another is not" (271b1–5). Mastery of such a science, however, requires one further thing: "the student must observe these things as they are in real life, and actually being put into practice, and be able to follow them with keen perception" (271d8–e1). It is not enough, in other words, to know what kinds of speeches affect what kinds of soul; the philosophical rhetorician must also know that this person in front of him is of such-and-such a

kind, and be able to talk in the kind of way that will prove convincing to him (271e2–272b2).

If we think (mistakenly, I have argued) that reputable beliefs—*endoxa*—are quite different from scientific evidence, and if we have an unnuanced picture of the role of science in rhetoric, we will see Aristotle as offering us a very different picture of rhetoric from Plato's. But if we are guided {lxxxvi} by our own earlier account of these matters, we will locate the difference in pretty much just one place. For while Plato apparently thinks of the philosopher-rhetorician—the only practitioner of the craft—as autonomously knowing the sciences on which he draws, and so being a sort of rhetorical philosopher-king, Aristotle assigns him autonomous knowledge only of what is possibly persuasive. This is certainly a big difference but one that should not be allowed to conceal the equally big similarities.

Another of these emerges when we consider Plato's account not of the soul in so-to-speak cosmic terms, as the *Phaedrus* does, but in political ones. I am thinking of what we find primarily in Books VIII and IX of the *Republic*, but also in that work as a whole. For there we learn that political constitutions and constitutions of the human soul go together, the one shaping the other, and the other—especially when present in the souls of the powerful rulers—the one. There are aristocratic, oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical constitutions, but there are also aristocratic, oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical souls. In aristocracies, aristocrats rule; in oligarchies, oligarchs; and so on. But in the aristocrats themselves, rational desires (the charioteer) rule, in tyrants, lawless appetitive ones (the blackest black one). Psychic organization and political organization are thus symbiotically connected. Laws make their way, via the political power of people with different sorts of souls, into education and habituation, and through them into other souls, and from souls back again, via political power, into laws, and the preservation of a constitution and way of life.

This is the background which allows Aristotle to claim that:

> The end aimed at by each constitution should not be overlooked [by the deliberative speaker], since people choose what furthers the end. The end aimed at by democracy is freedom; by oligarchy, wealth; by aristocracy, things concerned with education and customs; and by tyranny, keeping guard. It

> is clear, then, that it is as things related to the end aimed at by each constitution that one should distinguish characters, customs, and advantages, if indeed it is in relation to this that people make their choices. Since, then, means of persuasion come about not only through demonstrative argument but also through argument expressive of character (for we are persuaded by a speaker due to his appearing to be of a certain quality, that is, if he appears good, goodwilled, or both), we should have to hand the characters belonging to each constitution. For the character belonging to each is necessarily most persuasive to each. (*Rh*. I 8 1366^{a}2–14)

{lxxxvii} That our listeners are citizens of a more-or-less democratic society should influence not only how we, as practitioners of honest rhetoric, should present ourselves if we want to appear trustworthy to them, so that the body of our means of persuasion will be seen for what it truly is, but it is also how we should understand the ultimate ends that determine their other choices. Those ends may not be ours, but if we are, through our argument, to persuade them to change their ends for better ones, it is with the ones they actually have that we must start. That persuasion may be impotent, and sterner reformative measures required, is also something that, as having a "theoretical grasp on what is possibly persuasive in each case" (*Rh*. I 2 1355^{b}25–26), we will be in a position to recognize.

The Rhetoric *and Us*

Philosophers—and there is an element of the philosopher in all thinking people—read the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*, the *De Anima* and *Metaphysics*, not as ancient curiosities or as of merely historical interest, but as vital philosophical resources. When we think with Aristotle, we think better, not least when we disagree with him most. He is a worthy philosophical companion in part by being a worthy philosophical adversary. The *Rhetoric* is no less a masterpiece, I think, than these other great—and by philosophers more deeply studied—works, and its influence has been correspondingly enormous. We are its heirs, whether we study it or not. But is it, like its more philosophically admired companion works, still a vital resource, or is it more like *De Caelo* (say) or the *History of Animals*, great but part of the past? Read it

carefully, I say, and judge for yourself, as its closing words—εἴρηκα, ἀκηκόατε, ἔχετε, κρίνατε—invite you to do.

* "Unconditionally, what is prior is more knowable than what is posterior—for example, a point than a line, a line than a plane, and a plane than a solid, just as a unit is more so than a number, since it is prior to and a starting-point of all number. Similarly, a letter is more so than a syllable. To us, on the other hand, it sometimes happens that the reverse is the case. For the solid falls most under perception, the plane more than the line, line more than point. For ordinary people know things of the former sort earlier. For to learn them is a task for random thought, whereas to learn the others is a task for exact and extraordinary thought" (*Top*. VI 4 $141^{b}5$–14).

** Compare: "There are some things that cannot be put in only one genus—for example, the cheat and the slanderous accuser. For neither the one with the deliberate choice to do it but without the capacity, nor the one with the capacity but not the deliberate choice, is a slanderous accuser or a cheat, but rather the one with both" (*Top*. IV 5 $126^{b}8$–11).

*** Compare: "One must seek [premises] in the same way, looking not to indefinite things but to the facts the argument is about, marking off as many facts as possible and the ones closest to the thing at issue" (*Rh*. II 22 $1396^{b}6$–8).

**** For some elaborations and qualifications necessitated by the different functions of different sorts of speeches, see *Rh*. III 17.

***** Anytus was a democratic leader who helped restore democracy to Athens in 403 BC after the overthrow of the Thirty Tyrants (*Rh.* II 23 $1400^{a}18$n), under whom he had lost most of his wealth. Perhaps believing him responsible for the ruin of his son (Xenophon, *Apology* 29–31), and passionately opposed to sophists (Plato, *Meno* 89e–92c), he joined Meletus and Lycon in bringing a formal charge of impiety and corruption of the youth against Socrates in 399 BC.

****** See *Top*. I 18 $108^{b}12$–19, II 5 $112^{a}16$–23.

******* Secluding καὶ τὰς προτάσεις ἀπὸ στόματος ἐξεπίστασθαι ("and learning their premises by heart until they are at the tip of one's tongue").

******** See III 1 $1378^{a}8$–19 and the associated notes.

******** Aristotle uses signs in support of claims of his own more than thirty times in the *Rhetoric*, always, it seems, on the supposition that the

sign has this sort of character. See Index of Terms, s.v. Sign(s).

******** It is useful to compare this description with Aristotle's account of induction. See *Rh*. I 2 1356^{b}1n.

{1} Rhetoric

{2} Book I

I 1

Rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic.[1] For both |**1354ª1**| are concerned with such common things as are in a way known to all and belong to no definite science.[2] That is why all in a way share in both. For to a certain extent all try both to examine and to uphold an argument as well as to defend someone |1354ª5| and accuse someone.[3] Now among ordinary people, some do these things extemporaneously, others due to a state acquired by habit.[4] But since both ways are possible, it is clear that the same things could be done in a methodical way.[5] For it is possible to get a theoretical grasp on the cause due to which some succeed because of habit and others because of chance; and getting such a grasp, |1354ª10| all would immediately agree, is the function of a craft.[6]

Now as things stand those who have put together works on the craft of speeches have provided (one might almost say) no part of it.[7] For only the means of persuasion are within the province of craft; the other things are appendages.[8] But these writers say nothing about enthymemes, which just are the body of the means of persuasion, but mostly busy themselves with |1354ª15| matters that are outside the thing at issue.[9] For accusation, pity, anger, and such feelings of the soul do not have to do with the thing at issue, but are related to the juror.[10] So if all trials were conducted as they now are, at any rate in some cities, especially those that are in good legislative order, these writers would have nothing to say.[11] |1354ª20| For everyone thinks that the laws should proclaim this way of doing things (and some even make use of such laws and prohibit speaking of matters outside the thing at issue), as they in fact do in the court of the Areopagus, which correctly legislates against this.[12] For one should not distort [the judgment of] the juror by arousing anger, fear, or pity in him, since this would be as if someone who is going to use a standard, |1354ª25| made it crooked.[13] Further, it is evident that the task of the opponent is nothing at all outside of showing that [the thing at issue] is or is not the case, or did or did not occur. As to whether it is a large thing or a small one, however, or a just or an unjust one, whatever the legislator has

not defined, the juror should doubtless recognize for himself and not |1354[a]30| learn from the disputing parties.[14]

Above all, though, it is fitting for laws that are correctly laid down to define everything themselves, wherever possible, and leave the fewest things up to the jurors: first, because it is easier to find one or a few than {3} to find many who are practically-wise and capable of legislating and judging; |**1354[b]1**| next, legislation comes about on the basis of long-term investigations, whereas judgments are made on the spur of the moment, so it is difficult for the ones judging to give justice and advantage their due.[15] The most important factor of all, however, is that the judgment of a legislator is not a particular one, |1354[b]5| but is rather about future things and indeed about what is universal, whereas the assemblyman and the juror are already judging about present and definite issues, in relation to which they already feel both love and hatred, and with which their own private advantage is already knitted together, so that they are no longer capable of adequately seeing the truth, but instead |1354[b]10| their own private pleasure or pain overshadows their judgment.[16] Where other matters are concerned, then, as we say, the judge should be put in control of the fewest things, but where what has happened or has not happened, will be or will not be, or is or is not, are concerned, it is necessary to leave them up to judges since these the legislator cannot |1354[b]15| foresee.

If this is so, however, it is evident that those who define the other things are attempting to treat matters outside the thing at issue as being within the province of craft—for example, what the introduction or the narration should contain, as well as each of the other parts.[17] For they busy themselves only with how to produce a certain quality in the judge, |1354[b]20| whereas about the means of persuasion that are within the province of craft they show nothing, but it is on the basis of these that one would become enthymematically competent.

This is why indeed, although the same methodical inquiry is concerned with public and judicial oratory, and although public oratory is a nobler business and more suited to a citizen than the one concerned with transactions, these writers say nothing about the former, |1354[b]25| but all try to treat speaking in court as within the province of craft.[18] This is because, in cases of public oratory, it advances the work less to speak of matters outside the thing at issue and because public oratory is less malicious than judicial oratory, because more common in its scope.[19] For

there the person making a judgment is judging about his own affairs, so that no other thing is needed except to demonstrate that |1354[b]30| things are as his advisor says they are.[20] In judicial cases, by contrast, this is not enough, but rather it advances the work to win over the listener. For the judgment is about other people's affairs, so that the judges, looking to their own affairs, and listening with a view to gratification, surrender themselves to the opponents, and do not judge.[21] That is why, as we said previously, |**1355[a]1**| in many places the law prohibits speaking outside the thing at issue [in court], whereas in deliberative {4} contexts the people making the judgment adequately keep a watch over this.[22]

It is evident, however, that the methodical inquiry that is within the province of craft is concerned with the means of persuasion. And a means of persuasion is a sort of demonstration (for we are most persuaded when |1355[a]5| we take something to have been demonstrated).[23] And a rhetorical demonstration is an enthymeme; and this is (one might almost say) unconditionally the most controlling means of persuasion.[24] And an enthymeme is a sort of deduction.[25] And it belongs to dialectic, either as a whole or to one of its parts, to see about every sort of deduction. And since all that is so, it is clear that the person who is best able to get a theoretical grasp on |1355[a]10| the materials on the basis of which, and the manner in which, a deduction comes about is also the one who is most enthymematically competent, when he also grasps what sorts of things an enthymeme is concerned with and what sorts of differences (*diaphora*) there are between it and logico-linguistic deductions.[26] For it belongs to the same capacity to see the truth and what is like the truth, and at the same time human beings |1355[a]15| are naturally adequate as regards the truth and in most cases hit upon it.[27] That is why the capacity to aim at and hit upon the reputable beliefs belongs to the person who has a similar capacity with regard to the truth.[28]

It is evident, then, that the other writers treat matters outside the thing at issue as within the province of craft, and also evident why they lean more toward judicial oratory. |1355[a]20|

Rhetoric is useful, though, [1] because true things and just things are by nature stronger than their contraries, so that if judgments are not in accord with what is fitting, it must be because of these that they are defeated, and this merits criticism.[29]

Further, [2] not even the possession of the most exact scientific knowledge would make it easy for us in speaking to persuade some listeners on the basis of it.[30] |1355ª25| For argument in accord with scientific knowledge is proper to teaching, but teaching is impossible [in their case].[31] Instead, it is necessary to produce our means of persuasion and arguments (*logos*) out of common things, as we said in the *Topics* about encounters with ordinary people.[32]

Further, [3] one should be capable of persuading people of contraries, just as in the case of [dialectical] deductions, not |1355ª30| so as to do both in action (for one should not persuade people of base things), but in order that it not escape our notice how things stand, and, if someone else uses arguments (*logos*) in an unjust way, so as to be able to refute them for ourselves.[33] For none of the other crafts deduces contraries; dialectic and rhetoric alone do this, since both are alike concerned {5} with |1355ª35| contraries.[34] To be sure the underlying things at issue are not alike. On the contrary, true and better ones are always by nature more easily deduced and unconditionally more persuasive.

In addition, [4] it would be absurd if not being capable of defending oneself with one's body is shameful, while not being capable of doing so with speech were not shameful. For the latter is more special |**1355ᵇ1**| to a human being than the use of the body.[35] [If it is objected] that the one who unjustly uses such a capacity for [making] speeches might do great harms, *that* objection applies to all good things except virtue, and especially to the most useful ones, such as strength, |1355ᵇ5| health, wealth, and generalship.[36] For by using these justly someone can confer the greatest benefits, and by using them unjustly, the greatest harms.

It is evident, then, that rhetoric does not deal with a definite genus, but is like dialectic, and that it is useful, and that its function is not to persuade but to see the |1355ᵇ10| persuasive factors belonging in each case, just as in all the other crafts.[37] For it is not the function of medicine to produce health either, but rather to promote health as far as possible. For even to those who are incapable of partaking in health it is nonetheless possible to give good treatment. In addition, it is evident that it is a function of the same craft to see what is persuasive and what is apparently persuasive, |1355ᵇ15| just as in the case of dialectic it is to see the deduction and the apparent deduction. For sophistic is what it is in virtue not of the capacity but of the deliberate choice.[38] Here, in the case of

rhetoric, however, one person is an orator in virtue of his scientific knowledge, another in virtue of his deliberate choice, whereas there, in dialectic, a sophist is so called in virtue of his deliberate choice, and a dialectician |1355^{b}20| is so called not in virtue of his deliberate choice, but in virtue of the capacity he has.[39]

Let us now try to discuss the methodical inquiry itself, and the manner in which and the materials on the basis of which we will be capable of achieving the goals we set down.[40] Let us, then, as it were make a fresh start, and, having defined again what rhetoric is, state the rest.

I 2

Let rhetoric, then, be a capacity to get a theoretical grasp on |1355^{b}25| what is possibly persuasive in each case.[41] For this is not the function of any other craft whatsoever. For each of the others is capable of teaching and persuading about its own subject matter—for example, medicine about healthy and unhealthy things, geometry about the coincidental attributes of magnitudes, and arithmetic about numbers, and likewise |1355^{b}30| the rest of the crafts and sciences.[42] But rhetoric seems to be able to get {6} a theoretical grasp on what is persuasive on (one might almost say) any given subject matter. That is why we say that, as craft-like, it is not concerned with a special, definite genus.[43]

Of the means of persuasion, though, some are outside the province of craft, whereas others are within the province of craft. By outside the province of craft |1355^{b}35| I mean those that are not provided by ourselves [as orators], but are there at the start—for example, witnesses, results of torture, contracts, and the like.[44] And by within the province of craft I mean those capable of being furnished by the methodical inquiry and ourselves. So one must use the former and find the latter.

Of the means of persuasion that proceed through speech, there are three kinds (*eidos*).[45] **|1356^{a}1|** For some depend on [1] the character of the speaker, some on [2] disposing the listener in some way, and some on [3] the argument itself, due to its showing or appearing to show something.[46]

[1] Persuasion is through character whenever the speech is stated so that |1356^{a}5| it makes the speaker worthy of trust. For we trust decent people more, and more readily, on simply all subjects, and trust them entirely where there is no exactness but rather no belief either way.[47] This should come about through the speech, however, not through prior belief

that the speaker is of a certain quality. For it is not the case, |1356[a]10| as some claim who treat the subject as within the province of craft, that the decency of the speaker contributes nothing to persuasiveness; rather, character is pretty much (one might almost say) the most controlling factor in persuasion.[48]

[2] Persuasion is through the listeners whenever they are led to feel things by the speech. For we do not give the same judgments pained |1356[a]15| and pleased, or loving and hating. It is with this, and only with this, we say, that those people busy themselves who now treat the subject as within the province of craft. The details where this is concerned will be made clear when we speak about feelings.[49]

[3] Persuasion is through argument whenever we make clear the truth or the apparent truth on the basis of what is persuasive in each case.

Since, |1356[a]20| though, the means of persuasion are through these things, it is evident that to get hold of them a person must be capable of deducing and of getting a theoretical grasp on character, on the virtues, and third on feelings—that is, on what each of them is and what sort of thing, and from what it arises and in what way.[50] So it follows that rhetoric is a sort of offshoot |1356[a]25| of dialectic and of work in ethics, which it is right to call politics.[51] That is why rhetoric cuts the same figure as politics, as do those who pretend to a knowledge of it—some through {7} lack of educatedness, some through boastfulness, and some through other human causes.[52] In fact, it is a part |1356[a]30| of dialectic, and similar to it, as we also said at the start.[53] For neither of them is the science of how things stand with some definite [genus], but rather both are capacities concerned with providing arguments (*logos*).

About their capacities themselves, then, and how they stand in relation to each other, pretty much enough has been said.

[3] In cases of persuasion that operate through showing |1356[a]35| or appearing to show something, just as in dialectical ones there is induction, deduction, and |**1356[b]1**| apparent deduction, so it is like that here as well.[54] For a paradigm is an induction, and a enthymeme a deduction, and an apparent enthymeme an apparent deduction. I call a rhetorical deduction an enthymeme, and a rhetorical induction a paradigm.[55] |1356[b]5| And everyone produces means of persuasion through showing something by means either of paradigms or of enthymemes, and of nothing beyond these. So if indeed it is, in general, necessary to show

anything whatsoever either by deduction or by induction (and this is clear to us from the *Analytics*), it necessarily follows that enthymemes and paradigms |1356^{b}10| are, respectively, the same as deductions and inductions.[56]

The difference (*diaphora*) between a paradigm and an enthymeme is evident from the *Topics* (for there deduction and induction were spoken about previously), namely, that to show on the basis of many similar cases that things are a certain way is an induction in dialectic and a paradigm in rhetoric; |1356^{b}15| whereas to show that if some things are so, something beyond them follows through them by their being so, whether universally or for the most part, is called in dialectic a deduction and in rhetoric an enthymeme.[57] And it is evident too that each species of rhetoric has [its] advantage (for what is said in the *Methodics* |1356^{b}20| is so in these cases as well).[58] For some speeches are paradigmatic, others enthymematic; and speakers are the same way, some are paradigmatic, others enthymematic.[59] For arguments (*logos*) through paradigms are not less persuasive, but enthymematic ones are more applauded.[60] The cause, and how |1356^{b}25| each should be used, we shall discuss later. Now, though, we shall define these things themselves more clearly.

For since the persuasive is persuasive to someone (and is either immediately persuasive and convincing by itself or seems to be shown by such things), and since no craft investigates what is particular (for example, |1356^{b}30| medicine does not investigate what is healthy for Socrates or Callias but for a person of such-and-such a sort or for persons of such-and-such a sort—for this is in the province of craft, whereas what is particular is unlimited and is not scientifically knowable), rhetoric does not get a theoretical grasp on a particular reputable belief either {8} (for example, one persuasive to Socrates or to Hippias) but on one persuasive to people of such-and-such a sort, just as in the case of dialectic.[61]

For even dialectic does not deduce |1356^{b}35| from random things (for even to crazy people some things appear to be so) but from things [that appear to be so] to those in need of argument, as rhetoric does from things [that appear to be so] to those already accustomed to deliberate among themselves.[62] For rhetoric's function is concerned with |**1357^{a}1**| the sorts of things we deliberate about and have no crafts for, and in the presence of such listeners as are not capable of getting a comprehensive view of many or of rational calculation from a distant [starting-point].[63] For we

deliberate about things that appear to admit of alternative possibilities. For |1357ª5| no one deliberates about things that they take to be incapable of being otherwise than they have been, will be, or are.[64] For there is nothing more [to do about it].

It is possible, though, to deduce and draw conclusions either from previous deductions or from things that are not deduced, but which are in need of being deduced because they are not reputable beliefs. The former, however, are of necessity |1357ª10| not easy to follow due to their length (for the judge is assumed to be a simple person), while the latter are not persuasive because they are not drawn from things that are agreed nor from reputable beliefs.

So it is necessary for both an enthymeme and a paradigm to be concerned with things that for the most part admit of being other than they are (a paradigm being an induction, |1357ª15| an enthymeme being a deduction), and to be composed of few premises and fewer often than those that compose the primary deduction.[65] For if one of these is known, there is no need to state it, since the listener himself supplies it.[66] For example, to show that Dorieus was the victor in a competition in which the prize was a crown, it is enough to say that he won a victory in the Olympic games; there is no need to add that |1357ª20| the prize in the Olympic games is a crown, since everyone knows that.[67]

Since few of the premises from which rhetorical deductions are composed are necessary (for most of the things that judgments and investigations are concerned with admit of being otherwise; for people deliberate about and investigate what they do in action, and things done in action are all |1357ª25| of this kind (*genos*) and none—one might almost say—is necessary), and since things that happen for the most part and are possible must be deduced from other such things, and necessary ones from necessary ones (and this is also clear to us from the *Analytics*), it is evident that while some of the premises on the basis of which enthymemes are stated |1357ª30| will be necessary, the majority will hold for the most part.[68] But enthymemes are based on likelihoods and {9} signs, so that it is necessary that each of these be the same as the corresponding one of the former.[69]

A likelihood is what comes about for the most part, not however simply so, as some people define it, but rather [1] when it concerns things |1357ª35| that admit of being otherwise, [2] standing in relation to that in

relation to which it is a likelihood as the universal stands to the particular.[70]

Of signs, on the other hand, |**1357^{b}1**| some are related as particular to universal, others as universal to particular.[71] Of these, a necessary sign is a proof (*tekmêrion*), while that which is not necessary has no differentiating name. Now I call necessary those from |1357^{b}5| which a deduction comes about. That is why indeed such a sign is a proof. For when people think that it is not possible to refute what has been stated, they think they are putting forward a proof, on the supposition that the matter has been shown and come to an end. For *tekmar* and *peras* are the same in the ancient tongue.[72]

An example of signs |1357^{b}10| related as particular to universal is if someone were to say that, since Socrates is wise and just, it is a sign that the wise are just. This is indeed a sign, but it is refutable, even if true of the case mentioned, since it is non-deductive. But if someone were to say that there is a sign that someone is ill, since he has a fever, or that a woman has given birth, in that |1357^{b}15| she has milk, it is a necessary one. And among signs, this is just what a proof alone is. For only it, if true, is irrefutable. An example of signs related as universal to particular is if someone were to say that there is a sign that a person is feverish, since he is breathing rapidly. This too is refutable, even if true [of the person in question]. For it is possible to breathe rapidly and not be feverish. |1357^{b}20|

What a likelihood is, then, what a sign is, and what a token, and in what way they differ has now been stated. In the *Analytics* we have defined them in a more evident way, and what the cause is due to which some are non-deductive and others deductive.[73] |1357^{b}25|

We have said that a paradigm is an induction and what sorts of things it is an induction about.[74] It is not the relation of part to whole, of whole to part, or of whole to whole, but of part to part, and like to like—and it is a paradigm when both fall under the same kind (*genos*), but one is more knowable than the other. For example, [someone might claim] that |1357^{b}30| Dionysius is aiming at tyranny in demanding a bodyguard, since Pisistratus too, when aiming at tyranny previously, demanded a bodyguard and, having got one, made himself tyrant, and Theagenes did the same in Megara.[75] And the others that [the listeners] know all become paradigms for Dionysius, of whom they do not yet know whether it is

because of this that he demands a bodyguard. And {10} all these fall under the same universal, |1357^{b}35| namely, that someone aiming at tyranny demands a bodyguard.

The things from which those means of persuasion that seem to be demonstrative are composed have now been stated.

There is a very great difference (*diaphora*) among enthymemes, however, |**1358^{a}1**| that has escaped the notice of pretty much everyone, even though the very same difference is also found in the dialectical methodical investigation of deductions. For some enthymemes are in accord with rhetoric, just as some are in accord with the dialectical |1358^{a}5| methodical investigation of deductions, while others are in accord with the other crafts and capacities, whether those in existence or those not yet acquired.[76] That is why the difference escapes the notice of the listeners, and the more they grasp in accord with a mode [of inquiry], the more they stray beyond these [namely, rhetoric or dialectic]. This will be more perspicuous if stated in more detail.[77]

For I mean |1358^{a}10| that dialectical and rhetorical deductions are those concerned with what we call topics, which are common when they concern what is just, what is natural, what is political, and many things that differ in species—for example, the topic of the more and the less.[78] For it is no less possible to state a deduction or an enthymeme based on it |1358^{a}15| about matters of justice than it is about matters of natural science, or about anything else whatsoever, even though these things differ in species.[79] Special topics on the other hand are the ones based on premises concerning a given species and genus. For example, there are premises concerning natural things on which neither an enthymeme nor a deduction can be based concerning ethical things, and about the latter there are others on which none can be based concerning natural ones.[80] |1358^{a}20| And the same holds in all cases. The common topics will not make someone wise about any genus, since they are not concerned with any underlying subject.[81] But as to the special ones, the better someone is at selecting premises, [the more] he will—without noticing it—produce a science that is distinct from dialectic and rhetoric.[82] For if he hits upon starting-points, it will no longer be dialectic or |1358^{a}25| rhetoric, but instead will be that science whose starting-points he possesses.[83]

And yet most enthymemes are based on these, the so-called species, the ones that are particular and special, fewer on the common topics. As

in the *Topics*, then, so also here a distinction must be made between the species and the topics, on the basis of which enthymemes are selected. |1358[a]30| By species I mean the premises special to a given genus, and by topics those equally common to all.[84] We may begin, then, with the species. But let us first take up the kinds (*genos*) of rhetoric, so {11} that having determined how many they are, we may separately take up their elements and premises.[85] |1358[a]35|

I 3

The kinds (*eidos*) of rhetoric are three in number, since the listeners to speeches are of the same number. For a speech is composed of three elements: the speaker, what he speaks about, and whom it is addressed to. And the end it aims at relates to this—I mean, |**1358[b]1**| the listener. Now the listener must be either a spectator or a judge, a judge of either things past or things future. For example, an assemblyman is a judge concerning things future and a juror concerning things past, |1358[b]5| whereas a spectator is one concerned with capacity.[86] So of necessity there would be three kinds (*genos*) of speeches belonging to rhetoric: deliberative, judicial, and epideictic.[87]

A deliberative one is either exhortation or dissuasion.[88] For both those who serve as private advisors and those who speak publicly in the common assembly always do one or the other of these.[89] A judicial one |1358[b]10| is either accusatory or defensive, since it is necessary for the opponents to make one or the other of these. And an epideictic one consists in either praise or blame. Moreover, the times belonging to each of these are: to the advisor, the future (for whether exhorting or dissuading he advises about future things); to the judicial speaker, the |1358[b]15| past (for it is concerning what has been done in action that he always accuses or defends); and to the epideictic speaker the present has the most control (for all speakers praise or blame with regard to qualities that belong at present), although they often also make use of past things by way of recalling them, and of future ones by way of anticipating them.[90]

The end |1358[b]20| aimed at by each of them, though, is distinct—that is, three for three: to the deliberative speaker the end is the advantageous and harmful (for the one who exhorts advises something as a better course, while the one who dissuades, dissuades from something as a worse one), and he includes the others—just or unjust, noble or shameful—as

ancillary to this; |1358[b]25| to judicial speakers the end is the just and the unjust, and they too include the others as ancillary to these; and to those praising and blaming the end is the noble and the shameful, and they too take in the others as an assistant to these.[91]

A sign that what has been mentioned is the end of each is that sometimes speakers |1358[b]30| might not dispute about the other things—for example, a judicial speaker might not dispute that he had done something or done harm, but he would never agree that he had done an injustice. For {12} then there would be no need of a trial. Similarly, deliberative speakers, though they often let the other things go, would never concede that they are advising non-advantageous things or that they are dissuading from beneficial ones, |1358[b]35| but often they give no thought to [showing] it not unjust to enslave neighbors or those who have done no injustice.[92] And similarly those who praise and blame do not investigate whether a person has done advantageous things or harmful ones, but often take it as a matter for praise that, |**1359[a]1**| neglecting what was profitable to himself, he did something noble—for example, they praise Achilles because he went to the aid of his companion Patroclus, knowing that he himself must die, though he could have gone on living. To him, a death of this sort was nobler, although the advantageous thing was to live.[93] |1359[a]5|

It is evident from what has been said, then, that the speaker must first possess premises concerning these matters. For proofs, likelihoods, and signs are rhetorical premises, a deduction is wholly composed of premises, whereas an enthymeme is a deduction composed of the aforementioned premises. |1359[a]10| And since it is not impossible things that can have been done or will be done through action, but rather possible ones, and since what has not occurred nor will occur can neither have been done nor will be done, it is necessary for the deliberative, judicial, and epideictic speaker to possess premises dealing with possible and impossible, |1359[a]15| and whether something has happened or not, or will or will not happen. Further, since all speakers, whether praising or blaming, exhorting or dissuading, accusing or defending, not only try to show the things we mentioned but also that the good or the bad, the noble or the shameful, |1359[a]20| the just or the unjust, is great or small, either intrinsically speaking or in comparison to each other, it is clear that it will be necessary also to possess premises dealing with greatness and smallness

and the greater and the lesser, both universally and in particular—for example, what is the greater or lesser good, or unjust action or just action —and similarly |1359[a]25| for the others.

The things concerning which it is necessary to get hold of premises have now been stated. Next we must distinguish between each of them individually, namely, what things deliberative speech is concerned with, what things epideictic speeches are concerned with, and third what things judicial speeches are concerned with.

I 4

First, then, the sorts of good things and bad ones |1359[a]30| that the deliberative speaker gives advice about must be grasped, since it is not about all, {13} but about those that may possibly come to be or may not, whereas about those that of necessity either are or will be, or that cannot be or come to be, there is no giving advice. Nor indeed is there any about all possible things. For some good things among those that can come to be, or not come to be, by nature or by luck, |1359[a]35| and about those it does not at all advance the work to give advice.[94] But it is clear that there is giving advice concerning what we deliberate about, namely, concerning those things that can naturally be brought back to ourselves, and the starting-point of whose coming to be is up to us.[95] For we investigate as far as this: until we discover whether something is possible or impossible for us to do in action.[96] |**1359[b]1**|

Now to enumerate particular by particular in an exact way and divide into kinds (*eidos*) the things that people are accustomed to deliberate about in public, or to define them, as far as is possible where they are concerned, in accord with the truth, is not an inquiry we should undertake at the present moment, because |1359[b]5| this is not a matter for the craft of rhetoric—to which many more things than the ones within its own proper theoretical grasp are at present assigned—but for a more thought-involving and more truth-focused one.[97] For just what we said earlier is true, namely, that rhetoric is composed of the science of analytics and the [part of] politics concerned with ethics, |1359[b]10| and is like dialectic on the one hand and sophistical arguments (*logos*) on the other.[98] And to the extent that someone tries to establish dialectic or rhetoric not just as capacities but as sciences, to that extent he will—without noticing it—obscure their nature by the change, re-establishing them as sciences of certain underlying things, |1359[b]15| rather than only of arguments

(*logos*).[99] Nonetheless, let us now discuss as much as it furthers the work to go through, while still leaving the investigation of the rest to the science of politics.

Indeed, of the things that all people deliberate about and deliberative speakers speak in the assembly about, pretty much the most important are five |1359^{b}20| in number.[100] And these are: finances, war and peace, further, the defense of the country, imports and exports, and legislation.

So the one who is going to give advice about finances must know: what sorts of public revenues there are and how extensive they are, so that if any is omitted it may be added, and |1359^{b}25| if any is too small it may be increased; further, all the expenses of the city, so that if any is superfluous, it may be eliminated, and if any is too large it may be reduced. For people become wealthier not only by adding to what they have, but by eliminating expenses. It is not possible, though, from experience of matters relating to one's private affairs alone |1359^{b}30| to get a comprehensive view of these, rather it is necessary, with a view to giving advice about {14} them, to be disposed to inquire into what has been discovered on the part of others.[101]

Where war and peace are concerned, it is necessary to know: the military capacity of the city, both how great it is already and how great it can become, of what sort it is and |1359^{b}35| what else might be added to it; further, what wars it has waged and in what way. And it is necessary to know these not only about one's own city but also about bordering ones, and those with whom there is a danger of war, in order that peace may be maintained with the stronger ones, and that war with weaker ones may be up to it. |**1360^{a}1**| And one must know whether their military capacities are like or unlike that of his own city. For it is also possible to be advantaged or disadvantaged with respect to that. With reference to these matters, it is necessary to get a theoretical grasp not only on the wars of his own city but also on those of others, and how they ended. For like results naturally come about from like causes. |1360^{a}5|

Further, in regard to defense of the country one must not neglect to consider how it is to be defended, but one should also know the size of the defense force and its kind (*eidos*), as well as the locations of the guardhouses (and this is impossible without having experience of the country), in order that it may be increased if it is too small, eliminated if superfluous, and |1360^{a}10| suitable places kept a watch over instead.

Further, where food is concerned, one must know how much is adequate for the city and of what sorts, whether coming from the city itself or importable, and which sorts should be exported and which sorts imported, in order that contracts and treaties with the relevant ones be made.[102] For there are two |1360[a]15| one must closely guard the citizens from having disputes with: those that are stronger and those that are useful for the present purposes.

With a view to safety, it is necessary for [a deliberative speaker] to be capable of getting a theoretical grasp on all these things, but not least to have knowledge of legislation. For it is in the laws that the preservation of the city is based. So it is necessary to know how many |1360[a]20| kinds (*eidos*) of constitution there are, and what sorts of things are advantageous for each, and by what sorts—whether proper to it or the contrary—it is naturally destroyed.[103] By being destroyed by things proper to itself I mean that except for the best constitution, all the others are destroyed by loosening or tightening—for example, democracy becomes weaker |1360[a]25| not only when loosened, so that finally it ends up being an oligarchy, but also when tightened to excess, just as both a hook nose and a snub nose do not only reach the mean when loosened, but if they become exceedingly hooked or snub they are arranged in such a way that they do not seem to be noses at all.[104] In {15} relation to legislation it is useful |1360[a]30| for the person who has a theoretical grasp on the matter not only to get knowledge of what constitution is advantageous on the basis of its past but also to know the constitutions present in others, that is, which ones are fitting for which sorts of people.[105] So it is clear that, in relation to legislation, reports of world travelers are useful (for there one can get hold of the laws of [foreign] nations), and in relation to |1360[a]35| political deliberations, the researches of those writing about actions.[106] All these are a function of politics, however, not of rhetoric.[107]

These, then, are the most important things that someone who is going to give advice must possess premises about. But **|1360[b]1|** let us now go back and state the ones on the basis of which one should exhort or dissuade on these and the other matters.

I 5

Both for each private individual and for all people in common there is pretty much a sort of target they aim at in what they choose and avoid.[108] And |1360[b]5| this, to speak in headline form, is happiness and its parts.[109]

So, for the sake of having a paradigm, let us get hold of what happiness is, simply speaking, and of what its parts are composed. For every sort of exhortation and dissuasion is concerned with it and with the things that lead to it or are contrary to it. |1360^{b}10| For the things that provide happiness or some part of it, or which produce more rather than less of it, are the things that one should do in action, whereas the things that destroy or impede it or produce the contraries [of it or its parts] are the ones that one should not do.[110]

Let happiness, then, be doing well in action involving virtue, or self-sufficiency for living, or the pleasantest life involving security, or as abundance of possessions |1360^{b}15| and bodies, involving the capacity to guard these and make use of them in action.[111] For pretty much everyone agrees that happiness is one or more of these.

If, then, happiness is something of this sort, its parts must be good breeding, having many friends, having good friends, wealth, having good children, having many |1360^{b}20| children, having a good old age; further, the virtues of the body (for example, health, noble beauty, strength, stature, athletic capacity), reputation, honor, good fortune, virtue. For a person would be most self-sufficient if he had both the goods internal to himself and the external goods, |1360^{b}25| since there are no others beyond these. (The internal ones are those relating to the soul and those in the body, whereas good breeding, friends, wealth, and honor are external.[112]) Besides these we think that he should possess certain {16} capacities and luck. For that way his life would be most secure.[113] Let us now, in a similar way, get hold of what each of these is.[114] |1360^{b}30|

Good breeding in the case of a nation or a city, then, means that its members are indigenous or ancient, that its first leaders were distinguished men, and that from them have sprung many who were distinguished for qualities we admire. The good breeding of an individual may result from the male side or from the female one, requires legitimacy [in birth and citizenship] on both, and—as in the case of a city—that the |1360^{b}35| earliest ancestors were notable for virtue, wealth, or something else that is highly esteemed, and that many distinguished people—men and women, young and old—come from the stock.[115]

Having good children and many children is quite clear. For the community, it consists in a large number of young people who are good—good |**1361^{a}1**| as regards virtue of body (such as stature, noble beauty,

strength, and athletic capacity). As for the virtues of a young person's soul, these are temperance and courage. And for the individual, having good children and many children consists in having many of his own and of the sort described, both female and male. In the case of female ones, |1361ª5| virtue of body consists in noble beauty and stature, and of soul, in temperance and being industrious without being un-free.[116] And alike for the individual and for the community, both with regard to women and with regard to men, each of these qualities must be sought.[117] Those, like the Spartans, in which the qualities of the women are bad, are pretty much |1361ª10| half not happy.[118]

The parts of wealth are a quantity of money, land, the possession of numerous large and nobly beautiful estates; further, possession of movables and of slaves and cattle distinguished by their number and noble beauty; and all these privately owned, secure, |1361ª15| free, and useful.[119] And more useful are the things that are fruitful, but more free are the things that are related to enjoyment. By fruitful I mean those that are sources of income; by related to enjoyment I mean those from which nothing at all worth mentioning comes about beyond the use.[120] The definition of secure is what is possessed in such places and in such a way that the use of it is up to the owner himself. |1361ª20| And whether something is privately owned or not is a matter of when its alienation is up to him, and by alienation I mean gifting or selling. And, in general, being wealthy consists more in using than in possessing. For it is in the activation and use of such things that wealth consists.[121]

Good reputation consists in being considered an excellent person by all, |1361ª25| or having some quality of the sort that is sought by all, either by ordinary people, by the good, or by the practically-wise.[122]

{17} Honor is a sign of a good reputation as a benefactor, and those who have been benefactors are justly honored above all, nevertheless those who are capable of benefaction are honored too. Benefaction is either with regard to security [of life] and to whatever |1361ª30| is a cause of life, or to wealth, or to some other good things, namely, those that are not easy to acquire, whether in general, in this given situation, or whenever (for many people gain honor for things that seem small, yet the places and the opportune times are the causes of honor).[123] The parts of honor are: sacrifices, memorial inscriptions |1361ª35| in verse or prose, privileges, grants of land, front seats, public burial, statues, public maintenance, the

barbarian ones (for example, prostrations and standings aside), and gifts that are considered honors in the given place. For a gift in fact is the giving of a possession and a sign of honor, which is why both lovers of wealth and lovers of honor seek them. For the gift is to both of them what they want, since it is both a possession, which is sought by those who love |**1361^{b}1**| wealth, and involves honor, which is sought by those who love honor.

Virtue of body is health, and of such a sort that we are free from sickness when making use of our bodies. For many are healthy in just the way Herodicus was said to be, whom no one would count happy in matters of health, |1361^{b}5| because they abstain from everything human, or nearly everything.[124]

Noble beauty is a distinct thing at each stage of life. In a young man noble beauty consists in having a body useful for exertions, both for those related to the racecourse and those related to physical strength, and, in relation to enjoyment, pleasant to look at.[125] That is why pentathletes are the most nobly beautiful, in that they are naturally adapted for strength and |1361^{b}10| for speed at the same time.[126] In someone in his prime, noble beauty consists in being naturally adapted for the exertions of war, while having a pleasant and at the same time fearsome appearance.[127] In an old man, it consists in being adequate for such exertions as are necessary, not painful [to look at] due to not having any of the disfigurements of old age.[128]

Strength is the capacity to move something else in the way one wishes, |1361^{b}15| and moving something else necessarily consists in pulling, pushing, lifting, squeezing, or crushing, so that someone strong is strong in all or some of these.

Virtue of stature consists in exceeding ordinary people in height, depth, and breadth, but in such a way that movements are not made slower due to |1361^{b}20| the excess.[129]

Virtue of body in athletic competitions is a combination of size, strength, and speed (and in fact speed is a strength). For the one who {18} is capable of throwing his legs in a certain way, moving them quickly and for a distance, is a good runner; the one who can squeeze and hold down is good wrestler; the one who can thrust someone away with his fist is a good boxer; and the one who can do the latter two |1361^{b}25| is a good pancratist; and the one who can do all of them is a good pentathlete.[130]

A good old age consists in aging slowly and with freedom from pain, since no one who ages quickly is aging well, nor if he ages scarcely but painfully. And it comes from the virtues of body and from luck, since unless he is disease-free and strong, he will not be free from suffering, |1361^{b}30| nor will he without luck survive for a long time free from pain. There is, however, another sort of capacity for long life which is separate from both strength and health, since many are long-lived without the virtues of body, but an exact account of these things is not at all useful for present purposes.[131]

Having many friends and having good friends are quite clear when the definition of friend is given, |1361^{b}35| namely, that a friend is the sort of person who for the sake of the relevant other is inclined to do in action the things that he thinks to be good for that other. Accordingly, someone for whom there are many people of this sort has many friends, and if they are also decent people, he has good friends.[132]

Good fortune consists in the acquisition and possession of either all, most, or the most important of those goods of which luck is the cause. |**1362^{a}1**| For luck is a cause of some things that craft is a cause of too, and of many things that fall outside the province of craft, such as those of which nature is the cause (although it is also possible for luck to be contrary to nature).[133] For craft is a cause of health, while nature is a cause of noble beauty and stature. In general, the goods |1362^{a}5| that result from luck are the sort that cause envy. But luck is also the cause of good things that are beyond account—for example, if the other brothers are ugly, but one is nobly beautiful; or when the others do not see the treasure, but one person finds it; or when the arrow hits a bystander, not the one aimed at; of if one who frequently visits a certain place was the only one who did not go, while those who were going for the first and only time |1362^{a}10| were killed. For all such things seem to be cases of good fortune.

As to virtue, since it most properly belongs with the topic of praises, it must be defined when we give an account of praise.[134]

I 6

Now it is evident what future or already existing things should be aimed at in exhortation |1362^{a}15| and what in dissuasion, since they are contraries. {19} And since the advantageous is set before the deliberative speaker as the target (for people deliberate not about the end but about

the things that further the end, and these are the advantageous ones as regards actions, and the advantageous is a good), the elements |1362ª20| of good and advantageous must be grasped in a simple way.[135]

Accordingly, let good be whatever is choiceworthy for its own sake; or that for whose sake we choose something else; or what all things seek, or all that have perception or understanding, or would seek if they got understanding.[136] And whatever understanding would assign to each, and what in particular cases it does assign to each, |1362ª25| this for each is a good; also that due to whose presence something is well-situated and self-sufficient; and self-sufficiency [itself]; and what is productive or preservative of these things; and what they follow along with; and what is preventative and destructive of their contraries.[137] Things follow along, though, in two ways: either simultaneously or subsequently.[138] For example, |1362ª30| scientific knowing is subsequent to learning, whereas living is simultaneous with being healthy. And things are productive in three ways: some in the way that being healthy is of health; some as food is of health; some as athletic training is, because it for the most part produces health.[139]

With these things laid down, it necessarily follows that the acquisition of good things and the deliverance from bad ones are both good. |1362ª35| For in the latter case not having the bad follows along simultaneously [with the deliverance from it], and in the former having the good does so subsequently [to the acquisition of it]. And the acquisition of a greater good than a lesser one, and of a lesser bad one than a greater, are both goods, since to the extent that the greater exceeds the less, to this extent **|1362ᵇ1|** there is an acquisition of the one and deliverance from the other.[140] Also, the virtues are necessarily a good, since those who possess them are well-situated with regard to them, and virtues are both productive of good things and ones achievable in action (we must speak separately about what, and what sort of thing, each of them is).[141] And |1362ᵇ5| pleasure is a good, since all animals by nature seek it. So both pleasant things and noble ones are necessarily goods, since the former are productive of pleasure, while of the noble ones, some are pleasant, others intrinsically choiceworthy.[142]

Speaking of them one by one, the following things are necessarily good: Happiness |1362ᵇ10| (for it is both intrinsically choiceworthy and self-sufficient and we choose [all] the other things for the sake of it).[143]

Justice, courage, temperance, greatness of soul, magnificence, and the other such states (for they are virtues of soul).[144] Also health, noble beauty, and the like (for they are virtues of body, and productive of many [good] {20} things—for example, health |1362^{b}15| of pleasure and living, which is why it seems best, in that it is the cause of the two things most honored by most people, namely, pleasure and living).[145] Wealth (for it is virtue of possession and productive of many [good] things).[146] A friend and friendship (for a friend is intrinsically choiceworthy, and productive of many [good] things). Honor, reputation (for they too are pleasant |1362^{b}20| and productive of many things, and for the most part the actual possession of the things for which people are honored follows along with them). The capacity to speak and to do things in action (for all such things are productive of goods). Further, a good natural disposition, memory, ease at learning, readiness of wit, and all such things (for these capacities are productive of goods).[147] Likewise, |1362^{b}25| all the sciences and the crafts. Also living (for even if no other good should follow, it is intrinsically choiceworthy). And justice (for it is something advantageous to a community).[148]

These, then, are pretty much the agreed upon goods. And in the case of the disputed ones, deductions are drawn from the following: That whose contrary |1362^{b}30| is bad is good. Also, that whose contrary is advantageous to the enemies—for example, if to be cowardly is especially advantageous to their enemies, it is clear that courage is especially beneficial to the citizens. And, in general, the contrary of what enemies wish for or enjoy appears beneficial. That is why it is said: |1362^{b}35|

Now might Priam rejoice.[149]

But this is not always so, though it is so for the most part. For nothing prevents the same thing from sometimes being advantageous to both sides. Which is why it is said that evils bring human beings together when the same thing is harmful to both. |**1363^{a}1**|

And what is not extreme is good, and whatever is greater than it should be, bad. Also, that for whose sake much labor has been spent and many expenses incurred, since it is already an apparent good, and such a thing is taken to be an end, and an end of many endeavors, and the end is a good.[150] Which is why it is said: |1363^{a}5|

They would leave it to Priam to glory over . . . ,

and

It is disgraceful to wait long. . . .[151]

Also the proverb about the pitcher at the door.[152] And what many people seek, and what is evidently fought over. For the good, we saw, is {21} what all seek, and many seems like all. Also what is praised.[153] For no one praises what is not good. |1363ª10| And what enemies, especially the base ones, praise is good; for just like everyone they already agree that it is good, if even those who are badly affected [praise it].[154] For it is because of its being quite evident that they would agree to it, just as they would that those people are base whom their friends blame and their enemies do not blame. That is why the Corinthians took it that they had been abused by Simonides when he wrote the verse: |1363ª15|

Ilium does not blame the Corinthians.[155]

Also, what one of the practically-wise or one of the good men or good women has preferred, as Athena preferred Odysseus and Theseus Helen, and as the goddesses preferred Paris and Homer Achilles.[156]

And, in general, the things that are deliberately chosen are good.[157] And people deliberately choose to do the aforementioned things, as well as those that are bad for their |1363ª20| enemies and those that are good for their friends, that is, those that are possible.[158] But the latter are twofold, namely, things that might be brought about and things that are easily brought about. And the easy ones are those doable without pain or in a short time. For difficulty is defined either in terms of pain or of length of time.

Also, anything that comes about as people wish—and they wish either for nothing bad or less |1363ª25| bad than good (and this will be the case if the cost is unnoticed or slight).[159] And things that are special to someone, or that no one else wishes to do, or that are extraordinary, since that way the honor is greater.[160] And things that are fitting for them, and whatever in respect of their family (*genos*) or capacity is fitting for them is like this.[161] Also, the things they think they are lacking in, even if small, since nonetheless they deliberately choose to do [what will get] them. |1363ª30| And things that are easy to do, since being easy they are also possible.[162] (And the ones easily done are the ones that everyone, ordinary people, or people like or inferior to themselves have successfully accomplished.) Also, things that will please their friends or annoy their enemies. And whatever those they admire deliberately choose to do in action. Also, what they are naturally well-disposed toward and experienced

in, |1363[a]35| since they think they will easily succeed in accomplishing them. And the things no base person does, since these are more praiseworthy. Also, whatever they happen to have an appetite for, since it appears not only pleasant but also better.[163] And above all for each group that with reference to which he is a lover of such things—for {22} example, lovers of victory if it will be victory, |**1363[b]1**| lovers of honor if honor, lovers of wealth if wealth, and the others likewise.[164]

Where the good and the advantageous are concerned, then, it is on these that we should base our means of persuasion.

I 7[165]

Since people often agree that both of two things are advantageous |1363[b]5| but dispute about which one is more so, something must next be said about the greater good and the more advantageous.

Let exceeding, then, be being as great as plus something further, and let being exceeded be being contained; let greater and more always be what is so in relation to less, while great, small, much, and little are what are so in relation to |1363[b]10| the size of most things (with great being what exceeds it, while what falls short is small), and much and little likewise.

Since, then, we call good what is itself choiceworthy for its own sake and not for the sake of something else, and what all things seek, and what something with understanding and practical wisdom would choose, and what is productive and protective of or |1363[b]15| follows along with these, and since the end is the for-the-sake-of-which, and what the other things are for the sake of is an end, and since to an individual himself a good is what has received these attributes in relation to himself, it necessarily follows that more is a greater good than one or fewer, provided that the one or the few are counted within it (for it exceeds and what is contained is exceeded).[166] |1363[b]20| And if what is greatest [in one kind] exceeds what is greatest [in another], the one [kind] exceeds the other; and when the one [kind] exceeds the other, the greatest in one exceeds the greatest in the other.[167] For example, if the greatest man is greater than the greatest woman, in general, men are greater than women; and if, in general, men are greater than women, the greatest man |1363[b]25| is also greater than the greatest woman. For the excess of the kinds (*genos*) is proportional to that of the greatest in them.[168]

And whenever this would follow that, but not that this (and it follows either simultaneously, subsequently, or potentially), [then that is greater than this,] since the use of the latter is already contained in the former.[169] Living follows |1363^{b}30| being healthy, but not vice versa, and does so simultaneously; scientific knowing follows learning and does so subsequently; and stealing follows violating a holy place and does so potentially (for someone violating a holy place might also steal from it).[170]

And when two things exceed the same thing, the one that exceeds it more is a greater good. For it necessarily also exceeds the lesser of the greater [pair].[171] And things that are productive of greater goods {23} are greater ones, since this, |1363^{b}35| we saw, is what it is to be productive of the greater.[172] Likewise, the good whose producer is greater. For if being healthy is more choiceworthy than being pleased and a greater good, then health is also a greater good than pleasure.[173]

Also, what is intrinsically more choiceworthy is a greater good than what is not intrinsically so, as, for example, strength than what is health-giving, |**1364^{a}1**| since the latter is not so for its own sake, while the former is so for its own sake—which, as we saw, is just what the good is.[174] And what is an end is a greater good than what is not an end, since the latter is choiceworthy for the sake of something else, the former for its own sake—for example, athletic training for the sake of having a body in good condition. Also, what has less need of a second thing or |1364^{a}5| of other things is a greater good, since it is more self-sufficient (and to have less need is to need fewer things or things easier to get).[175] And when this cannot exist or come to be without that, while the latter can exist or come to be without the former, the latter is a greater good; what does not have the need is more self-sufficient, so that it appears to be a greater good.

Also, if something is a starting-point and the other not a starting-point, it is a greater good, or—due to the same consideration—if the one is a cause and the other not |1364^{a}10| a cause.[176] For without a cause and a starting-point, being or coming to be is impossible. And if there are two starting-points, what comes from the greater starting-point is greater; and if there are two causes, what comes from the greater cause is greater. And the reverse, of two starting-points, the starting-point of the greater is greater, and of two causes, the cause of the greater is greater. |1364^{a}15| It is clear, then, from what has been said that a thing appears greater in two ways. For if one thing is a starting-point and the other is not a starting-

point, the former seems to be greater, and likewise if one is not a starting-point, but the other is[, the former seems to be greater] (for the end is greater and not a starting-point).[177] Thus Leodamas said, when accusing Callistratus, that the one who gave the advice did a greater injustice than the one who did the action, since the action would not have been done |1364^{a}20| had the other not given the advice.[178] On the other hand, when accusing Chabrias, he also said the reverse, that the one who did the action did a greater injustice than the one who had given the advice, since it would not have occurred if there had not been a doer of the action.[179] For this is what plotting is for the sake of, namely, in order for people to act on it.[180]

Also, what is rarer is a greater good than what is abundant, as gold is than iron, though less useful, since acquisition of it is a greater thing due to its being more difficult. |1364^{a}25| In another way, though, the abundant is {24} a greater good than the rare, because use is superior [to non-use], since often is superior to seldom. Which is why it is said:

> Water is best.[181]

And, in general, the more difficult is a greater good than the easier, since it is rarer. In another way, though, the easier is a greater good than the more difficult, since it is how we wish it to be.[182] |1364^{a}30|

Also, that whose contrary is greater is itself greater, and that whose lack is greater.[183] And virtue is greater than non-virtue and vice than non-vice; for the one is an end and the other is not an end.[184] Also, those things of which the functions are nobler or more shameful are themselves greater. And of those things whose virtues and vices are greater, the functions are also greater, if indeed as the starting-points and causes are, so too are the consequences.[185] |1364^{a}35| And as the consequences are, so too are their causes and starting-points. Also, those things whose superiority is more choiceworthy or nobler. For example, seeing with exactness is more choiceworthy than smelling with exactness, since sight is also more choiceworthy than smell; and to love companions is far more noble than to love wealth, |**1364^{b}1**| so that love of companions is also nobler than love of wealth.[186] Conversely, the better things are, the better their superiority is, and the more noble they are, the more noble it is. So too the objects of nobler and better appetites; since greater desires are for greater things. Also, due to the same considerations, |1364^{b}5| appetites for nobler or better things are nobler or better.

And things of which the sciences are nobler or more excellent are nobler or more excellent things, since, as the science stands, so too does the reality [that is its object]: each prescribes in its own area of it.[187] And the sciences of more excellent and nobler things |1364^{b}10| are proportional, due to the same consideration.[188] And what the practically-wise—either all, many, most, or the most excellent—would judge or have judged to be the good or the greatest good must be such, either unconditionally or insofar as they make their judgment in accord with practical wisdom.[189] This applies in common to other matters too. For something also is what it is, is a quantity, or is a quality, in the way in which |1364^{b}15| scientific knowledge and practical wisdom would affirm it to be.[190] We have said this in the case of goods, since we defined that to be good which each and every thing, if it had practical wisdom, would choose.[191] It is also clear, then, that a greater good is one that practical wisdom more [firmly] asserts to be one. Also, what belongs to better people, either unconditionally or insofar as they are better [is a better good], as courage is better than strength.[192] |1364^{b}20| Also, what a better person {25} would choose, either unconditionally or insofar as he is better, such as to suffer injustice rather than to do injustice, since this is what the more just person would choose.[193]

Also, the more pleasant than the less pleasant, since all pursue pleasure, and desire to be pleased for its own sake, and it is in terms of this that the good and the end were defined.[194] And |1364^{b}25| something pleasant that is more free from pain and longer lasting is more pleasant. Also, the more noble than the less noble, since the noble is either the pleasant or the intrinsically choiceworthy.[195] And things people wish to be more of a cause of, either to themselves or to their friends, are greater goods, and what they wish to be least of all a cause of, greater evils.[196] Also, things that last a longer time rather than those that last a shorter |1364^{b}30| time, and more secure ones than less secure ones. For the use of things that last a longer time is superior in regard to time and the use of things that are more secure is superior in regard to wish, since the secure one is readier for use whenever people wish.

Also, just as certain things would follow along from co-ordinates and similar inflections, so there are other things that follow along as well—for example, if what is done courageously is nobler than |1364^{b}35| and more choiceworthy than what is done temperately, courage is more

choiceworthy than temperance, and being courageous than being temperate.[197]

And what is chosen by all is better than what is not chosen by all, and what more choose than fewer, since good, we saw, is what all seek, so that a greater one is what they seek |**1365ª1**| more.[198] And what opponents or enemies [so choose], or discerning people or those whom discerning people judge [to be competent], since in the former two cases it would be as if all people would say so, and in the latter two as if those in control or those who know would.[199] And sometimes what all share in is greater, since it would be a dishonor not to share in it. But sometimes it is what no one else or a few share in, since it is rarer.[200]

Also, things that are more praiseworthy, since they are nobler.[201] |1365ª5| And things for which the honors are greater, in a similar way, since an honor is like a sort of estimate of worth. Also, things for which the punishments are greater. Also, things that are greater than those that are agreed to be or that are apparently greater. Also, the same things when divided into their parts appear to be greater, |1365ª10| since there seems to be superiority in a greater number of things.[202] Which is why the poet too says that Meleagros was persuaded to rise up [by the thought of]:

> All the sorrows that come to human beings whose city is taken:
> The people perish, and fire leaves the city in ashes,
> And strangers lead the children away.[203] |1365ª15|

{26} Also, combination and building to a climax, as Epicharmus does, [is greater] both because this is the same as division (for combination shows great superiority) and because it makes something appear to be a starting-point and cause of great things.[204]

And since the more difficult and rarer is greater, so opportune times, stages of life, places, the times, and |1365ª20| capacities make things great. For if someone does something beyond his capacity, his stage of life, or what his equals do, and in such a way, or in circumstances, or at a time, the action will get great stature among actions that are noble, good, just, and their contraries. Hence the epigram on the Olympian victor: |1365ª25|

> In the past, with a rough yoke on my shoulders,
> I used to carry fish from Argos to Tegea.[205]

And Iphicrates praised himself, saying:

> Look what I started from.[206]

Also, what is self-grown is greater than what is acquired, since it is more difficult—which is why the poet too says:

But I am self-taught.[207]

Also, the |1365[a]30| greatest part of what is great is greater—for example, Pericles said in his Funeral Oration that the young men were taken from the city:

As if the spring had been taken from the year.[208]

And things that are useful in greater need are greater—for example, those in old age or in illnesses. Also, of two goods, the one closer to the end.[209] And the one for the individual himself than the unconditional one.[210] And the |1365[a]35| possible one than the impossible one, since the former is good for the individual himself, whereas the latter is not.[211]

And things included in the end life aims at, since the end is a greater good than what is close to the end.[212] Also, things related to truth than things related to seeming. For the definition of what is related to seeming is **|1365[b]1|** what a person would not choose if he were going to escape notice. That is why for someone to have a good done to him seems to be more choiceworthy than to do a good. For a person will choose the former even if it escapes notice, but it seems that no one would do good were it to escape notice. Also, what someone wishes to be than {27} what he wishes to seem, |1365[b]5| since the former is more related to truth. That is why people say that even justice is a small thing, because it seems to be more choiceworthy rather than being more choiceworthy.[213] But this is not the case with being healthy.

Also, what is more useful for more things—for example, for living and living well and pleasure and doing noble things. That is why wealth and health seem to be the greatest goods, |1365[b]10| since they possess all these qualities. And what is freer from pain and what involves pleasure, since these are more than one thing, so that pleasure is present as a good as well as painlessness.[214] And of two goods, the one that when added to the same thing makes the whole greater is more choiceworthy. And things whose presence does not escape notice are greater than those whose presence does. For they tend toward the truth. |1365[b]15| That is why being wealthy would appear to be a greater good than seeming to be so.[215] Also, what is beloved and what to some people is beloved alone while to others is possessed together with other things—[would appear to be a greater good than what is not]. That is why the punishment is not the same if one

blinds a one-eyed person as if one half blinds a person with two eyes, since in the first case one takes away what is beloved.

The things, then, on which the means of persuasion should be based in exhortation and dissuasion have pretty much been stated. |1365^{b}20|

I 8

The greatest and most controlling of all things as regards being capable of persuading and giving good advice is to get a grasp on all constitutions and to distinguish the characters, customs, and advantages of each.[216] For all people are persuaded by what is advantageous, and what preserves the constitution is advantageous. Further, the |1365^{b}25| declaration of the controlling element is controlling, and the controlling elements differ in accord with the constitutions, since there are as many controlling elements as there are constitutions.[217] And there are four constitutions: democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and monarchy, so that the controlling and deciding element would either be some part of these or the whole.[218] |1365^{b}30|

Democracy, then, is a constitution in which offices are distributed by lot; oligarchy one in which it is on the basis of a property assessment; and aristocracy one in which it is in accord with education.[219] By education I mean that laid down by law, since in an aristocracy it is those who have remained true to the laws who rule. And they necessarily appear best (*aristos*), |1365^{b}35| and it is from this that the constitution has {28} taken its name. And monarchy, in accord with its name, is a constitution in which one person is in control of all. And of monarchies, the one that |**1366^{a}1**| is in accord with some order is a kingship, while the indefinite one is a tyranny.[220]

And the end aimed at by each constitution should not be overlooked [by the deliberative speaker], since people choose what furthers the end.[221] The end aimed at by democracy is freedom; by oligarchy, wealth; by aristocracy, things concerned with education |1366^{a}5| and customs; and by tyranny, keeping guard.[222] It is clear, then, that it is as things related to the end aimed at by each constitution that one should distinguish characters, customs, and advantages, if indeed it is in relation to this that people make their choices.[223] Since, then, means of persuasion come about not only through demonstrative argument but also through argument expressive of character (for we are persuaded by a speaker due to his appearing to be of a certain quality, |1366^{a}10| that is, if he appears good,

goodwilled, or both), we should have at hand the characters belonging to each constitution.[224] For the character belonging to each is necessarily most persuasive to each. And these characters will be grasped by means of the same things, since characters are made apparent in accord with deliberate choice, and deliberate choice |1366^{a}15| is referred back to the end.[225]

It has now been stated what things, whether future or present, should be sought while engaged in exhortation, and from what they should take their means of persuasion about the advantageous; further, through what and in what way we shall be well-equipped where the characters and the customs belonging to constitutions are concerned, so far as is |1366^{a}20| suited to the present occasion (for an exact examination of these matters is given in the *Politics*).[226]

I 9

Next let us speak about virtue and vice, noble and shameful, since these are targets for the one who is praising and blaming. In speaking of these, we shall at the same time in fact coincidentally make clear those things |1366^{a}25| on the basis of which we shall be taken to be people of a certain sort in accord with our character, which was just the second sort of means of persuasion.[227] For it is on the basis of the same things that we shall be capable of making both ourselves as well as someone else worthy of trust with regard to virtue. But since it happens that people, both in jest and in all seriousness, often praise not only a human being or a god but also inanimate things or a random animal, |1366^{a}30| we must in the same way get hold of premises concerning these.[228] So, {29} to the extent necessary for the sake of having a paradigm, let us speak about these matters too.

The noble, then, is that which, being choiceworthy because of itself, is praiseworthy, or which, being good, is pleasant because it is good. And if this is what the noble is, it is necessary for virtue to be something noble, |1366^{a}35| since it is praiseworthy because of being good. And virtue is a capacity, so it seems, capable of supplying goods and of preserving them, and a capacity productive of many and great benefactions—actually, of all of them in all cases.[229] The parts of virtue are justice, courage, temperance, |**1366^{b}1**| magnificence, greatness of soul, generosity, mild-manneredness, practical wisdom, and theoretical wisdom.[230] It is necessary, though, for the greatest virtues to be those that are most useful to others, if indeed

virtue is a capacity productive of benefaction.[231] Because of this, people most honor the just and the courageous, |1366^{b}5| since courage is useful to others in war, and justice both in war and in peace.[232] Next is generosity. For the generous spend freely and do not compete about money, which is what other people seek most of all.[233]

Justice is the virtue due to which each has his own, and as law prescribes, whereas injustice is that due to which he has what is another's, |1366^{b}10| not as law prescribes. Courage is the one due to which people are capable in the midst of dangers of doing noble works, both as law prescribes and in submission to it; cowardice the contrary. Temperance is the virtue due to which people are disposed in the way that the law prescribes in relation to the pleasures of the body; intemperance the contrary. Generosity |1366^{b}15| is the disposition to do good things in money matters; acquisitiveness the contrary.[234] Greatness of soul is virtue productive of great benefactions; magnificence is virtue productive of greatness in matter of expenditure; the contraries are smallness of soul and niggardliness. Practical wisdom is virtue of thought in accord with |1366^{b}20| which people are capable of deliberating well with a view to happiness about the goods and evils we mentioned.[235]

About virtue and vice universally, then, and about their parts, enough has been said for the purposes of the present occasion, and the other things are not difficult to see.[236] For it is clear that the things |1366^{b}25| productive of virtue must be noble (for they further virtue), as must the things that are brought about by virtue, and both the signs and works of virtue are like this.[237] But since the signs and such things as are the works done or things undergone that are characteristic of a good person are noble, it is necessary for whatever are the works of courage, signs of courage, or actions done courageously to be noble. Also just {30} actions |1366^{b}30| and works done justly (although not things justly undergone, since in the case of this virtue alone "justly" is not always noble, rather, in the case of being punished, to undergo it justly is more shameful than to do so unjustly).[238] And with regard to the other virtues it is the same way.

Also, those things for which the rewards are honor are noble; and those for which they are honor rather than money. |1366^{b}35| Also, whatever choiceworthy things someone does not for his own sake. Also, unconditionally good things, and whatever someone has done for his country, disregarding his own interest. And things that are good by nature,

and not [simply] good for himself (for the latter are the sort done for his own sake). And whatever can belong to a person when he is dead |**1367^{a}1**| more than when he is alive (for what belongs to a person when he is alive has more the character of being for his own sake). And whatever works are for the sake of others (for they are less for the sake of himself). Also, whatever things are done well in relation to others but not in relation to oneself.[239] And those works that relate to benefactors (for it is just to do them). |1367^{a}5| Also benefactions (for they are not directed to oneself). Also, things that are the contraries of things that people are ashamed of (for they are ashamed of saying, doing, or intending to do shameful things), as when Alcaeus said:

> I wish to say something, but shame prevents me. |1367^{a}10|

Sappho in fact replied:

> If you had a longing for the good and the noble,
> And if your tongue had not stirred up some bad thing to utter,
> Shame would not have filled you eyes,
> But you would speak about what is just.[240] |1367^{a}15|

Also, those things are noble for which people compete without fear (for this is what one is feeling in relation to good things that conduce to reputation). And the virtues and actions of those who are by nature more excellent are more noble—for example, those of a man than those of a woman.[241] Also, those related to the enjoyment of others rather than ourselves (that is why the just and justice are noble).

Also, |1367^{a}20| to take revenge on enemies and not be reconciled (for to retaliate is just, and what is just is noble, and not to give way is characteristic of a courageous man). Also, victory and honor are among {31} the noble things (for they are choiceworthy even if purposeless, and reveal a superiority of virtue).[242] And things that are remembered, and the more so more. And the ones |1367^{a}25| that follow a person when he is not alive, the ones with which honor follows, the extraordinary ones, and the ones that belong to only one person, are more noble (for they are more memorable). As are possessions that are purposeless (for they are freer).[243]

Also, the things special to each people are noble, and whatever are signs of the things praised among them—for example, in Sparta long hair is noble, |1367^{a}30| since it is a sign of freedom (for it is not easy with long hair to do any work characteristic of a hired laborer).[244] Also, not to work

at any vulgar craft is noble (for it is characteristic of a free person not to live in dependence on others).[245]

We should also take it that qualities that are closely allied to the actual ones are the same as them for the purposes of both praise and blame—for example, that a cautious person is cold and calculating, |1367[a]35| and that a silly one is kindly, and an unfeeling one calm. And [when praising] one should always take each of the qualities that follow along in the best sense (for example, one should take an irascible and enthusiastic person to be simple, and a surly one to be magnificent and dignified) and take those given to excess as [really] being **|1367[b]1|** in the virtuous condition (for example, a rash one as courageous, and a wasteful one as generous).[246] For this will seem so to ordinary people, and at the same time is [a paradigm of] a fallacious argument proceeding from the cause.[247] For if a person faces up to danger when it is not necessary, he will seem much more likely to do so wherever it is noble, and if |1367[b]5| he is lavish with random people, he will seem much more likely to be so with friends, since to do good for everyone is superiority of virtue.

One should also investigate whom the praise is in front of. For as Socrates said it is not difficult to praise Athenians among Athenians.[248] And one should speak of whatever is honored among each lot as actually present in [the one being praised]—for example, among Scythians, Spartans, or philosophers. |1367[b]10| And, in general, one should draw what is honored toward what is noble, since indeed they seem to be neighbors.

Also, all such things as are in accord with what is fitting are noble—for example, if they are worthy of someone's ancestors or his past achievements (for to acquire additional honor has the stamp of happiness and is noble). Also, something is noble if it goes beyond what is fitting but toward the better and the nobler—for example, if |1367[b]15| someone is moderate in times of good fortune, but great-souled in times {32} of bad-fortune, or if, when he becomes greater, he is better and more open to reconciliation.[249] Iphicrates' remark:

> Look what I started from,

is like this, as is that of the Olympic victor:

> In the past, with a rough yoke on my shoulders. . . ,

and of Simonides: |1367[b]20|

> She whose father, husband, and brothers were tyrants.[250]

Since praise is based on actions, however, and to act in accord with deliberate choice is a special characteristic of an excellent person, one should try to show that the person [one is praising] is acting in accord with deliberate choice, and it is useful that it should appear that he has done so often.[251] That is why one should take coincidences and things that happen by luck |1367[b]25| as due to deliberate choice. For if many similar cases are adduced, they will seem to be a sign of virtue and deliberate choice.

Now praise is speech that makes the greatness of virtue apparent.[252] Hence one should show that the person's actions have been of the requisite sort. An encomium, on the other hand, is concerned with works.[253] Circumstances, such as good breeding and education, contribute to persuasion, |1367[b]30| since it is likely that good children will come from good parents and that people brought up in a certain way will be of the relevant sort. That is why we bestow encomia on those who have done some action, since works are signs of the state. For we would praise even someone who had not done any [similar] action, if we were persuaded that he was of the sort to do it. Blessing people and felicitating them are the same as each other, but not the same as praise and encomium, but just as |1367[b]35| happiness encompasses virtue, so felicitation encompasses these.[254]

Praise and speeches of advice belong to a common kind (*eidos*), since the things one might propose in advising become encomia when their expression is changed.[255] Accordingly, when we have in hand what actions should be done **|1368[a]1|** and what sort of person someone should be, we ought to state these as proposals by changing and turning their expression.[256] For example, "one ought not to think highly of what is due to luck but of what is due to oneself." When {33} expressed in that way it is equivalent to a proposal, while as praise it is expressed this way: |1368[a]5| "He thinks highly not of what comes due to chance but due to oneself."[257] So, when you wish to praise, see what you would propose; and when you want to make a proposal, see what you would praise. The expression, though, will of necessity be the opposite when a preventative proposal and a non-preventative proposal are altered.[258]

One should also use many means of amplification in praising. For example, if |1368[a]10| the person is the only one, or the first one, or one of the few, or the one who has most of all done something (for all these are

noble). Also, things based on times and opportunities—that is, if these go beyond what is fitting.[259] Or if the person has often been successful in the same accomplishment (for that is a great thing and would seem to be not the result of luck but due to the person himself).[260] Also, if incentives to achievement |1368[a]15| and awards of honor have been invented and established because of him. And if he was the first to whom an encomium was made, as in the case of Hippolochus, and in that of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, for whom statues were set up in the marketplace.[261] And likewise in the case of the contraries. And if one is not well-equipped as regards the person himself, compare him with others, just as Isocrates used to do because of his |1368[a]20| familiarity with judicial oratory.[262] Also, one should compare him to reputable people (for he is amplified and made noble if he is better than the excellent ones).

Amplification quite reasonably falls within the means of praise, since it involves [showing a] superiority, and superiority is included among the noble things. That is why, even if not to the reputable, one should compare the person to ordinary people, if indeed the superiority |1368[a]25| does seem to indicate virtue.[263] In general, among the kinds (*eidos*) of things common to all speeches, amplification is best suited to the epideictic ones (for these take up actions that are agreed upon, so that what remains is to bestow greatness and noble beauty on them); paradigms to deliberative ones (for we judge future things by a hunch |1368[a]30| based on past ones); and enthymemes to judicial ones (for what has happened, because of its lack of perspicuousness, is most of all receptive of a cause and a demonstration).[264]

These, then, are the things on which speeches of praise and blame are pretty much all based, as well as the ones to look to when praising or blaming, and the things from which encomia |1368[a]35| and reproaches are produced.[265] For if we have these in hand, their contraries are evident, since blame is based on the contraries.

{34} I 10

We have to speak next about accusation and defense, and from how many **|1368[b]1|** and from what sorts of things deductions should be produced. One should, then, get hold of three things: first, what things and how many of them people do injustice for the sake of; second, in what way these people are disposed; third, the sorts of people they do

injustice to and their condition. Let us discuss these in order after first defining what doing injustice is. |1368^{b}5|

Accordingly, let doing injustice be doing harm voluntarily contrary to the law. And law is either special or common. By special I mean the written law by which people are governed; by common I mean whatever unwritten ones seem to be agreed to among all.[266] And people do voluntarily whatever they do knowingly and without being compelled. Of the things they do |1368^{b}10| voluntarily, though, not all are deliberately chosen, but those that are deliberately chosen are all done knowingly, since no one is ignorant of what he has deliberately chosen.[267] Vice and lack of self-control are the things due to which people deliberately choose to do harm and do evil.[268] For if certain people have one sort of depravity or more than one, it is with respect to the depravity they happen to have |1368^{b}15| that they are also doers of injustice.[269] For example, the ungenerous does injustice where money is concerned; the intemperate where the pleasures of the body are concerned; the soft where comfort is concerned; and the cowardly where dangers are concerned (for they abandon their comrades in danger because of fear).[270] The lover of honor does injustice, because of honor; the quick-spirited one, because of anger; |1368^{b}20| the lover of victory, because of victory; the bitter person, because of revenge; the one who lacks practical wisdom, because of being mistaken about what is just and unjust; the shameless one, because of contempt for reputation; and likewise each of the others with respect to its underlying sort of depravity.[271]

But this will be clear, partly from what we said about virtues, |1368^{b}25| and partly from what we will say about feelings.[272] It remains to state what people do injustice for the sake of, in what way they are disposed, and to whom they do it.

First, then, let us go through what people desire and what sorts of things they are avoiding when they put their hand to doing injustice. For it is clear that the accuser must investigate the number and the sorts of things belonging to the opponent |1368^{b}30| that all are seeking when they do injustice to their neighbors; and the defendant, the number and sorts of these that do not belong.

{35} Accordingly, all people do all things either not due to themselves or due to themselves. Of the ones that are not due to themselves, they do some due to luck, others due to necessity, and of those due to necessity,

some occur by force, some by nature.[273] |1368[b]35| So all the things that people do that are not due to themselves are in some cases the result of luck, in some occur by nature, and in some by force. But whichever ones are due to themselves, and of which they themselves are the causes, are in some cases due to habit and in some due to desire, some |**1369[a]1**| due to rationally calculative desire and some to non-rational desire.[274] In one case, then, there is wish, a desire for some good (for no one wishes for something except when he thinks it is a good), whereas anger and appetite are non-rational desires.[275] Thus all the things that people do they of necessity do due to seven causes: |1369[a]5| due to luck, nature, force, habit, rational calculation, spirit, or appetite.

To further divide these in accord with stage of life, state [of character], or other things related to action is superfluous. For if the young happen to be prone to anger or appetite, they do not do actions of this sort due to their youth, but due to |1369[a]10| anger and appetite. Nor is it due to wealth or poverty—rather, the poor happen to have an appetite for money due to their lack of it, while the rich happen to have an appetite for unnecessary pleasures due to their abundant resources.[276] But these people too will do the actions they do, not due to wealth or poverty but due to appetite. Similarly, |1369[a]15| both the just and the unjust, and the others said to do the actions they do in accord with their states [of character], do them due to the same causes, since they do them either due to rational calculation or due to feeling, although some due to excellent characters and feelings, some due to the contrary ones.[277] Of course, it is a fact that states of one sort are followed by one sort of action, and of another sort |1369[a]20| by another sort. For excellent beliefs and appetites concerned with pleasures follow immediately and in like manner for the temperate person due to his being temperate as the contrary ones do for the intemperate person concerning the same things. That is why, though these sorts of divisions must be put aside, we must investigate which sort usually follows which sort. For if someone is pale |1369[a]25| or dark, big or small, nothing is regulated so as to follow from such things, whereas if someone is young or old, just or unjust, it immediately makes a difference.[278] And, in general, [we must investigate] whatever things make the characters of human beings be different—for example, seeming to oneself to be rich or poor will make some difference, or to be lucky or unlucky. We shall

discuss these issues later on, |1369[a]30| but now let us speak first about what remains.[279]

{36} The sorts of things that are the result of luck are the ones whose cause is indefinite, which do not occur for the sake of anything, or always, or for the most part, or in some orderly way (all this is clear from the definition of luck); those that are by nature are the ones whose cause |1369[a]35| is within themselves and is orderly (for they always or for the most part |**1369[b]1**| occur in the same way). As for those that occur contrary to nature, nothing need be argued in an exact way as to whether they are in accord with nature or due to some other cause; luck, though, would also seem to be a cause of such things.[280] By force are whatever things come to be, contrary to their appetite or their rational calculation, |1369[b]5| through the doers themselves.[281] Things that occur by habit are whatever things people do due to having done them often. Things that occur due to rational calculation are the things that seem to be advantageous on the basis of the goods mentioned, either as an end or as what furthers an end, whenever they are done for the sake of the advantage (for the intemperate also do advantageous things, not because of |1369[b]10| the advantage, though, but because of pleasure).[282] Things that occur due to spirit or anger are acts of revenge. (Revenge and punishment are different, however, since punishment is for the sake of the sufferer, revenge for the sake of the doer, in order that he get satisfaction.[283] What anger is will become clear in the discussion of the feelings.[284]) Due to appetite is whatever is done |1369[b]15| that appears pleasant. The customary and the habitual are included among the pleasant things. For people even do with pleasure many things that are not by nature pleasant when they have become habituated to them.

So, by way of summary, whatever things people do due to themselves are all either good or apparently good, pleasant or apparently pleasant. And since |1369[b]20| they do voluntarily whatever they do due to themselves, and not voluntarily whatever is not due to themselves, everything they do voluntarily would be either good or apparently good, pleasant or apparently pleasant. For I place the removal of evils and apparent evils, or the exchange of lesser for greater ones, among the good things (for they are in a way choiceworthy). |1369[b]25| And I likewise place among the pleasant ones, the removal of pains or apparent pains, and the exchange of a greater pain for a lesser. We must, therefore, get

hold of advantageous things and pleasant ones, both how many they are and of what sorts.

We spoke previously about the advantageous in the case of deliberative oratory; |1369[b]30| let us now speak about the pleasant.[285] And we should consider our definitions as adequate in each case if they neither lack perspicuousness nor are [too] exact.[286]

{37} I 11

Let us assume, then, that pleasure is a sort of movement of the soul, an intensive and perceptible settling down into its original natural state, and pain the contrary.[287] And if pleasure is something |1369[b]35| like this, it is also clear that what is productive of the aforementioned **|1370[a]1|** condition is also pleasant, and what is destructive of it or is productive of the contrary settling down painful.[288] Thus movement into the condition that is in accord with nature is necessarily pleasant for the most part, and especially whenever what comes about in accord with nature has recovered its own natural state.

Also, |1370[a]5| habits are pleasant (for the habitual has already become natural, as it were; for habit is something like nature, since in fact what occurs often is close to what occurs always, and nature belongs with always, habit with often).[289] Also, what is not forced is pleasant (for force is contrary to nature—which is why what is compelled is painful, and why it has been correctly said that: |1370[a]10|

Every necessary thing, indeed, has a troublesome nature.[290]

Also, things that require supervision, effort, and exertion are painful (for these too are necessary and forced, unless people become habituated to them; then habit makes them pleasant).[291] But their contraries are pleasant—which is why comforts, exemptions from toil, exemptions from supervision, amusements, relaxations, and |1370[a]15| sleep are among the pleasant things, since none of these is related to compulsion.

Also, everything for which we have an appetite within us is pleasant.[292] For appetite is a desire for what is pleasant. Of appetites, though, some are non-rational, whereas others involve reason (*logos*). By non-rational ones I mean those where people do not have an appetite on the basis of taking something to be the case.[293] Those that are by nature said to be of this sort, |1370[a]20| like those that are present in us through the body—for example, for nourishment, namely, thirst and hunger, and for a particular

kind (*eidos*) of nourishment, a particular kind (*eidos*) of appetite; those connected with taste, sexual pleasures, and, in general, with objects of touch; and those of smell, hearing, and sight. Those that involve reason (*logos*), on the other hand, are those where people have an appetite on the basis of being persuaded |1370^{a}25| (for there are many things that people have an appetite to look at or acquire after hearing about them and being persuaded).[294]

Since being pleased consists in perceiving a certain feeling, and imagination is a sort of weak perception, and some sort of imagination {38} of what he remembers or expects always follows along with the perception in the person expecting or remembering, then, if all this is so, it is clear |1370^{a}30| that pleasure too follows along simultaneously in those remembering and expecting, if indeed perception also does.[295] So it is necessary that all pleasant things are either present (in the perceiving), or past (in the remembering), or future (in the expecting), since people perceive present things, remember past ones, and expect future ones. |1370^{a}35| Hence memories are pleasant, not only about things that were pleasant in the present in which they took place, |**1370^{b}1**| but sometimes even about some unpleasant things if their subsequent results were noble and good. Which is why too it has been said:

> But pleasant it is when rescued to remember one's sufferings
>
> and
>
> For afterward a man rejoices at his pains |1370^{b}5|
>
> When he remembers them, one who suffers much and much accomplishes.[296]

The cause of this is that not having a bad thing is also pleasant. And those expected things are pleasant that appear to confer great delight or benefit when present, or to benefit without pain. In general, things that give delight when present are pleasant, both when we expect them and, for the most part, when we remember them. That is why even being |1370^{b}10| angry is pleasant, as Homer too said when he wrote about spirit that it

> is much sweeter than dripping honey.[297]

For no one is angry at someone on whom it is apparently impossible to take revenge, nor at those who are greater than themselves in capacity, [that is,] either they feel no anger or less anger.[298]

Also, a sort of pleasure follows along with most appetites, |1370[b]15| since people enjoy a certain pleasure when they remember that they got something or anticipate that they will get it. For example, those in a fever, during their attacks of thirst, enjoy both remembering having drunk and anticipating drinking. And lovers always enjoy discussing things, writing, and doing something concerning the beloved, since in all such things, |1370[b]20| by remembering, they think they perceive, as it were, their beloved.[299] For the starting-point of love is the same for all, namely, when they not only enjoy the beloved when he is present, but also remember him when he is absent, though pain would attach to his {39} not being present.[300] So too in the same way there is a certain pleasure that attaches to mourning and lamentation for a departed one, |1370[b]25| since there is pain at his not being there and pleasure in remembering and, in a way, seeing him, the actions he was doing, and what he was like. That is why it made perfect sense to say:

> Thus he spoke, and stirred in all of them the longing for weeping.[301]

Also, getting revenge is pleasant. For if something is such that not getting it is painful, getting it is pleasant, and angry people who do not get |1370[b]30| revenge are unsurpassably pained, whereas they enjoy anticipating it. And victory is pleasant, not only for those who love victory, but for all. For an appearance of superiority results, which all have an appetite for, whether mild or more intense.[302] And since victory is pleasant, |1370[b]35| amusements must also be pleasant, both warlike ones and contentious arguments (for victory often occurs in these), |**1371[a]1**| as must games of knucklebone, ball, dice, and checkers.[303] It is the same where more serious amusements are concerned. For some become pleasant when one is accustomed to them, whereas others are pleasant straightaway, such as tracking with dogs and every sort of hunting (for where there is a contest, there is victory too). |1371[a]5| That is why judicial oratory and contentious argument are pleasant to the habituated and capable.

And honor and good reputation are among the pleasantest things, because in each case an appearance results of having the qualities of an excellent person, and all the more when others say so whom the person thinks to be truthful. (And of the latter sort |1371[a]10| are: those close to him rather than the ones at a distance; the ones he is accustomed to and his fellow citizens rather than those from far away; his contemporaries

rather than future people; practically-wise people rather than those without practical-wisdom; and many rather than few.[304] For those mentioned are more likely to be truthful than their contraries.) Since one cares nothing about the honor or opinion of those one greatly despises, such as children or beasts, |1371ª15| at any rate for the sake of one's reputation, but rather if indeed one does, it is because of something else.[305]

Also, a friend is one of the pleasant things, since loving something is pleasant (for no one is a wine lover who does not enjoy wine) and so is being loved. For in being loved too there is an appearance that he is himself the possessor of the goodness that all those who perceive it have an appetite for, |1371ª20| since to be loved is to be liked because of oneself. And to be admired is pleasant because it is the same thing as being {40} honored. And to be flattered and have a flatterer is pleasant, since a flatterer is an apparent admirer and an apparent friend.

Also, to often do the same thing is pleasant, since, as we saw, what one is accustomed to is pleasant.[306] And [then] change |1371ª25| is pleasant, since change is to one's natural condition, since always doing the same thing produces an excess of the state settled down into.[307] Hence the saying:

> In all things change is sweet.[308]

Because of this, what comes at intervals is also pleasant, whether human beings or things.[309] For there is change from what is present, and at the same time what comes at intervals is also rare.[310]

Also, to learn and to wonder is for the most part pleasant, since in wondering there is an appetite for learning, so that what is wondered at is appetitively desired, and in learning there is a settling down that is in accord with nature.[311] And to do good and to have good done to one are pleasant things, since to be well-treated is to |1371ª35| attain what you have an appetite for, and to do good implies both having and superiority, **|1371ᵇ1|** both of which people seek.[312] And because being productive of good is pleasant, so too it is pleasant for human beings to rectify their neighbors and make up for their deficiencies.[313] And since to learn is pleasant and to wonder [at things], so too other things are necessarily |1371ᵇ5| pleasant—for example, what is imitative (like the crafts of painting, sculpture, and poetry) and everything that is well-imitated, even if what is imitated is not pleasant, since it is not it that one enjoys, but the

deduction that *this* is *that*, so that the result is that one learns something.[314] Also, reversals and |1371[b]10| narrow escapes from danger [are pleasant], since all of these excite wonder.[315] And since what is in accord with nature is pleasant, and those that are of the same kind (*genos*) are related to each other in accord with nature, all things that are of the same kind (*genos*) and alike are for the most part pleasant to each other—for example, human to human, horse to horse, and youth to youth. Whence the proverbs: "Contemporary |1371[b]15| delights contemporary," "Like to like," "Beast knows beast," "Birds of a feather flock together," and other such things.

But since all that is like oneself or the same in kind is pleasant to oneself, and each person feels this pleasure above all in relation to himself, necessarily all are more or less self-lovers.[316] For all such things belong, in the highest degree, to his relation to himself.[317] And since all are |1371[b]20| self-lovers, necessarily the things that are their own are also pleasant to all —for example, their works and words (*logos*). That is why people for the most part are lovers of flatterers, of lovers, of honors, {41} and of children (for children are their own work).[318] And to make up for deficiencies is pleasant, since then the thing becomes their own |1371[b]25| work.[319] And since to rule is most pleasant, seeming to be theoretically-wise is also pleasant (for what is practically-wise is fitted to rule, and theoretical wisdom is the scientific knowledge of many wondrous things).[320] Further, since people are for the most part lovers of honor, it is necessary that it is pleasant to criticize one's neighbors, and to rule [in that way].[321] Also, to spend time at what one seems to oneself to be best in |1371[b]30| is pleasant, as the poet too says:

> Toward this he presses hard,
> To this each day allots the biggest part—
> What he is indeed the best in.[322]

Similarly, since amusements are among the pleasant things, every sort of relaxation is too. And |1371[b]35| since laughter is among the pleasant things, necessarily ridiculous things (whether human beings, words (*logos*), or works) are as well. The ridiculous has been discussed **|1372[a]1|** separately in the *Poetics*.[323]

About pleasant things, then, let this much be said; those that are painful will be evident from the contraries of these.

These, then, are things for the sake of which people do injustice; let us now discuss the way in which they are disposed and whom they do injustice to.[324]

People do injustice, then, whenever they think that |1372ª5| the thing at issue can be done, and can be done by them—whether they think either that their action will escape notice, or that if it does not escape notice, will not be given a trial, or that if it is given one, the penalty will be less than the profit to themselves or to those for whom they care.[325] What sorts of things appear possible or impossible will be discussed later, since they are common to |1372ª10| all speeches.[326]

Those who do injustice think that they can especially do so without penalty when they are capable speakers, [effective] doers of action, and experienced in many [political] debates, and if they have many friends, and if they are rich people. And they especially think they can do so if they themselves are among those mentioned; but if not, if they have |1372ª15| friends, assistants, or partners like this, since due to these they can [effectively] do actions, escape notice, and not be punished. Also, if they are friends of those being treated unjustly or of the judges. For {42} friends are not on guard against being treated unjustly and, besides, they attempt reconciliation before undertaking to prosecute; and judges favor those they are friends with, |1372ª20| and either wholly acquit them or impose a small penalty.

The ones likely to escape notice are the ones who are the contraries of the accusations—for example, a weak person where assault is concerned, and a poor or ugly one where adultery is concerned.[327] Also, when the things are done very much in the open and in the public eye (for they are not guarded against, since no one at all would think them possible), or are so great or of such a sort that no |1372ª25| one person [would be thought capable of them], since these things are not guarded against either. For all guard against the usual unjust actions, which is also the case with illnesses, but illnesses that no one at all has ever been ill with no one takes precautions against. Also, those who have either no enemies or many, since the former think they will escape notice because they are not being guarded against, while the latter escape notice because it does not seem that they would attempt |1372ª30| to attack those on their guard, and because they have as their defense that they would not have attempted it.

And those who have ways or places of concealment, or abundant opportunities for disposal [of stolen property].

Also, those who do not escape notice but can have the trial put aside or postponed, or corrupt the judges. And those who, if a penalty is imposed, can get full payment put aside or postponed for a time. Or |1372^{a}35| if, due to lack of means, the person has nothing to lose. Also, those for whom the profits are evident, large, or immediate, while the penalties are small, un-evident, or remote. And the one for whom the retribution is not equal to the benefit, as |**1372^{b}1**| seems to be the case with tyranny.[328] Also, those for whom the unjust actions bring solid gains, whereas the only penalties are mere reproaches; and, contrariwise, those whose unjust actions tend to involve some praise, for example, if the person happened at the same time to have taken revenge for a father or mother, as in the case of Zeno, whereas the penalties tend to involve |1372^{b}5| fines, exile, or something of that sort.[329] For people do injustice for either reason and in either condition [of mind], yet they are not the same, but rather contrary, in character.[330]

Also, those who have often escaped notice or gone unpunished; and those who have often been unsuccessful (for there are even some among cases like these, as, among the warlike, there are those ready to renew the fight). |1372^{b}10| And those for whom the pleasure is immediate, while the pain is later, or where the profit is immediate, while the penalty is later (for those who lack self-control are like that, and lack of self-control is concerned with everything that people desire); and, {43} contrariwise, those for whom the pain or the penalty is immediate, while the pleasure and benefit are later and more lasting (for those who are self-controlled and |1372^{b}15| those who are more practically-wise pursue such things).[331]

Also, those who may possibly seem to have acted due to luck, necessity, nature, or habit, and, in general, to have committed an error rather than an injustice.[332] And those for whom there is a chance of decent consideration.[333] And those in need; but someone is in need in two ways: for either need is a matter of necessity, as in the case of the poor, or of excess, as in the case of the |1372^{b}20| rich. Also, those who are very reputable, and those who are very disreputable—the former because they are not suspected, the latter because they will not be less disreputable than before.

When disposed in these ways, then, people attempt to do injustice, and they do injustice to people of the following sorts and regarding things of the following sorts: Those that have something they need, either as necessities, or as excess, or for enjoyment, |1372^{b}25| whether they are far away or close by. For in the latter case the getting is fast, and in the former the retribution is slow, as if the [Greeks] were to plunder the Carthaginians.[334] Also, those who are not cautious nor on their guard, but trusting, since it is easy to take all these unawares. And those who are careless, since prosecuting is characteristic of a careful person. Also, those who are prone to shame, |1372^{b}30| since they are not likely to fight over profits.[335] And those that have been treated unjustly by many but have not prosecuted them, since these are, as the proverb goes, "Mysian spoil."[336] Also, those who have never, and those who have often, been so treated, since both are off their guard—the former, because it has never happened, the latter because it surely would not happen again. And those who have been accused or it is easy to accuse, since such people, |1372^{b}35| as hated and resented, neither deliberately choose [to prosecute], for fear of the judges, nor are capable of persuading them. And those against whom they have the pretext that their ancestors, they themselves, or their friends |**1373^{a}1**| treated badly, or were going to treat badly, either the doers of the injustice themselves, their ancestors, or those for whom they care. For as the proverb says, "A pretext is the only thing wickedness needs." Also, their enemies and their friends, since the latter is easy, and the former pleasant. And those who are friendless, or not clever |1373^{a}5| either in speaking or in action, since they either do not attempt to prosecute, or seek reconciliation, or accomplish nothing. And those for whom there is nothing to gain from spending time keeping an eye on the trial or the full payment of the fine, for example, foreigners and the self-employed, since they resolve the case for a small sum and {44} readily cease the proceedings. Also, those who have done many unjust actions, or of the same sorts as are being done to them |1373^{a}10| (for it almost seems not to be an injustice when someone is done an injustice of the same sort as the injustice he is accustomed to do to others). I mean, for example, if someone treats a person in an insulting way who is accustomed to committing wanton aggression.[337] Also, those who have done evils to them, or wished, wish, or are about to do them (for it includes something both pleasant and noble and appears close to not being an injustice).

|1373ª15| And those by doing injustice to whom they gratify friends, those they admire or love, those in control, or, in general, those they live in dependence upon.[338] And those with regard to whom there is a chance of decent consideration. And those against whom they have made complaints and had previous differences, as Calippus did in the Dion affair.[339] For even things like that appear close to not being an injustice. |1373ª20| And those to whom others are going to do injustice, if they themselves do not do so first, on the supposition that it is no longer possible to deliberate, as Aenesidemus is said to have sent the prize in a game of *kottabos* to Gelon after the latter had enslaved the city, because he had done first what Aenesidemus himself was going to do.[340] Also, those whom, after doing them the injustice, they can do many just things for, on the supposition that they will thus easily repair it, as Jason the Thessalian said |1373ª25| that he had to do some unjust things in order to be capable of doing many just ones too.[341]

Also, [people do injustice regarding] things of the sort that all or many are accustomed to do, since they think they will get sympathetic consideration.[342] And things easy to hide, and of the sort that are quickly consumed, such as the edible ones. Or those that are easy to change in color, shape, or |1373ª30| by mixing, or those that it is easy to conceal in many places.[343] Such things include those that can be easily carried or concealed in small places, and those that are indistinguishable from or similar to many that the doer of the injustice already had. Also, things that those treated unjustly are ashamed to mention—for example, acts of wanton aggression against the women of their household, or against themselves or their sons. And those the |1373ª35| prosecutor of which would seem litigious, and those that are small or which merit sympathetic consideration are like this.

The ways, then, in which those who do injustice are disposed, what sorts of unjust actions they do and to what sorts of people, and due to what, are pretty much these.

{45} I 13

Let us now determine all the unjust actions and all the just actions, |**1373ᵇ1**| starting first with the following points. The just actions and the unjust actions, accordingly, have been defined in relation to two sorts of laws and in two ways in relation to persons. I mean that law is on the one hand special and on the other hand common, the latter being unwritten,

|1373^{b}5| the former written, and special being what each [community] has defined relative to itself, and common what is in accord with nature.[344] For there is what all people, even if they do not share any community whatsoever with each other or any contracts, have a hunch that there is, namely, a just and unjust that are by nature common.[345] For example, this is what Antigone in Sophocles' play is evidently speaking of when she says |1373^{b}10| that it is just, though forbidden, to bury Polyneices, since this is just by nature:

> For not just now or yesterday, but always, ever
> Lives this [law], and no one knows whence it appeared.[346]

And, as Empedocles says about not killing an animate thing, since this is not just for some and unjust for others: |1373^{b}15|

> What is lawful for all extends continuously
> Through the wide-ruling ether and through the immense light of the sun.[347]

And as Alcidamas says in the *Messianicus*:

> God has made all people free; nature has made none a slave.[348]

And in relation to persons, law is divided in two ways. For what one should do or not do is defined in relation to the community or in relation to an individual member of the community. That is why |1373^{b}20| unjust actions and just actions are a matter of doing injustice and acting justly in two ways, either in relation to a single and definite individual or in relation to the community. For to commit adultery or to strike a blow is to do injustice to some definite individual, whereas refusing to serve in the army is to do injustice to the community.

With this division, then, of all the unjust actions, some |1373^{b}25| being in relation to the community, others in relation to one person or in relation to several persons, let us take the matter up again and state what it is to be treated unjustly.[349] To be treated unjustly, accordingly, is to suffer {46} unjust actions at the hands of someone who does them voluntarily. For doing injustice was previously defined to be a voluntary thing.[350] And since the one treated unjustly must be harmed, and harmed involuntarily, such |1373^{b}30| harmful actions are evident from our previous discussion (for intrinsic goods and evils have been discussed previously, as have things that are done voluntarily, namely, that they are the ones done knowingly), so that all accusations must be either in relation to the community or in relation to the private individual, the accused having acted either

ignorantly and involuntarily or voluntarily and knowingly, and in the latter case some |1373[b]35| from deliberate choice and others due to feeling.[351] Spirit will be spoken about in the account of the feelings; and what sorts of things are deliberately chosen and the way those who do them are disposed were spoken about earlier.[352]

But since people often agree that they have done an action but do not agree with the indictment or |**1374[a]1**| what the indictment is about—for example, to have taken something, but not to have stolen it; to have struck the first blow, but not to have committed wanton aggression; to have had sexual relations, but not to have committed adultery; to have stolen something, but not to have committed sacrilege (for it did not belong to a god); to have trespassed, but not on public land; or to have had discussion |1374[a]5| with enemies, but not to have committed treason. Because of this, definitions should be given of these things, namely, of what theft is, what wanton aggression is, and what adultery is. That way if we wish to show that an offense has or has not been committed, we shall be able to make evident what is just. And in all such cases the dispute is about whether the accused is unjust and base or not unjust.[353] |1374[a]10| For depravity and injustice lie in the deliberate choice, and all such names —for example, "wanton aggression" and "theft"—additionally signify deliberate choice.[354] For if someone has struck another a blow, he has not in all cases committed wanton aggression against him, but rather if he has done so for the sake of something—for example, to dishonor the other or to please himself.[355] Nor in all cases, if he took something by stealth, has he stolen it, but rather |1374[a]15| if he took it for the purpose of harm and for the use and advantage of himself.[356] It is the same where the others are concerned as it is concerning these.

But since, as we saw, there are two kinds (*eidos*) of just and unjust actions (for some are written, others unwritten), and the ones the laws proclaim have been spoken about, two kinds (*eidos*) of [such actions as determined by] unwritten laws remain.[357] |1374[a]20| On the one hand these are the ones that are in accord with a superiority of virtue or vice, for which there are reproaches and praises, dishonors and honors, and rewards —for example, being grateful, or doing good in return for {47} good, to a benefactor, helping one's friends, and other such things.[358] On the other hand they are the ones omitted by the special written law. |1374[a]25| For decency seems to be something just, and decency is justice that lies

beyond the written law.[359] These omissions are sometimes voluntary on the part of legislators and sometimes involuntary. They are involuntary whenever something escapes their notice, voluntary whenever they cannot define something [exactly], but, on the one hand, it is necessary |1374^{a}30| to speak in universal terms, and, on the other, the definition does not hold universally, but rather for the most part.[360] Also, wherever it is not easy to give a definition due to the unlimitedness [of the possibilities], for example, the size and sort of iron implement to be used in a case of wounding, since a lifetime would not suffice to enumerate them completely. If the action, then, is something that cannot be [exactly] defined, but a law must be established, it is necessary to speak unconditionally, so that if someone wearing a ring raises his hand or strikes a blow, |1374^{a}35| according to the written law he will be liable and have done injustice, whereas in truth he has not done injustice; and this is decency. |**1374^{b}1**|

If, then, decency is what was stated, it is evident what sorts of things are decent and what sorts not decent, and what sorts of human beings are not decent. For cases in which there should be sympathetic consideration are cases for decency, and it consists in not judging errors and unjust actions as deserving of the same [penalty], or |1374^{b}5| misfortunes either.[361] Misfortunes are whichever ones are contrary to reasonable expectation and do not result from depravity; errors are whichever ones are not contrary to reasonable expectation and do not result from depravity; and unjust actions are whichever ones are not contrary to reasonable expectation and do result from depravity.[362] Also, to make allowances for |1374^{b}10| human weaknesses is decent.[363] As is looking not to the law but to the legislator; not to the word (*logos*) but to the thought of the legislator; not to the action but to the deliberate choice; not to the part but to the whole; and not to what sort the person is now but |1374^{b}15| to what sort he has been always or for the most part. Also, to remember good things received rather than bad ones, and good things received rather than good ones done. And to show restraint when one is treated unjustly. And to be willing to be judged by word (*logos*) rather than by work.[364] And to wish to go into arbitration rather than to trial. For the |1374^{b}20| arbitrator looks to what is decent, whereas the juror looks to the law.[365] Indeed it was for the sake of this that arbitrators were invented, namely, that decency prevail.

Where decent things are concerned, then, let them be determined in this way.

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An unjust action is greater insofar as it results from a greater [state of] injustice; that is why the least one may be the greatest—for example, |1374^{b}25| the accusation of Callistratus against Melanopus, that he defrauded the officials in charge of temple upkeep of three consecrated half-obols.[366] But in the case of justice it is the contrary. This [namely, that the least may be the greatest,] is so because the greatest are potentially present in the least, since the one who has stolen three consecrated half-obols would do any injustice whatsoever. Sometimes, then, the greater is judged in this way, sometimes from the harm [done].

Also, [an unjust action is greater] where there is no |1374^{b}30| equal penalty but all are too little.[367] And where there is no remedy, since it is difficult, indeed impossible [to find a just penalty].[368] And if the sufferer of the injustice cannot get a trial, since then the injustice is not remediable (for a trial is both a punishment and a remedy). And if the sufferer, that is, the person who has been treated unjustly, inflicted some great punishment on himself, since then the doer of the injustice would justly be punished with a yet greater one—for |1374^{b}35| example, Sophocles, when pleading on behalf of Euctemon, who had cut his own throat after the wanton aggression he had suffered, declared that he would not assess the penalty at less than the sufferer |**1375^{a}1**| had assessed for himself.[369]

Also, when someone is the only, the first, or among the few, to have done it.[370] And to commit the same error often is a great thing.[371] Also, when due to it preventions and penalties have been sought and discovered —for example, in Argos a person is penalized due to whom a law was set up, as are those due to whom |1375^{a}5| a prison was built.[372] And an unjust action is greater, the more beast-like it is.[373] Also, the more premeditated it is. And what those who hear about it fear more than pity.[374] (And the rhetorically relevant facts are of the following sort: that the person has abrogated or exceeded many [parts of] justice—for example, oaths, handshakes, promises, marriage agreements.[375] For this is an excess consisting of many unjust actions.) |1375^{a}10|

Also, those that occur in a place where doers of injustice are being punished—which is just what perjurers do. (For where would they not do injustice, if they do it even in court?) And things in which there is the

most shame. And if done to someone who has done good to him (for he does more injustice, in that he does bad and also in that he does not do good).[376] And the person who contravenes the unwritten |1375[a]15| parts of justice [is more unjust] (for it is characteristic of a better person to be just without being compelled, and the written parts compel, whereas the unwritten ones do not).[377] But is so, in another way, if he {49} contravenes the written ones (for the unjust person who does unjust actions that involve fears and punishments would also do them were they punishment-free).

Let this much be said, then, about greater and lesser unjust action. |1375[a]20|

I 15

Following what has been said we have now to run through the means of persuasion that are called "outside the province of craft."[378] For they are special to judicial speeches.[379] They are five in number: laws, witnesses, contracts, [results of] torture, and oaths.

First, then, let us speak about laws, and in what way |1375[a]25| they should be used in exhorting and dissuading and accusing and defending.[380] For it is evident that if the written law is contrary to the thing at issue, one should use common law and what is decent as being more just.[381] And [one should say] that "the best consideration" requires this, namely, not to use the written law point by point.[382] |1375[a]30| And that the decent always remains and never changes, and neither does the common law (for it is in accord with nature), whereas the written ones often do. Hence what is said in Sophocles' *Antigone*. For Antigone defends herself for having buried Polyneices contrary to the law of Creon, but not contrary to the unwritten one, by saying |1375[a]35|

> For not just now or yesterday, but always, ever **|1375[b]1|**
>
> . . .
>
> This I was not likely [to break] because of any man.[383]

And that the just is something true and advantageous, but what [only] seems to be so is not, so that neither is the written law (for it does not always perform the function of law).[384] And that the judge is like the assayer of silver, |1375[b]5| because he distinguishes counterfeit justice from true justice. And that it is characteristic of a better man to use and abide by the unwritten laws rather than the written ones.[385]

Also [one should look to see] whether the [written] law is in some degree contrary to popular law, or if it is even contrary to itself (for sometimes one law prescribes that contracts be binding, whereas another forbids |1375^{b}10| making contracts contrary to the law).[386] And if it is ambiguous, so that one can turn it about and see which construal will fit either what is just or what is advantageous, then this is the construal to use.[387] And if the circumstances that led to setting up the law no longer remain in place but the law does, one should try to make this clear, and fight against the law by means of it. |1375^{b}15|

{50} If, on the other hand, the written law is in accord with the thing at issue, one should say that [the oath requiring] "the best consideration" is not there for the sake of judging contrary to the law, but in order that, if the juror is ignorant of what the law says, he does not violate his oath.[388] Also, that no one chooses what is unconditionally good, but what is good for himself.[389] And that there is no difference between a law's not being laid down and its not being used.[390] And |1375^{b}20| that in the other crafts there is no profit in being "wiser than the doctor" (for an error on the part of a doctor does not do so much harm as getting in the habit of disobeying the ruler).[391] And that to seek to be wiser than the laws is the very thing that is forbidden in the laws that are praised. And where the laws are concerned let things be determined in this way. |1375^{b}25|

As for witnesses, witnesses are of two sorts: the ancient ones and the recent ones. And of the latter, some share in the risk, while others are outside it.[392] By ancient I mean the poets and other notable people whose judgments are available—for example, the Athenians used Homer as a witness concerning Salamis, and the Tenedians |1375^{b}30| recently used Periander of Corinth against the Sigeans.[393] And Cleophon used the elegies of Solon against Critias, saying that the loose living of his family was ancient. For otherwise Solon would never have written:

Tell the fair-haired Critias from me to listen to his father.[394]

Such witnesses, then, are concerned with past events, |1375^{b}35| whereas interpreters of oracles are concerned with future ones. For example, Themistocles said that |**1376^{a}1**| "the wooden wall" meant that a naval battle must be fought.[395] Further, proverbs, as has been said, are witnesses.[396] For example, if someone advises against making a friend of an old person, the proverb, "Never do good to an old person," testifies to

this.[397] |1376ª5| And if he advises doing away with children after having done away with the fathers:

> Foolish is he who having killed the father leaves behind the sons.[398]

Recent witnesses are notable people who have given a judgment about something (for their judgments are indeed useful to those disputing about the same things)—for example, Eubulus, when attacking Chares in court, made use of what Plato |1376ª10| said against Archibius, namely, that "confessions of wickedness have increased in the city."[399] Also, those who share in the risk, if they seem perjurious. Such people are witnesses only as to whether something has happened or not, or {51} is or is not the case; they are not witnesses as to the quality of the action—for example, whether it was just or unjust, advantageous or disadvantageous. |1376ª15| Outsiders are most persuasive also about such matters; but most persuasive are the ancient witnesses, since they are not corruptible.[400]

The one who has no witnesses as confirmation of testimony should say that judgment must be made on the basis of likelihoods, and that this is what "the best consideration" requires. And that it is not possible for likelihoods to deceive for a sum of money. And that likelihoods are not convicted |1376ª20| of perjury. The one who has witnesses should say to the one who does not have them that likelihoods are not liable to trial, and that there would be no deed for witness if it were enough to consider [the case] on the basis of the arguments (*logos*).

Some pieces of testimony are about oneself, others about the opponent, and some are about the thing at issue, others about character, so it is evident |1376ª25| that there is never a scarcity of useful testimony. For if there is no testimony relating to the thing at issue, whether agreeing with oneself or contrary to the opponent, still there will be some about character, whether pointing to one's own decency or one's opponent's baseness. Other points about a witness—whether he is a friend, an enemy, or in between, whether he is reputable, disreputable, |1376ª30| in between, and all other such differences (*diaphora*)—should be based on the very same topics on which we state enthymemes.[401]

Where contracts are concerned, the use of arguments (*logos*) extends this far, namely, to amplifying or reducing, that is, making them persuasive or unpersuasive—if on one's side, persuasive and in control, if on the opponent's, |**1376ᵇ1**| their contraries.[402] With a view to

establishing their persuasiveness or un-persuasiveness, there is no difference from where witnesses are concerned. For whatever sorts of people signatories and custodians are, in these reside the persuasiveness of the contracts.[403] |1376[b]5|

If it is agreed that a contract exists, this should be amplified if on one's side. For a contract is a law applying to individuals and particular cases, and while contracts do not make the law to be in control, the laws do make contracts that are in accord with the laws to be in control, and, in general, the law itself is a sort of contract, so that whoever disobeys a contract or does away with it, |1376[b]10| it is the laws that he does away with. Further, many transactions, especially the voluntary ones, are carried out in accord with contracts, so that if these are without control, the business relations of human beings with each other are done away with. And the other things that are fitting [to say] are easy to see.

If the contract goes contrary to oneself and along with the opponents, then in the first place the things that are fitting [to say] are the {52} very ones that one might use to fight against a contrary law. |1376[b]15| For it would be absurd if we think, on the one hand, that we must not obey the laws whenever they are not correctly laid down but those who put them in place erred, and, on the other, that it is necessary to obey contracts. Second, one can say that the juror is an umpire of what is just; accordingly, he must consider not this [written contract], |1376[b]20| but as [construed] in the more just way. And say that while it is not possible to alter what is just by deception or compulsion (for it is something natural), contracts are among the things that come about both through deception and compulsion. In addition, one should look to see whether the contract is contrary to any written or common laws, and in the case of written ones, whether to |1376[b]25| domestic ones or to foreign ones, and next whether it is contrary to other contracts, whether later or earlier.[404] For one should look to see whether the later are the controlling ones (but the earlier ones without control), or whether the earlier ones are correct (but the later ones are deceptive)—whichever of the two may be useful. Further, one should see what is advantageous—whether the contract is in any way contrary to the interests of the judges, and anything else like this.[405] For these things too are similarly easy to see. |1376[b]30|

Results of torture are a sort of evidence and seem to carry conviction, in that a sort of compulsion is also involved.[406] And it is not difficult in

their case either to state the possibilities [regarding their use] on the basis of which to provide amplification, if the results of torture are on one's side, by saying that they are the only sorts of testimony that are true. But if they go contrary to oneself and along with the opponent, |**1377[a]1**| one could refute them by stating the truth generally about the kind (*genos*) to which the results of torture belong. For people speak falsely no less than truly when being tortured, whether through resilience they obstinately refuse to speak the truth, or readily tell lies to stop the torture more quickly. And one must be able to refer to |1377[a]5| paradigms of this sort of thing actually happening that are known to the judges. And one must say that the results of torture are not guaranteed to be true. For many slow-witted and thick-skinned people, and those who true to their noble breeding are capable of it in their souls, |1377[a]7a| steadfastly endure the compulsions [of torture], whereas cowards and cautious people accuse someone [even] before |1377[a]7b| they see the instruments of torture, so that there is nothing that carries conviction |1377[a]7c| in the results of torture.[407] |1377[a]7d|

Where oaths are concerned there is a fourfold division to make: either to offer one and accept one; do neither; do one but not the other (and of these, to offer but not accept, or accept but not offer).[408] Further, {53} in another way, beyond these, there is the question of whether an oath was already sworn either by oneself or by the other party. |1377[a]10|

If one does not offer, one can say that people swear false oaths easily; that the one who has sworn will not pay, whereas those who have not sworn, one thinks, will be condemned [by the jurors]; and that this risk will be better, namely, the one in the hands of the jurors, since one trusts them, not the opponent.[409]

If one does not accept an oath oneself, one can say that an oath is a substitute for things, |1377[a]15| and that if one were a base person, one would have accepted it (for it is better to be base for something than for nothing, and one who accepts the oath wins the case, while the one who does not accept it does not), and so one's not swearing an oath would be due to virtue, not to [a fear of] committing perjury.[410] And Xenophanes' remark is fitting, namely, that:

> A challenge to accept an oath made to a pious man is not itself the equal of one made to an impious man.[411]

Rather, it would be like |1377[a]20| a strong person challenging a weak one to strike a blow or be struck one.

If one does accept an oath, one can say that one trusts oneself, not the other. And, reversing the remark of Xenophanes, one should say that this way it is equal, namely, if the impious person offers and the pious one swears. And that it would be terrible to be unwilling to swear an oath oneself on matters that one thinks it fitting for others to judge after swearing one.

If one |1377[a]25| offers an oath, one can say that it is pious to be willing to turn the matter over to the gods, and that there is no need for the opponent to require other judges (for one is offering him the judgment).[412] And that it would be absurd not to be willing to swear about things we demand that others swear about.

But since it is clear how one should speak in each of these cases, it is also clear how one should speak when they are coupled—for example, |1377[a]30| if one wishes to accept but not to offer, if one wishes to offer but not accept [an oath], and if one wishes to accept *and* offer, or to do neither. For these are necessarily composed of the ones discussed, |**1377[b]1**| so that the arguments (*logos*) too are composed of the ones discussed.

And if one has already taken an oath, and an oath contrary [to the present case], he should say that it is not perjury. For while doing injustice is voluntary, and committing perjury is doing injustice, what is done due to force or deception is involuntary. Here |1377[b]5| one must conclude that perjury too is something committed by thought, not by mouth. {54} If, on the other hand, the oath is contrary to the opponent's case and has been sworn by him, one should say that those who do not abide by what they have sworn do away with everything (for this is in fact why jurors take an oath before administering the laws): "my opponents demand that you abide by the oaths you swore you would judge by, whereas they themselves do not abide by theirs." |1377[b]10| And there are many other things one might say by way of amplification.

About the means of persuasion that fall outside the province of craft, then, let this much be said.

{55} Book II |1377b15|

II 1

These, then, are the things on the basis of which one should exhort as well as dissuade, praise as well as blame, accuse as well as defend, and these are the sorts of beliefs and premises useful in relation to the means of persuasion belonging to these.[413] For enthymemes special to (one might almost say) each kind (*genos*) of speech are concerned with these and composed of these.[414]

But since rhetoric is for the sake of |1377b20| judgment (for people judge deliberations and a trial is a judgment), it is necessary for the speaker to look not only to the argument, that it be demonstrative and persuasive, but also to himself, that he be of a certain quality, and to the judge, to produce a certain quality in him too.[415] For it makes a great difference with a view to persuading—especially in deliberative speeches, but next in |1377b25| judicial ones—both that the speaker appear to be of a certain quality and that his listeners take him to be disposed in a certain way toward them, and if, in addition, they too will be disposed in a certain way. Now, for the speaker to appear to be of a certain quality is more useful in deliberative speeches, and for the listener to be disposed in a certain way in |1377b30| judicial speeches. For things do not appear the same to those who love and those who hate, nor to those who are angry and those who are mild-mannered, but either altogether distinct or distinct in degree.[416] To the one who loves, the person about whom he makes |**1378a1**| his judgment seems not to do injustice or to do little injustice, but to the one who hates, it is the contrary; to one feeling appetitive desire and being expectant, if something in the future is pleasant, it appears that it will both come about and be good, but to the one who feels none and is disgusted, the contrary.[417] |1378a5|

The causes due to which speakers themselves are persuasive are three. For that is how many things there are, outside demonstrations, due to which we trust. And these are practical wisdom, virtue, and goodwill. For speakers are deceptive in what they say or advise due to all of these or due to one of them.[418] For either it is due to a lack of practical wisdom that

they do not |1378[a]10| form beliefs correctly; or, though forming beliefs correctly, it is due to depravity that they do not say what seems to be so to them; or they are practically-wise and decent people, but not people of goodwill, so that it is possible for them not to give {56} the best advice though they know it; and beyond these there is none.[419] It is necessary, therefore, for a person who seems to have all these to be convincing to his listeners. The basis on which |1378[a]15| we might appear to be practically-wise and excellent people must be grasped from our discussions of the virtues.[420] For it is on the basis of the same things that a person would establish both another person and himself as being of a certain sort. About goodwill and friendliness, on the other hand, we must speak in our discussion of the feelings.[421]

The feelings are those things due to which people, by undergoing a change, differ in their judgments, and that entail pain and |1378[a]20| pleasure—for example, anger, pity, fear, and other such things, and their contraries.[422] And with respect to each a division into three must be made.[423] I mean, for example, in speaking of anger, by being disposed in which way people are angry, at whom they are usually angry, and for which sort of things.[424] For if we possessed one or two of these, but not all, it would be impossible |1378[a]25| to produce anger in another person. And similarly in the case of the others. Just as we have given a catalogue of premises in the case of the things discussed earlier, then, let us do so about these too, and let us divide them in the way mentioned.[425]

II 2

Let anger be desire, involving pain, for apparent revenge, because of apparent contempt |1378[a]30| on the part of someone unfitted to treat the person himself, or one of those close to him, with contempt.[426] If, then, this is what anger is, the angry person must always be angry at some particular individual (for example, with Cleon not with [the kind] *human*), because the individual has done or is going to do something to him or one of those close to him, and all anger must entail some sort of pleasure, |**1378[b]1**| namely, the one from the hope of being revenged.[427] For it is pleasant to think that he will get what he seeks, and no one seeks things that are apparently impossible for him to attain, and the angry person seeks what is possible for him to attain.[428] That is why it has been well-said of spirit that: |1378[b]5|

Far sweeter than dripping honey
It grows in the hearts of men.[429]

For a sort of pleasure actually follows along because of this, and also because angry people spend their time in taking revenge through thinking, and so the appearance that occurs at that time produces pleasure, as in the case of dreams.[430] |1378^{b}10|

{57} Since contempt is an activation of belief concerned with what appears to be worth nothing (for we think that both good things and bad ones are worth serious attention, as is what leads to them, whereas whatever amounts to little or nothing, we suppose to be worthy of none), there are three kinds (*eidos*) of contempt: despising, spite, and wanton aggression.[431] For the one who despises |1378^{b}15| is contemptuous (for the things people despise are the ones they think are worth nothing, and the ones they think are worth nothing they have contempt for).

And the one who is spiteful appears to show contempt. For spite is an impediment to the wishes [of the other], not in order to get something for himself, but in order that the other not get it. Since, then, he does it not to get something for himself, he is showing contempt. For it is clear that |1378^{b}20| he does not suppose that the other will harm him (for then he would be afraid and would not show contempt), nor that the other might benefit him in anything worth mentioning (for then he would be taking care so as to be his friend).

And the wantonly aggressive person also shows contempt. For wanton aggression consists in doing or saying things that involve shame for the one who suffers them, not in order that something or other [beneficial] may come about for the agent himself, or because something [bad] has happened to him, but in order to take pleasure in it. |1378^{b}25| For those who are doing the same thing back are not committing wanton aggression but revenging themselves. The cause of pleasure to those who commit wanton aggression, though, is that they think that they become more superior themselves by doing evil [to others] (that is why young people and rich ones are prone to wanton aggression, since they think themselves superior when they commit wanton aggression). And dishonor is characteristic of wanton aggression, and one who dishonors treats with contempt. For what is worth nothing receives no honor, |1378^{b}30| whether for good or for bad.[432] That is why Achilles, when angered, says:

He has dishonored me, since he has taken away my prize and keeps it,

and

[Treats me] like some dishonored vagabond,

as one angered because of these things.[433]

And people think it fitting that they be highly esteemed by |1378[b]35| those inferior in birth (*genos*), in capacity, in virtue, and, in general, in {58} whatever they themselves are largely superior in—for example, in money, |**1379[a]1**| the rich man by the poor man; in speaking, one skilled at speaking by one incapable in speaking; ruler by ruled; and one who thinks himself worthy of rule by one worthy of being ruled.[434] That is why it has been said that:

Great is the spirit of Zeus-cherished kings, |1379[a]5|

and

Yet it may be that even afterwards he has a grudge.[435]

For kings are vexed because of their superiority. Further, [a person thinks it fitting that he be highly esteemed] by those he thinks he should be treated well by, namely, the ones he has treated well, is treating well, or wishes or has wished to treat well—either himself, or someone else because of himself, or someone among those close to him.

It is already evident from these considerations by being disposed in which way people are angry, |1379[a]10| at whom they are angry, and because of what sorts of things.[436] For they are angry when they are pained; for the one who is pained seeks something.[437] If, then, anyone in any way directly obstructs, for example, a thirsty man from drinking, or if he does not do so directly, appears to be doing the same thing, or if he acts against him or does not assist him in acting, or annoys him in some other respect when he is so |1379[a]15| disposed [namely, seeking something], at all such people he is angry. That is why those who are ill, poor, at war, in love, thirsty—in general, those with an appetite and not successful in satisfying it—are irascible, that is, easily provoked to anger, especially toward those who show contempt for their present condition. For example, the one who is ill is easily provoked because of things related to his illness, the poor one because of things related to his poverty, the one at war |1379[a]20| because of things related to the war, the one in love because of things related to his love, and likewise too in the other

cases.[438] For each is prepared by his present feeling to follow the path toward his particular anger.[439]

Further, [a person is angry] if he happened to be expecting the contrary, since what is to a high degree contrary to belief pains more, just as what is to a high degree contrary |1379^{a}25| to belief delights more, if what is wished for comes about.[440] And that is why it is evident from these considerations what opportune moments, times, dispositions, and stages of life are the sort in which people are more easily moved to {59} anger, and in what conditions, and when, and when they are more in these, they are more easily moved.

People so disposed, then, are easily moved to anger, |1379^{a}30| and they are angry at those who ridicule, satirize, or jibe at them (for they commit wanton aggression). And at those who do such actions as are signs of wanton aggression—and these must be such as are neither payback for something nor beneficial to those who do them (for actions of this sort are immediately taken to be due to wanton aggression).[441] And at those who speak badly about, or despise, things they themselves take most |1379^{a}35| seriously—for example, those who take pride in philosophy, if someone does this about philosophy, or those who take pride in their looks, if someone does it about their looks, and likewise in other cases. And they do so much more if they suspect that they themselves do not really possess [the things they take pride in], either at all or in any strong sense, or do not seem to. For when they very confidently think themselves to be superior in the **|1379^{b}1|** things that are being jibed at, they give it no thought.

Also, [people are angry] at friends more than at those who are not friends (for they think it more fitting to be treated well by them than not). And at those who are in the habit of honoring or caring about them, if, contrariwise, they do not care about them in the same way (for they |1379^{b}5| think they are being despised by them too, since otherwise they would not treat them in the same way [as before]). And at those who do not treat them well in return, and those who do not give equally in return; and at those who do things contrary to [their wishes], if they are inferiors (for all such people appear to despise them: the latter as if looking down on them as if *they* were inferiors; the former as if they had been treated well by inferiors). And more so at those who are of no account, if |1379^{b}10| they show contempt in some way (for anger

characteristic of contempt is assumed to be at those unfitted to show it, and it is fitting for inferiors not to show contempt).[442]

Also [people are angry] at friends if these do not speak well of them or treat them well, and yet more so if they do the contrary, and if they are imperceptive of those in need, as in the case of Plexippus in Antiphon's *Meleager* (for |1379^{b}15| not to be perceptive is a sign of contempt, since what we care about does not escape our notice).[443] And at those who rejoice or are fully in good mood during their misfortunes (for it is a sign of being either an enemy or one showing contempt). And at those who do not care if they pain them (that is why people are angry at those who bring bad news). And at those who listen |1379^{b}20| to bad things about them or contemplate base things of theirs (for these are like contemptuous people or enemies; for friends feel pain jointly, and {60} all are pained when they contemplate base things that are properly their own).[444]

Further, [people get angry] at those who show contempt for them in front of five sorts of people, namely, those they take to be their rivals, those they admire, those they wish to be admired by, those in front of whom they feel shame, or those |1379^{b}25| who are ashamed in front of them.[445] If someone shows contempt for them in front of these, they are yet more angry. And at those who show contempt for things of the sort it would be shameful for them not to help—for example, parents, children, wives, and those they rule.[446] And at those who do not return a favor (for the contempt shown is beyond what is fitting). And at those who are self-deprecating in relation to what they take seriously |1379^{b}30| (for then self-deprecation is [a sign of] despising).[447] And at those who treat others well, if they do not also treat them that way (for then this too is [a sign of] despising, namely, not thinking them worthy of what they do for all and sundry). And forgetfulness is also productive of anger—for example, forgetfulness of their names, although it has to do with such a small matter (for even forgetfulness seems to be a sign of contempt, |1379^{b}35| since forgetfulness comes about through indifference, and indifference is a sort of contempt).

Those, then, at whom people are angry, by being disposed in which way they are angry, and because of what sorts of things, |**1380^{a}1**| have at one and the same time been stated. And it is clear that a speaker might need to establish by his speech the sort of state in his listeners as will

dispose them to anger, and to establish his opponents as liable for those things about which one gets angry, and as being themselves of the sort of people one gets angry with. |1380ª5|

II 3

Since becoming angry is the contrary of becoming mild-mannered, and anger to mild-manneredness, we must grasp by being disposed in which way people are mild-mannered, to whom they are mild-mannered, and because of what sorts of things.[448] Accordingly, let becoming mild-mannered be a settling down and coming to rest of anger.[449] If, then, people are angry at those who show contempt, and showing contempt is something voluntary, it is evident that |1380ª10| they are mild-mannered toward those who do none of these things, or do them involuntarily, or are only apparently of this sort. And toward those wishing to do the contrary of what they have done. And toward all who are such toward themselves too (for no one seems to show contempt for himself).

{61} Also, toward those who admit and regret (for taking as just recompense their being pained at |1380ª15| what they have done, they cease to be angry). A sign of this is found in the punishment of slaves. For we punish more severely those who dispute and deny, whereas we cease our spirited response toward those who agree that they are justly punished. And the cause of this is that to deny evident facts is shamelessness, and |1380ª20| shamelessness shows contempt and [in particular] despising—at any rate, we feel no shame before those we deeply despise.[450]

Also, toward those who humble themselves before them and do not dispute with them (for they appear to agree that they are inferior, inferiors are afraid, and no one who is afraid shows contempt)—indeed, the fact that anger ceases toward those who humble themselves is something that even dogs make clear by not biting |1380ª25| those who are sitting.[451] And toward those who are serious toward the serious (for it seems to them that they are being taken seriously rather than being despised). And toward those who have shown them greater favor.[452] And toward those who are begging a favor and entreating them [not to be angry] (for they are humbler).

Also, toward those who are not being wantonly aggressive, satirizing, or showing contempt toward anyone, or not against good people, or

people |1380[a]30| like themselves; and in general, the things that inspire mild-manneredness should be looked for from their contraries.[453] Also, they do not get angry at those whom they fear or feel shame in front of, and are not angry as long as they are thus disposed (for it is impossible to be afraid and angry at the same time). And people are not angry, or are less angry, at people who have done things because of anger, since they do not seem to have acted because of wanton aggression |1380[a]35| (for no one is wantonly aggressive while angry, since wanton aggression is painless, whereas anger involves pain). Also, people are mild-mannered toward those who feel shame in front of them. |**1380[b]1**|

Also, it is clear that people whose condition goes contrary to being angry are mild-mannered—for example, in the condition of amusement, of laughter, in a holiday mood, in a condition of prosperity, of success, of satisfaction—in general, in a condition of painlessness, of pleasure that does not result from wanton aggression, and of decent hope.

Further, when they have spent time with |1380[b]5| their anger and are not in the first burst of it (for time causes anger to cease). And vengeance previously taken on one person causes a greater anger against another person to cease. That is why when someone asked Philocrates on an occasion when the people were angry, "Why do you not defend yourself?" he answered wisely, "Not yet." "But when?" "When I see {62} someone else has been accused."[454] For people become mild-mannered when |1380[b]10| they have spent their anger on someone else. This happened in the case of Ergophilus.[455] For though the people were more embittered against him than against Callisthenes, they let him go because they had condemned Callisthenes to death on the previous day.[456]

Also, if they pity [the offenders], especially if these have suffered a greater bad thing than they, when angry, would have done to them (for they think they have, as it were, gotten their revenge).[457] |1380[b]15| And if they think that they themselves have done injustice and suffered justly, since anger does not arise at what is just (for they no longer think that they are suffering beyond what is fitting, and this, we saw, is what anger requires).[458] That is why one should inflict a preliminary punishment by words (*logos*) (for even slaves are less vexed when so punished).[459]

Also, if the offended think that the ones punished will not perceive that the punishment suffered is due to [the offended] themselves |1380[b]20| and is in return for what they themselves have suffered.[460] For

anger is directed at a particular individual, as is clear from the definition.[461] That is why the poet has correctly written:

Say it was Odysseus, sacker of cities,

on the supposition that he has not been revenged if [Polyphemus the Cyclops] has not perceived both by whom and in return for what [he had been blinded].[462] So people are not angry either with all the others who do not perceive these things, |1380^{b}25| or any further with the dead, on the supposition that they have suffered the ultimate, and do not feel pain or have perception, which is what angry people seek.[463] That is why the poet, in wishing Achilles to cease his anger at Hector once he was dead, well said:

For it is senseless clay that he outrages in his wrath.[464] |1380^{b}30|

It is clear, then, that those who wish to make their listeners mild-mannered should speak from these topics, making, on the one hand, the listeners be of that sort and, on the other, rendering those with whom they are angry as either fearsome, or worthy of being ashamed in front of, or as having shown them favor, or as involuntary agents, or as deeply pained by what they have done.[465]

{63} II 4

Let us say whom people love and hate, and because of what, after having defined friendliness |1380^{b}35| and being friendly.[466] Let being friendly, then, be wishing for someone what one thinks to be good things, for his sake not for one's own, and to be productive in action of such things so far as one can. And a friend is one who loves and |**1381^{a}1**| is loved in return; and people think they are friends when they think they are both this way. These things being presupposed, a friend is necessarily someone who shares in one's pleasure at good things and in one's pains at painful ones, not because of something else, but because of oneself. For |1381^{a}5| all enjoy it when the things they wish for come about, and are pained when the contrary ones do, so that the pains and the pleasures are signs of wish. And friends are the ones, then, to whom the same things are good and bad and who are friends and enemies with the same people, since it is necessary for them to wish for the same things. So the one who also wishes for another the very things he wishes for himself is evidently a friend to him. |1381^{a}10|

Also, people are friendly to those who have done good things for them, whether for themselves or for those they care about (be these great

things, or done eagerly, or at opportune times), and for their sake—or to those they think wish to do good things. And to the friends of their friends, and to those who like the same people they
like. And to those who are liked by those who are liked by them; those |1381[a]15| who have the same enemies they have and hate those they hate; and those who are hated by those who are hated by them (for the same things seem to be good to all these [as seem to be good] to themselves, so that these others wish for the things that are good for themselves, which is just the thing, as we saw, that is characteristic of a friend).[467]

Further, [people are friendly] to those who are able and disposed to do good things for others with regard to money and with regard to safety (that is why they honor generous and courageous |1381[a]20| people). Also, to those who are just.[468] And they suppose that those who do not live off others are just, namely, the ones who are such as to live by their own labor, and, of these, the ones who do so from farming, and, of these, above all the ones who work the land themselves.[469] And to those who are temperate, because they are not unjust.[470] And to those who mind their own business, due to the same consideration.[471]

And [we are also friendly] to those we wish to be friends with, if they appear |1381[a]25| to wish it; and those who are good in accord with virtue {64} are like this, as are those who have a good reputation, either among all, or among the best people, or among those who are admired by us, or among those who admire us. Further, to those who are pleasant to pass the time with and spend our days with.[472] Those who are calm and not critical of our errors, |1381[a]30| and neither lovers of victory nor quarrelsome, are like this (for all such people are pugnacious, and pugnacious people quite evidently wish for the contrary things). And [we are also friendly] to dexterous people in mocking and standing one's ground [when mocked] (for both strive toward the same thing as their neighbor, namely, to be capable of jibing and of taking a jibe in a gracious way).[473] Also, to those who praise the |1381[a]35| good qualities that belong to us, and of these, especially the ones that we are afraid may not belong to us. And to those who are refined in appearance, dress, **|1381[b]1|** and in their whole way of life. And to those who do not reproach us either for our errors [in their regard] or for their benefactions [to us] (for both lots are inclined to be critical of us).

Also, [people are friendly] to those who are not inclined to remember injuries or store up accusations, but instead are easily appeased (for as they take them |1381^{b}5| to be toward others, so they think they will be toward themselves). And to those who do not speak badly, or even want to know the bad things, either about their neighbors or about themselves, but instead the good ones (for these are the things a good person does). And to those who do not oppose others who are angry or being serious (for such people are pugnacious). And to those who are |1381^{b}10| in some way seriously disposed toward them—for example, who admire them, take them to be excellent people, and find enjoyment in them, and especially those who feel this way about things they especially wish for themselves, or admire, or believe to be excellent, or take pleasure in. And to those who are like themselves and have the same practices, provided they do not become too annoying or |1381^{b}15| get their livelihood from the same thing (for then it becomes a case of potter versus potter).[474] And to those who have an appetite for the same things, when it is possible to share these at the same time; otherwise the same thing results as in the previous case.

Also, to those they are so disposed toward that they are not ashamed of what seems to be [bad], provided they do not despise them. And to those they are so disposed toward that they are ashamed of |1381^{b}20| what truly is [bad]. And they are friendly to, or wish to be friends with, those they are rivals of, or those they wish to be emulated by, not envied.[475] And to those together with whom they do good things, unless greater bad ones are going to result for themselves. And to those who are equally {65} friendly to their friends both absent and present, which is why |1381^{b}25| all are friendly to those who are such even toward dead friends.[476] And, in general, those who are intensely friendly to their friends and are not inclined to leave them in the lurch (for among the good they are especially friendly to those who are good at being friendly). Also, those who do not falsify themselves to them; and those who tell them even the bad things about themselves are like this (for it was mentioned that in front of friends |1381^{b}30| we are not ashamed of things that seem [bad]; if, then, someone who is ashamed is not a friend, the one who is not ashamed is like a friend). And those who are not fearsome and in whom we have confidence (for no one is friendly to someone he is afraid of).

The kinds (*eidos*) of friendship are companionship, intimate, familial, and others of this sort.[477] And things productive of friendship are: doing a favor; doing it without being asked to do it; and |1381^{b}35| not advertising it when it has been done. For then it appears to be done for the sake of the friend and not because of something else.

Where enmity and hating are concerned, it is evident that they are to be theoretically grasped **|1382^{a}1|** from their contraries. And the things productive of enmity are anger, spite, and accusation. Now anger arises from things done against oneself, enmity also not from things done against oneself (for if we take someone to be of such-and-such sort, we hate him). And anger is always concerned with particulars, such as Callias |1382^{a}5| or Socrates, whereas hate is also directed against kinds (*genos*) (for everyone hates the thief and the sycophant).[478] And the former is curable in time, whereas the latter is not curable. And the former seeks pain [for its object], whereas the latter seeks evil (for the angry person wishes [his revenge] to be perceived, whereas to the latter it makes no difference; and painful things are all perceptible, whereas the greatest evils |1382^{a}10| are the least perceptible ones, [for example,] injustice, lack of practical wisdom).[479] For the presence of evil does not at all cause pain. And anger involves pain, whereas hate does not involve pain (for the angry person is pained, whereas the one who hates is not).[480] And the angry person may feel pity when many [revengeful] things have happened, whereas the one who hates never does (for the former wishes the one he is angry at to suffer in turn, whereas the latter wishes for him not to exist).[481] |1382^{a}15|

It is evident, then, from these considerations that it is possible to demonstrate that people are enemies or friends, to make them so when they are not, to refute those who claim to be friends or enemies, and to draw those who because of anger or enmity are our opponents toward whichever of them one may deliberately choose.

{66} II 5

What sorts of things people fear, and whom, and by being disposed in which way [they feel fear] will be evident from what follows. |1382^{a}20| Let fear, then, be a sort of pain or disturbance coming from the appearance of a future destructive or painful evil.[482] For people do not fear all evils (for example, that one will become unjust or slow-witted), but rather those that are capable of [causing] great pains or great

destructions, and if they appear not far off but close at hand, and so about to happen. For people do not fear what is very far off. |1382[a]25| For they all know that they will die, but because it is not close at hand, they care nothing about it.

If, then, this is what fear is, necessarily the sorts of things that are fearsome are whichever ones appear to have a great capacity for destroying or causing harms that lead to great pain. That is why even the signs of such things are fearsome |1382[a]30| (for what is fearsome appears close at hand). In fact, this is what danger is, namely, the approaching of something fearsome. Such signs are enmity, anger on the part of those capable of doing something [fearsome] (for it is clear that they wish to do it, so that they are close to doing it), and injustice having this capacity (for the unjust person is unjust |1382[a]35| by deliberate choice).[483] Also, virtue outraged by wanton aggression when it has this capacity (for it is clear **|1382[b]1|** that when outraged by wanton aggression, it deliberately chooses [to retaliate], always [does so], and now it can). And fear on the part of those capable of doing something [fearsome] (for someone like that is also necessarily in readiness).

Since ordinary people are worse [than they should be], subjugated to profit, and cowardly in times of danger, being in the power |1382[b]5| of another is for the most part fearsome, so that the accomplices of someone who has done something terrible are fearsome, as likely to inform on him or leave him in the lurch.[484] And those capable of doing injustice are fearsome to those capable of having injustice done to them (for human beings, for the most part, do injustice when they have the capacity to do so). Also, those who have been treated unjustly, or think they have been treated unjustly (for they are always on the lookout for an opportune moment [to take revenge]). And those who have done |1382[b]10| injustice, if they are capable [of doing something fearsome], are fearsome, as being anxious about retaliation (for this was assumed to be something fearsome).[485] And those who are competitors for the same things, whenever it is not possible for both to share them at the same time (for people always make an enemy of such competitors).

Also, those who are fearsome to others who are stronger than us [are fearsome] (for those people are capable of harming us more, if they are {67} capable of harming even |1382[b]15| those who are stronger than us). And (due to the same thing) those feared by others who are stronger than

we are. And people who have destroyed those stronger than they are. And people who have attacked those weaker than they are (for those are either already fearsome, or will be when they have grown stronger). And among those we have treated unjustly, or are either enemies or rivals, it is not the quick-tempered or outspoken ones [who are fearsome], but the mild-mannered, the self-deprecating, and the unscrupulous ones |1382^{b}20| (for in their case it is unclear if they are close [to taking revenge], so that it is never evident that they are far off [from doing so]).[486]

All fearsome things that people have committed in error and are not possible to rectify—but are either wholly impossible or not possible for them but are for their opponents—are more fearsome. Also when there are no possibilities of help, or not easy ones.

Simply speaking, though, the fearsome things are the ones that are pitiable when they happen or are going to happen to others.[487] |1382^{b}25|

These, then, are pretty much (one might almost say) the most important things that are fearsome and that people fear. Let us now speak about by being disposed in which way people are afraid.

If fear involves a certain expectation of undergoing some destructive suffering, then, it is evident that no one is afraid |1382^{b}30| if he is among those who think that they will suffer nothing at all. Nor will people be afraid of things they do not think they will suffer, nor of people at whose hands they do not think they will suffer, nor at times when they do not think so. Necessarily, therefore, people who think they might suffer something are afraid, and are afraid of those at whose hands they think they might do so, and of the things and at the times that they think they might suffer. And people do not think they will suffer it when they are, or seem to themselves to be, in the midst of great prosperity; that is why |**1383^{a}1**| they are wantonly aggressive, contemptuous, and rash (and what makes them such is wealth, strength, many friends, and [great] capacity).[488] Nor are people afraid who consider that they have already suffered every terror and have grown coldly indifferent to the future, like those being flogged to death and already nearly dead; on the contrary, for them to be afraid there must be some hope of |1383^{a}5| being saved from what they are anxious about.[489] A sign of this is that fear makes people inclined to deliberate, whereas no one deliberates about hopeless things.

So whenever it is better that [the listeners] should feel afraid, [the speaker] should make them feel as if they were to suffer (for even others,

greater than them, have suffered), and he should show that there are others like them who are suffering |1383^{a}10| or have suffered at the hands of {68} those from whom they did not think [it possible], and things they did not expect, and at a time they did not think [it possible].[490]

Since it is now evident what fear is, what the fearsome things are, and by being disposed in which way each is afraid, it is also evident on the basis of this what being confident is, what sorts of things people feel confident about, and by being disposed in which way people feel confident, since confidence is the contrary of |1383^{a}15| fear, and what inspires confidence, of what is fearsome. So [confidence's] hope of things providing safety involves an appearance of them as being close at hand, and of fearsome things as either non-existent or as being far away. What inspires confidence in people is the remoteness of what is dreadful and the closeness of what provides safety.[491] [Things that inspire confidence] also include ways of rectifying the situation, or |1383^{a}20| many possibilities of help, or great ones, or both. Or the fact that they have not been treated unjustly or treated others unjustly, that they have no competitors, or that these have no capacity. Or that those having capacity are their friends, or that they have either done them good or received it from them. Or the fact that those whose advantage is the same as theirs are more numerous, or stronger, or both [than those opposed].

People feel confident by being disposed as follows: |1383^{a}25| when they think they have often been successful and not suffered, or have often come into terrible situations and escaped them (for people become free from the feeling [of fear] in two ways: either by not having been put to the test or by having the means to help, just as in dangers at sea those without experience of a storm are confident |1383^{a}30| about what will happen, as too are those who have the means to help due to their experience); also, when something is not fearsome to people like themselves, their inferiors, or those whose superiors they think themselves to be; and they think themselves superior to those they have defeated, either these themselves, their superiors, or their equals; also, if they think they have more or better resources in which superiority makes them fearsome— |1383^{a}35| these are a quantity of money, of strong bodies, |**1383^{b}1**| of friends, of lands, and of armaments for war, either all of them or the most important ones.

Also, if they have done no injustice to anyone, or not to many, or not to those in front of whom they have anything to fear, and, in general, if their relations with the gods are good, both as told in other ways and from signs and oracles (for anger |1383^{b}5| is something inspiring confidence, not to do injustice but to suffer injustice is productive of anger, and the divine is supposed to help those who have suffered injustice).[492] And people feel confident when, putting their hands to something, they think they are not likely [here and now] to suffer, will not suffer in the future, or will be successful.

{69} About both fearsome things and confidence-inspiring ones, then, let this much be said. |1383^{b}10|

II 6

What sorts of things people are ashamed of or are shameless about, in front of whom, and how—by being disposed in the relevant way [they feel shame]—is clear from the following. Let shame be a sort of pain or disturbance concerned with the evils—whether present, past, or future—that appear to bring a person into disrepute, and shamelessness a sort of contempt and lack of feeling concerning these same things.[493]

If, then, |1383^{b}15| what has been defined is shame, necessarily people are ashamed of such evils as seem shameful either for themselves or for those they care about. And works due to vice are like this. For example: Throwing away a shield or fleeing (for these are due to cowardice). Refusing to return a deposit (for this is due to injustice).[494] |1383^{b}20| Having sexual relations with those one should not, or where one should not, or when one should not (for these are due to intemperance). Making a profit from petty or shameful things or from incapable people, such as the poor or the dead—hence the proverb, "He would even rob a corpse" (for this is due to shameful profiteering and acquisitiveness).[495] Not helping out with money when one can, or |1383^{b}25| helping less. Being helped by those with fewer resources. Seeking a loan from someone when he seems likely to ask for one, and asking for one when he seems likely to ask to have one returned, and asking to have one returned when he seems likely to ask for one, and praising in order not to seem to be asking, and though one has failed in the effort, to ask nonetheless (for all these are signs of acquisitiveness).[496] Praising those present (a sign of flattery).[497] Overpraising good things |1383^{b}30| and minimizing bad ones, and feeling over-pained at the pain of someone present, and all other such

things (for these are signs of flattery). Not enduring exertions that older people endure, or those who are effeminate, of higher rank, or, in general, more incapable [of enduring them] |**1384[a]1**| (for all are signs of softness).[498] Accepting good deeds from another, and doing so often, or reproaching someone who did something good [to you] (for all these are signs of smallness of soul and humbleness).[499] Talking about oneself all the time, and making pronouncements, and claiming other people's achievements |1384[a]5| as one's own (for these are signs of boastfulness).[500] Likewise too for the works, signs, and the like that are due to the other vices of character (for these are shameful and productive of shame).[501]

{70} In addition to these, it is shameful not to share in the noble things in which all—or all those like oneself, or most of them—share. By those like oneself I mean those of the same nation, fellow citizens, those at the same stage of life, |1384[a]10| those of the same birth (*genos*), and, in general, one's equals (for it is already shameful not to share, for example, in education to the same extent, and similarly for other things). And all these are more shameful if they appear to be due to oneself (for in this case they already seem more due to vice, namely, whenever one is oneself the cause of one's past, present, or future condition).

People feel shame when they suffer, have suffered, |1384[a]15| or are going to suffer such things as lead to dishonor and reproaches—such things are those in regard to the services of the body or those subserving shameful works, of which being treated with wanton aggression is one, and while those in regard to intemperance may be either voluntary or involuntary, those in regard to force are involuntary (for enduring them and not defending oneself against them is due to a lack of manliness and cowardice).[502] |1384[a]20|

These, then, and the like are the things people are ashamed of. And since shame is an appearance concerning disrepute, and this for its own sake and not for the sake of its consequences, and since no one cares about reputation [by itself], but rather does so because of those who have the pertinent opinion, necessarily a person feels shame in front of those he takes account of.[503] And he takes account of those who admire him, |1384[a]25| those whom he admires, those whom he wishes to be admired by, and those whose rivals he is, and those whose opinion he does not despise.

Now people wish to be admired by those and to admire those who possess any good from among those that bring honor, or from whom they desperately need something that those people control—for example, their |1384[a]30| lovers. And they are rivals of those who are like them, and they give thought to practically-wise people as tellers of the truth, and their elders and well-educated people are like this.[504]

And they feel more shame at things done in front of [everyone's] eyes and in the open; hence too the proverb, "Shame is in the eyes."[505] This is why people feel more shame in front of those who will always be with them and those |1384[a]35| who notice what they do, because in both cases they are in front of their eyes. And |**1384[b]1**| in front of those not liable to the same charges (for it is clear that the contrary things seem reputable to them). And in front of those not inclined to be sympathetically considerate to those who appear to have erred (for what one does oneself, it is said, is what one is not indignant at one's neighbor for doing, so it is clear that what one does not do oneself one is indignant at him for {71} doing). And in front of those inclined to gossip |1384[b]5| to many people (for there is no difference between its not seeming so to them and their not gossiping about it); and those inclined to gossip are those who have been treated unjustly, because they keep on the lookout, and those who speak badly of others (for if indeed they do so about those who have committed no error, they will do so still more about those who have committed an error). And in front of those who spend their time on their neighbors' errors—for example, satirists and writers of comedies (for these are in a way people who speak badly of others |1384[b]10| and are in a way gossips). And before those in front of whom they have never failed (for they are in the position of people admired); that is also why they feel shame before those asking for a favor for the first time, as not yet being disreputable in front of these; and people who recently wished to be their friends are like this (for they have seen their best sides)—which is why Euripides' reply |1384[b]15| to the Syracusans is apropos; and among old acquaintances who know nothing [against us].[506]

And people are ashamed not only of the shameful things that have been mentioned, but also of all the signs of shamefulness—for example, people are ashamed not only of their engaging in sexual intercourse but also of the signs of it, and not only of doing shameful things, but also of talking about them. Similarly, |1384[b]20| people are not only ashamed

before those who have been mentioned, but also before those who will reveal things to the former—for example, their servants and friends. But, in general, they are not ashamed before those whose opinion in respect of their telling the truth they despise (for no one feels shame before small children and beasts), nor of the same things before acquaintances and unknown people, but before acquaintances they are ashamed of what seems shameful in relation to truth, |1384^{b}25| and before those from far away they are ashamed of what seems shameful in relation to custom.[507]

People would feel ashamed if they were disposed as follows: first, if there were certain people who were related to them as are those in front of whom we said they feel shame. And these, as we saw, are the ones who are admired by them, who admire them, by whom they wish to be admired, or from whom they want |1384^{b}30| something needed that they will not get if they are disreputable.[508] And [second] if these are either seeing what they are doing (as Cydias said publicly about the allotment of land in Samos; for he thought that the Athenians should imagine all the Greeks to be standing around them in a circle, as if they were seeing how they might vote and not merely hearing about it), or if people like this are in the neighborhood, or are going |1384^{b}35| to perceive what they are doing.[509] That is also why people, when they have fallen into misfortune, do not wish to be seen by those who were once feeling {72} jealous of them (for those who feel jealous are admirers).[510] And whenever |**1385^{a}1**| they have works or things which will bring shame on them, whether their own works or things, those of their ancestors, or certain others with whom they have a sort of close kinship.[511] And, in general, they feel shame before those on whose account they themselves feel shame—these are the ones mentioned and those who refer themselves to them, either those whose teachers or |1385^{a}5| advisors they have been, or if there are others like themselves whose rivals they are (for they are ashamed both to do and not to do many things because of such people).[512] And if they are going to be seen by and go about in public with those who share in the knowledge of [their shameful acts], they are more prone to shame. Hence too what Antiphon the poet said, when about to be flogged |1385^{a}10| to death by order of Dionysius, on seeing that those who were about to die with him covered their faces as they passed through the gate: "Why do you cover your faces?" he said. "Or is it in case some of these people will see you *tomorrow*?"[513]

These, then, are the things that concern shame; it is clear that from their contraries we shall be well-equipped with things concerning shamelessness. |1385[a]15|

II 7

Those toward whom people feel grateful, and why, and how—by being disposed in the relevant way [they feel it], will be clear after having defined a favor.[514] Let a favor, then, in the sense in which the person who has received it is said to feel grateful, be a service provided to one in need, not in return for anything, nor in order that the provider get something, but in order that the recipient get something. It would be a great one if the person is in desperate need, in need of great and difficult-to-get things, or in need at times |1385[a]20| of the correlative sorts, or if the provider is the only one, the first one, or the one who most of all provides it.[515]

Needs are desires and, among desires, especially the ones that involve pain at what is not attained.[516] Appetites are such things as love, and those desires felt in sufferings of the body and in times of danger (for the one who is in danger appetitively desires something and so does the one who is in pain). That is why those who stand by someone in poverty |1385[a]25| or in exile, even if the services they provide are small, because of the greatness of the need and the opportune time of them, have shown favor—for example, the one who gave the mat in the Lyceum.[517] Necessarily, then, favor especially consists in providing service in these sorts of cases or, if not, in cases of equal or greater need.[518]

{73} So, since it is evident to whom, on account of which things, and by being disposed in which way people feel grateful, it is clear that it is from |1385[a]30| these that speakers should produce feelings of gratitude, showing that some people either are or have been in the relevant sort of pain or need and that others have provided some such service in some such time of need or are providing it.

It is also evident on what basis it is possible to exclude feelings of gratitude and produce feelings of ingratitude. For it might be shown that either the people were providing or had provided |**1385[b]1**| a service for their own sake (and this, as we saw, is not a favor), or that it happened by luck, or they were compelled, or that they were returning a favor and not doing one, whether knowingly or not knowingly (for in both cases there

would be a return, so that not even in this respect would it be a favor). And it should be investigated in relation to all the categories.[519] |1385^{b}5| For a favor is a favor either because it is this particular thing, or because of its quantity, quality, time, or place. And it is a sign of disfavor if a small service is not provided or if the same, equal, or greater services are provided to enemies (for it is clear that in neither case are these for our sake). Or if someone has provided a worthless service and knows it (for no one agrees to having a need for worthless things). |1385^{b}10|

About feeling gratitude and feeling ingratitude, then, let this much be said. Let us now say what sorts of things are pitiable, whom people pity, and by being disposed in which way they feel it.[520]

II 8

Let pity, then, be a sort of pain at an apparently destructive or painful bad thing happening to someone who does not deserve it, and one that a person might expect himself or one of his own to suffer, and this when it appears close at hand.[521] |1385^{b}15| For it is clear that the person who is going to feel pity must actually be such as to think that he, or one of his own, might suffer some such bad thing as is mentioned in the definition, or one like it or nearly like it. That is why neither those who are totally ruined feel pity (for they think there is nothing for them yet to suffer, since they have suffered [everything]) |1385^{b}20| nor those who think themselves to be extremely happy—they instead are wantonly aggressive (for if they think that all goods are actually theirs, it is clear that they think it not possible for them to suffer any evil, since this is one of the goods).

The sort of people who think they might suffer are those who have already suffered and escaped, older people (because of both their practical wisdom and |1385^{b}25| their experience), weak ones, those who are rather {74} more cowardly, and those who are well-educated (for they rationally calculate well).[522] And those who have parents, children, or wives (for these belong to them and are able to suffer the things mentioned).[523] And those who are not in a courageous state of feeling, such as anger or confidence (for these feelings do not rationally calculate about future things).[524] Nor those in a wantonly |1385^{b}30| aggressive condition (for these people too do not rationally calculate about suffering anything). Nor, conversely, those feeling intense fear (for those who are driven out of their minds with fear do not feel pity, due to being taken up with their

own suffering). Instead, it is only those who are intermediate between these who feel pity.[525] As they do if they think that certain people are among the decent ones (for the one who thinks that no one is decent will think that all are worthy of something bad).[526] And, in general, then, someone feels pity when he is so disposed |**1386^{a}1**| that he remembers things like this happening to himself or to his own, or expects them to happen to himself or to his own.

By being disposed in which way people feel pity, then, has now been stated; and the things they pity are clear from the definition. For whichever painful or distressing things |1386^{a}5| are destructive are all pitiable, and whichever ones are ruinous, and whichever evils having magnitude of which luck is the cause. The distressing and destructive ones are: the various sorts of death, assaults on the body, ill-treatment, old age, diseases, and lack of food. The evils that luck is the cause of are: friendlessness, fewness of friends (which is why it is a pity to be torn away from friends and |1386^{a}10| the people one is accustomed to), ugliness, weakness, disablement. And it is pitiable for something bad to come about from what something good should have come. And for this to happen often. And for something good to come about after a person has suffered, as when the gifts from the king were sent to Diopeithes after he had died.[527] And it is pitiable either for nothing good whatsoever to have come about [for someone], or for there to be no |1386^{a}15| enjoyment of it. These, then, and things like them are the ones people pity.

[As for the people they pity,] they pity those they know, provided they are not too closely related to them (if they are, they feel for them as they do about their own future sufferings). That is why Amasis, so it is said, did not weep when his son was led to |1386^{a}20| execution, but did weep when he saw his friend begging, since the latter was pitiable, the former dreadful (for the dreadful is distinct from the pitiable and tends to drive out pity, and is often useful to the opponent, since people no longer pity when something dreadful is close to themselves).[528] And people pity those who are like themselves in stage of life, |1386^{a}25| character, {75} state, position, or birth (*genos*) (for in all these cases it appears more likely that their misfortune may befall the person himself as well). For, in general, one should suppose here too that the things people fear for themselves are the ones they pity when they are happening to others.[529] And since sufferings are pitiable when they appear close at hand, and

since people do not feel pity either at all, or not to the same degree, at things ten thousand years in the past or future, |1386[a]30| since they neither expect nor remember them, necessarily those who contribute to the effect by their gestures, voice, dress, and, in general, by their dramatic manner are more pitiable (for they make the evil appear close at hand by setting it before our eyes either as something about to happen or as something that has happened).[530] And things that have just happened or are going to happen |1386[a]35| soon are more pitiable. That is why signs and actions are pitiable too—for example, |**1386[b]1**| the clothes of those who have suffered and any things of that sort, and the words (*logos*) and any things of that sort of those who are in the midst of suffering, for example, of those on the very point of death—are pitiable, and especially so when those involved in such crises are excellent people.[531] For all such things, through |1386[b]5| appearing close at hand, produce more pity (both because the suffering is of someone who does not deserve it and because it is appearing before our eyes).

II 9

But most opposed to feeling pity is what people call being indignant.[532] For being pained at undeservedly doing badly is in a way opposed to, and due to the same character as, being |1386[b]10| pained at undeservedly doing well. And both feelings belong to a good character. For one should grieve together with and feel pity for those who undeservedly do badly, but feel indignation at those who undeservedly do well. For what happens contrary to what is deserved is unjust, which is why we ascribe indignation even to the gods.[533] |1386[b]15|

It might seem, though, that envy is also opposed to feeling pity in the same way, as being of the same kind (*genos*)—even the same thing—as indignation; but it is a distinct thing.[534] For though envy too is a disturbing pain and is directed at doing well, it is not at someone undeserving of it, but at an equal and a similar. And what must be present alike in each and every instance of envy and indignation |1386[b]20| is that [the painful disturbance] not be because something distinct will accrue to the person himself, but because of his neighbor himself. For it will be neither envy nor indignation but rather fear if the pain and the disturbance are present because something {76} bad will happen to the person himself because of the other's doing well.

And it is evident that contrary feelings |1386^{b}25| will follow along with these. For the one who is pained at people undeservedly doing badly will be pleased or not pained by their doing badly in the contrary way—for example, no good person would be pained at parricides and bloodthirsty murderers when they are punished. For one should rejoice in such cases, as in the case of those who |1386^{b}30| deservedly do well, since both are just things that make a decent person rejoice. For he must expect that the very things that have happened to someone like him will happen to him too. And all these belong to the same character, and the contrary ones to the contrary one. For the same person will be spiteful and envious, since when someone is pained at the acquisition or possession of something, |**1387^{a}1**| he necessarily rejoices at its lack or destruction. That is why, all these tend to prevent pity, though they differ due to the causes mentioned, so that they are similarly useful in making people not pity someone. |1387^{a}5|

First, then, let us speak about being indignant, whom people are indignant at, why, and by being disposed in which way they feel it, and after this about the other feelings. And it is evident from what has been said. For if being indignant is being pained at what appears to be undeservedly doing well, it is clear, first, that it is not possible to be indignant at all good things. |1387^{a}10| For if someone is just or courageous or if he will acquire virtue, no one will be indignant at these things (for neither is there pity for the contraries of these), but people are indignant at wealth, capacity, and the like—at, simply speaking, all those things that good people—and those who possess the things that are good by nature (for example, good breeding, noble beauty, and the like)—deserve.[535]

And since |1387^{a}15| what is long established appears to be something close to what is by nature, if two parties have the same good, people are necessarily more indignant at the one who has recently acquired it and is doing well because of it, since the nouveaux riches cause more pain than those whose wealth is long established or through the family. And similarly the ones who hold office, have many friends, have capacity, have good children, or anything |1387^{a}20| like that. And if some other good comes to them because of these things, it is the same way. For in this case the nouveaux riches cause more pain than do those whose wealth is long established when they hold office because of their wealth. And similarly

in the other cases. And the cause of this is that what the latter have seems to be their own, whereas what the former have does not. For what appears always to be that way seems real and true, with the result {77} that |1387ª25| the others seem not to have what is their own. And since each good thing is not deserved by any random person, but rather there is a sort of proportion and fit involved (for example, nobly beautiful weapons are fitting not for the just person but for the courageous one, and distinguished marriages are fitting not for the nouveaux riches but for the well-bred), it follows that if a good person gets what is not fitting, it is a cause of indignation.[536] |1387ª30| Also, for an inferior person to dispute with a superior one, especially when they are involved in one and the same matter—hence too this has been said:

> But he avoided doing battle with Ajax, son of Telemon,
> For Zeus was indignant with him when he fought with a better man.[537]

But if it is not the same, even if it is in any way whatsoever that an inferior person disputes with a superior one—for example, if **|1387ᵇ1|** a musician does so with a just person (for justice is better than music)—it is a cause of indignation.[538]

At whom people are indignant, then, and why, is clear from this, since they are the ones mentioned and those like them. And people tend to be indignant if |1387ᵇ5| they are worthy of great goods and have acquired them (for it is not just that those not like them should have been thought worthy of goods like theirs). Second, if they happen to be good and excellent, since they judge well and hate unjust things. Also, if they are ambitious and desirous of certain things, and especially |1387ᵇ10| if they are ambitious for things that others, who happen to be unworthy of them, have obtained. And, in general, those who think themselves worthy of things of which they think others unworthy tend to be indignant at the latter and about these things. That is why, the slavish, the base, and the unambitious do not tend to be indignant, since there is nothing they think themselves to be worthy of. |1387ᵇ15|

It is evident from these considerations what sort of people those are at whose being unfortunate, doing badly, and not succeeding one should rejoice or not be pained. For these opposites are clear from what has been said. So if the speech makes the judges be of this sort, and shows that those who think they deserve to be pitied, and to be pitied for certain

things, do not deserve it, |1387[b]20| or deserve not to get it, it will be impossible to pity them.

II 10

And it is also clear why people envy, whom they do, and by being disposed in which way, if indeed envy is a sort of pain at apparent doing {78} well in terms of the goods mentioned, on the part of those like themselves, not in order that something accrue to the person himself, but because of those [possessing it].[539] For the sort of people who feel envy are those who have |1387[b]25| equals, or appear to themselves to have them (and by equals I mean equal in terms of birth (*genos*), familial relationship, stage of life, state, reputation, possessions).[540] Also, those who fall just short of having everything (that is why those who do great things and those who are successful are envious), since they think that everyone is taking what is [rightfully] theirs.[541] Also, those who are exceptionally |1387[b]30| honored for something, and especially for theoretical wisdom or happiness.[542] And the ambitious are more envious than the unambitious. And the seemingly wise (*doxosophoi*), since they are ambitious for wisdom.[543] And, in general, those who are lovers of reputation (*philodoxoi*) concerning something are envious where it is concerned. Also, the small-souled, since all things seem great to them.[544]

The good things that make people envious have already been stated.[545] |1387[b]35| For the works and possessions that make people lovers of reputation and for which they are ambitious |**1388[a]1**| and desire a reputation, as well as whatever things are the gifts of fortune, are all pretty much objects of envy, and especially the ones that they themselves desire or think they should have, or things whose possession makes them slightly superior or slightly inferior.[546] And whom people envy is also evident, since these have just now |1388[a]5| been stated.[547] For they envy those close to them in time, space, stage of life, and reputation—hence it has been stated that:

> For what is the same in kind also knows how to envy.[548]

And people envy those they rival (for they rival those mentioned, whereas no one rivals people who lived ten thousand years ago, those of |1388[a]10| the future, or those who are dead, or those who live at the Pillars of Hercules, or those that they or others think are far inferior or far superior).[549] And in the same way those concerned with the same

things.[550] And since people are ambitious for success in relation to their competitors, their rivals in love, and, in general, those who are pursuing the same things, |1388ª15| they are necessarily most envious of these—which is why it is said [that they are as]:

Potter versus potter.[551]

And they are envious of those whose past acquisitions or present successes are a reproach to them, and those are, again, the ones that are close {79} at hand and like them (for it is clear that it is because of themselves that they did not attain the relevant good, so that this failure, being painful, produces |1388ª20| envy).[552] Also, [they are envious] of those who have or have acquired what is fittingly theirs or which they once possessed, which is why the older envy the younger. And those who have spent much money envy those who have spent little on the same thing. And those who acquired something with difficulty or did not acquire it at all envy those who got it quickly.[553]

And it also clear |1388ª25| what things and what people envious ones rejoice at and by being disposed in which way. For the way by being disposed in which people are pained is also the way by being disposed in which they are pleased at the contrary things. So if [the audience] has been made to be disposed in this way, and if people of the sort described have thought themselves deserving to be pitied or to attain some good, it is clear that they will not attain pity from those with the controlling vote.[554] |1388ª30|

II 11

By being disposed in which way people feel jealous and for what sorts of things, and toward what sorts of people is clear from the following.[555] For if jealousy is a sort of pain at the apparent presence, in the case of others who are by nature like the person himself, of good things that are honored and possible for someone to acquire, not due to the fact that another has them but rather due to the fact that he himself does not (and that is why jealousy is a decent thing characteristic of decent people, whereas |1388ª35| envy is a base one characteristic of base ones—for the decent person, because of jealousy, is setting himself up to attain the good things, whereas the base one, because of envy, is setting his neighbor up not to have them), necessarily, then, those people are jealous who think themselves worthy of good things they do not have |**1388ᵇ1**| (for no one thinks himself worthy of things that appear to be impossible).[556] That is

why, young people and great-souled ones are like this.[557] Also, those who possess such goods as are worthy of honorable men, and these are wealth, many friends, offices, and the like (for on the supposition that |1388^{b}5| it is fitting for them to be good people, they are jealous of such goods, because such goods are fitting for those who are good).[558] And those whom others think worthy of such goods. And they are inclined to be jealous of anything for which their ancestors, relatives, households, nation, or city are honored (for they think that such things are properly theirs and that they are worthy of them).[559]

{80} But if the objects of jealousy |1388^{b}10| are the honored goods, the virtues are necessarily such, and whatever is beneficial or beneficent to others (for people honor those who are benefactors as well as those who are good). Also, whatever goods give enjoyment to neighbors—for example, wealth and noble beauty rather than health.[560]

Whom people are jealous of is also evident. For the people we are jealous of are the ones who have acquired these things and others of the same sort |1388^{b}15| (and these are the things mentioned, such as courage, theoretical wisdom, and office—for officials have the capacity to do good things for many people), namely, generals, orators, and all who possess such capacities. And those whom many wish to be like, or many of their acquaintances, or many of their friends, or those whom many admire, or whom they themselves admire. |1388^{b}20| Also, those whose praises and encomia are sung by poets or professional speechwriters.[561]

And people despise the contraries of these. For despising is the contrary of jealousy, and to despise someone is the contrary of being jealous of him. And those who are so disposed that they are jealous of others or others are jealous of them are inclined to despise those |1388^{b}25| who have the bad contraries of the goods that people are jealous of, and to do so because of these.[562] That is why they often despise those who are fortunate, whenever luck comes to them but without their having the good things that are honored.

The things by which the feelings may be aroused or dissolved, and from which the means of persuasion concerning them come about, have now been stated.[563] |1388^{b}30|

II 12[564]

Next let us discuss people's characters, that is, of what sorts people are with regard to their feelings and states, as well as with regard to their

stages of life and fortunes.[565] By feelings I mean anger, appetite, and the like, about which we spoke previously, and by states I mean virtues and vices, which have also been spoken about previously, as well as the sorts of things that each deliberately chooses, and the sorts that each is prone to do in action.[566] |1388[b]35| The stages of life are youth, prime, and old age.[567] By fortune I mean good breeding, wealth, capacities, and their contraries, |**1389[a]1**| and, in general, good fortune and misfortune.

The young, with regard to their character, are inclined to be appetitive and to do whatever they have an appetite for.[568] And of the appetites of the body they are especially inclined to follow the one relating to sexual pleasures, and they lack self-control concerning it. |1389[a]5| And they are changeable and fickle in their appetites, and though their appetites {81} are intense they are quickly over (for their wishes are sharp but not strong, like the thirst and hunger of the sick). And they are inclined to be spirited and quick-tempered and apt to follow their anger.[569] And they are unable to resist their spirit (for because of their love of honor they cannot bear |1389[a]10| to be treated with contempt, but become vexed if they think they are being done an injustice). And though they are lovers of honor, they are lovers of victory more (for youth has an appetite for superiority, and victory is a sort of superiority), and they are both of these more than they are lovers of money. And they are, least of all, lovers of money because they have not yet experienced need, as the pithy remark of Pittacus |1389[a]15| about Amphiaraus puts it.[570]

And they are not cynical but naïve, because of not yet having seen much wickedness.[571] And they are trusting, because of not yet having been much deceived. And they are hopeful (for like those drinking wine the young are warmed through and through due to their nature, and at the same time because they have not experienced much failure).[572] And they mostly live by hope (for |1389[a]20| hope is of something future, memory of something past; and for the young the future is long, whereas the past is short—for in our early days nothing can be remembered but we can hope for everything). And they are easily deceived because of what was said (for they are easily hopeful). And they are more courageous [than the other two age groups] (for they are spirited and |1389[a]25| hopeful, the former of which makes them unafraid, the latter confident, since no one is afraid when he is angry, and to hope for something good

is a source of confidence). And they are prone to shame (for they do not yet grasp other aspects of nobility, but have been well-educated by the laws alone).[573]

And they are great-souled (for they have not yet been humbled by life, but |1389[a]30| lack experience of its necessities; and to think oneself worthy of great things is greatness of soul, and this is characteristic of a hopeful person).[574] And they choose to do noble things more than advantageous ones (for they live more by character than by rational calculation, and rational calculation has to do with what is advantageous, virtue with what is noble).[575] And they love friends and love companions more than do |1389[a]35| people at the other stages of life, because they enjoy living with others and as yet |**1389[b]1**| judge nothing by reference to advantage, so that they do not judge friends that way either.

And all the errors they make are in the direction of being more and more intensely contrary to the maxim of Chilon (for they do everything too much, since they love too much, hate too much, and similarly all the others).[576] And they think they know everything |1389[b]5| and confidently affirm things (for this is the cause of their doing everything too much). {82} And the unjust actions they commit are due to wanton aggression, not malice.[577] And they are inclined to pity because of supposing everyone to be good or better than they in fact are (for they measure their neighbors by their own non-vice, and so suppose them to be suffering unjustly). And |1389[b]10| they love laughter, which is why they are witty (for wit is well-educated wanton aggression).[578]

Such, then, is the character of the young.[579]

II 13

People who are older and pretty much past their prime have characters that are composed mostly of things that are contrary to those [in the characters of young people] (for because they have lived for many years, |1389[b]15| have been more often deceived, have made more errors themselves, and because [they think that] most things are bad, not only do they affirm nothing with assurance but everything with far less assurance than they should).[580] And they *think* things but *know* nothing. And believing either way, they always add "perhaps" and "maybe," and state everything that way, but nothing firmly.[581]

And they are cynical |1389[b]20| (for cynicism consists in taking everything in the worst way). Further, they are suspicious because they lack trust, and lack trust because of their experience. And, because of these things, they neither love nor hate intensely but, following the advice of Bias, love as if they would one day hate and hate as if they would one day love.[582] And they are small-souled because of having been humbled |1389[b]25| by life (or they have an appetite for nothing grand or unusual but rather for things that are related to life). And they are ungenerous (for one of the necessities is wealth, and at the same time they know from experience that it is difficult to acquire and easy to lose). And they are cowardly and fearful about everything ahead of time (for their disposition is the contrary of that of the young—for they |1389[b]30| are chilly, whereas the latter are warm, and so old age has paved the way for cowardice, since in fact fear is a sort of chilling).[583]

And they love life, and all the more so at the end of their days, because their appetite is for what is absent, and also because what they need is what they most have an appetite for.[584] And they love themselves more than they should |1389[b]35| (for this too is a sort of smallness of soul).[585] And, more than they should, they live with a view to what is advantageous and not to what is noble, because of their self-love (for what is advantageous is good for the individual, whereas what is noble is unconditionally so). And |**1390[a]1**| they are more shameless than prone to shame (for since {83} they do not care equally about what is noble and what is advantageous they are contemptuous of their reputation).

And they expect the worst because of their experience (for most of the things that happen are bad, or at any rate many things turn out for the worse), |1390[a]5| and because of their cowardice too.[586] And they live by memory more than by hope (for what is left of life is short, what is past is long, and hope is for the future, memory for what is gone by). This is the very cause of their babbling (for they keep talking about things that have happened in the past, since it is by reminiscing that they get pleasure). |1390[a]10|

And their outbursts of spirit, though sharp, are weak. And while some of their appetites have forsaken them, others are weak, so that they are not appetitive people, or people who act in accord with their appetites, but rather in accord with profit. That is why people of this age appear to be inclined to temperance, for their appetites have loosened their hold

and they are slaves to profit. And they live |1390[a]15| more in accord with rational calculation than in accord with their character (for rational calculation has to do with what is advantageous, character with the virtues).[587] And the unjust actions they commit are due to malice, not wanton aggression.

The old too are inclined to pity, but not because of the same thing as the young (for the latter are so because of a love of human beings, whereas the former are so because of weakness, since they think that all sorts of [bad] things are close at hand |1390[a]20| for themselves to suffer, and this, as we saw, tends to arouse pity).[588] As a result, they are inclined to be querulous and are neither witty nor lovers of laughter (for an inclination to querulousness is the contrary of a love of laughter).[589]

Such, then, are the characters of the old and the young, and so, since all listeners welcome speeches adapted to, |1390[a]25| and reflecting, their own characters, it is quite clear how speakers in the speeches they employ may appear to be such, both themselves and their speeches.[590]

II 14

It is evident that those in their prime will be intermediate in character between the other two [that is, the young and the old], minus the excess: neither intensely confident (for a state of this sort is rashness) nor exceedingly fearful, |1390[a]30| but well-disposed in regard to both; neither trusting everyone nor mistrusting everyone, but judging them in accord with truth; neither living with a view only to what is noble nor only to what is advantageous, but with a view to both; and neither with a view to miserliness nor to wastefulness, |**1390[b]1**| but {84} to what is fitting. And similarly in regard to spirit and in regard to appetite. And they are temperate accompanied by courage and courageous accompanied by temperance (for in the case of young people and old ones they have divided these between themselves, since the young are courageous and intemperate, while the |1390[b]5| old are temperate and cowardly).[591] To speak in universal terms, whatever benefits youth and age have divided, those in their prime have both of, and whatever the former have an excess or deficiency of, the latter have in due measure and fittingly. The body is in its prime from the age of thirty to thirty-five, the |1390[b]10| soul at around forty-nine.[592]

About youth, old age, and the prime of life, then, and what sorts of characters each has, let this much be said.

II 15

Let us speak next about the goods that come about by luck, due to which characters of a certain sort also result for human beings.[593] |1390^{b}15| The character that belongs to good breeding means that its possessor is more ambitious (for all people who have something to start with usually add to it, and good breeding is honor that derives from ancestors). Also, [men of such character] are inclined to despise even those who are the equals of their own ancestors, because the same things when they are further back in time rather than close at hand |1390^{b}20| are more honorable and easier to boast about.[594]

Good breeding, though, is in accord with the virtue of the stock (*genos*), whereas being true to one's stock (*gennaios*) is in accord with not being a degeneration from nature.[595] For the most part, this degeneration does not happen to the well-born, although there are many who are worthless people. For in the generations of men, as in the fruits of the earth, there is a certain yield, |1390^{b}25| and sometimes, when the stock is good, exceptional men are produced for a period of time, and then again later on [after a period of worthless ones]. Naturally clever stock degenerates into rather manic characters (for example, the offspring of Alcibiades and of Dionysius), whereas steady stock degenerates into stupidity and sluggishness (for example, the offspring of Cimon, of Pericles, |1390^{b}30| and of Socrates).[596]

II 16

The sorts of character that wealth entails are on the surface for all to see. For the wealthy are wantonly aggressive and arrogant, since they are affected somewhat by the possession of wealth (for their disposition {85} is the same as if they possessed every good thing, since wealth is something like a standard of value for the other good things, which is why |**1391^{a}1**| all of them appear to be purchasable by it). And they are luxurious and pretentious people: luxurious, because of their mode of life and their display of prosperity; pretentious and vulgar, because all of them are accustomed to spending their time on what they love and admire, |1391^{a}5| and to thinking that others are emulously jealous of the same things as themselves.[597] At the same time, their being affected in this way makes perfect sense, since there are many who need those who have wealth. Hence too the remark Simonides made about the wise and the

rich to the wife of Hiero, when she asked whether it was better to be rich or wise.[598] He replied, "to be rich." |1391ª10| "For," he said, "we see the wise spending their time at the doors of the rich." And they think they deserve to rule (for they think they have the things on account of which one is worthy to rule). And, in sum, the character proper to wealth is that of a prosperous person who lacks understanding.

The characters of the nouveaux riches and those with old money differ, however, in that the nouveaux riches have all the vices to a greater degree |1391ª15| and in a baser form (for nouveau richesse is, as it were, a lack of educatedness in wealth). And the unjust actions they commit are not malicious ones, rather some are acts of wanton aggression while others are due to lack of self-control—for example, those that end in assault or adultery.[599]

II 17

Similarly with capacity, most of the characters it entails are pretty much evident. |1391ª20| For capacity has some of the same features as wealth, some that are better. For those who have capacity are more ambitious and more manly in character than the rich, because of seeking all those works that they have the resources and the license to carry out in action because of their capacity. And they are more serious because of being in a supervisory position, compelled to keep an eye on the things |1391ª25| related to their capacity. And they are more dignified than severe (for their worth makes them more dignified, which is why they are more measured—dignity being a mild and gracious severity).[600] And if they do unjust actions, they are not doers of small unjust actions, but doers of great unjust actions.

Good fortune in its various parts includes the sorts of characters of those just mentioned, |1391ª30| since the sorts of good fortune that seem to be greatest tend toward these [characters].[601] And, further, good fortune makes one able to get more with regard to good children and the {86} goods of the body.[602] Although people are more arrogant and more non-rationally-calculating because of good fortune, there is one very good **|1391ᵇ1|** character trait that follows along with good fortune: that of being lovers of the gods, and of standing in a certain relation to the divine, namely, trusting in gods because of the things that have come about as a result of luck.

About the sorts of character having to do with stages of life and luck, let this much be said. For the contrary sorts are evident from what has been said—for example, |1391^{b}5| the character of the poor, unlucky, or incapable.

II 18

The use of persuasive speeches is in relation to judgment (for about things we know and have already judged there is no further need of argument).[603] And there is judgment even if someone by using a speech in relation to a single individual exhorts or dissuades him—for example, those giving advice or trying to persuade (for a single person is no less |1391^{b}10| a judge, since the one we must persuade is the one who is—one might almost say—unconditionally a judge). And if someone speaks in relation to an opponent, or in relation to a proposed subject, the same is true (for it is necessary to use speech and to refute the contrary arguments in relation to which the speech is made as if they were an actual opponent). It is the same way with epideictic ones (for |1391^{b}15| the speech is composed in relation to the spectator as if in relation to a judge).[604] In general, however, the only person who is unconditionally a judge is the one who in political debates judges the things being inquired into (for he inquires into how things stand with the matters under dispute, and with the ones being deliberated about).[605] The characters that are in accord with the constitutions were spoken about earlier in discussing deliberative speeches.[606] So, as a result of all that, how |1391^{b}20| and through what means one should make speeches expressive of character has been determined.[607]

But since, as we saw, there is a different end for each kind (*genos*) of speech, and since with regard to all of them beliefs and premises have been collected from which speakers are to derive their means of persuasion in deliberative, epideictic, and disputatious speeches, and, further, since we have determined from which things |1391^{b}25| it is possible to make speeches expressive of character, it remains to determine the common things.[608] For it is necessary for all [speakers] to in addition make use of the possible and the impossible in their speeches, and for some to try to show that something will happen, others that {87} it has happened.[609] Further, the question of magnitude is common to all. |1391^{b}30| For all use diminishing and amplifying when deliberating, or when praising or blaming, accusing or defending.[610] When these have

been determined, we will try to say what we can about enthymemes in common, |**1392^{a}1**| and about paradigms, in order that, having added what remains, we may deliver over what was proposed at the start.[611]

Of the common things, amplification most properly belongs to epideictic speeches, as has been said, the past to judicial ones |1392^{a}5| (for past things are what the judgment is about), and possibility and the future to deliberative ones.

II 19

First, then, let us speak about possible and impossible.[612] If it is possible for one of the contraries to exist or to have happened, its contrary would also seem to be possible—for example, if it is possible for a human being to become healthy, |1392^{a}10| it is also possible for him to become ill. For the same capacity is for contraries, insofar as they are contraries.[613] And if what is similar to another thing is possible, so too is the other thing. And if the more difficult thing is possible, so too is the easier one. And if something can come to be excellent and nobly beautiful, it can also come to be in general (for it is more difficult for a house to be nobly beautiful than for it to be a house).[614]

Also, if the starting-point of something is possible, |1392^{a}15| so too is its end (for no impossible thing comes to be or starts to come to be—for example, the diagonal could not start to be, or be, commensurable).[615] And if the end of something is possible, so too is its starting-point (for all things come to be from a starting-point). And if what is posterior in substance or in coming to be can come to be, so too can what is prior—for example, |1392^{a}20| if a man can come to be, so also can a boy (for the latter is prior in coming to be), and if a boy can, so too can a man (for a boy is also a starting-point).[616]

Also, that for which there is by nature a love or appetite is possible (for no one, for the most part, loves or has an appetite for impossible things).[617] And where there are sciences or crafts, it is possible for the subjects of these to be or come to be.[618] And things are possible |1392^{a}25| when the starting-point of their coming to be lies in things we can compel or persuade—and these are things we are stronger than, things we control, or friends.

Also, if the parts of something are possible, so too is the whole, and if the whole of something is possible, the parts for the most part are {88} as

well (for if sole, toe, and top can be, shoes can also be, and |1392[a]30| if shoes can, so can sole, toe, and top). And if the genus as a whole is among the possible things, so too is the species, and if the species is, so too |**1392[b]1**| is the genus—for example, if a ship can come to be, so can a trireme, and if a trireme can, so can a ship. And if one of two things that are naturally related to each other can, so can the other—for example, if double, also half, and if half, also double.

Also, if it is possible for something to come to be without craft knowledge or preparation, |1392[b]5| it is more so through craft knowledge and carefulness. Hence Agathon's saying:

> And indeed some things must be done by craft, others
> Accrue to us by necessity or by luck.[619]

And if something is possible for worse, inferior, or less practically-wise people, |1392[b]10| it is more possible for their contraries; thus Isocrates said that it would be strange if he could not find out for himself something that Euthynos had learned [from others].[620]

As for the impossible, it is clear that it comes about from the contraries of the things that have been stated.

The question of whether a thing has or has not happened should be investigated on the basis of the following.[621] First, if |1392[b]15| what is naturally less disposed to happen has happened, what is more so should also have happened. And if what usually happens as posterior to another thing has happened, then the anterior thing has also happened—for example, if a person has forgotten something, he also once learned it. Also, if a person was capable of something and wished to do it, he has done it (for all people, when they wish something and are capable of doing it, do it, since there is no impediment).[622] |1392[b]20| Further, if a person wished to do something, and nothing external prevented him, or if he was capable of doing it and was angry, or if he was capable of doing it and had an appetite for it [, then he has done it] (for, for the most part people do what they desire to do when they can—the base because of lack of self-control, the decent because the things they have an appetite for are decent).[623] Also, if something was going to happen, and if a person was going to do something (for it is likely that a person who was going to do something |1392[b]25| also did it).[624]

Also, if whatever by nature happens before a thing, or happens for the sake of it, has happened—for example, if lightening has occurred, so has

thunder, and if a person tried to something, he did it. And if whatever by nature happens as posterior to a thing, or is what it happens for the sake of, has happened, [then the thing has happened]—for example, if {89} thunder has, so has lightening, and if a person did something, |1392^{b}30| he tried to do it. Of all of these, some are so by necessity, some for the most part.[625]

As for what has not happened, it is evident that [that it results] from the contraries of the things that have been stated.

And what will be in the future is clear from the same things. For |**1393^{a}1**| what lies in both [our] capacity and wish, will be. Also, those things that lie in [our] appetite, anger, or rational calculation, combined with the capacity to do them, [will be]. And those that also lie in an impulse or that are about to be done (for, for the most part, things that are about to be done are more likely to happen than those that are not about to be done).[626] And if whatever things |1393^{a}5| naturally happen before something have happened—for example, if it is cloudy, it is likely that it will rain. And if what is for the sake of the thing at issue has happened, it is likely that the thing has happened too—for example, if the foundation has been, then a house too.

As for the greatness or smallness of things, the more and the less, and the large and the small generally, they are evident from what |1393^{a}10| was stated earlier. For in the discussion of deliberative speeches we spoke about the magnitude of goods and about what is unconditionally larger or smaller.[627] So, since of each sort of speech the proposed end is a good (that is to say, the advantageous, the noble, and the just), it is evident that every speaker must take |1393^{a}15| the materials of amplification from these.[628] But to go further beyond this, and to inquire about unconditional magnitude and superiority, is to argue emptily. For among the things at issue, the particulars are more controlling factors in relation to needs than the universals.[629]

About possibility and impossibility, whether something has happened |1393^{a}20| or has not happened, will or will not be, and further about the largeness or smallness of things at issue, let this much be said.

II 20

It remains to speak about the means of persuasion that are common to all, since the special ones have been stated. These common means of persuasion are two in kind (*genos*): paradigm and enthymeme (for a

maxim is a part of an enthymeme).[630] |1393[a]25| First, then, let us speak about a paradigm. For a paradigm is like an induction, and an induction is a starting-point.[631]

There are two kinds (*eidos*) of paradigms. For to speak of things that have happened before is one kind of paradigm, and to make one yourself is another. And of the latter, one sort is comparison and one fables—for example, the Aesopic |1393[a]30| and the Lybian.[632]

{90} Speaking of things that have happened before is something such as the following. If someone were to argue: It is necessary to make preparations against the king [of Persia] and not allow Egypt to be subdued. For earlier Darius did not cross over [to Greece] until he had previously taken Egypt, whereas having taken it, he crossed over; and |**1393[b]1**| later Xerxes did not attack, until he had previously taken it, whereas having taken it, he invaded; so if the present king takes it, he will invade; that is why it must not be allowed.[633]

Socratic arguments are cases of comparison.[634] For example, if someone were to argue that officials should not be chosen by lot, since that would be like someone |1393[b]5| choosing athletes by lot—not those capable of competing, but those to whom the lot falls; or like choosing by lot one of the sailors to act as captain, on the grounds that it should be the one to whom the lot falls and not the one with scientific knowledge.[635]

An example of fable is what Steisichorus said about Phalaris, and Aesop about the popular leader.[636] For Steisichorus, when the people of Himera had chosen Phalaris as autocratic general, |1393[b]10| and were going to give him a bodyguard, after the many other things he said in the discussion, told them the following fable: A horse had a meadow to himself. A stag came along and damaged the pasture. The horse, wishing to avenge himself on the stag, asked a human if he could help him to avenge himself on the stag. |1393[b]15| He said he could, if the horse accepted a bridle and he himself mounted up javelins in hand. When the horse agreed and the human mounted, instead of avenging himself the horse found himself enslaved to the human.[637] "So you too," he said, "should look out, lest in wishing to avenge yourselves on your enemies you suffer the same thing as the horse. You already have on the bridle, |1393[b]20| having appointed an autocratic general. If you give him a

bodyguard and allow him to mount up, at that moment you will already be enslaved to Phalaris."

Aesop, defending a popular leader in Samos who was on trial for his life, said the following: A fox, while crossing a river, was driven into a crevice in the bank and, not being able to get out, was for a long time in sore distress, and many dog-fleas |1393^{b}25| had hold of her. A hedgehog, while wandering about, saw her and feeling a lot of compassion asked her if she would like him to remove the dog-fleas, but she would not allow it. When the hedgehog asked why not, she replied, "Because these are already full of me and draw little blood, but if you remove them, other hungry ones will come and drink the blood that is left to me."[638] |1393^{b}30| "You too, then," Aesop said, "men of Samos will suffer no more harm from {91} this man (for he is already rich).[639] But if you put him to death, other poor ones will come, who will steal and squander your |**1394^{a}1**| public funds."[640]

Fables are suited to the speeches of public oratory, and have this good feature, namely, that whereas it is difficult to find similar things that have happened, it is easy with fables. For they should be produced in the same way as comparisons, provided one is capable of seeing similarity, which is just what is easy on the basis of philosophy.[641] |1394^{a}5| But though examples that operate through fables are easier to provide, the ones that operate through things that have happened are more useful in deliberation, since, for the most part, future events are similar to past ones.

A speaker who does not possess enthymemes should use paradigms as demonstration (for persuasion is through these), |1394^{a}10| whereas the one who does possess them should use paradigms as witnesses, as supplementary arguments to the enthymemes.[642] For when the paradigms are placed first, the speech looks like an induction, but induction does not properly belong in rhetorical speeches, except in a few instances.[643] As supplementary arguments, though, they serve as witnesses, and a witness is persuasive in every context. That is also why, when they are put first, it is necessary to state many of them, although as a supplementary argument even one is sufficient, since even a single good one is useful.[644] |1394^{a}15|

How many kinds (*eidos*) of paradigms there are and how and when they should be used has now been stated.

II 21

As for the use of maxims, once it has been stated what a maxim is, it should be most evident about what, when, and for whom it is fitting |1394[a]20| to make use of maxims in speeches.[645] A maxim is an affirmation, not though about particulars (for example, about what sort of person Iphicrates is), but about universals, and not about all of them (for example, that the straight is contrary to the crooked), but about the objects of actions, and with things that are to be chosen or avoided with a view to doing an action.[646] So, since |1394[a]25| the [relevant] enthymemes are pretty much a deduction about such things, the conclusions of the enthymemes or their starting-points, the deduction being omitted, are maxims.[647] For example,

A man naturally of sound mind should never
Have his children taught to be too wise.[648] |1394[a]30|

{92} This, then, is a maxim. But if the cause and the why are added, the whole thing is an enthymeme—for example,

For apart from the various sorts of idleness they face,
They incur the hostile envy from their fellow citizens.[649]

And this: |**1394[b]1**|

There is no man who is happy in everything.[650]

And this

There is none among men who is free

is a maxim, although taken with what follows

For he is a slave either of money or of luck,

it is an enthymeme.[651] |1394[b]5|

If, then, a maxim is the thing mentioned, there are necessarily four kinds (*eidos*) of maxims, since the maxim is either with or without a supplementary argument. Now those that need a demonstration are those that say something contradoxical or disputable, whereas those that say nothing contradoxical are without a need for a supplementary argument.[652] |1394[b]10| Some of these, because of being already known, necessarily need no supplementary argument—for example,

Being healthy is the best thing for a man, so it seems to me.[653]

(For it appears that way to many people.) Others, though, as soon as they are uttered, are clear to those who look at them carefully—for example, |1394[b]15|

No one is a lover who does not love always.[654]

Of those with a supplementary argument, some are part of an enthymeme, as is,

A man naturally of sound mind should never . . . ,

whereas others are enthymematic but not part of an enthymeme, and are the very ones |1394[b]20| that are most popular.[655] These are the ones in which the cause of what is said is made apparent, as it is, for example, in:

{93} Being a mortal, one should not hold fast to immortal anger.[656]

For to say "do not hold fast . . ." is a maxim, and the addition "being a mortal" is the why. Similarly with: |1394[b]25|

A mortal should think mortal not immortal thoughts.[657]

It is evident, then, from what has been said, how many kinds (*eidos*) of maxims there are and what each sort is fitting for. For about disputed or contradoxical things they should not be without a supplementary argument, but the supplementary argument may be put first and the maxim used as a conclusion—for example, if someone were to say, |1394[b]30| "As for me, then, since one should neither be the object of envy nor be idle, I say that children should not be educated"—or the maxim may be stated first and the supplementary argument stated after it. About matters that are not contradoxical yet not clear, the why should be added as tersely as possible. In such cases both Laconic apothegms and riddles are fitting—for example, |1394[b]35| if someone were to say just what Steisichorus said to the Locrians, namely, that they should not be |**1395[a]1**| wantonly aggressive, lest their cicadas sing from the ground.[658]

The use of maxims is fitting for people who are older in age and about matters of which a person has experience, so that to make use of maxims is—like telling stories—unseemly for someone not of such an age, and to make use of maxims about things in which one lacks experience, |1395[a]5| is silly and shows lack of education. Here is a sufficient sign of this: boors are especially fond of coining maxims and ready to show them off.[659]

To speak in universal terms of what is not universal is especially fitting in outrage and indignation, and, in these cases, either at the start or after the demonstration.[660] And one should use oft-repeated and |1395[a]10| common maxims, if they are useful (for because they are common, on the grounds that everyone agrees, they seem to be

correct).[661] For example, it is fitting for someone who is exhorting his troops to face danger without sacrificing to the gods to say:

> One omen is best, to defend one's fatherland.[662]

And, if they are outnumbered, |1395[a]15|

> The War God is impartial.[663]

{94} And, if exhorting them to destroy the sons of their enemies even though they have done no injustice:

> Foolish is he who having killed the father leaves behind the sons.[664]

Further, some proverbs are also maxims—for example, the proverb "an Attic neighbor."[665]

One should also use maxims that are contrary to the ones |1395[a]20| that are public property (by those that are public property I mean ones like "Know thyself" and "Nothing too much"), whenever the speaker's character is likely to be made to appear better, or the maxim to be stated with feeling.[666] An example of a maxim stated with feeling is if someone in anger were to say: "It is false that one should know oneself, since, at any rate, *this* man, if he had known himself, would never have thought himself worthy to be a general."[667] |1395[a]25| And his character [would appear] better [if he were to say]: "One should not, as people say, love as if one will one day hate, but rather hate as if one will one day love."[668] And one should make one's deliberate choice completely clear by one's wording, or else one should state the cause in a supplementary argument, saying, for example, "One should not love in the way people say, but as if one were always going to love, since the other is characteristic of a traitor;" or this, |1395[a]30| "The saying does not please me, since the true lover should love as if he were always going to love;" or "'Nothing too much' does not please me either, since one should hate bad people too much."[669]

Maxims have great help to give to speeches and the first is due to **|1395[b]1|** the vulgarity of the listeners.[670] For people enjoy it if someone speaking in universal terms hits upon beliefs that they themselves hold about a particular case. What I mean will be clear from the following, as at the same time will be how one should hunt for maxims. A maxim, as has been said, is a universal affirmation, |1395[b]5| and people enjoy things said in universal terms that they happen to assume beforehand in particular cases—for example, if someone happened to have bad

neighbors or bad children, he would welcome someone saying that nothing is worse than having neighbors or that nothing is sillier than begetting children. So one should aim to discover the sorts of things people happen to assume beforehand |1395^{b}10| and then speak in universal terms about these things in the way described.

This, then, is one sort of helpfulness of the use of maxims; and another is stronger. For it makes speeches be expressive of character. For speeches involving character are those in which the deliberate {95} choice is clear, and all maxims make it so, because the one stating the maxim makes evident a universal fact about the objects of deliberate |1395^{b}15| choices.[671] So if the maxims are good, they make the speaker appear to have a good character.

Where maxims are concerned, then, what they are, how many kinds (*eidos*) of them there are, how they should be used, and what sorts of benefits they have, let this much be said. |1395^{b}20|

II 22

Let us now speak about enthymemes in universal terms, that is, in what way one should seek them, and after that about their topics, since each of these two is distinct in kind (*eidos*).[672]

Now, that the enthymeme is a deduction was stated earlier, and in what way it is a deduction, and in what respect it differs from those in dialectic.[673] For it should not draw its conclusion from far back, nor by necessarily including everything, |1395^{b}25| since the former is not perspicuous because of length, while the latter amounts to babbling, because what is said is evident.[674] This is the cause of the uneducated being more persuasive than the well-educated in front of crowds of people—as the poets tell us, the uneducated are "more accomplished at speaking before a crowd."[675] For the well-educated say the common things and universals, while the uneducated say things |1395^{b}30| on the basis of what they know and things close at hand.[676] So one should not speak on the basis of all the things that seem to be so but on the basis of definite ones—for example, those accepted by the judges or of those they approve. And in fact it should be clear that what is said |**1396^{a}1**| appears so to all or to most.[677] And one should not only draw the conclusion from what is necessary, but also from what holds for the most part.

First, then, one should grasp that about whatever subject one has to speak or deduce, whether the subject of the deduction is political or

anything else whatsoever, it is necessary |1396[a]5| to have facts concerning it, either all of them or some of them.[678] For if you have none of these, you will have nothing to draw a conclusion from. I mean, for example, how could we advise the Athenians whether they should go to war or not without knowing what their capacity is, whether naval or infantry or both, and how great it is, and what revenues or |1396[a]10| friends and enemies they have, further, what wars they have fought and in what way, and other such things? Or praise them, if we did not have [as a fact] the sea battle at Salamis or the battle of Marathon, or what they did for the children of Heracles, or something else of that sort.[679] For all people praise on the basis of noble things that are, or seem to be, facts. |1396[a]15| {96} Similarly, people blame the Athenians on the basis of the contraries, looking for one that applies to them or seems to—for example, that they enslaved the Greeks and sold into slavery those who had fought with them against the barbarian and gained the prize for valor (namely, the inhabitants of Aegina and Potidaea), and other such things—and whether some other error |1396[a]20| of this sort is attributed to them.[680] Similarly, those accusing and those defending accuse and defend on the basis of looking to the relevant facts after examining them.

And it makes no difference whether it concerns Athenians or Spartans, human or god; one should do the very same thing. For also in advising Achilles and in praising or |1396[a]25| blaming him and in accusing or defending him, one must grasp the relevant facts, or what seem to be facts, about him, in order to say on the basis of these, when praising or blaming, if there is anything noble or shameful [in his case], or, when accusing or defending, anything just or unjust, or, when advising, anything advantageous or harmful. And the same is true |1396[a]30| of any thing at issue whatsoever—for example, about justice, whether it is good or not good, [one should speak] on the basis of the facts relevant to justice and the good.[681]

So, since it is evident that everyone does indeed demonstrate in this way, whether they deduce in a more exact or in a more loose fashion (for they do not take from all the facts but from facts relevant to **|1396[b]1|** the given case), and since it is clear that it is impossible through argument to show anything in any other way, it is evident that it is first necessary, as in the *Topics*, to have selected [premises] relevant to the given case concerning possible points [of discussion] and the ones that are most

opportune.[682] And where things happening on the spur of the moment are concerned, |1396^{b}5| one must seek [premises] in the same way, looking not to indefinite things but to the facts the argument is about, marking off as many facts as possible and the ones closest to the thing at issue.[683] For the more of the relevant facts are in hand, the easier the showing is, and the closer they are, the more properly they belong [to the thing at issue] and are less common.[684] By common facts I mean, |1396^{b}10| for example, praising Achilles because he was a human being, because he was one of the demigods, or because he went on the expedition against Troy, since these apply to many others as well, so that such a speaker does not praise Achilles any more than Diomedes.[685] Special facts, by contrast, are ones that apply to no one other than Achilles—for example, being the killer of Hector, the |1396^{b}15| best of the Trojans, and of Cycnus, who prevented all the Greeks from disembarking and was invulnerable, and because he was the youngest who went on the expedition and the one who went without having sworn, and anything else of this sort.[686]

{97} One way, then, of selecting, the first one, is this: the *topical*. Let us now speak of the elements of enthymemes. And by element |1396^{b}20| and topic, I mean the same thing.[687] First, though, let us say some things that it is necessary to say first. For there are two kinds (*eidos*) of enthymemes.[688] For one lot are suited to showing that something is or is not the case, while another lot are refutative, and the difference is like that in dialectical ones between refutation and deduction.[689] An enthymeme suited to showing |1396^{b}25| draws its conclusion from what is agreed to, whereas one suited to refuting draws conclusions that are disagreed with.

Now the topics concerning each of the kinds (*eidos*) that are useful and necessary are pretty much in our possession.[690] For premises concerned with each have been selected, so that the topics on the basis of which enthymemes should be derived |1396^{b}30| concerning good or bad, noble or shameful, just or unjust, and concerning characters, feelings, and states, which were earlier selected by us in the same way, are already on hand.[691]

Still, let us now get a grasp on all these in another way, namely, universally, and |**1397^{a}1**| let us speak taking note of the refutative ones and the ones suited to showing, and of those belonging to apparent

enthymemes, which are not really enthymemes, since they are not even deductions.[692] When these things have been made clear we shall make determinations about refutations and objections, and on what basis |1397ª5| one should bring them against enthymemes.[693]

II 23[694]

[T1] One topic belonging to enthymemes is that based on contraries, since one should look to see if the contrary belongs to the contrary, doing away with it if it does not belong, establishing it if it does—for example, saying that to be temperate is a good thing, since to lack self-control is a harmful one. |1397ª10| Or, as in the *Messianicus*:

> For if the war is cause of the present evils, with peace they should be put right.[695]

Or—

> For if indeed it is not just even for those
> who did evil involuntarily to anger us,
> Then it is not fitting for someone who is compelled to do good |1397ª15|
> To be shown gratitude for the benefit he conferred.[696]

{98} Or–

> But if indeed, old man, among mortals false speaking
> Is persuasive, you should believe the opposite too,
> That many truths are unpersuasive to mortals.[697]

[T2] Another is based on the different inflections of the same word, since it is necessary for them to belong |1397ª20| or not belong in the same way [to the subject]—for example, to say that what is just is not good in every respect, since then even the just*ly* would be good [in every respect], while as things stand to be put to death justly is not choiceworthy.[698]

[T3] Another is based on correlatives, since if doing something nobly or justly belongs to one of a pair, to have suffered in a correlative way belongs to the other, and if prescribing belongs to one, doing belongs to the other—as, for example, what Diomedon |1397ª25| the tax collector said about taxes:

> If it is not shameful for you to sell, neither is it shameful for me to buy.[699]

And if suffering nobly or justly belongs to one, producing it in a correlative way belongs to the other. But there is in this the possibility of

fallacy. For if someone has suffered something justly, he has justly suffered, but not perhaps at your hands.[700] That is why one should look separately to see whether the sufferer suffered and the |1397[a]30| producer produced, and then to make use of whichever fits the case. For sometimes |**1397[b]1**| there is disagreement in a case of this sort and nothing prevents a reply like this in the *Alcmeon* of Theodectes:

Did no one of the mortals loathe your mother?

[Alphesiboa asks. And Alcmaeon says] in reply:

But one should investigate by dividing.

And when Alphesiboa asks how, he understands and replies: |1397[b]5|

They judged that she should die, but not that I should kill her.[701]

Also, the trial of Demosthenes and those who killed Nicanor; for since the jury judged that they had justly killed him, they believed him to have been justly killed.[702] Also, the case of the man killed at Thebes, {99} where the accused demands that a judgment be made as to whether he died justly, on the supposition that it was not unjust to kill |1397[b]10| someone who died justly.[703]

[T4] Another is based on the more and the less.[704] For example, "If not even the gods know everything, human beings can much less do so." For this is to say, "If something does not belong to what it should more belong to, it is clear that neither does it belong to what it should less belong to." And that someone who beats his father also beats his neighbors follows from "If the less |1397[b]15| belongs, the more belongs too." For men beat their fathers less than they beat their neighbors. Or one may argue in this way, if what more belongs does not belong, [what less belongs does not], or if what less belongs does belong, [so does what more belongs to], depending on which of the two one needs to show.[705]

Further, that there is neither more nor less, on the basis of which it was said: |1397[b]20|

Your father too is pitiable for having lost his children;

Is Oeneus, then, not also pitiable for having lost an illustrious offspring?[706]

And that, if Theseus did no injustice, neither did Paris, and if the sons of Tyndareus did none, Paris did none, and if Hector did none to Patroclus, Paris did none to Achilles.[707] And if other craftsmen are not |1397[b]25| base, neither are philosophers.[708] And if generals are not base because they are often put to death, neither are sophists.[709] And that "if a

private individual should care about your reputations, you too should care about that of the Greeks."

[T5] Another is based on looking at time—for example, what Iphicrates |1397^{b}30| said in the speech against Harmodius: "If I had asked for a statue when I will accomplish the thing, you would have granted it. Will you not grant it now that I have accomplished it? Do not, accordingly, grant when you expect something, and rescind when you have received it."[710] Again, against Thebans [not allowing] Philip to pass through into Attica: "If he had made this request before helping them by moving into Phocis, they would have granted it. |**1398^{a}1**| It is absurd, then, because he gave up the opportunity and trusted them, that they will not let him pass through now."[711]

[T6] Another is based on turning what has been said about oneself against the speaker. But the turn differs, for example, in the *Teucer* and in the argument Iphicrates used against Aristophon.[712] He asked the latter if he would |1398^{a}5| betray the fleet for money. He denied it. And then Iphicrates said, "If *you*, Aristophon, would not betray it, would *I*, {100} Iphicrates, do so?" But the opponent must be one who would seem more likely to do injustice; if he is not, it would be ridiculous—for example, if one were to say this to Aristides as accuser.[713] But against the trustworthiness of an accuser [of the former sort, it works well], |1398^{a}10| since, in general, the accuser wishes to be better than the defendant. This, then, should be refuted. It is universally absurd, however, when someone reproaches others for what he himself does, or would do, or exhorts others to do what he himself does not, or would not.

[T7] Another is based on definition—for example, of what the divine is: |1398^{a}15| Is it not a god or the work of a god?[714] Accordingly, whoever thinks that a work of a god exists must think that gods also exist. And as Iphicrates argued that the best person is the most well-bred one, since even Harmodius and Aristogeiton had nothing well-bred about them until they did something well-bred in action, while he himself was bred more (*suggenesteros*) like them: "At any rate, my works |1398^{a}20| are more like (*suggenestera*) those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton than yours are."[715] And, as in the *Alexandros*, that all would agree that all those who are not moderate are not content with the enjoyment of one [woman's] body.[716] Also, why Socrates said he did not visit Archelaus.[717] For he said

that wanton aggression is a matter of not being able to repay equally even when one is treated well, |1398[a]25| as it also is when one is treated badly.[718] For all these speakers by defining and grasping the what-it-is deduce things about the subject they are talking about.[719]

[T8] Another is based on the many ways—as, for example, in the *Topics* concerning "sharp."[720]

[T9] Another is based on division—for example, if everyone does injustice for the sake of three things |1398[a]30| (namely, for the sake of this, this, or this), and because two of them are impossible in the present case, and because not even the accusers themselves affirm the third. . . .[721]

[T10] Another is based on induction—for example, from the case of the woman of Peparethus. [It is argued] that women everywhere determine the truth about the paternity of children, |**1398[b]1**| since when the speaker Mantias was disputing in Athens about the paternity of a child, the child's mother made known the truth.[722] Similarly, when Ismenias and Stilbon were disputing in Thebes, the woman of Dodona demonstrated [this when she] identified her son as being the son of Ismenias, and because of this Thettaliscus was acknowledged as Ismenias' son.[723] |1398[b]5| And, again, from the *Law* speech of Theodectes: "If people do not entrust their own horses to those who have taken bad care of the horses of others, nor their own ships to those who have capsized the ships of others, then, if this is likewise so in all cases, one should not employ for {101} one's own preservation those who have badly guarded the preservation of others."[724] And, |1398[b]10| as Alcidamas argued, that all honor the wise: "The Parians, at any rate, honored Archilochus although he slandered them; the Chians Homer, although he was not a citizen; the Mytileneans Sappho, although she was a woman; the Spartans even made Chilon one of their senators although they are least fond of words; and the Italians, Pythagoras; |1398[b]15| the Lampsacenes buried Anaxagoras, although he was a foreigner, and still honor him even now; the Athenians were prosperous while they made use of the laws of Solon, and the Spartans those of Lycurgus; and at Thebes, as soon as the leading men became philosophers the city prospered."[725] |1398[b]20|

[T11] Another is based on a judgment about the same, a similar, or a contrary case, especially when all always [judge in that way]—but if not, at any rate when most do, or the wise (either all or most of them), or the good, or if these judges themselves do, or those these judges approve, or

those one cannot judge contrary to (for example, those with the controlling vote), or those it would not be noble to judge contrary to |1398[b]25| (for example, the gods, a father, or teachers—as Autocles said against Mixidemides: "It is [a terrible thing] if it was fine for the Dread Goddesses to stand trial before the Areopagus but not for Mixidemides").[726] Or as Sappho said, that it is bad to die, since the gods have so judged—for otherwise they would die. Or as Aristippus |1398[b]30| did against Plato when he said something too professorially: "But our companion," he said, "never spoke like that"—meaning Socrates.[727] And at Delphi Agesipolis consulted the god, having previously consulted the oracle at Olympia, as to whether his belief was the very same as his father's, on the supposition that it would be shameful to say contrary things.[728] And |**1399[a]1**| as Isocrates wrote about Helen, that she was good, since Theseus so judged, and about Paris, whom the goddess judged to be better than others; and about Evagoras, that he was excellent, as Isocrates said at any rate, since when Conon was in misfortune, leaving others aside, |1399[a]5| he came to Evagoras for help.[729]

[T12] Another is based on the parts, as in the *Topics*: What sort of movement is the soul? For it is this or that.[730] There is a paradigm in the *Socrates* of Theodectes: "What holy place has he profaned? Which gods that the city acknowledges does he not honor?"[731] |1399[a]10|

[T13] Another—since in most cases the same thing is followed by good and bad—is to exhort or dissuade, accuse or defend, and praise or blame on the basis of consequences. For example, being educated is followed by being envied, which is a bad thing, whereas to be wise is good: therefore, one should not |1399[a]15| be educated, since one should not be envied; or certainly one should be educated, since one should be wise. {102} This topic constitutes the craft of Callippus, with the addition of the possible and the other things that have been mentioned.[732]

[T14] Another is when one needs to exhort or dissuade about things that are opposites, and one needs to use the way mentioned in the previous case |1399[a]20| in both.[733] But the difference is that there random things are opposed, whereas here they are contraries. For example, a priestess did not allow her son to speak publicly: "For," she said, "if you say what is just, the human beings will hate you; and if what is unjust, the gods will. Certainly, you should speak publicly, since if you say what is just, the gods |1399[a]25| will love you; and if what is unjust,

human beings will." This is the same as the saying, "buying the marsh with the salt."[734] The turning inside out consists in this: when each of two contraries is followed by a good and an evil, [apply] each contrary to each.[735]

[T15] Another—since people do not praise the same things openly as they do non-openly, |1399^{a}30| but openly praise the just and the noble most of all, while in private they wish more for what is advantageous—is on the basis of these to try to draw on each. For among the ones that are contradoxical this topic is the most controlling one.[736]

[T16] Another is based on analogical consequences—for example, when they tried to compel his son, who was younger than the required age, to perform public service because he was tall, Iphicrates argued that if they consider tall boys to be men, they should vote that short men are boys.[737] And Theodectes in the *Law* speech argued that |**1399^{b}1**|: "Since you are making citizens of mercenaries, such as Strabax and Charidemus, because of their decency, will you not make exiles of those among the [citizen] mercenaries who have done irreparable harm?"[738]

[T17] Another is based on [arguing] that if what results is the same, the things from which |1399^{b}5| it resulted are also the same—for example, Xenophanes said that those who say that the gods are born and those who say that they die are equally impious, since in both cases it results that at some time gods do not exist.[739] And, in general, one should take the result of each of the relevant things as always the same: "You are going to make a judgment not about Isocrates, |1399^{b}10| but about education, as to whether one should study philosophy."[740] And that to give "earth and water" is to be a slave, and that to share in "the common peace" is to do what is commanded.[741] And one should take whichever of the two is useful.[742]

[T18] Another is based on the fact that people do not always choose the same thing before as after, |1399^{b}15| but rather the reverse one—for example, the following enthymeme: "When in exile, we fought to return home, but having returned, are we to go into exile in order to {103} avoid fighting?"[743] For at one time they chose to be at home at the cost of fighting, and at another time not to fight at the cost of not being at home.

[T19] Another is to say that that for the sake of which something *might* exist or *might* have come to be is that for the sake of which

|1399^{b}20| it *does* exist or *did* come to be—as if someone gave something to someone in order to cause him pain by taking it back.[744] Hence it has been said:

> It is not out of good will that the divine,
> Gives great good fortune to many, but in order that
> The misfortunes they suffer be more evident.[745] |1399^{b}25|

And, from the *Meleager* of Antiphon,

> Not in order to kill the beast, but to be witnesses
> Of the virtue of Meleager to Greece.[746]

And, from the *Ajax* of Theodectes, that Diomedes deliberately chose Odysseus not in order to honor him but in order that his companion might be inferior to him.[747] |1399^{b}30| For he could have done it for the sake of this.

[T20] Another, common to opponents [in court] and deliberative speakers, is to look to see what the incentives and the disincentives are, and for the sake of what people do things or avoid doing them.[748] For these are the things that if present, one should do the action, and if not present, |1399^{b}35| then one should not do it.[749] For example, if it is possible, easy, or beneficial either to oneself or to friends, or harmful to enemies, or, if it is punishable, the punishment is less than the thing at issue.[750] And people are given an incentive on the basis of these, and a disincentive on the basis of their contraries. And accusation and defense |**1400^{a}1**| are based on the same ones: they defend themselves on the basis of the disincentives [to take punitive action] and accuse on the basis of the incentives [to take it]. This topic is the whole craft of Pamphilius and Callippus.[751]

[T21] Another is based on things that are believed to have occurred but are unpersuasive, because |1400^{a}5| they would not have been believed had they not actually occurred or nearly so—in fact, that they are more likely to have occurred, since people [only] accept things that really exist or that are likely to exist.[752] If, then, something were unpersuasive and not likely, it would be true, since it is not because of being likely or being persuasive that it seems so [but because it is true]. For example, when Androcles of Pitthus spoke against a law, since he was shouted at, he said: "Laws need |1400^{a}10| a law to rectify them, since even fish need salt" {104} (and yet it is neither likely nor persuasive that creatures reared in

saltwater would need salt), "and pressed olives need oil" (and yet it is unpersuasive that things from which oil comes need oil).[753]

[T22] Another is refutative, namely, looking for inconsistencies, to see whether there is any |1400ª15| inconsistency among all the times, actions, or words (*logos*).[754] First, separately, regarding the opponent [in court]—for example, "And he says he loves you, but he conspired with the Thirty."[755] Next, separately, regarding [the speaker himself]: "And he says that I am litigious, but he cannot show that I have brought a case to be judged." Next, separately, regarding both the speaker himself |1400ª20| and the opponent: "He has never put up any money, but I have ransomed many of you."[756]

[T23] Another, for human beings or things at issue against whom negative prejudices have been, or seem to have been, raised beforehand, is to state the cause of the prejudicial belief, since it must appear so because of something.[757] For example, a certain woman who had palmed off |1400ª25| her own child as another's seemed to be the lad's lover because of clinging fondly to him, but when the cause was stated, the accusation was refuted.[758] Another example is in the *Ajax* of Theodectes: Odysseus tells Ajax why, though he is more courageous than Ajax, he does not seem so.[759]

[T24] Another is from the cause: if it exists, [arguing] that the effect does, and if it does not |1400ª30|, that the effect does not. For the cause and what it is cause of go together, and nothing can exist without its cause. For example, when Leodamas was defending himself against Thrasybulus' charge that his name had been inscribed on a column on the Acropolis, but had been erased in the time of the Thirty.[760] That was not possible, he said, since the Thirty would have trusted him more |1400ª35| if his enmity for the people had remained inscribed.[761]

[T25] Another is to look to see whether it was possible or is possible for the action that someone advises, or is doing or has done, to be done in a better way. For it is evident that if this is not so, he did not do the action, since no one |**1400ᵇ1**| voluntarily and knowingly deliberately chooses the bad things.[762] But this is [sometimes] false. For often it later becomes clear how things could have been done better, whereas earlier it was unclear.

[T26] Another, when an action is about to be done that is contrary to what has been done, |1400ᵇ5| is to look at them together—for example,

when the people of Elea asked Xenophanes if they should sacrifice and sing dirges to Leucothea or not, he advised them not to sing dirges if they took her to be a god, and not to sacrifice if they took her to be a human being.[763]

{105} [T27] Another topic is to accuse or defend on the basis of errors that have been made. For example, in the *Medea* of Carcinus, some accuse |1400^{b}10| Medea on the grounds that she has killed her children —at any rate, they are nowhere to be seen. For Medea made the error of sending her children away.[764] But she defends herself on the grounds that it is not her children but rather Jason that she would have killed, since she would have made an error in not doing so, if in fact she had done the other thing. This topic and kind (*eidos*) of |1400^{b}15| enthymeme constituted the whole craft before Theodorus.[765]

[T28] Another is from the name—for example, as in Sophocles:

> Clearly you are iron as the name you bear.[766]

And, as people are accustomed to speak in praises of the gods, or as Conon called Thrasybulus "daring in council (*thrasuboulon*)," or as Herodicus said to |1400^{b}20| Thrasymachus, "you are always daring in battle (*thrasumachos*)," and to Polus, "you are always a colt (*polos*)," and of Draco the legislator that his laws were not those of a human being but of a snake (*dracon*) (for they were harsh).[767] Also, as Hecuba in Euripides says of Aphrodite:

> And rightly does the name of the goddess start like "foolishness (*aphrosunês*)."[768]

And as Chaeremon said:

> Pentheus, named for his future misfortunes.[769] |1400^{b}25|

Refutative enthymemes are more popular than demonstrative ones because a refutative enthymeme is a bringing together of contraries in a small space, and when these are set side by side they are more evident to the listener.[770] But of all deductions, whether refutative or demonstrative, the most applauded are those of the sort the listeners |1400^{b}30| foresee the moment they start, as long as they are not superficial (for at the same time people are also pleased with themselves for pre-perceiving the conclusion), and those of the sort that they are late in apprehending, so that they know them the moment they are stated.[771]

II 24

But since it is possible for a thing to be a deduction or for another thing not to be one, but to appear to be one, necessarily, it is also possible for {106} a thing to be an enthymeme |1400^{b}35| and for another thing not to be one, but to appear to be one, since an enthymeme is a sort of deduction.[772] And there are topics for apparent enthymemes. |**1401^{a}1**|

[T1a*] One is by exploiting the mode of expression, and one part of this, just as in dialectical ones, is when what is ultimately stated, though not deduced, is said in the form of a deductive conclusion: "Therefore, such-and-such is not so," |1401^{a}5| "Therefore, such-and-such must be so."[773] Similarly, in the case of enthymemes, stating something tersely and antithetically makes it appear to be an enthymeme. For a mode of expression of this sort is the province of enthymemes.[774] And something of this sort seems to be so by exploiting the figure of the mode of expression.[775] With regard to speaking deductively in one's mode of expression it is useful to state the crowning points of a number of deductions: "He saved some, avenged others, |1401^{a}10| and freed the Greeks." For each of these has been demonstrated from other things, but when they are put together something new appears to result from them too. [T1b*] The other part is by exploiting homonymy: saying that the mouse (*mus*) is excellent, since from it is derived the most estimable of all festivals; for the Mysteries (*musteria*) is the most estimable festival of all.[776] Or if someone |1401^{a}15| composing an encomium for a dog were to include the Dog Star or Pan in their account, because Pindar said:

> O blessed one, whom the Olympians call dog, multifarious,
> Of the Great Goddess.[777]

Or to say that to be without a dog is the greatest dishonor, so it is clear that the dog |1401^{a}20| is estimable.[778] Or that Hermes is the most sociable (*koinônikos*) of the gods (for he alone is called "The Sharing (*koinos*) Hermes").[779] Or that speech (*logos*) is the most excellent thing, because good men are worthy of esteem (*logou axioi*) not of money. For the expression *axion logou* is not said of things in a simple way.[780]

[T2*] Another is for the speaker to combine what is divided or |1401^{a}25| to divide what is combined. For since what is not the same often seems to be the same, whichever is more useful should be done. This is Euthydemus' [kind of] argument—for example, claiming to know that there is a trireme in the Piraeus (for he knew each of the [three] things involved), and claiming of the one knowing the letters that he

knows the word (for the word is the same as these).[781] |1401[a]30| Also, saying that since two doses of something cause illness, one dose is not healthy either, since it would be absurd if two goods equaled one evil. Put this way it is for refutation, but it is for showing in the following one: For two goods do not equal one evil. But the whole topic is fallacious. Again, {107} what Polycrates said in regard to Thrasybulus, that he deposed thirty tyrants |1401[a]35| (for he combines).[782] Or what is in the *Orestes* of Theodectes (for it is a case of division):

It is just that she who has killed her husband

should die; and for the son to avenge the father; accordingly, these things have been justly done.[783] But perhaps when they are combined, it is no longer |**1401[b]1**| just. This would also be one by omission (for it leaves out the *by whom*).[784]

[T3*] Another topic is establishing or disestablishing an argument by exaggeration. This is when, without showing that someone did or did not do something, one amplifies the thing at issue.[785] For, when the accused amplifies it he makes it appear that he has not |1401[b]5| done the action, or that he has done it, when the accuser amplifies it.[786] There is, then, no enthymeme. For the listener fallaciously reasons that someone has done it, or that he has not done it; but this has not been shown.

[T4*] Another is based on a sign; for this one too is non-deductive—for example, if someone were to say: "Lovers are advantageous to cities. |1401[b]10| For the love of Harmodius and Aristogeiton destroyed the tyrant Hipparchus."[787] Or if someone were to say that Dionysius is a thief since he is wicked. For this of course is non-syllogistic. For not every wicked person is a thief, although every thief is wicked.

[T5*] Another is through what is coincidental—for example, Polycrates says of mice |1401[b]15| that they helped by gnawing bowstrings.[788] Or if someone were to say that being invited to dinner is the most estimable thing, since Achilles' rage at the Achaeans in Tenedos was because of his not being invited. But he was enraged because he was dishonored, and being dishonored was coincidental to not being invited.[789]

[T6*] Another is by [affirming] the consequent—for example, in the *Alexandros*, |1401[b]20| the argument that Alexandros [Paris] was great-souled.[790] For, looking down on social interaction with ordinary people, he passed his time on Mount Ida by himself (for because great-souled

people are like this, he too should be believed to be great-souled). And: when someone is well-dressed and wanders around at night, he is an adulterer, since adulterers are like this.[791] The same is true of the fact that in front of temples beggars sing and dance, and |1401^{b}25| that exiles can live wherever they like. For because these things belong to those who seem to be prosperous, the people to whom these things belong might seem to be prosperous too.[792] But there is a difference in how [they belong], which is why this too falls under omission.[793]

{108} [T7*] Another is by taking a non-cause as a cause—for example, when the thing has happened at the same time as another or after it. |1401^{b}30| For people take the coming-after-something as being because-of-something, and especially political policy makers—for example, as Demades took the policy of Demosthenes to be the cause of all evils, since it is after it that the war came.[794]

[T8*] Another is by omission of how and when—for example, arguing that Paris took Helen justly, since the choice |1401^{b}35| had been given to her by her father. For presumably it was not given for ever, but for the first time. For a father's control also extends to this point. Or if someone were to say |**1402^{a}1**| that it is wanton aggression to strike free people. For it is not so always, but when someone strikes the first blow unjustly.

[T9*] Further, as in contentious arguments, an apparent deduction results by taking the unconditionally so and the not unconditionally so, but so in a certain respect—for example, in dialectical arguments, that what is not is |1402^{a}5| (for what is not *is* what is not) and that the unknowable is scientifically knowable (for it is scientifically knowable that it *is* unknowable)—in rhetorical arguments as well there is an apparent enthymeme by taking the not unconditionally likely but likely in a certain respect.[795] But this latter is not universally likely, as Agathon too says: |1402^{a}10|

> Perhaps one could say that the thing itself is likely;
> To mortals many things happen that are not likely.[796]

For what is contrary to the likely does also occur, so that even what is contrary to the likely is likely.[797] And if this is so, what is not likely will be likely. But not unconditionally so. Instead, as in contentious arguments, not adding with respect to, in relation to, and |1402^{a}15|

where, produces sophistry, so does the fact that the likely is not unconditional but likely in a certain respect.[798]

The craft of Corax is based on this topic.[799] For if a person is not liable to be guilty of the charge (for example, if a physically weak person is accused of assault), he should be acquitted of the charge, since it is not likely; and if he is liable to be guilty (for example, if he is physically strong), [he should be acquitted,] since it is not likely, because it was going to seem likely.[800] |1402^{a}20| And similarly in other cases. For necessarily a person is either liable to be guilty or not liable to be guilty of the charge. Both alternatives *appear* likely, then, but one *is* likely, whereas the other is so not unconditionally but in the way mentioned.[801] And this is "to make the weaker argument the stronger." Hence human {109} beings were justly disgusted at Protagoras' declaration, |1402^{a}25| since it consists in what is false, not true but apparently likely, and is included in no craft, but in rhetoric and contentious argument.[802]

II 25

Enthymemes, both real and apparent, have now been spoken about. The next thing to be discussed, after what has already been said, is refutation.[803] |1402^{a}30|

It is possible to refute [an enthymeme] either by stating a counter-deduction or by bringing an objection.[804] Now it is clear that it is possible to produce the stating of a counter-deduction on the basis of the same topics [as a deduction]. For the deductions are based on reputable beliefs, and many things that seem to be so are contrary to one another.[805] But objections are brought, as also described in the *Topics*, in four ways: |1402^{a}35| [1] based on itself, [2] on what is similar, [3] on what is contrary, or [4] on what has been judged.[806]

[1] By from itself I mean, for example, if the enthymeme were about love as something excellent, the objection is in two ways. For it is possible to make a universal |**1402^{b}1**| statement and say that all need is bad, or to make a particular one and say that there would be no talk of "Caunian love" if there were not also bad sorts of love.[807]

[3] By from what is contrary: for example, if the enthymeme was that "the good man does good to all his friends," [the objection is,] "but |1402^{b}5| not even the depraved one does evil to all of his."[808]

[2] Regarding what is similar: for example, if the enthymeme was that "those to whom evil is done always hate," [the objection is,] "but not even those to whom good is done always love."[809]

[4] The judgments are those of notable men: for example, if someone stated the enthymeme that one should be sympathetically considerate to those who are drunk, since their errors are made in ignorance. |1402^{b}10| The objection is that then Pittacus is not praiseworthy, since he would not have legislated greater punishments for someone who commits an error while drunk.[810]

Enthymemes are stated on the basis of four things, and these four are likelihood, paradigm, proof, and sign. Those that are drawn from what either does or seems to hold for the most part |1402^{b}15| are enthymemes based on likelihoods. Those that proceed through induction based on what is like, whether on one case or more than one, whenever a person by grasping the universal deduces the particular cases, are enthymemes through paradigms.[811] Those through what holds {110} necessarily and always are enthymemes through a proof. And those, whether through a universal or a particular one, that something is so or is not so, are enthymemes through signs. |1402^{b}20| And since this is so, and since what is likely holds not always but for the most part, it is evident that enthymemes of these sorts can be refuted by bringing objections, although the refutation may be an apparent one, and not always true. For the objector does not refute that it is likely, but that it is necessary. That is also why the defendant rather than the accuser always has the advantage, |1402^{b}25| namely, through this fallacy. For since the accuser demonstrates through similarities, and since it is not the same thing to refute by showing that an argument is not likely as by showing that it is not necessary, what holds for the most part is always open to objection (for otherwise it would not hold for the most part, and would not be a likelihood, but would hold always and necessarily).[812] And the judge thinks, when a refutation is made in this way, either that the thing is not likely or that it is not for him to judge, |1402^{b}30| reasoning fallaciously, as we said (for he should not only judge on the basis of what is necessary, but also on the basis of likelihoods, since this is to judge in accord with "the best consideration").[813] It is not enough, then, to refute by showing that it is not necessary, rather one should refute by showing that it is not likely. And this will result if the objection holds to a higher degree for the

most part.[814] |1402[b]35| And an objection of this sort can be brought in two ways: either by the time or by the things at issue—but in the most controlling way, if by both (for if things are more often thus, this is more likely).[815] |**1403[a]1**|

Both signs and enthymemes stated on the basis of a sign are refutable, even if the things hold, as was said in the first discussions.[816] For that every sign is non-deductive is clear to us from the *Analytics*.[817] |1403[a]5|

The refutation of enthymemes based on paradigms is the same as that of likelihoods. For if we have one case that is not so, there is a refutation, because the argument is not a necessity, even if more cases on more occasions are otherwise, but if more cases or more occasions are that way, we should contend that his present one is not like them, or not like them in the relevant way, or at least has some differentiating feature (*diaphora*).[818]

Proofs, though, |1403[a]10| and enthymemes based on proofs cannot be refuted as non-deductive (and this too is clear to us from the *Analytics*), and what remains is to show that the thing claimed does not hold.[819] But if it is evident that it both holds and that there is a proof of it, the argument at once becomes irrefutable, since the entirety of it becomes at once an evident demonstration.[820] |1403[a]15|

{111} II 26

Amplifying and diminishing are not elements of enthymemes.[821] For I mean the same thing by element and topic, since an element or topic is something into the province of which many enthymemes fall.[822] But amplifying and diminishing are related to showing that something is great or small, as they are to showing that it is good or bad, just or unjust, or anything |1403[a]20| else whatsoever.[823] All these latter, though, are things that deductions and enthymemes are about, so that if no one of these is a topic for enthymemes, neither is amplifying and diminishing.

Nor are refutative enthymemes some one species of enthymemes.[824] For it is clear |1403[a]25| that one refutes by showing something or by bringing an objection. In the first case they show the opposite in reply—for example, if he showed that something happened, the other shows that it did not. So this is not a differentiating feature (*diaphora*), since they both use the same [topics].[825] For they bring in enthymemes to show that something is not the case or that it is the case. An objection |1403[a]30| is

not an enthymeme either, but rather, as in the *Topics*, it is to state a belief on the basis of which it will be clear that [the opponent] has not [validly] deduced or that he has assumed something false.[826]

Since, though, there are three things that should be examined in a systematic way where a speech is concerned, let this much be said about paradigms, maxims, enthymemes, and |1403^{a}35|, in general, about matters concerning the thought, and the bases on which we are well-equipped with these and |**1403^{b}1**| the ways we refute them.[827] It remains to go through style and arrangement.[828]

{112} Book III |1403^{b}5|

III 1

There are three things that should be systematically treated where a speech is concerned, first, what its means of persuasion will be based on; second, matters concerning its style; and third, matters concerning how the parts of the speech should be arranged. Now the means of persuasion have already been spoken about and how many things they are based on, namely, that they are based on three, and what sort these are, and why there are only these.[829] (For |1403^{b}10| all judges are persuaded either because they themselves are affected in a certain way, or because they take the speakers to have certain qualities, or because something has been demonstrated.[830]) And enthymemes too have been spoken about, and the basis on which they should be supplied (for on the one hand there are special topics (*eidos*) for enthymemes and on the other [general] topics).[831] So the next thing to speak about is style. For it is not enough |1403^{b}15| to have things one should say, but also necessary to have a way in which one should say them, and this contributes much to a speech's (*logos*) appearing to have a certain quality.

The first thing to be inquired into in accord with nature was just the one that naturally comes first, namely, the basis on which the things at issue themselves have persuasiveness; second is the setting out of these by means of a certain style; and third of these |1403^{b}20| is something the capacity of which is very great, but has not yet been systematically attacked, namely, things having to do with delivery.[832] For delivery was late in making its way even into tragedy and comedy. For at first the poets themselves acted their tragedies. It is clear, then, that there is something of this sort in rhetoric too, as there is in poetics, which is just |1403^{b}25| what some others have busied themselves about, among them Glaucon of Teos.[833]

Delivery lies in the voice, and how it should be used in relation to each feeling (that is, sometimes loud, sometimes soft or intermediate), how the tones should be used (that is, high, low, or intermediate), and what rhythms to use in relation to each. For there are three things that

such people investigate, |1403[b]30| which are, volume, harmony, and rhythm.[834] And those who use these are pretty much the ones who win the rewards in competitions. And just as actors have greater capacity to do so than poets nowadays, so it is too in political debates, due to the depravity of the citizens.[835]

A craft concerned with delivery has not yet been contrived, since even |1403[b]35| one concerning style was late in emerging. And it seems to {113} be something vulgar, when correctly considered.[836] But since the whole business of rhetoric is related to belief, |**1404[a]1**| one should pay the requisite attention to delivery, not because it is something just, but because it is something compulsory, since the just thing at any rate is to seek nothing more in a speech than that it neither pain nor gladden.[837] For it is just to contend by means of |1404[a]5| the things at issue themselves, so that other things, which are outside the demonstration, are superfluous.[838] Nevertheless, delivery's capacity is great, as has been said, because of the depravity of the listener.[839]

Matters of style, however, are a small necessary part in all teaching.[840] For to speak in one way rather than another does make some difference in relation to making things clear, although not so great a one; |1404[a]10| on the contrary, all this is appearance, and appeals to the listener, so no one teaches geometry this way.[841]

Whenever that [, namely, style,] does come up it will do the same thing as the craft of delivery, and some people have tried to say a little about it—for example, Thrasymachus in his *Appeals to Pity*.[842] But what concerns delivery is a natural thing, and largely outside the province of craft, |1404[a]15| while what concerns style is within the province of craft.[843] That is why, again, those who are capable in it receive rewards, just as orators do for their delivery. For written speeches are stronger due to their style than due to their thought.[844]

It was naturally the poets, then, who first got it going.[845] |1404[a]20| For names are imitations, and the voice, the most imitative of all our parts, was there to start with.[846] That is why the crafts were set up of rhapsodizing, delivery, and of course others.[847] And since the poets, though saying something simpleminded, seemed to acquire their reputation because of |1404[a]25| the style, a poetic style [of writing] first came about—for example, that of Gorgias.[848] And even now the majority of the uneducated still think that such people discuss things in the most

nobly beautiful way.[849] This is not so, however, but rather the style characteristic of speech is distinct from that characteristic of poetry.[850] This is shown from what happened. For not even the tragic poets still use it in the same way, |1404^{a}30| but just as they changed from tetrameters to iambic meter because, of all the various meters, it is most like [ordinary] speech, so they have also given up using names contrary to ordinary ways of speaking, and the ones with which the first poets ornamented their verses, and which the writers of hexameters still use even now.[851] That is why it is ridiculous |1404^{a}35| to imitate those who no longer use style in that way.

So it is clear that we need not speak in an exact way about whatever matters have to do with style, but only those having to do with what we are discussing. The former is spoken about in the *Poetics*.[852]

{114} III 2

Let the matters just discussed be regarded as theoretically grasped, and let virtue of a style |**1404^{b}1**| be to be perspicuous (for speech is a sort of sign and if it does not make things clear it will not perform its function), and neither low nor too elevated, but appropriate.[853] For a poetic style, though presumably not low, is not appropriate for a speech.

In the case of nouns and verbs |1404^{b}5| it is the prevalent ones that make a speech perspicuous, whereas the other names spoken about in the *Poetics* make it not low but ornamented, since to deviate from them gives it an appearance of greater dignity.[854] For human beings feel the same in relation to style as they do in relation to strangers and fellow citizens. That is why one should give one's ordinary way of speaking |1404^{b}10| an air of unfamiliarity.[855] For people find wondrous what is far away, and what is wondrous is pleasant.

Now in poetry of all sorts there are many ways of producing this effect, and they are fitting there, since the account is about things and people that are more out of the ordinary. But in prose speech they are much less so, since the subject matter is less so, and since even in poetry it would be inappropriate if a slave |1404^{b}15| or a very young person were to use nobly beautiful language, or if it were used about very minor things.[856] But even in these cases what is appropriate is a matter of lowering or elevating.[857] That is why doing it should be concealed, and one should not seem to speak in an artificial way but in a natural one. For

the latter is persuasive, whereas the former is the contrary, since, as with someone setting a trap for them, people resent it, |1404^{b}20| just as they do spiked wines.[858] An example is the effect of Theodorus' voice in comparison to that of other actors.[859] For his seems to be that of the character speaking, whereas theirs seems alien to it. One conceals well if one composes one's speech by choosing from ordinary ways of speaking. This is just what Euripides does, and he first set the example. |1404^{b}25|

A speech is composed of names and verbs, and the kinds (*eidos*) of names are those we got a theoretical grasp on in the *Poetics*, and of these, exotic names, double ones, and neologisms should be used rarely and on rare occasions (where, we shall say later; why has already been stated: |1404^{b}30| it deviates from what is appropriate in the direction of excess).[860] But what is prevalent, what is in proper form, and metaphor are alone useful in the style characteristic of prose speeches.[861] A sign of this is that these are the only ones that everyone uses. For everyone makes use of metaphors, of what is in proper form, and of prevalent words in discussion. So it is clear that if one composes a speech well, there will be |1404^{b}35| an air of unfamiliarity to it, its composition will possibly {115} be concealed, and it will be perspicuous. This, we said, is the virtue of rhetorical speech.[862] The sorts of names that are useful to a sophist, by contrast, are homonyms (for it is through these that he argues unfairly), and to a poet, synonyms.[863] By words that are both prevalent and synonymous I mean, for example, "go" and "walk" (for these two |**1405^{a}1**| are both prevalent and synonymous).

What each of these is, and how many kinds (*eidos*) of metaphor there are, and that its capacity both in poetry and in speeches is great, has been stated, as was said before, in the |1405^{a}5| *Poetics*.[864] But in a speech one should lavish more loving attention on them, inasmuch as a speech has fewer resources to assist it than verse. Perspicuity plus pleasantness plus an air of unfamiliarity are most of all possessed by metaphor, and [the use of] metaphor cannot be acquired from anyone else.[865] But the epithets and metaphors |1405^{a}10| used in speaking should be fitting.[866] And this will be based on analogy—otherwise, it will be evidently inappropriate, because contraries are most evident when set side by side.[867] Instead, one should look to see what is appropriate to an old man as a red cloak is to a young one (for the same clothes are not appropriate to both).[868] And if one wishes to honor, one should take one's metaphor from better things

belonging in the same genus, |1405[a]15| and if to blame, from worse ones.[869] I mean, for example, since they are contraries in the same genus, saying of the one who begs that he "prays," or of the one who prays that he "begs," because both are sorts of solicitation, is a case of doing this.[870] As also is when Iphicrates called Callias a "begging priest" instead of a "torchbearer" and the latter replied that Iphicrates must be uninitiated into the Mysteries himself |1405[a]20| or he would not have called him a begging priest but a torchbearer.[871] For both epithets have to with a god, but one is a term of honor and the other of dishonor. And the one [who called actors] "flatterers of Dionysus," whereas they call themselves "artists."[872] These epithets are both metaphors, the first of which disparages, while the second does the contrary.[873] Also, pirates call themselves "purveyors" |1405[a]25| nowadays—which is why one can say that the person who has done an injustice has "made an error," or that the one making an error has "done an injustice," and that a thief either "received" or "carried away."[874] A phrase like that in Euripides' *Telephus*,

Holding sway over the oar and landing in Mysia,

is inappropriate, since "holding sway" is more elevated than the worth [of what it refers to]—hence, no concealment.[875] |1405[a]30|

{116} There is an error in syllables too if they are not signs of pleasant voiced sounds. For example, Dionysius the Brazen in his elegies calls poetry "Calliope's screech," since both are voiced sounds; but the metaphor, by [using] meaningless voiced sounds, is bad.[876]

Further, metaphors should not be far-fetched, but rather should be transferred, in the form of names, from things that are of the same genus and same species to what is nameless, |1405[a]35| so that as soon as the name is uttered it is clear that it is of the same genus—as, for example, in the well-regarded riddle,

I saw a man gluing bronze onto a man using fire. |**1405[b]1**|

For the process is nameless, but both are a sort of application. Accordingly, the author of the riddle called the application of the cupping instrument "gluing."[877] And, in general, from good riddles it is possible to get decent metaphors. For metaphors imply riddles, so that it is clear that the metaphorical transfer will be a good one.[878]

And |1405[b]5| it should be from nobly beautiful things. And noble beauty in names, as Licymnius says, lies in the voiced sound or in the thing signified, and ugliness is the same way.[879]

Further, and thirdly, there is what refutes the sophistical argument. For it is not as Bryson said that nobody uses shameful language, if indeed the same thing is signified by saying this word instead of that.[880] In fact, this is false. |1405^{b}10| For one may be more prevalent than another, more like the thing, or more properly belonging to it, by setting the thing at issue before the eyes.[881] Further, this word may not have the same way of signifying as that one, so that on this ground too one must be posited as more nobly beautiful or more shameful than the other. For while both signify what is nobly beautiful or shameful, they do not do so insofar as it is nobly beautiful or insofar as it is |1405^{b}15| shameful, or, if they both do so, one does it more and the other less.

These are the sources from which metaphors may be got: from the nobly beautiful either in voiced sound or in capacity, or to sight or to some other sort of perception.[882] It makes a difference, for example, whether one says "rosy-fingered dawn" rather than "purple-fingered," or still worse, "red-fingered."[883]

In the case of epithets too, |1405^{b}20| the application is made from what is bad or shameful, for example, "mother-slayer," and from what is better, for example, "father-avenger."[884] And Simonides, when the winner in a mule-race offered him a small fee, was unwilling to produce [a celebratory ode], as being disgusted at producing one about "half-asses," but when the winner paid enough, |1405^{b}25| he wrote:

{117} Hail daughters of storm-footed mares.

And yet they were daughters of the asses too.[885]

And, again, the same is true of the use of diminutives. The use of diminutives, though, makes both the bad and the good less so, as Aristophanes jibes |1405^{b}30| in the *Babylonians*, when he uses "gold-let" instead of "gold," "cloak-let" instead of "cloak," "abuse-let" instead of "abuse," and "disease-let" instead of "disease."[886] But one should watch closely and carefully observe moderation in both [epithets and diminutives].

III 3

Frozen effects, on the other hand, come about in four ways with regard to style: [1] First, in |1405^{b}35| double names—for example, Lycophron's "many-faced heaven of the mighty-summited earth" and "narrow-passaged shore"; or like the name given by Gorgias, "oath-breaking and oath-keeping beggar-mused-flatterers"; or like Alcidamas,

"his soul |**1406ª1**| filled with wrath and his face growing flame-colored," and he thought their eagerness would be "end-accomplishing," made the persuasion of his words (*logos*) "end-accomplishing," and the sea bed "indigo-blue."[887] All of these appear poetic |1406ª5| because of the doubling. This is one cause of frozenness.

[2] Another one is the use of exotic names, as when Lycophron calls Xerxes a "*pelôron* [monstrous] man" and Sciron a "*sinis* [destroying] man," and Alcidamas of "*athurma* [toys] in poetry," "the *atasthalia* [wretchedness] of his nature," and "*tethêgmenon* [whetted] with the unmixed anger of his thought."[888]

[3] A third lies in the use of epithets |1406ª10| that are long, or inopportune, or too frequent.[889] For in poetry it is appropriate to say "milk white," but in a speech it is not only less appropriate, but also, if such things are used to excess, it puts it to the test and makes it plain that it is a poetic production.[890] Epithets must of course be used to some extent (for they deviate from what is customary and give the style an air of unfamiliarity), but |1406ª15| one should aim at moderation, since otherwise it does greater evil than speaking extemporaneously (for while the latter does not achieve the good, the former does achieve the bad).[891]

That is why Alcidamas' epithets appear frozen. For he uses epithets not as seasonings but as the main course, so frequent, long, and conspicuous are they. For example: not sweat but "the moist |1406ª20| sweat"; not to the Isthmian games, but "to the festal assembly of the Isthmian games"; not laws but "laws, the kings of cities"; not by running but "by a running {118} impulse of the soul"; not a school of the Muses but "a school of the Muses inherited from nature"; and "the melancholic meditation of his soul"; |1406ª25| the craftsman not of favor but of "all-popular favor"; and "household steward of the listeners' pleasure"; and concealed not with "boughs" but with "boughs of wood"; and not he covered his body but "his body's shame"; and "closely imitating (*antimimon*) the soul's appetite (*epithuminan*)" (this is at the same time using a double name and an epithet, |1406ª30| so the result is a poetic production); and "so extravagant an excess of depravity." That is why, by speaking poetically, people produce, because of inappropriateness, something ridiculous and frozen, and, because of babbling, something lacking in perspicuousness.[892] For when a speaker heaps words on

someone who already knows, he dissolves the perspicuousness by casting a shadow over it.

Human beings use the double names they do when |1406[a]35| something is nameless and the word (*logos*) is easily put together, as in "pastime (*to chronotribein*)." But if it is overdone, it becomes an entirely poetic production. That is why a style using double names is most useful |**1406[b]1**| to dithyrambic poets (for they are noisy); exotic names to epic poets (for the style is dignified and self-secure); and metaphor to iambic poets (for they [tragic poets] now use iambics, as was said).[893]

[4] And further, a fourth sort of frozen effect is found in metaphors. |1406[b]5| For there are also inappropriate metaphors, some because they are ridiculous (for comic poets use metaphors too), some because they are overly dignified and tragic. And, if far-fetched, they lack perspicuousness. For example, Gorgias' "things green and bloodless," or "you have shamefully sown and badly reaped" |1406[b]10| (for these are overly poetic).[894] And as Alcidamas called philosophy "a fortress against the law," and the *Odyssey* "a nobly beautiful mirror of human life" and "introducing no such toys to poetry" (for all these are unpersuasive because of what was stated).[895] As for what Gorgias said to the swallow, when she flew down |1406[b]15| and let fall her droppings on him, it was in the best of tragic styles, since he said, "Shame on you, Philomela." For, though shameful for a maiden, if a bird did it, it was not shameful.[896] He well-rebuked her by calling her what she was, then, but not what she is.

III 4

A simile is also a metaphor.[897] For the difference is small. |1406[b]20| For when the poet says of Achilles, "He rushed on like a lion," it is a simile, when "a lion, he rushed on," it is a metaphor (for because both are courageous, he used a metaphor and called Achilles "a lion").[898] The simile is useful in a speech too, but on occasion, since it is poetic. And similes are to {119} be got in just the way metaphors are.[899] |1406[b]25| In fact they are metaphors, but differing in the way they are stated.[900]

Examples of similes are: What Androtion said about Idreus, that he was "similar to mongrels let off the chain" (for as they run to bite, so Idreus, let off his chains, was dangerous).[901] And Theodamus likened Archidamus to a "Euxenus without a scientific knowledge |1406[b]30| of geometry" (this is by analogy, since Euxenus will then be a geometry--

knowing Archidamus).[902] And the one in Plato's *Republic*, that those who strip the dead [of their weapons] are like mongrels who bite at stones but do not attack the throwers; or the one applied to the people, that it is similar to a ship owner who is strong but |1406^{b}35| deaf; or the one applied to the verses of the poets, that they are like those who are in the bloom of youth but lack beauty (for when the latter have finished blooming and the **|1407^{a}1|** former are dissolved into their elements they do not appear the same).[903] And the one of Pericles about the Samians, that they are like children who take the tasty morsel but go on crying; or about the Boeotians, that they are like holm oaks (for they are felled by holm oaks, and the |1407^{a}5| Boeotians by fighting each other).[904] And Demosthenes' one about the people, that they are similar to those who get seasick on ships.[905] And the way Democritus likened orators to nurses who swallow the baby's tasty morsel and rub his lips with the spit.[906] And the way Antisthenes likened the thin Cephisodotus |1407^{a}10| to incense, because he gives pleasure by wasting away.[907]

All these can be stated either as similes or as metaphors, so it is clear that whichever ones are popular when stated as metaphors will also be popular as similes, and similes are metaphors in need of a ratio.[908] And a metaphor based on an analogy should always be |1407^{a}15| reciprocally applicable to either of the two things of the same genus—for example, if a wine-saucer is the shield of Dionysus, the shield can be fittingly said to be the wine-saucer of Ares.[909]

A speech, then, is composed of these things.[910]

III 5

The starting-point of style, however, is to speak correct Greek. This consists in five things: [1] First, |1407^{a}20| in the use of connectives, which should be introduced in the natural order of coming before or after each other that some of them require—for example, as *ho men* and *ho egô men* require *de* and *ho de*.[911] And they should be correlatively introduced while the listeners still remember the correlation, and the two should neither be too far apart, nor should [another] connective be introduced before the connective |1407^{a}25| that is necessary. For this is rarely appropriate: {120} "But I, on the one hand (*men*), since he spoke to me, for Cleon came begging and praying, set out, taking them with me." In cases like this, many connectives are thrown in [before] the correlative

one is introduced, and if what is intermediate includes many [connectives] before the conveyed one, it lacks perspicuousness.[912]

In one case, then, |1407[a]30| good style consists in the use of connectives, whereas in [2] a second consists in calling things by their special names and not by encompassing ones.[913] [3] A third is not to use ambiguities, unless by using them, you deliberately choose to achieve the contrary effect [namely, obscurity], which is just what people do when they have nothing to say, yet pretend to say something (in fact, such people say it in verse, just as Empedocles does).[914] |1407[a]35| For by much going around in circles it tricks the listeners, and they feel just the way that many do about oracles, since when oracles speak ambiguously, they also assent—

> Croesus, by crossing the Halys, will dissolve a great empire.[915]

And because there is generally less chance of an error, |**1407[b]1**| oracles speak of the thing at issue in general (*genos*) terms. For in a game of odd-or-even one is more likely to win by saying "odd" or "even" rather than how many it is, or that "it will be" rather than when, which is why soothsayers never add the when.[916] All these things, then, are alike, and so —except |1407[b]5| for the sake of the sort of thing we mentioned— should be avoided.

[4] A fourth is to follow Protagoras' division of the kinds (*genos*) of names into masculine, feminine, and neuter.[917] For these too should be introduced correctly: "She, having come and having spoken, went away."[918] [5] A fifth consists in the correct naming of many, few, and one: "They, having come, beat me."[919] |1407[b]10|

In general, what is written should be easy to read and easy to speak, which is the same thing. Now, this quality is just what the many connectives do not possess, nor do the writings that are not easy to punctuate—for example, those of Heraclitus.[920] For to punctuate Heraclitus' writings takes work because it is unclear what word goes with what, the preceding one or the following one. For |1407[b]15| at the start of his written composition he says:

> Of this *logos*' being forever do human beings prove to be uncomprehending.

For it is unclear whether "forever" goes with what proceeds [or what follows].[921] Further, the following produces solecism: not introducing, when you join words, what is appropriate for both—for example, if [you

{121} are introducing] sound and color "seeing" is not common, whereas |1407^{b}20| "perceiving" is common.[922] And lack of perspicuousness results if you do not set out your thesis beforehand, if you are going to throw in many things in the middle—for example, "I was in fact, after speaking to that man, going blah, blah, blah, to go for a walk," instead of "I was in fact going, after speaking, to go for a walk, then blah, blah, blah happened." |1407^{b}25|

III 6

To the weight of a style, the following things contribute: [1] Using the account instead of the name—for example, not "circle" but "a plane figure that extends equally from the center."[923] To concision, doing the contrary: the name instead of the account. And if something is shameful or inappropriate, if what is shameful is in the account, using the name in speaking, but if it is in the name, |1407^{b}30| using the account. [2] - Making things clear by means of metaphors and epithets, while guarding against the poetic. [3] Making the singular plural, just as the poets do. For they say, though there is only one harbor,

> to the Achaean harbors,

and

> Here are my tablet's many-leaved folds.[924] |1407^{b}35|

[4] Not joining two names [under one article], but introducing a single one for each—for example, "the woman, the one that is mine"—and, when speaking concisely, doing the contrary: "the woman of mine." [5] Speaking with a conjunction, and, if speaking concisely, doing the contrary, although without ungrammatical asyndeton—for example, "having walked over and having spoken" and "having walked over, I spoke."[925] [6] The practice of Antimachus |**1408^{a}1**| is also useful, namely, speaking on the basis of what the thing does not possess, as he does in the case of Teumessos,

> There is a windy little hill . . .[926]

Amplification of this sort can go on without limit. And it is available in the case of good things and bad things that are not possessed, whichever is useful. |1408^{a}5| It is from this too that the poets get names, such as, "string-less and lyre-less music," since they get them from things that {122} are lacked. For this is popular when using proportional metaphors in speaking—for example, saying that the trumpet is "lyre-less music."[927]

III 7

The style will have appropriateness if it expresses feeling as well as |1408[a]10| character and is proportional to the underlying things at issue.[928] And it is proportional if it neither speaks off-handedly about weighty things nor in a dignified way about worthless ones, and if no ornamental epithet is attached to a worthless name.[929] Otherwise, it has the appearance of comedy, like what Cleophon produces, since some of the things he said were like saying "Milady |1408[a]15| fig."[930]

Style [appropriately] expresses feeling, if wanton aggression is the thing at issue, when it is that of an angry person; if impious or shameful things, when it is that of one who is disgusted and reluctant even to speak of them; if praiseworthy things, admiringly; but if they are pitiable, in a lowly way; and similarly in the other cases. And the proper style too makes the thing at issue be persuasive. For the soul draws a false inference |1408[a]20| as to the truthfulness of the speaker, because, in the case of such things, they feel the same way, so that, even if the things at issue are not as the speaker says, they think they are that way. In fact, the listeners always feel the same things as a speaker who speaks with [appropriate] feeling, even if he says nothing.[931] That is why many speakers overwhelm their listeners by shouting.[932]

The sort of showing that is |1408[a]25| based on signs is also expressive of character, when what is appropriate to each kind (*genos*) and state [of character] follows along with it. By kind I mean in accord with stage of life (for example, boy, man, old man), woman or man, Spartan or Thessalian; by states, the ones in accord with which someone is of a certain sort in life.[933] For lives are not of the same sort in accord with every state. If, then, a person speaks using names |1408[a]30| that also properly belong to a state, he will convey the [relevant] character. For a boorish and a well-educated person would not say the same things or would not say them in the same way.[934]

Listeners' feelings are also affected by expressions that professional speechwriters use immoderately: "who does not know?" "everybody knows." For a listener agrees out of shame, in order also to share in the very thing |1408[a]35| all the others do.

Opportune or inopportune use is common to all |**1408[b]1**| the kinds (*eidos*).[935] A cure for every excess, though, is the oft-repeated one: the

speaker himself should add criticism [of it], since something seems true when even the one making the speech does not conceal what he is doing.[936] {123} Further, not using all the proportionalities at the same time (for this way the listener is deceived).[937] |1408^{b}5| I mean, for example, if the names are harsh, the voice, countenance, and the other appropriate things should not also be harsh.[938] Otherwise, what each of them is becomes evident. But if one is used, but not another, the speaker does the same thing, but escapes notice. But if, then, gentle things are said [too] harshly and harsh things [too] gently, it becomes unpersuasive.[939] |1408^{b}10|

Double names, a number of epithets, and especially unfamiliar names are fitting for anyone speaking in a way expressive of feeling. For sympathetic consideration is shown to an angry person for saying that an evil is "cosmic-sized" or "gargantuan."[940] And they are also appropriate when the speaker already has hold of the listeners and, by his [words of] praise or blame, anger or love, has produced ecstasies of feeling in them, as Isocrates does at the end of the *Panegyricus*: "fame and name . . ." and |1408^{b}15| "in that they endured. . . ."[941] For people do utter such things when they are in an ecstasy of feeling, so that the listeners, being themselves in a similar condition, are clearly receptive of them. That is why these things are also fitting for poetry, since poetry is god-inspired. They should be used, then, in the way described, or with self-deprecation, as Gorgias did, or as in the *Phaedrus*.[942] |1408^{b}20|

III 8

The scheme of the style should be neither metrical nor rhythmless.[943] For the former is unpersuasive (for it seems fabricated), and at the same time also diverts attention, since it makes the listener attend to the similar cadence and its next occurrence—just as children anticipate the answer to the herald's, "Who does the emancipated slave choose as his sponsor?" |1408^{b}25| with "Cleon!"[944] But what is rhythmless is unlimited, whereas a speech should be limited, although not by meter, since what is unlimited is displeasing and unknowable.[945] All things, though, are limited by number.[946] And the number of the scheme of a style is a rhythm, of which the meters are segments.[947] That is why a speech should have rhythm, but not meter |1408^{b}30| (for then it will be a poem).[948] Its rhythm, though, should not be exactly implemented; and this will be if it is rhythmical only up to a point.

Of the rhythms, the heroic is dignified, but deficient in the harmony suited to speaking.[949] The iambic is the very style of ordinary people (which is why of all the meters it is most used in speaking), whereas style [in a speech] needs to be dignified and |1408^{b}35| removed from common usage.[950] The trochaic is too much like comic dancing, as is clear from [trochaic] tetrameters (for tetrameter is a dancing rhythm). |**1409^{a}1**| What remains is the paean, which came into use starting with Thrasymachus, although he and {124} his followers could not state what it was.[951] The paean is a third rhythm, closely connected to those already mentioned, since it has the ratio three to two, whereas the others are one to one or two to one.[952] |1409^{a}5| And one-and-a-half is closely connected to these, and this is what the paean is.[953]

Now, the other rhythms should be avoided because of what we mentioned and because they are metrical, whereas the paean should be adopted. For it alone of the rhythms mentioned is not a meter, so that it most of all escapes notice.[954] As things stand, however, only one sort of paean is used, both at the start |1409^{a}10| and at the end. But the start should differ from the end. For there are two kinds (*eidos*) of paean that are opposite to each other, of which one is appropriate as a start (as it is in fact used). This is the kind that starts with a long syllable, and ends with three short ones:

Dālŏgĕnĕs eite Lukian

and

khrūsĕŏkŏma Hekate pai Dios.[955]

The other is the contrary, |1409^{a}15| where three shorts start, and a long ends:

mĕtă dĕ gān hŭdată t' ōkĕănŏn ēphănĭsĕ nūx.[956]

This produces an ending. For a short syllable, because of its incompleteness, produces something docked.[957] Instead it should be brought to an abrupt close with a long syllable, and the end clearly marked, not by the scribe nor by |1409^{a}20| a marginal mark, but by the rhythm.[958]

That the style, then, should be rhythmical, not un-rhythmical, and what rhythms make it rhythmical and what they are like, has been stated.[959]

III 9

The style is necessarily either continuous and united by connective, like the preludes in dithyrambs, |1409[a]25| or compact and like the antistrophes of the ancient poets.[960]

The continuous style is the ancient one (for previously all used it, but nowadays not many do).[961] By continuous I mean one that has no intrinsic end, except by the discussion of the thing at issue |1409[a]30| having been completed. It is displeasing because it is unlimited.[962] For all wish to have the end in view. That is why runners lose their breath and relax {125} when they reach the end.[963] For they do not flag before that because of seeing the limit-point ahead of them. This, then, is the continuous style.

The compact style, by contrast, is the one in periods. And by a period I mean |1409[a]35| a style having an intrinsic starting-point and end-point, and a magnitude easily surveyed as a whole.[964] This is pleasing and easily learned. |**1409[b]1**| It is pleasing, because it is contrary to the unlimited one and because, being limited, the listener always thinks he has got hold of something for himself, whereas neither to foresee nor get to an end is displeasing. And it is easily learned because easily remembered, and this is so because a periodic style has a number, |1409[b]5| which is the most easily remembered thing of all.[965] That is why everyone remembers things in verse better than those in prose. For it has a number by which it is measured. And the period should also be completed in thought and not broken off, as in the iambic line of Sophocles:

Calydon is this land, of Pelops' soil . . .[966] |1409[b]10|

For the division makes it possible to suppose the contrary, as in the case we mentioned, that Calydon is in the Peloponnese.[967]

A period is either divided into clauses or smooth.[968] A style consisting in clauses is completed, divided, and easily uttered in a breath, not by means of [arbitrary] division, |1409[b]15| but as a whole.[969] A clause is one of the two parts of this.[970] I call a period smooth when it has only one clause. And both clauses and periods should be neither truncated nor too long. For a short one often jolts the listener. For when he is still being impelled onward, namely, by the measure, of which he has a defining mark within himself, |1409[b]20| if he is pulled up short by the speaker's pausing, he is necessarily made to stumble, as it were, due to the abrupt pause.[971] Those, on the other hand, that are too long make him feel left behind, like walkers who go past the turning-point, since they too leave

behind their fellow walkers.[972] Similarly, periods that are too long become a [whole] speech that is like a rambling [dithyrambic] prelude. |1409^{b}25| The result is what Democritus of Chios jibed at in Melanippides, who instead of antistrophes composed [dithyrambic] preludes:

> A man does bad things to himself in doing bad things to another,
>
> But a long dithyrambic prelude does the worst one to the composer himself.[973]

For the same applies to those who speak in long clauses.[974] |1409^{b}30| But those that are too short do not turn into a period, and, accordingly, they drag the listener stumbling along.[975]

{126} A style consisting in clauses is either divided or opposed. An example of a divided one is: "I have often admired those who organized assemblies and established athletic contests."[976] |1409^{b}35| It is opposed when in each clause contrary is brought into relation with contrary or when the same [word] is yoked together with the |**1410^{a}1**| contraries.[977] For example: "They profited both, both those who stayed and those who followed; for the latter they gained more than they had at home, and for the former they left enough behind"—the contraries are staying and following, enough and more.[978] "So both |1410^{a}5| to those needing [to get] things and those wishing to enjoy them . . ."—enjoying and getting are contraries.[979] And, further: "It often happens in these circumstances that the practically-wise fail and the not practically-wise succeed"; "They were straightaway thought worthy of the prizes of valor, and not much later they took the command of the sea"; |1410^{a}10| "To sail through the land and march through the sea, bridging the Hellespont and digging through Athos"; "And though citizens by nature, by law deprived of the city"; "For though some of them miserably perished, others were shamefully saved"; "Privately using [only] barbarians as household slaves, while communally |1410^{a}15| overlooking their many enslaved allies"; "Either to possess when alive or to bequeath when dead."[980] Also, what someone said against Peitholaus and Lycophron in court: "And these men, though they used to sell you when they were at home, have come to you here to buy you off."[981] For all these do what has been said. And |1410^{a}20| such a style is pleasing, because contraries are most knowable, and are more knowable when side by side, and because they are like

deductions, since refutation consists in a bringing together of opposites.[982]

Antithesis, then, is of this sort. Equalization (*parisôsis*) is if the clauses are equal [in the number of syllables], and unison (*paromoiôsis*),
if each of the two clauses has a similar extremity; |1410ª25| but it must have this either at the start or at the end. And at the start it is always found in [similar] names, whereas at the end it may be found in the last syllable, the inflection of the same name, or the same name. At the start in such cases as:

Agron gar elaben argon par' autou, |1410ª30|

and

Dôrêtoi t' epelonto pararrêtoi t' epeessin.[983]

At the end:

Ô[i]êthês an auton ou paidion tetokenai, all' auton paidion gegonenai

{127} and

En pleistais de phrontisi kai en elachistais elpisin.[984]

Inflexion of the same name:

Axioi de stathênai chalkous, ouk axios ôn chalkou.[985]

The same name:

Su d' auton |1410ª35| *kai zônta eleges kakôs kai nun grapheis kakôs.*[986]

The same syllable:

Ti an epathes deinon, ei andr' eides argon?[987]

And it is possible for the same clause to have all these at the same time, namely, for the same one to be a case of antithesis, |**1410ᵇ1**| equalization and similarity of ending.[988]

The starts of periods have been pretty much enumerated in the *Theodectes*.[989] And there are also false antitheses—for example, the one Epicharmus wrote:

Toka men en tênôn egôn ên, toka de para tênois egôn.[990] |1410ᵇ5|

III 10

Since determinations have been made about these things, we must next state the sources of elegant and popular expressions.[991] Well, to produce them is a matter for natural cleverness or training; to show what

they are, on the other hand, is a matter for this methodical inquiry.[992] Let us say what they are, then, and enumerate them completely, and let the following be for us a starting-point.

To learn easily is in fact by nature pleasant to everyone, |1410^{b}10| and names signify something, so whichever names produce learning in us are pleasantest. Exotic names are unknown, whereas we [already] know the prevalent ones.[993] Metaphor, by contrast, most of all produces learning.[994] For when he says that old age is "stubble," he produces learning and knowledge through the genus, since both old age and stubble are [in the genus of] things that have finished blooming.[995] |1410^{b}15| The similes of the poets also do the same thing. That is why, if they do it well, they appear elegant. For a simile, as was said earlier, is a metaphor {128} differing in how it is set out.[996] That is why it is less pleasing, namely, because it is longer, and because it does not say that this *is* that, and so the [listener's] soul does not inquire into it.[997]

Necessarily, then, both in style and in enthymemes, |1410^{b}20| the ones that are popular are those that produce rapid learning in us. That is why superficial enthymemes are not popular (by superficial I mean those that are entirely clear and there is no need to inquire into), and neither are those that are unknown when stated.[998] Instead, the ones that are popular are those of which there is knowledge at the same time as they are stated (even if it did not exist previously), or the thought |1410^{b}25| is apprehended a little later.[999] For then some sort of learning takes place, in the other case neither [sort of learning] takes place.[1000] In terms of the thought belonging to what is spoken, then, enthymemes of this sort are popular. In terms of the style, on the other hand, it is popular because of its scheme, if it is expressed in an oppositional way (for example, "considering that the peace common to the others was a war against their own private interests"—where |1410^{b}30| peace is opposed to war), and because of names, if these contain a metaphor, provided it is neither strange (for then it is difficult to comprehend) nor superficial (for then it makes no impression).[1001] Further, setting things before the eyes [is popular] (for things should be seen as being done rather than as being in prospect).[1002] One should therefore aim at these three things: metaphor, |1410^{b}35| antithesis, activity.[1003]

Of the four sorts of metaphor, the most popular |**1411^{a}1**| are those by analogy, as when Pericles said that the youth killed in the war vanished

from the city as if the spring had been taken from the year.[1004] Leptines speaking about the Spartans, said that he would not allow [the Athenians] to look on |1411ª5| while Greece "became one-eyed."[1005] And when Chares was eager to have his accounts for the Olynthian war inspected, Cephisodotus indignantly exclaimed that he was trying to have his accounts inspected while "squeezing the people's throat."[1006] And once, exhorting the Athenians, he said that they should march out to Euboea, and there provide themselves with supplies |1411ª10| "by the decree of Miltiades."[1007] When the Athenians had made a truce with the Epidaurus and the neighboring coasts, Iphicrates, indignant, said that "they had stripped themselves of provisions [for the journey] of the war."[1008] Peitholaus called the Paralian "the people's bludgeon" and Sestus "the corn seller's board of the Piraeus."[1009] Pericles urged the removal of Aegina, "the |1411ª15| eyesore of the Piraeus." Moerocles said he was no more wicked than X (naming one of the decent people), since that person was wicked at thirty-three and a third percent interest, he himself at ten.[1010] Anaxandrides' iambic line about the daughters who were slow in marrying:

{129} The maidens, I find, are past their marriages' due date.[1011]
|1411ª20|

That of Polyeuctus to a certain Speusippus, who was a paralytic, that he could not keep quiet, though "shackled by fortune in a five-holed pillory of disease."[1012] Cephisodotus called triremes "multi-colored millstones," and the Cynic called taverns the "communal messes of Attica."[1013] Aesion said that the Athenians had "drained" their city into Sicily |1411ª25| (for this is a metaphor and sets things before the eyes).[1014] And his "so Greece cried aloud" is also in a way a metaphor and sets things before the eyes. Cephisodotus urged the Athenians not to hold their "race meetings" too often.[1015] And Isocrates spoke of those who "race together" in the general assemblies.[1016] And |1411ª30| the example in the Funeral Oration, that "it is fitting for Greece to cut off her hair [in mourning] beside the tomb of those who died at Marathon, since together with their virtue freedom was buried."[1017] For if the speaker had said that it was proper to shed tears since their virtue was being buried together with them, it would have been a metaphor and set things before the eyes, but "with virtue freedom" involves an antithesis.[1018] And when Iphicrates **|1411ᵇ1|** said "The route of my words (*logos*) is though the

middle of Chares' actions," it was a metaphor by analogy, and "through the middle of" set things before the eyes.[1019] To say "Summoning dangers to help with dangers" is a setting before |1411^{b}5| the eyes and a metaphor.[1020] Lycoleon said in defense of Chabrias, "They did not even feel shame before his supplicant—the bronze statue [over there]."[1021] For this was a metaphor at that time, but not at all time, although it set things before the eyes, since when Chabrias was in danger, the statue —"the inanimate yet animate" memorial of his works for the city— supplicated.[1022] |1411^{b}10| And "in every way practicing smallness of soul" (for to practice is to increase something).[1023] That "the god kindled the understanding as a light in the soul" (for both understanding and light make something clear).[1024] "For we are not putting an end to our wars, but rather postponing them" (for both postponing and a peace of this sort are putting off).[1025] |1411^{b}15| That "treaties are a much nobler trophy than those that come about in wars, since the latter concerns small gains and a single stroke of luck, whereas treaties concern the whole war" (for both treaties and trophies are signs of victory).[1026] And that "cities pay a heavy inspection-based fine with the blame of human beings" (for an inspection-based |1411^{b}20| fine is a sort of legal blame).[1027]

That elegant expressions are based on metaphors by analogy, then, and on setting things before the eyes has been stated.[1028]

{130} III 11

We must now state, though, what we mean by setting things before the eyes and what must be done for this to come about. I mean, then, that things are set before the eyes by whatever signifies them being active —for example, |1411^{b}25| to say that a good man is "foursquare" is a metaphor (for both are complete things), but it does not signify activity, whereas "having his prime of life in full bloom" does signify activity, as does "you, like a sacred animal roaming at will" and

> Thereupon, the Greeks darting forward with their feet.[1029] |1411^{b}30|

"Darting" signifies activity and is a metaphor (for it means "quickly"). And the way Homer often used setting before the eyes, namely, to make inanimate things animate through metaphor. But in all of them it is by producing activity that he wins popularity, as, for example, in the following:

> Downward again to the plain rolled the ruthless stone,

and, "the arrow flew," and, "[the arrow] was eager to fly," and,

> [The spears] stuck in the ground, |**1412ª1**| still longing to take their fill of flesh

and,

> The spear-point sped eagerly though his breast.[1030]

In all of these, because the things are [signified as] animate, there is an appearance of their being active. For "being ruthless," "longing," and the others signify activity. And these he has applied to the things through a metaphor by analogy. |1412ª5| For as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is the shameless person to the one shamefully treated.

Homer does the same to inanimate things in his most popular similes as well:

> Arched, foam-crested, in ranks, one upon another.[1031]

He makes everything into something that moves and lives, and activity is movement.[1032] |1412ª10|

Metaphors, as was said earlier, should be drawn from things that are closely related but not evidently so—as even in philosophy getting a theoretical grasp on the resemblances in things that are very far apart {131} is a matter of good guesswork.[1033] So it was that Archytas said that arbitrator and altar are the same thing (for someone who has suffered an injustice flees to both).[1034] Or if someone were to say that an anchor and a |1412ª15| pothook are the same (for they are the same thing, but they differ with respect to the above and the below).[1035] And the "re-equalization" of cities [signifies] the same thing in cases that are very far apart—the equality is in surface area and the equality is in [political] capacity.[1036]

In most cases elegant expressions are due to metaphors and to accompanying deception.[1037] For it becomes more clear to the listener that he has learned |1412ª20| something new when this is contrary to what he expected, and his soul seems to say, "how true, and I was in error."

For the elegance of epigrams too comes from their not meaning what they say—for example, the one of Steisichorus, that "their cicadas will sing to themselves from the ground."[1038]

And good riddles are pleasing due to the same thing (for learning is involved and they are said by means of a metaphor), |1412ª25| as also are what Theodorus calls "novel expressions."[1039] But this effect comes about

when there is something contradoxical, and not, as he says, something in accord with previous belief.[1040] Instead, it is like the plays on words in jokes.[1041]

Jibes involving a change of letter have just this effect, since they involve deception.[1042] It also occurs in verse, since things may not be |1412ª30| as the listener expected:

He strode along, having on his feet—*chilblains*!

—the listener was expecting sandals.[1043] And it should be clear as soon as it is uttered.[1044] Those involving a change of letter make the speaker mean not what he says, but what he twists the name to mean—for example, Theodorus saying to Nikon the lyre player, *thratt' ei* (for he pretends to mean |1412ª35| *thrattei se* and deceives us, since he means something else).[1045] That is why it is pleasing to the one who learns it, **|1412ᵇ1|** since if the listener does not know that Theodorus is a Thracian, it will not seem elegant.[1046] Also, *Boulei auton persai*.[1047] But both must be said in the way that is fitting.[1048]

Likewise too with elegant expressions.[1049] For example, saying that the *archê* of the sea was not the *archê* of the |1412ᵇ5| evils for the Athenians (for they profited from it), or—as Isocrates said—the *archê* was for the city the *archê* of the evils.[1050] For in both cases what one would not think anyone would say is what is said and is recognized as true. For to say that an *archê* is an *archê* is to say nothing clever, but Isocrates does not {132} mean it that way, but rather in another way, and he denies *archê* not in the sense he has spoken of it, |1412ᵇ10| but in another one.

In all these cases, when the name is introduced in a fitting way, whether by homonymy or metaphor, it is done well.[1051] For example, "*Anaschetos ouk anaschetos*."[1052] The denial is by homonymy, but is used fittingly, if he is displeasing. Also, "Do not make yourself more *xenos* than a *xenos*," or not more than you should be.[1053] And the same with:

The *xenos* should not |1412ᵇ15| always be *xenos*.[1054]

For this too means something foreign [to what it says]. And the same with the much praised line of Anaxandrides:

It is noble to die before doing anything that deserves death.[1055]

For this is the same as saying that someone deserves to die who does not deserve to die, or that someone deserves to die who does not deserve death, |1412ᵇ20| or who has done nothing that deserves death. The form (*eidos*) of the style is the same in these cases, but the briefer and more

oppositional the style, the more popular it is. The cause of this is that learning come about more because of opposition, and faster because of brevity.[1056]

And what is said should always apply in addition to |1412^{b}25| the person addressed and be correctly expressed, if it is going to be true and not superficial, since these may be separate.[1057] For example, "One should die erring in nothing." But it is not elegant.[1058] "A deserving man should marry a deserving woman."[1059] But it is not elegant. But it is elegant if both are present at the same time: "He deserves to die who does not deserve to die." |1412^{b}30| And the more it has of these, the more elegant it appears—for example, if the names are a metaphor, and a metaphor of the relevant sort, and there is antithesis, equalization, and it has activity.[1060]

Popular similes too, as has already been said above, are also in a way popular metaphors.[1061] For they are always stated on the basis of two [relations], |1412^{b}35| just like metaphor by analogy—for example, "the shield," we say, "is the wine-saucer of Ares" and "the bow is a stringless lyre."[1062] |**1413^{a}1**| This way of stating it, then, is not simple, whereas to say that the bow is a lyre or the shield a wine-saucer is simple.[1063] People also make similes in this way—for example, by likening a flute player to an ape, or a shortsighted person to a spluttering oil-lamp (for both contract).[1064] And it is done well when it involves metaphor. |1413^{a}5| For it is possible to liken a shield to "the wine-saucer of Ares" and a ruin to "the rags of a house," {133} and to say that Niceratus is like a "Philoctetes stung by a Pratys"—a simile used by Thrasymachus when he saw Niceratus, after his defeat by Pratys in a rhapsode contest, still long haired and parched.[1065] It is especially in regard to these that |1413^{a}10| poets are hissed off the stage, if they do not make them well, and if they do make them well, that they are popular. I mean when they would introduce a corresponding [metaphor]:

> Like curly celery the legs he wears,

and

> Like Philammon punching his leather bag.[1066]

And all things of this sort are similes.

That similes are metaphors |1413^{a}15| has been stated often.[1067] Proverbs are also metaphors, though from species to species.[1068] For example, if someone brings something into his house, being himself

persuaded that it is good, and then is harmed, it is as "the Carpathian says of the hare" (for both suffered what was described).[1069]

The sources of elegant expressions, then, and the cause due to which |1413ª20| they are such have been pretty much stated.

Popular hyperboles are metaphors too. For example, saying of someone with a black eye that "you would have thought he was a basket of mulberries" (for his eye is somewhat purple, but there is exaggeration in the quantity). And in the phrase "like so-and-so" there is hyperbole that differs in the style:

> Like Philammon punching |1413ª25| his leather bag,

and,

> You would have thought that *he* was Philammon punching his leather bag.[1070]

And,

> Like curly celery the legs he wears,

and,

> You would have thought he had celery for legs, so curly are they.

{134} Hyperboles are characteristic of young people, since they exhibit great exaggeration. |1413ª30| That is why they are most used by those who are angry:

> Not even if he gave me as many gifts as there is sand or dust . . .
> Nor will I marry a daughter of Atreus' son, Agamemnon,
> Not even if she rivals Aphrodite the golden in beauty,
> Or the works of Athena.[1071] |1413ª35|

That is why it is unfitting for an older person to use it. (This [figure of speech] is especially used by |**1413ᵇ1**| Attic orators.[1072])

III 12

One should not overlook the fact, however, that a distinct style is fitting for each kind (*genos*) [of rhetoric]. For the writing style and the debating style are not the same, neither are the style of public oratory and judicial style.[1073] It is necessary, though, [for an orator] to know both. For the craft of debate |1413ᵇ5| implies having a scientific knowledge of how to speak correct Greek, whereas writing implies not being compelled to keep anything silent that one may wish to communicate to others—which is just the condition of those who do not have the scientific knowledge of how to write.[1074]

Writing style is the most exact, whereas debating style is most suited to delivery.[1075] And of the latter there are two kinds (*eidos*). For one kind is expressive of character and the other of feeling. |1413^{b}10| That is why actors too are in pursuit of these sorts of plays, and poets in pursuit of actors of these sorts. But poets who write plays suited to reading are also in demand—for example, Chaeremon (for he is as exact as a professional speechwriter), and, among the dithyrambic poets, Licymnius.[1076] And, when compared, the speeches of the writers appear thin in debates, |1413^{b}15| while those of the orators appear prosaic in the hands.[1077] The cause of this is that their fitting place is in debates—which is why speeches intended for delivery, when the element of delivery is removed, no longer do their work and appear simpleminded.[1078] For example, cases of asyndeton and frequent saying of the same thing are correctly rejected in writing style, |1413^{b}20| but not in debating style—indeed, the orators use them, since they are suited to delivery.[1079] But one must vary the expression when one says the same thing—which is just the factor that, as it were, paves the way for delivery: "This is the one who stole from you, this is the one who cheated you, this is the one who last of all attempted to betray you."[1080] Also, for example, what Philemon the actor used to do |1413^{b}25| in Anaxandrides' *An Old Man's Madness*, when {135} he says "Rhadamanthus and Palamedes," and, in the prologue of *The Pious Ones*, the word "I."[1081] For if one does not deliver things of this sort [with variation], it become a case of "the man carrying a beam."[1082]

Similarly with cases of asyndeton: I "came, met, begged." For these must be delivered, and not spoken as if |1413^{b}30| they are one [phrase], in the same character and tone of voice.[1083] Further, cases of asyndeton have a special attribute, since many things seem to be being said at the same time.[1084] For the connecting particle makes the many into one, so that if it is removed, it is clear that the contrary will result, namely, the one will be many. Therefore, it involves amplification: I "came, discussed, beseeched" (what is said seems to lean on many things).[1085] **|1414^{a}1|** This is what Homer wishes to do in the passage:

> Nereus, again, from Syme . . .
> Nereus, son of Aglaia . . .
> Nereus, the most nobly beautiful man who . . .[1086]

For a person about whom many things are said must also be often referred to. If someone is often referred to, then, it also seems [wrongly]

that many things are being said about him. So Homer amplified [Nereus' importance], |1414ª5| though mentioning him in only one passage, and by means of this fallacy made him memorable, though no account at all is given of him later on.

Now the style of public oratory seems altogether like illusionistic-painting, since the greater the mob is, the more distant the view—which is why exactness is superfluous and gives a worse appearance in both cases.[1087] |1414ª10| Judicial speech, on the other hand, is more exact.[1088] And that before a single judge even more so, since it is least of all "rhetorical." For what properly belongs to the thing at issue and what is alien to it is more easily surveyed [by him], and debate is absent, so that the judgment is clear. That is why it is not the same orators who are popular in all these. But where delivery is most a factor, |1414ª15| there exactness is least present. And this is where voice is a factor, and most of all where a loud one is. The epideictic style is most like that of writing, since its function is reading.[1089] The judicial style, though, comes second.[1090]

To make the further distinction that style should be pleasant and magnificent is superfluous.[1091] |1414ª20| For why *that* rather than temperate, generous, or some other virtue of character? For clearly the things we mentioned will make the style pleasant, if indeed the virtue of style has been correctly defined.[1092] For otherwise for the sake of *what* should it be perspicuous and not low but appropriate? For if it is babbling, it is {136} not perspicuous, nor if it is concise, |1414ª25| but it is clear that the mean between the two is fitting.[1093] And the things mentioned will make the style pleasant, if they are well-mixed: the customary and the unfamiliar, rhythm, and persuasiveness based on what is appropriate.

Style, then, has been spoken about, both in general about all of it and in a way special to each kind (*genos*) [of speech]. It remains to speak about arrangement. |1414ª30|

III 13

There are two parts to a speech. For it is necessary to state the thing at issue and also to demonstrate it. That is why to state without demonstrating or to demonstrate without having first stated is impossible. For the person demonstrating demonstrates something and the one first stating it first states it for the sake of demonstrating it. Of

these the former is the statement of the case |1414^{a}35| and the latter the means of persuasion—just as if one were to make the division that one part was the problem and the other the demonstration.[1094]

As things stand, though, people make a ridiculous division.[1095] For a narration surely belongs only in a judicial speech. For how in an epideictic speech or in a one of public oratory can there possible be the sort of narration they talk about, or replies to the opponent, or an epilogue in demonstrative ones?[1096] |**1414^{b}1**| And an introduction, reply by comparison, and recapitulation sometimes occur in public speeches when there is a dispute.[1097] And in fact both accusation and defense often occur there, but not insofar as it is deliberative.[1098] Further, an epilogue does not even belong in every judicial speech—for example, if the speech is short |1414^{b}5| or if the thing at issue is easily remembered. For in the epilogue what happens is that there is a reduction of length.

The necessary parts [of a speech], therefore, are the statement of the case and the means of persuasion. These, then, are its special ones, and the most it has are: introduction, statement of the thing at issue, means of persuasion, and epilogue.[1099] For the replies to the opponent belong to the means of persuasion, and the reply by comparison is amplification of one's own case, |1414^{b}10| so that it is a part of the means of persuasion. For one who does this demonstrates something, whereas the introduction does not and neither does the epilogue, but rather serves as a reminder.

If one were to go on making divisions of this sort, then, which is just what the followers of Theodectes do, there will be a distinct narration, a post-narration, and a pre-narration, as well as a refutation and an additional refutation.[1100] But a |1414^{b}15| name should be assigned [only] {137} if speaking of a species and a differentia, otherwise it becomes empty and frivolous, like the ones Licymnius produced in his *Craft*, naming things "wafting," "wandering," and "ramifications."[1101]

III 14

The introduction is a speech's (*logos*) starting-point, which is just what a prologue is in poetry and a prelude in flute playing.[1102] For all |1414^{b}20| these are starting-points and a paving of the way, as it were, for what follows. The prelude is like the introduction in epideictic speeches. For as flute players play as a prelude whatever they are able to play well and join it to the keynote of the piece, so too in epideictic speeches this is the way one should write: after saying whatever one wishes, straightaway

|1414^{b}25| sound and join the keynote.[1103] And this is just what all writers do. A paradigm is the introduction in Isocrates' *Helen*, where there is nothing in common between those who employ contentious arguments and Helen.[1104] At the same time, even if the writer wanders into foreign territory, it is fitting for the whole speech not to be of the same kind (*eidos*).

The introductions in epideictic speeches say things that are based on praise |1414^{b}30| or blame—for example, Gorgias in his *Olympic Speech*, says, "You are worthy of the admiration of many, men of Greece . . ;" that is, he praises those who first brought the festal assemblies together, whereas Isocrates blames them because they honored the virtues of the body with gifts, but awarded no prize to those who think well.[1105] They also derive from advice—for example, |1414^{b}35| that one should honor good people, which is why one should praise Aristides, or those who are neither well-reputed nor bad but good though living in obscurity, like Paris the son of Priam (for one who speaks in this way offers advice).[1106] Further, they are based on introductions in judicial speeches, that is, from the appeals to the listener, |**1415^{a}1**| if the speech concerns something contradoxical, hard to bear, or oft-repeated by many, in order to obtain sympathetic consideration [for discussing it]—for example, Choerilus':

> Now when all subjects have been allocated . . .[1107]

The introductions in epideictic speeches, then, are based on the following: |1415^{a}5| on praise, on blame, on exhortation, on dissuasion, and on appeals to the listener.[1108] And they should be either unfamiliar or closely related to the keynote of the speech.[1109]

Introductions in judicial speeches should be taken to have just the same capacity as prologues in plays and introductions in epic poems. {138} For those in dithyrambs |1415^{a}10| are like those in epideictic speeches—for example,

> Due to you and your gifts or your battle spoils.[1110]

In the speeches and in epic poems there is a sample of the account, in order that the listeners may have some foreknowledge of what the account is about and their thought not kept in suspense.[1111] For what is unlimited makes a listener's thought wander, whereas the one who gives the starting-point into the listener's hand, so to speak, enables him, by holding on to it, to follow the account.[1112] This is why [we have]: |1415^{a}15|

Sing, goddess, the wrath . . .

and

Tell me, Muse, of the man . . .

and

Bring me another account, about how from the land of Asia
There came to Europe a great war.[1113]

The tragedians too make clear what the play is about—if not straightaway, as Euripides does, at any rate somewhere in the prologue, as |1415ª20| Sophocles does:

My father was Polybus . . .[1114]

And the comic dramatists do the same thing.

The most necessary and the special function of the introduction, then, is this: to make clear what the end is that the speech is for the sake of.[1115] That is why if the thing at issue is clear or [the speech] short, there is no use of an introduction.[1116]

The other kinds (*eidos*) of introduction that are used are remedies |1415ª25| and are common [to all the kinds of speeches]. These say things based on the speaker, the listener, the thing at issue, and the opponent. Those based on the speaker himself and the opponent are all those concerned with refuting or making an accusation.[1117] But these are not done in the same way. For in the defendant's case things having to do with the accusation come first, whereas in the accuser's they come in the epilogue. |1415ª30| Why this is so is quite clear. For the defendant, when he is about {139} to introduce his own case, must do away with any hindrances to it, and so must first refute the accusation.[1118] But the one attacking him should put his accusation in the epilogue in order that the listeners may remember it better.

Appeals to the listener [in the introduction] are based on producing goodwill |1415ª35| and sometimes on making him attentive.[1119] For it is not always advantageous to make him attentive, which is why many speakers try to provoke laughter. Many things will lead to ease of learning, if the speaker wishes it, including his appearing to be a decent person.[1120] For the listeners pay more attention to such people. And they are attentive to large things, to their own private affairs, **|1415ᵇ1|** to wondrous things, and to pleasant ones. That is why one should try to produce the impression in them that one's speech is about such things. For, if they are not attentive, it is because the issue is small, has nothing

to do with them, or is painful. But one should not overlook the fact that all such things are outside the argument, since they are addressed to |1415^{b}5| a listener who is base and ready to listen to what is outside the thing at issue, since if he were not like that, there would be no need of an introduction, except for one that stated the thing at issue in headline form, in order that it have a head, as if it were a body.[1121]

Further, making the listeners attentive is common to all the parts [of the speech], if there is a need for it. In fact, they are inclined to slacken more anywhere than at the start. |1415^{b}10| That is why it is ridiculous to put [making the listener attentive] at the start, when all listen with the greatest attention. So wherever it is opportune, one should say, "And now give me your attention, for this concerns me no more than it does you," or "I'll tell you something strange, something so wondrous, you've never heard the like of it." This, as Prodicus said, |1415^{b}15| is "to throw in some of the fifty-drachma lecture when the listeners nod."[1122] But it is clear that this is not addressed to the listener insofar as he is a *listener*.[1123]

In fact all speakers in their introductions are either accusing or relieving fears. [As in:]

> My lord, I will not say that eagerly . . . |1415^{b}20|

and

> Why this introduction? . . .[1124]

Also, those who have, or believe themselves to have, a bad case [make use of introductions], since it is better to spend time on anything other {140} than the thing at issue. That is why slaves [when accused of something] do not answer questions but rather state the surrounding circumstances and produce introductions.

The sources from which one should produce goodwill and each of the other things |1415^{b}25| of that sort have already been stated.[1125] But since,

> Grant that on reaching the Phaeacians I may find friendship or pity,

is well-said, these are the two things one should aim at.[1126]

In epideictic introductions, however, one should make the listener think that he shares in the praise, either himself, his family (*genos*), his practices, or in some other way.[1127] For |1415^{b}30| what Socrates says in the funeral oration is true, namely, that it is not difficult to praise Athenians in front of Athenians, but in front of Spartans.[1128]

Introductions in public oratory are based on those of judicial speech, but by the nature of the case there is little need of them. For they are concerned with what the listeners also know, and the thing at issue needs no introduction, except because of the speaker himself |1415^{b}35| or his opponent, or if the listeners do not take the thing to have the importance the speaker wishes, but either more or less. That is why it is necessary to accuse or to refute accusations, to amplify or diminish. And it is for the sake of these things that an introduction is needed, or for the sake of ornamentation, lest the speech appear off-handedly done without it. For Gorgias' encomium **|1416^{a}1|** to the Eleans is like that, since without any preliminary sparring or warm-ups he starts at once by saying, "Elis, happy city."[1129]

III 15

[T1] One [topic] concerning accusation is based on anything with which one might remove offensive prejudice.[1130] For it makes no difference whether someone has expressed it |1416^{a}5| or not, so that this way is universally applicable.

[T2] Another topic is to contest the things that are disputed: either they did not occur, or they were not harmful, or not harmful to this person, or not harmful to this degree; or they were not unjust, or not very, or not shameful, or not hugely so.[1131] For dispute is about things of this sort, as in the reply of Iphicrates to Nausicrates: |1416^{a}10| he said that he had indeed done what Nausicrates claimed and that it had caused harm, but that he had not done an injustice.[1132] Or, though admitting the injustice, counterbalance it: if it caused harm, that it was nonetheless {141} noble, and if it caused pain, it was nonetheless beneficial, or something else of that sort.

[T3] Another topic: that it was an error, or a stroke of bad luck, or necessary, as Sophocles said that he was trembling not, as his accuser |1416^{a}15| said, in order to seem old, but out of necessity (for it was not by his own volition that he was eighty years old).[1133] Also, the for-the-sake-of-which may counterbalance it, for example, that you did not wish to harm but rather so-and-so, and not the thing about which you are accused, though it happened to have harmed—"Hating me would be just, if I had acted *so as* to bring it about."

[T4] Another: if |1416^{a}20| the accuser is also involved [in similar actions], either at the present time or previously, either himself or one of

those close to him.[1134] [T5] Another: if there are others who are involved [in similar actions] but are agreed to be not guilty of the accusation—for example, if so-and-so is an adulterer, because he is dressed in a refined way, what's-his-name must also be one. [T6] Another: if the accuser or someone else has accused others, or if—without [a formal] accusation—they were under the same suspicion |1416^{a}25| as the defendant is now, and were shown not guilty.[1135] [T7] Another is based on counteraccusing the accuser. For it is absurd, if he himself is untrustworthy, for his words (*logos*) to be trustworthy.

[T8] Another: if there has already been a judgment of the matter, as in Euripides' reply to Hygiaenon in an exchange of property trial, when he was accused of impiety for having written a line encouraging |1416^{a}30| perjury:

> The tongue swore, but the mind is unsworn.[1136]

For he said that Hygiaenon was doing an injustice by bringing a judgment into the law-courts that belonged in the court of Dionysus.[1137] For there is where he gave an account of these words or where he will give one if anyone wished to bring an accusation.

[T9] Another |1416^{a}35| is on the basis of accusing the accusation [itself], how great an evil it is, and this because it produces different judgments and because it does not persuade as to the thing at issue.[1138]

[T10] Common to both sides is the topic of speaking with [reference to] symptoms.[1139] For example, in the *Teucer*, **|1416^{b}1|** Odysseus claims that Teucer is closely related to Priam, since his mother Hesione was Priam's sister, whereas Teucer says that his father Telamon was Priam's enemy, and that he has not betrayed the spies.[1140]

[T11] Another, for the accuser, is to praise some small thing at great length and then blame something big in a concise way, |1416^{b}5| or first to set {142} out many good things, and then put forward the single thing that bears on the thing at issue and blame it. Speakers of this sort are most crafty and most unjust.[1141] For they attempt to do harm by means of good things, [that is,] by mixing them with what is bad.

[T12] Common, though, to both attacker and defender is that, since the same action may be done for the sake of many things, the accuser |1416^{b}10| should put a bad construction on it by selecting a worse one, whereas the defender should select a better one—for example, saying that Diomedes deliberately chose Odysseus, on the one side, because he took

Odysseus to be the best, and, on the other, not because of that, but because he alone, as someone inferior, would not be a rival.[1142] |1416^{b}15|

And concerning accusation let this much be said.[1143]

III 16

Narration in epideictic speeches is not continuous but part by part, since one should go through the actions on which the speech is based.[1144] For the speech is composed, on the one hand, from what is outside the province of craft (for the speaker is in no way the cause of the actions) and, on the other, from what comes from the craft, which consists in showing either |1416^{b}20| that the actions did take place, if the audience is not persuaded, or that they were of a certain quality, of a certain quantity, or even all three.[1145] This is why one should sometimes not narrate everything continuously, because things shown in this way are difficult to remember: on the basis of some actions the person is shown to be courageous, on the basis of others, wise or just. Also, a speech composed in this way is simpler, whereas in the other way it is complex and not |1416^{b}25| plain sailing. Of well-known actions the listener should just be reminded. That is why many people have no need of narration. For example, if one wishes to praise Achilles, since everyone knows all his actions, one should instead make [other] use of these. If, on the other hand, one wishes to praise Critias, he does need it, for not many people know [his good actions]. . . .[1146]

But nowadays they say—ridiculously—that the narration should be rapid.[1147] |1416^{b}30| And yet, as the man said to the baker when asked whether he should knead the dough hard or soft ("What?" he said, "Is it not possible to do it well?"), so here too the case is similar. For one should not narrate at great length, just as one should not produce introductions or state the means of persuasion at great length either. For, in these cases too, doing these things well is not a matter or rapidity or concision but of [due] measure. |1416^{b}35| And this consists in saying just as much as will make the thing at issue clear, or as much as will make the listener suppose {143} that it has happened, that harm or injustice has been done, |**1417^{a}1**| or things of whatever magnitude one wishes their magnitude to be—or, for the opponent, the opposites of these.

And one should narrate in whatever way bears on one's own virtue (for example, "I admonished him, by always stating what was just, not to abandon his children"), or bears on the opponent's vice ("But he

answered me that, |1417ª5| wherever he might find himself, there he would find other children")—which is what Herodotus tells us the Egyptians who had revolted replied [to the king who had invited them to return], or what is pleasing to the jurors.[1148]

For the defender the narration may be shorter. For what is disputed is either that the thing has not happened, was not harmful, was not unjust, or was not of the alleged magnitude. So one should not spend time |1417ª10| on what is agreed, unless it contributes to [making the case]—for example, that the action was done, but that it was not unjust. Further, one should speak of the actions as done in the past, except for those that, when presented as being done in the present, conduce to pity or indignation.[1149] A paradigm is the story of Alcinous, as it is told to Penelope in sixty lines, or as Phaÿllus told the epic cycle, or the |1417ª15| prologue in the *Oeneus*.[1150]

The narration should be expressive of character.[1151] And it will be so if we know what makes the character. One thing that certainly does so is making the deliberate choice clear, and it is by the quality of this that the character is of a certain quality, and it is by its end that the deliberate choice is of a certain quality.[1152] This is why mathematical arguments (*logos*) do not involve character, namely, because they do not involve deliberate choice (for they do not involve |1417ª20| the for-the-sake-of-which), but the Socratic arguments do (for they speak of things of this sort).[1153]

Other things expressive of character are those that follow along with each particular character—for example, that someone walks away as he was talking (for this makes clear his insolence and boorishness of character).[1154]

And do not speak as from thought, as they do nowadays, but as from deliberate choice: not "I wished it" or "In fact, I deliberately |1417ª25| chose it," but, "Although I gained no benefit, it was better." For the former is characteristic of a practically-wise person, the latter of a good one. For what is characteristic of a practically-wise person consists in the pursuit of what is beneficial, and of a good one in that of what is noble.[1155]

If anything seems unpersuasive, also state its cause, as Sophocles does. A paradigm is the passage from the *Antigone*, that Antigone cared more

for her brother than for either |1417[a]30| her husband or children, since if they perished they might be replaced,

> {144} But when mother and father have gone to Hades
> No brother can ever be born.[1156]

If you do not have a cause, say that you are not unaware that the things you are saying are unpersuasive, but that you are by nature a person of this sort, and in fact people are never persuaded that anyone |1417[a]35| voluntarily does anything other than what is advantageous.

Further, speak on the basis of feelings, narrating both the things that follow along with them, which the listeners know, and the ones that are special to oneself or to one's opponent: "And off he went, scowling at me," and, as Aeschines says about Cratylus, that he was "furiously hissing |**1417[b]1**| and furiously shaking his fists."[1157] For these are means of persuasion, because these things they do know become symptoms of those they do not know. Many things of this sort are to be got hold of from Homer:

> Thus she spoke, and the old nurse covered her face with her hands.[1158] |1417[b]5|

For those who start to cry put their hands over their eyes.

Also, you should straightaway present yourself too as a person of a certain sort, in order that the listeners may see you as such—your opponent as well; but do it concealing that you do it. And this should be easy to see from messengers.[1159] For we know nothing of what they are going to say, nonetheless, we get some notion of it [from their demeanor]. |1417[b]10| Narration, though, should occur at many places, and sometimes not at the start.[1160]

In public oratory there is hardly any narration, because no one narrates about future things. But if there is narration at all, it is about things in the past, in order that, reminded of them, the listeners—either accusing or praising [them]—will deliberate better about things to come, or in order to accuse or praise.[1161] |1417[b]15| In the latter case, however, the speaker does not perform the function of an advisor.[1162] And if something is unpersuasive, promise to state the cause straightaway and to set it out with as many details as the listeners wish—for example, Jocasta in Carcinus' *Oedipus* is always promising, when the one inquiring into her son asks her questions, as is Sophocles' Haemon.[1163] |1417[b]20|

III 17

Means of persuasion should be demonstrative, and, since dispute is concerned with four issues, the demonstration should bear on the {145} disputed one—for example, if whether the thing happened or not is disputed, in the trial, the demonstration should most of all bear on this; if that it did no harm, on this; and if that it was not of such-and-such magnitude, |1417^{b}25| or that it happened justly, likewise.[1164] And if the dispute is about whether this thing happened, do not forget that it is only in this dispute that it is necessary for one or other of the two opponents to be wicked. For ignorance is not a cause [that can excuse], as it might be if the dispute were about justice.[1165] So in this case one should spend time on it, but in the others one should not. |1417^{b}30|

In epideictic speeches amplification is mostly for [arguing] that things are noble or beneficial, since the things at issue should be taken on trust.[1166] And in fact demonstrations rarely bear on these, unless they are unpersuasive, or someone else is held to be the cause of them.

In the speeches of public oratory one may dispute that something will be, or that though the things he [that is, the opponent] recommends will be, they will not be |1417^{b}35| just, or beneficial, or of such-and-such magnitude.[1167] And one should also look to see whether anything outside the thing at issue is falsely stated. For such things appear to be proofs that the other ones are falsely stated too.[1168]

Paradigms are |**1418^{a}1**| more suited to public oratory, enthymemes are more suited to judicial oratory.[1169] For the former is concerned with the future, so it must quote paradigms from the past, whereas the latter is concerned with things that are or are not the case, which more admit of demonstration and of necessity. For the past has a necessity about it.[1170] |1418^{a}5|

Enthymemes, though, should not be stated successively, but rather mixed in. Otherwise, they damage each other. For there is a defining mark of their quantity:

> My friend, since you have spoken *as much as* a wise man should —

but not *such things as*.[1171] And do not look for enthymemes about everything. Otherwise, you will do just what some of those doing philosophy do, |1418^{a}10| who deduce things that are more knowable and more persuasive than the things on the basis of which they state them.[1172] And when you are trying to arouse feelings, do not speak in enthymemes.

For an enthymeme either knocks out feeling or is spoken pointlessly, since simultaneous movements knock out each other and either extinguish each other or make each other weak.[1173] Nor, when the speech is expressive of character, |1418[a]15| should you look for an enthymeme at the same time. For demonstration involves neither character nor deliberate choice.[1174]

{146} Maxims should be used both in a narration and in a means of persuasion, since they are expressive of character: "I have given the money —and this while knowing [the maxim] 'one should not trust anyone'."[1175] Or to arouse feelings: "And I do not regret it, although I have been treated unjustly. |1418[a]20| For though the profit remains his, the justice remains mine."

Speaking publicly is more difficult than judicial speaking, as makes perfect sense, because it is concerned with the future, the latter with what happened in the past, which is scientifically knowable "even to prophets," as Epimenides the Cretan said (for he used to "prophesize" not about the future but about things that happened in the past |1418[a]25| that were unclear).[1176] And the law is a given in judicial speeches, and, having a starting-point, it is easier to find a demonstration.[1177] Also, public speaking does not afford many opportunities for leisurely digressions—for example, against the opponent, or about oneself, or to arouse feelings.[1178] On the contrary, it least of all does so, unless one wanted to divert attention.[1179] Therefore, when at a loss, one should produce a digression, just as the orators in Athens do—Isocrates |1418[a]30| too.[1180] For, even when giving advice, he brings accusations—for example, against the Spartans in the *Panegyricus*, and against Chares in *On the Peace*.

In epideictic speeches one should for variety introduce episodes of praise, as Isocrates does, since he is always bringing someone in for this purpose. In fact, what Gorgias used to say, namely, that he was never left without a word (*logos*), comes to the same thing.[1181] |1418[a]35| For if he is speaking about Achilles, he praises Peleus, then Aeacus, then the god, and likewise with [his] courage, which produces these and those things, or is of such-and-such a sort.[1182]

If you possess demonstrations, you should speak both in a way expressive of character and demonstratively, but if you do not possess enthymemes, in a way expressive of character. And to appear good fits a decent person more |1418[a]40| than an exact argument does.[1183]

Refutative enthymemes |**1418^{b}1**| are more popular than demonstrative ones, because whenever something produces a refutation, it is more clear that it deduces, since contraries set side by side are more readily known.[1184] Refutative ones directed against the opponent are not a distinct species, however, but |1418^{b}5| belong among the means of persuasion.[1185] Some refute by objection others by [counter-]deduction.[1186]

In both deliberative and judicial speech the [starting] speaker should state his own means of persuasion first, then meet the contrary ones, refuting them and pulling them to pieces beforehand. But if the opposition's case is manifold, meet the contrary points first, as Callistratus |1418^{b}10| did in the Messenian assembly.[1187] For first refuting by anticipation the {147} things they were likely to say, he then stated his own case. If you speak second, however, you should first speak to the contrary argument, refuting it and counter-deducing, especially if it proved popular. For just as the soul is not receptive to a human being against whom accusations have been made beforehand, in the same way it is not receptive to argument either, |1418^{b}15| if the opponent seems to have spoken well.[1188] Hence one should make room in the listener for the argument one is going to give. And this will happen if you do away with [the opponent's arguments]. That is why, it is by fighting against all of them, or the most important, the popular, or the easily refuted ones, that one will make one's own persuasive:

> The goddesses I will be allied with first, . . . |1418^{b}20|
> For I do not think that Hera. . . .[1189]

In these lines Hecuba seizes first on what is most easily refuted.[1190]

So much for means of persuasion. As regards character, since there are some things which, if one says them about oneself, leave one open to envy, to a charge of long-windedness, or to disputation, and, if one says them about another, to a charge of abusiveness or boorishness, |1418^{b}25| one must make another say them, just as Isocrates does in the *Philippus* and the *Antidosis*; as Archilochus does when he blames someone, since he makes the father say about his daughter in an iambus,

> Nothing is unexpected or declared impossible on oath,

and makes Charon the carpenter say in the iambus that starts, |1418^{b}30|

> Not for me the wealth of Gyges;

and as Sophocles does, when he makes Haemon speak to his father about Antigone as reporting what others say.[1191] And sometimes one should also change one's enthymemes into maxims.[1192] For example, "People with understanding should bring about reconciliation when fortunate, since that way |1418^{b}35| would be conducive to getting or having most," which, expressed as an enthymeme, is: "For if it is whenever it is most profitable and conducive to getting or having most that one should be reconciled, then it is when one is fortunate that one should be reconciled."[1193]

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As for questioning, it is most opportune to do it |1418^{b}40| when the opponent has stated one of the two [premises], so that when one additional question is asked |**1419^{a}1**| something absurd results.[1194] For example, when Pericles questioned Lampon about the sacred rites of the savior goddess, he replied that it was not possible for an uninitiated person to hear them.[1195] When asked if he knew them himself, he said he did. Pericles then asked, "And how so, since you are uninitiated?" Second, it is opportune when |1419^{a}5| one point is evident and it is clear to the questioner that the opponent will grant the other. For having learned that [second] premise, he should not additionally ask about the evident one but should state the conclusion.[1196] For example, when Meletus stated that Socrates did not acknowledge the gods, but admitted that there was something he called a *daimonion*, Socrates asked if *daimons* were not either gods, children of gods, |1419^{a}10| or something divine, and when Meletus said, "They are," he replied, "Does anyone think there are children of gods but not gods?"[1197] Further, when the speaker is intending to show that the opponent is stating contrary things or something contradoxical.[1198] Fourth, when it is not possible for the opponent to refute you except by answering in a sophistical way. For if he answers that "It is so and it is not so," or "Some are so, some are not," or |1419^{a}15| "In one way it is so, in another not," the listeners shout out on the supposition that he is at a loss to answer.[1199] Otherwise, though, you should not attempt it. For if the opponent gets in an objection, you will seem to be beaten. For it is not possible to ask many questions, because of the weakness of the listener. That is also why one should compress enthymemes as much as possible.[1200]

One should give answers to ambiguous questions, on the other hand, by dividing them |1419[a]20| by account and not concisely.[1201] And answers to things that seem to be contraries should be conveyed straightaway by the answer [itself], before [the opponent] asks further questions or deduces the conclusion. For it is not difficult to foresee the drift of the argument.

This, though, and the means of refutation may be taken as evident to us from the *Topics*.[1202]

When a conclusion is being drawn, if [the opponent] frames the conclusion |1419[a]25| as a question, you should state the cause. For example, when Sophocles was asked by Pisander if it seemed good to him, as it did to the other preliminary councilors, to put in place the Four Hundred, he said it did.[1203] "What? Did this not seem to you to be a wicked thing?" He said it did. "Therefore, what you did was wicked?" "Yes," he said, "for nothing else was better." |1419[a]30| And when the Spartan, who was {149} being inspected for his term as overseer, was asked whether it seemed to him that the other overseers had been justly put to death, he said that it did. "But did you not put in place these same measures?" And he said that he did. "Therefore, would you not," he was asked, "be justly put to death too?" "No, indeed not," he said, "for they took bribes to do these things, whereas I did them by [giving them] due consideration." That is why |1419[a]35| one should neither ask any question after drawing the conclusion nor frame the conclusion **|1419[b]1|** as a question, unless the balance of truth is much in one's favor.

As for jokes, since they seem to have some use in debates, and Gorgias rightly said that one should "destroy the opponents' seriousness with laughter and their laughter with seriousness," |1419[b]5| we have stated in the *Poetics* how many kinds (*eidos*) of jokes there are.[1204] Of these, one lot is fitting for a free person, the other not. And accordingly a speaker will take whatever one is fitting for him. Self-deprecation is more suited to a free person than buffoonery, since the self-deprecator makes a joke for the sake of himself, whereas the buffoon makes it for the sake of someone else.[1205] |1419[b]10|

III 19

The epilogue is composed of four things: what produces a good disposition toward the speaker himself in the listener and a bad one

toward the opponent; amplifying and minimizing; what brings the feelings of the listener into a certain state; and recollection.[1206]

For the natural thing for him to do, after he has demonstrated that he is truthful and his opponent false, is to praise and blame and drive the point home. |1419^{b}15| And one of two things should be aimed at: to demonstrate that he is a good person in the relevant respects, or that he is one unconditionally, or that his opponent is a bad person in the relevant respects, or that he is one unconditionally.[1207] And the topics on the basis of which he should establish them as being of these sorts have been stated.[1208]

After this, it is accord with nature to amplify (*auxein*) or minimize what has already been shown. |1419^{b}20| For the things at issue should be agreed to, if one is going to speak of their magnitude. For the growth (*auxêsis*) of bodies too is from something pre-existing.[1209] The topics from which amplifying and minimizing should be set forth were stated earlier.[1210]

After this, when the things, their sorts, and how great they are, are clear, one should induce the listener to feel the [relevant] feelings. And these are pity, |1419^{b}25| indignation, anger, hatred, envy, jealousy, and strife.[1211] Their topics too were stated earlier.[1212]

{150} So it remains to recollect the things that were said before. And this it is fitting to do in the way that people—speaking incorrectly—say one should do it in introductions.[1213] For in order to be easily learned, they prescribe saying things many times. But what one should in fact do [in the introduction] |1419^{b}30| is state the thing at issue, in order that it not escape notice what the judgment is about, whereas in the epilogue one should speak in summary form of the things through which the conclusion has been shown.

And the starting-point is for the speaker to state that he has demonstrated the things he promised, and why they hold, so that what these things are and why they hold should be mentioned. And it is stated on the basis of a comparison with the opponent's case—comparing what both have said about the same thing (for example, "But he said |1419^{b}35| this about this, whereas I said that, and because of these things") or straight down point by point. Or on the basis of |**1420^{a}1**| self-deprecation (for example, "He *said* this, while I *said* that—and what would he have done if he had *shown* this, but [I had] not [shown] that?").

Or on the basis of questioning ("What has not been shown?" or "What did he show?")—either by comparison or in a way that is in accord with nature given the statements made, first one's own, and again, |1420^{a}5| if one wishes, those of the opponent separately.[1214]

Asyndeton is fitting for one's final utterance, in order that it be an epilogue and not a speech: "I have spoken; you have listened; you have the facts; render judgment."[1215]

{151} Notes

Book I

Note 1

Rhetoric (*rhetorikê*): To a first approximation, rhetoric is the theory and a speech the product (see III 10 $1410^{b}7$–8). A *rhêtôr* is someone who knows the theory, knows how to use it, and puts it to use. Insofar as he does so by writing speeches to be read, or for others to deliver, he is a "rhetorician"—or, in the standard translation, which I have adopted—an "orator." But the one who actually delivers the speech, considered as such, is a "speaker."

Dialectic (*dialektikê*): A problem (*problêma*) is posed: Is pleasure choiceworthy, or not? The answerer claims that yes it is (or, alternatively, that no it isn't). The questioner must refute him by asking questions—by offering him propositions or premises (*protaseis*) to accept or reject. The questioner succeeds if he forces the answerer to accept as a premise contrary to the one he undertook to defend (*SE* 2 $165^{b}3$–4). The questioner fails if the answerer always accepts or rejects premises in a way consistent with that proposition. To a first approximation, *dialectic* is the craft (*technê*) or capacity (*dunamis*) that enables someone to play the role of questioner or answerer successfully (*Top.* I 1 $100^{a}18$–21, VIII 14 $164^{b}2$–4). See also, Introduction, pp. xl–lii.

[1] Rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic: At I 2 $1356^{a}30$–31 [1] is glossed as follows: "[2] Rhetoric is a part (*morion ti*) of dialectic and similar to it, as we also said at the start." (Compare, Plato, *Grg.* 465d–466a: "What cosmetology is to athletic training, sophistry is to legislation, and what pastry-making is to medicine, rhetoric is to justice. . . . You've now heard what I say rhetoric is. It's the counterpart in the soul to pastry-making, which is its counterpart in the body. . . . It's a part (*morion*) of flattery.") A few lines previously the relationship is characterized in yet a third way: [3] "Rhetoric is a sort of offshoot (*paraphues*) of dialectic and of work in ethics, which it is right to call politics" ($1356^{a}25$–26). The relationships in [1–3] are, on the face of it, quite different, but this may be due to the fact that they have in mind different aspects of dialectic. Thus [1] is followed by a description of the

sorts of things that rhetoric and dialectic are concerned with. Since [2] is presented as a restatement of [1], it presumably has the same idea in mind, with the additional one that rhetoric is concerned with only some of these. Not all dialectical topics are suitable for rhetorical purposes. [3], on the other hand, with its reference to politics, suggests that rhetoric draws on a sort of knowledge, provided by politics, that dialectic itself need not draw on. See I 8 1366^{a}2–14. Perhaps, though, the thought here is mostly this: rhetoric persuades; dialectic refutes. See also Introduction pp. lxx–lxxi.

{152} **Counterpart** (*antistrophos*): In the choral odes familiar from Greek tragedies the antistrophe answers a preceding strophe: the word is used in this sense at III 9 1409^{a}26.

Note 2

Common things (*koina*): The class of *koina* includes "the common beliefs (*koinas doxas*) on the basis of which we all prove things, such as that in every case it is necessary either to affirm or deny, and that it is impossible for something at the same time to both be and not be, and any other propositions like that" (*Met.* III 2 996^{b}27–29). But it also includes what will later be called topics. See *Rh.* I 2 1358^{a}10–22.

Known (*gnorizein*) **to all:** Although there may be little difference between *gnôsis* (verb: *gnorizein*) and *epistêmê* (verb: *epistasthai*), *epistêmê* is usually applied only to demonstrative sciences, crafts, or other bodies of systematic knowledge, so that *epistêmê* is specifically *scientific* knowledge. *Gnôsis* is weaker and is used for perceptual knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance—something familiar is *gnôrimon*. If X knows that p, it follows that p is true and that X is justified in believing it. Similar entailments hold in the cases of *epistasthai* and *eidenai* but may not hold in that of *gignôskein*.

Science (*epistêmê*): (1) To understand what a science—whether theoretical, productive, or practical—is like we must begin a few steps back.

(2) A statement (*logos apophantikos*) is the true (or false) predication of a single predicate term A of a single subject term B, either as an affirmation (*kataphasis*) (A belongs to B) or a denial (*apophasis*) (A does not belong to B) (*Int.* 5, 8). What makes a term a single subject term, however, is not that it is grammatically singular or serves as a grammatical subject but that it designates a substantial particular—a canonical

example of which is a perceptible matter-form compound, such as Socrates. Similarly, what makes a term a predicate is that it designates a universal (man, pale)—something that can have many particular instances. When the role of predicate is restricted to universals, therefore, while that of subject is left open to both particulars and universals, it is more on ontological or metaphysical grounds than on what we would consider strictly logical ones. Subjects and predicates are thus ontological items, types of beings, rather than linguistic or conceptual ones, and logical principles, such as PNC, are very general ontological principles, truths about all beings as such, or qua beings. Particular affirmations (Socrates is a man) and general affirmations (Men are mortal) have the same subject-predicate form, but when the subject is a universal, the affirmation may itself be either universal (All men are mortal) or particular (Some men are mortal)—that is to say, the predicate may be affirmed (denied) of the subject either universally (*katholou*) or in part (*kata meros*) or, if the quantifier is omitted (Men are mortal), indefinitely (*adioristos*). General affirmations, as a result, which are the only ones of interest to science (*Met.* VII 15 $1039^{b}27$–31), are of four types: A belongs to all B (**a**AB), A belongs to no B (**e**AB), A belongs to some B (**i**AB), A does not belong to all B (**o**AB).

(3) A *science* is a state of the soul that enables its possessor to give demonstrative explanations—where a demonstration (*apodeixis*) is a special sort of deduction {153} (*sullogismos*) from scientific starting-points and a deduction is "an argument in which, certain things having been supposed, something different from those supposed things necessarily results because of their being so" (*APr.* I 2 $24^{b}18$–20). The things supposed are the argument's premises; the necessitated result is its conclusion; all three are affirmations of one of the four types we looked at. In Aristotle's view, such deductions are *syllogisms* (*sullogismos*, again) consisting of a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion, where the premises have exactly one "middle" term in common, and the conclusion contains only the other two "extreme" terms. The conclusion's predicate term is the *major term*, contributed by the major premise; its subject is the *minor term*, contributed by the minor premise. The middle term must be either subject of both premises, predicate of both, or subject of one and predicate of the other. The resulting possible combinations of terms yield the so-called figures of the syllogism:

	First figure		Second figure		Third figure	
	Predicate	Subject	Predicate	Subject	Predicate	Subject
Premise	A	B	A	B	A	C
Premise	B	C	A	C	B	C
Conclusion	A	C	B	C	A	B

Systematic investigation of the possible combinations of premises in each of these figures results in the identification of the *moods* or modes that constitute valid deductions. In the first figure, these are as follows:

Form	Mnemonic	Proof
aAB, **a**BC | **a**AC	B**arba**r**a**	Perfect
eAB, **a**BC | **e**AC	C**elare**nt	Perfect
aAB, **i**BC | **i**AC	D**arii**	Perfect
eAB, **i**BC | **o**AC	F**erio**	Perfect

A mood is perfect when there is a proof of its validity that is *direct*, in that it does not rely on the validity of any other mood. Only first figure syllogisms have perfect moods.

(4) Besides their logical interest as admitting of direct proof, perfect syllogisms in Barbara are also of particular importance to science. First, because "syllogisms that give the why, which hold either universally or for the most part, in most cases are carried out through this figure. That is why it is the most scientific of all; for getting a theoretical grasp on the why is most important for [scientific] knowledge" (*APo.* I 14 $79^{a}20$–24). Second, "only through this figure can you hunt for scientific knowledge of something's essence" ($79^{a}24$–25): essences hold universally, only perfect syllogisms in Barbara have universal conclusions, and definitions of essences, which are scientific starting-points, must hold universally.

{154} (5) Specifically scientific starting-points are of just three types (*APo*. I 10 $76^{a}37$–$^{b}22$). Those *special* to a science are *definitions* (*Rh*. II 23 $1398^{a}15$–27) of the real (as opposed to nominal) essences of the beings with which the science deals (II 3 $90^{b}24$, II 10 $93^{b}29$–$94^{a}19$). Because these are definitions by genus and differentia (II 13 $96^{a}20$–$97^{b}39$), a

single science must deal with a single genus (*APo*. I 7 $75^{b}10$–11, I 23 $84^{b}17$–18, 28 $87^{a}38$–39). Other starting-points (so-called axioms) are common to all or many sciences (*APo*. I 2 $72^{a}14$–24, I 32 $88^{a}36$–$^{b}3$). A third sort of starting-point posits the existence of the genus with which the science deals, but this may often be left implicit if the existence of the genus is clear (I 10 $76^{b}17$–18). The source of these starting-points, in turn, is perception and experience, which lead by induction to a grasp by understanding of them: "From perception memory comes to be, and from many memories of the same thing, experience. For, then, memories that are many in number form one experience. And from experience, or from the whole universal that has come to rest in the soul (the one over and above the many, this being whatever is present as one and the same in all of them), comes a starting-point (*archê*) of craft knowledge and scientific knowledge—of craft knowledge if it concerns coming to be (*genesis*), of scientific knowledge if it concerns being" (*APo*. II 19 $100^{a}3$–9).

(6) To constitute a *demonstration* (*apodeixis*) a deduction must be a valid syllogism in the mood Barbara, whose premises meet a number of conditions. First, they must be immediate or indemonstrable, and so must be reached through induction. Second, our confidence in them must be unsurpassed: "If we are to have scientific knowledge through demonstration, . . . we must know the starting-points [= definitions of essences] better and be better persuaded of them than of what is being shown but we must also not find anything more persuasive or better known among things opposed to the starting-points, from which a contrary mistaken conclusion may be deduced, since someone who has unconditional scientific knowledge must be incapable of being persuaded out of it" (*APo*. I 2 $72^{a}37$–$^{b}4$). Finally, they must be necessary (and so, of course, true) in a special sense: the predicates in them must belong to the subjects in every case, intrinsically, and universally (*APo.* I 4 $73^{a}24$–27): (6a) *In every case:* a predicate A belongs to every subject B if and only if there is no B to which it fails to belong and no time at which it fails to belong to a B: "for example, if animal belongs to every man, then if it is true to say that this thing is a man, it is also true to say that it is an animal, and if the former is the case now, the latter is also the case now" ($73^{a}29$–31). (6b) *Intrinsically:* a predicate A belongs intrinsically to a subject B just in case it is related to B in one of four ways: (i) A is in the

account or definition of what B is, or of B's substance, or essence ($73^{a}34$–37); (ii) B is a complex subject φB_1, where φ is an intrinsic prim of B_1—for example, odd number or male or female animal (*Met*. XIII 3 $1078^{a}5$–11)—and *A* is in the definition of φB_1's essence; (iii) *A* just is B's essence; (iv) A is not a part of B's essence or identical to it but stems causally from it, so that being B is an intrinsic cause of being A ($73^{a}34$–$^{b}24$). (6c) *Universally:* a predicate A belongs to a subject B universally just in case "it belongs to it in every case and intrinsically, that is, insofar as it is itself" ($73^{b}26$–27).

{155} (7) Because intrinsic predicates stem in various ways from essences, the subjects to which they belong must have essences. In other words, they must be *intrinsic beings*, since—stemming as they do from essences—intrinsic predicates identify them or make them clear: "The things said to be intrinsically are the very ones signified by the figures of predication" (*Met*. V 7 $1017^{a}22$–23). These figures of predication are the so-called *categories*: "Anything that is predicated (*katêgoroumenon*) of something must either be . . . a definition . . . if it signifies the essence . . . or, if it does not, a special attribute (*idion*) [see *Rh*. I 1 $1355^{b}1$n] . . . or one of the things in the definition, or not; and if it is one of the things in the definition, it must signify the genus or the differentiae, since the definition is composed of genus and differentia. If, however, it is not one of the things in the definition, it is clear that it must be a coincident; for a coincident was said to be that which belongs to a thing but that is neither a definition nor a genus nor a special attribute. Next we must distinguish the kinds (*genos*) of predication in which one will find the four mentioned above. These are ten in number: what it is, quantity, quality, relation, when, where, position, having, doing, and being affected. For the coincidents, the genus, the special attributes, and the definition will always be in one of these kinds of predication [or *categories*]" (*Top*. I 8–9 $103^{b}7$–25). For each of the intrinsic beings in these ten *categories* we can state what it is (*Met*. VII 4 $1030^{a}17$–24), even if strictly speaking only substances have definitions and essences (5 $1031^{a}7$–24). Specifying these beings is one of the tasks of *Categories*, where Aristotle explains how beings in categories other than that of substance are ontologically dependent on those in the category of substance. The list of categories itself, however, has a somewhat provisional status, as Aristotle's remark about the category of *having*

indicates: "Some further ways of having might perhaps come to light, but we have made a pretty complete enumeration of those commonly spoken of" (*Cat.* 15 15^{b}30–32).

(8) What all four types of intrinsic beings have in common, what makes them worth the attention of someone inquiring into starting-points and causes, is that they are the ontological correlates or truth-makers for scientific theorems—the beings responsible for the necessary truth of those theorems. Moreover, they would seem to be the only sorts of being that can play this role, since they constitute an exhaustive catalogue of the necessary relations that can hold between a subject (A) and something (B) predicated of it: B is part of the essence of A; A is part of the essence of B; B is the essence of A; the essence of A (being A) is an intrinsic cause of (being) B.

Definite science (*epistêmês aphôrismenês*): A first-order or special science dealing with a special, definite genus. See I 1 1355^{b}8–9, 2 1355^{b}33–34.

Note 3

To examine (*exetazein*) **and to uphold an argument:** "Because of its ability to stand outside and examine (*exetastikê*), dialectic has a route toward the starting-points of all methodical inquiries" (*Top.* I 2 101^{a}34–^{b}4). Examining is presumably the dialectical task of the questioner; upholding that of the answerer.

Argument (*logos*): In ordinary Greek *logos* (here "argument") can refer among other things (1) to a word or organized string of words constituting a discussion, speech (as at I 1 1355^{b}1), conversation, explanation, definition, principle, reason, {156} or piece of reasoning, or (2) to what such words or their utterances mean, express, or denote, such as, the ratio between quantities (*NE* V 3 1131^{a}31–32), or (3) to the capacity of reason (*Pol.* VII 13 1332^{b}5) that enables someone to argue, give reasons, and so on. In our text, it is translated as "argument," "speech," "word," or "reason," as context suggests or dictates, with the Greek term in parenthesis, when needed for clarity.

To defend someone and accuse someone: A task of rhetoric.

Note 4

Ordinary people (*tôn pollôn*): Aristotle sometimes uses *hoi polloi* (literally, "the many," "the multitude") to refer simply to a majority of people of whatever sort—to most people. Sometimes, though, he uses it

somewhat pejoratively to refer to the vulgar masses (*NE* I 5 1095^{b}16) in contrast to cultivated, sophisticated, or wise people (1095^{a}21). The contrast here is with experts. "Ordinary people" seems to convey the correct sense.

Some do these things extemporaneously (*eikê[i]*): As Socrates claimed to be doing at his trial (Plato, *Ap*. 17c).

Others due to a state acquired by habit: Habituation (*ethismos*) is a process, typically involving pleasure (reward) and pain (punishment), by which we acquire a habit that is at once cognitive (as in the case of induction) and conative, because what we experience as pleasurable we tend to desire and pursue and what we experience as painful we tend to be averse to and avoid (*DA* III 7 431^{a}8–^{b}10, *NE* III 5 1114^{a}31–^{b}3, III 12 1119^{a}25–27, *Pol*. VIII 5 1340^{a}23–28). The forthcoming contrast between rhetorical competence based on habit and one based on method and craft is cognate with the following distinction between experience-based knowledge and craft: "We regard knowledge and comprehension as characteristic of craft rather than of experience, and take it that craftsmen are wiser than experienced people, on the supposition that in every case wisdom follows along rather with knowledge than with experience. This is because craftsmen know the cause (*aitian*), whereas experienced people do not. For experienced people know the that but do not know the why, whereas craftsmen know the why, that is, the cause" (*Met*. I 1 981^{a}24–30). Notice *aitian* at *Rh*. I 1354^{a}10.

Note 5

But since both ways are possible, it is clear that the same things could be done in a methodical way: Compare: "Everyone, even private individuals, makes a certain use of dialectic and the examinational craft. For everyone tries, up to a certain point, to test those who profess knowledge. And this is where the common things come in. For they themselves know these no less [than the others do], even if they seem to speak from very far outside [the relevant sort of knowledge]. All, then, practice refutation. For they participate in a non-craft-like way where dialectic does so in a craft-like one, and the dialectician is one who by means of the craft of deduction is examinational" (*SE* 11 172^{a}30–36).

A methodical way (*hodô[i]*): A *methodos* (1355^{a}4) is a *tropos tês zêtêseôs*—a way of inquiry (*APo*. I 31 46^{a}32 ^{b}36). *Hodos* means "way,"

"route," or "road," as at *NE* I 4 1095^{a}33. Sometimes the *met-* prefix is omitted, as at *GC* I 8 324^{b}35–325^{a}2.

{157} Note 6

Get a theoretical grasp on (*theôrein*): The verb *theasthai*, with which *theôrein* is cognate, means to look at or gaze at. Thus *theôria* itself is sometimes what someone is doing in looking closely at something, or actively observing, studying, or contemplating it, and sometimes the capacity someone has to do these things (*Met.* IX 6 1048^{a}34–35, 8 1045^{a}36). When *theôria* is an exercise of understanding (*nous*), which is the element responsible for grasping scientific starting-points (*NE* VI 6 1141^{a}7–8), such as (the definition of) a right angle in the case of geometry, or (the definition of) happiness in the case of politics, it is translated as "contemplation," and the cognate verb *theôrein* as "contemplate." The corresponding capacity is translated as "theoretical knowledge," and what gives rise to it as "get a theoretical grasp on." So when we get a theoretical grasp on A, we acquire the theoretical knowledge of A, which we exercise in contemplating A.

Cause (*aitian*): The difference between *aition* (neuter) and *aitia* (feminine), used here, is that an *aitia* is an explanatory argument (a type of deduction) that identifies causes, whereas an *aition* is an item in the world that is causally efficacious. Aristotle does not systematically observe the distinction, but it is *aitia* that figures in his definitions of craft knowledge and scientific knowledge (*APo.* I 2 71^{b}9–12, II 11 94^{a}20–27). Both *aition* and *aitia* are translated as "cause."

Chance (*automatou*): Unlike luck (*tuchê*), which is restricted to the subclass of what results from coincidental efficient causes that are "achievable by action" (*Ph.* II 6 197^{a}36–^{b}3) and deliberate choice (*Met.* XI 8 1065^{a}30–32), chance (*to automaton*) applies quite generally to the entire class, and so consists of all those things "whose cause is indefinite and that do not occur for the sake of anything, or always, or for the most part, or in some orderly way" (*Rh.* I 10 1369^{a}32–34). Things that come to be by chance are sometimes said to come about spontaneously, or to be spontaneously generated.

Function (*ergon*): A function is (1) an activity that is the use or actualization of a state, capacity, or disposition; (2) a work or product that is the further result of such an activity (*NE* I 1 1094^{a}5–6). It is intimately related, as here, to its possessor's end or final cause: "The

function is the end, and the activity is the function" (*Met.* IX 8 1050^{a}21–22); "each thing that has a function is for the sake of its function" (*Cael.* II 3 286^{a}8–9). Moreover, a thing's good or doing well "seems to lie in its function" (*NE* I 7 1097^{b}26–27). But this holds only when the thing itself is not already something bad (*Met.* IX 9 1051^{a}15–16). Finally, a thing's function is intimately related to its nature, form, and essence. For a thing's nature is "its for-the-sake-of-which" (*Ph.* II 2 194^{a}27–28), its form is more its nature than its matter (II 1 193^{b}6–7), and its essence and form are the same (*Met.* VII 7 1032^{b}1–2). Hence "all things are defined by their function" (*Mete.* IV 12 390^{a}10), with the result that if something cannot function, it has no more than a name in common with its functional self (*Met.* VII 10 1035^{b}14–25, *Pol.* I 2 1253^{a}20–25, *PA* I 1 640^{b}33–641^{a}6). Functions are thus attributed to a wide variety of things, whether living or non-living. These include plants (*GA* I 23 731^{a}24–26) and animals generally (*NE* X 5 1176^{a}3–5), including divine celestial ones (*Cael.* II 3 286^{a}8–11), parts of their bodies and souls (*PA* II 7 652^{b}6–14, IV 10 686^{a}26–29), instruments or tools of {158} various sorts (*EE* VII 10 1242^{a}15–19), crafts, sciences (II 1 1219^{a}17), philosophies (*Met.* VII 11 1037^{a}15) and their practitioners (*NE* VI 7 1141^{b}10), cities (*Pol.* VII 4 1326^{a}13–14), and nature itself (I 10 1258^{a}35).

Craft (*technê*): A canonical craft is a science concerned with production rather than action or truth. See *Met.* VII 7 1032^{a}26–1032^{b}31, *NE* VI 4. Aristotle distinguishes, however, between craftsmen of different degrees of excellence or achievement: (1) The lyre player and the good lyre player have the same function, but the latter has "the superior achievement that is in accord with the virtue (for it is characteristic of a lyre player to play the lyre and to a good one to do so well)" (*NE* I 7 1098^{a}8–12). (2) Some craftsmen know all that is in the craft handbook, so to speak, but when it comes to problems that lie outside it, and so require deliberation, they sometimes arrive at reasons that are false (VI 5 1140^{a}28–30). These people know all the true handbook reasons, but not the true deliberative ones. They may be good craftsmen for routine jobs, but, lacking the relevant sort of practical wisdom, they are not good for hard cases. (3) Some craftsmen are wise (*sophos*) in that they are the most exact practitioners of their craft (7 1140^{b}9–10). They know not just the true handbook and deliberative reasons, but the ultimate explanatory ones—those that might be found in the most exact treatises on the craft's

starting-points. Thus, what distinguishes "those doctors who pursue their craft in a more philosophical or wisdom-loving way" is that their search for the "primary starting-points of health and disease" leads them to begin by considering nature in general (*Sens.* 1 436^{a}17–^{b}1; also *Juv.* 21 480^{b}22–30). This third class is that of the architectonic craftsmen: "It is also because of this that we consider the architectonic practitioners in each craft to be more estimable, to know in a yet more full sense, and to be wiser than the handicraftsmen, because they know the causes of the things they produce. The handicraftsmen, by contrast, we consider to be like some sort of inanimate things that produce without knowing what they produce, in the way, for example, that fire burns. But whereas inanimate things produce each result by a sort of natural tendency, the handicraftsmen do so by habit—the supposition being that architectonic craftsmen are wiser not in terms of being practically efficient, but in terms of having the account themselves and knowing the causes" (*Met.* I 1 981^{a}30–^{b}6). We can see, then, why "in the most controlling sense the ones who above all do actions, even in the case of external actions, are the ones who by means of their thoughts are their architectonic craftsmen" (*Pol.* VII 3 1325^{b}22–23). We can see too why—at any rate in the practical sphere—politics seems to be the most architectonic science, "since it is the one that prescribes which of the sciences need to exist in cities and which ones each class in cities should learn and up to what point. Indeed, we see that even the capacities that are generally most honored are under it—for example, generalship, household management, and rhetoric. And . . . it uses the other practical sciences and, furthermore, legislates about what must be done and what avoided" (*NE* I 2 1094^{a}26–^{b}6).

Note 7

Now as things stand those who have put together works on the craft of speeches have provided (one might almost say) no part of it: Kassel reads ὀλίγον {159} πεπονήκασιν ("those who have put together works on the craft of speeches have labored at a small part of it").

Works on the craft of speeches (*tas technas tôn logôn*): Or "the craft of rhetoric."

Note 8

Only the means of persuasion are within the province of craft: Reading ἐστι with Kassel, Grimaldi, and the mss. for OCT εἰσι.

The means of persuasion (*hai pisteis*): A *pistis*, for Aristotle, is "a sort of demonstration" (I 1 1355^{a}5)—on which, see 1354^{a}3n(6). But this is clearly the ideal: *pisteis* "should be demonstrative" (III 17 1417^{b}21), actual *pisteis*, however, need not be: "*pisteis* come about not only through demonstrative argument but also through argument expressive of character" (I 8 1366^{a}9–10). Indeed, only some *pisteis* "proceed through speech" (1356^{a}1) or "through showing" (1356^{a}35–36). Moreover, some *pisteis* are outside the province of the craft of rhetoric, namely, "those that are not provided by ourselves but are there at the start—for example, witnesses, results of torture, contracts, and the like" (1355^{b}35–37). Although even in these cases, rhetoric has various roles to play (I 15). Rhetoric, for its part, is "a capacity to get a theoretical grasp on what is possibly persuasive (*pithanon*) in each case" (I 2 1355^{b}25–26). Thus, at a minimum, *pisteis* should be persuasive items—items productive of conviction (another meaning of *pistis*). All in all, then, "means of persuasion" seems like a good translation: for these can take the form of argument, but need not (a piece of evidence can persuade us of something), are at their best demonstrative, but can be inductive too, and are productive of conviction. Not everything that speakers or listeners take to be *pisteis* are *pisteis*, however, so that we need to distinguish between genuine *pisteis* and apparent ones: "just as in dialectical ones there is induction, deduction, and apparent deduction, so it is like that here [in rhetoric] as well" (1356^{a}36–^{b}2). So means of persuasion should be understood as the genus whose species are genuine means of persuasion and apparent ones. Apparent enthymemes are discussed in II 24.

Within the province of craft: See I 2 1355^{b}35–39.

Note 9

Enthymemes: An enthymeme is a rhetorical demonstration (I 1 1355^{a}5–6).

The body (*sôma*) **of the means of persuasion:** As opposed to an accessory or appendage (*prosthêkai*). Notice *kephalaiôdôs* at III 19 1419^{b}32, which derives from *kephalê* ("head"): the introduction to the speech prepares the way for the enthymematic body; the epilogue recapitulates it in headline form. See also Introduction, pp. xl–lii.

Matters that are outside the thing at issue (*tôn exo tou pragmatos*): The thing at issue need not be a specifically legal issue, although it may be

one, as in *hoi ponêron to pragma echontes* ("those who have a bad case") at III 14 1415^{b}22.

Note 10

Accusation, pity, anger, and such feelings (*ta toiauta pathê*) **of the soul:** The feelings in question are not, apparently, all feelings, but those relevant to rhetoric, {160} which are identified at III 19 1419^{b}25–27 as "pity, indignation, anger, hatred, envy, jealousy [or emulation], and strife (*eris*)" and are defined as a class at II 1 1378^{a}19–21.

Accusation (*diabolê*): *Diabolê* is not itself a feeling, but is apparently being used as a sort of shorthand for the feelings it is used to arouse—the same is perhaps true of *eris*. The cognate verb *diaballein* means "to make hostile, to engender a mutual dislike between two parties." See Introduction, pp. lvi–lvii. In III 14–15, however, *diaballein* is used for any sort of accusation no matter whether it is justified or not, what is also the usual meaning of the verbs *diaballein* ("accuse") and *antidiaballein* ("counteraccuse"). So I have opted to use "accuse" as the uniform translation.

Feelings (*pathê*): The verb *paschein* means "suffer," "undergo," "be affected by," so that *pathê* are things we are passive in experiencing rather than active—"affections" and "passions" are common translations.

Soul (*psuchê*): Unlike souls as we conceive of them, which are found only in "higher" beings like us, Aristotelian souls are found wherever there is life and movement: souls are animators. Thus all plants and animals, however primitive or simple, have some sort of soul. Moreover, unlike Cartesian or some religious conceptions of the soul, Aristotelian souls (understanding aside) are tightly tied to the bodies whose souls they are. The account of them makes this apparent: "It is necessary, then, for the soul to be substance, as form, of a natural body that has life potentially. But substance is actuality. Therefore, it is the actuality of such a body. But something is said to be actual in two ways, either as scientific knowledge is or as contemplating is. And it is evident that it is as scientific knowledge is. For both sleep and waking depend on the presence of the soul; waking is analogous to contemplating, and sleep to having but not exercising [scientific knowledge]; and in the same individual scientific knowledge is prior in coming to be. That is why the soul is the first actuality of a natural body that has life potentially" (*DA* II

2 412^{b}19–28). Thus an ensouled body is a matter-form compound whose body is matter and whose soul is form.

Although the various sorts of soul are found separated from each other in other living things, they are also found hierarchically organized within the human soul, with higher ones presupposing lower ones (*Pol.* VII 14 1333^{a}21–30, 15 1334^{b}15). On the lowest rung in the hierarchy is nutritive soul, responsible for nutrition and growth. It is the only sort of soul possessed by plants. The next rung up is perceptual soul, responsible for perception and for the feeling and appetite that cause animal movement. Together with nutritive soul it is found in all animals. In human beings, both are constituents of the non-rational part of the soul. The third sort of soul, found only in human beings, is rational soul, which comprises the part of the soul that has reason and the understanding.

Looked at from the bottom up, rather than from the top down, this hierarchy is teleological: lower sorts of soul and their functions are for the sake of the higher ones. For example, the homoeomerous parts, such as flesh, and their functions exist for the sake of the non-homoeomerous or structured parts and their functions. Among the latter parts, the sense organs are particularly important with regard to survival, which is essential for all other functioning (*DA* III 12 {161} 434^{a}22–^{b}27). In animals with rational soul, the senses (especially smell, hearing, and sight) "inform us of many distinctions from which arise practical wisdom about intelligible objects as well as those of action," and so also exist "for the sake of doing well" or being happy (*Sens.* 1 436^{b}10–437^{a}3). Finally, practical wisdom itself, though it exists for its own sake, also exists for the sake of the understanding (*NE* VI 13 1145^{a}6–9). Understanding, then, is at the teleological peak of the organization, and so is the final or teleological cause of everything else in it.

Do not have to do with the thing at issue, but are related to the juror: Compare III 14 1415^{b}4–9.

Juror (*dikastês*): Since verdicts were typically determined by majority vote of the jurors, the distinction we make between judge and jury had little or no application in Athenian trials, so that a juror was in effect a sort of judge.

Note 11

Cities (*poleis*): Unlike a typical modern city, a *polis* enjoyed the political sovereignty characteristic of a modern state: it could possess its own army and navy, enter into alliances, make war, and so on. Unlike a typical modern state, however, it was a politically, religiously, and culturally unified community, and quite small scale. The territory of a *polis* included a single (typically) walled town (*astu*) with a citadel and a marketplace, which, as the political and governmental heart of the *polis,* is itself often referred to as the *polis*. But a *polis* also included the surrounding agricultural land, and the citizens lived both there and inside the town proper.

Good legislative order (*eunomoumenais*): "Political virtue and vice are closely investigated by those concerned with good legislative order (*eunomias*). Thus it is quite evident that the city must be concerned with virtue—at any rate, the one that is truly, and not just for the sake of argument, so called" (*Pol.* III 9 $1280^{b}5$–8).

Note 12

The court of the Areopagus: From earliest times the Athenian court of the Areopagus (a rocky hill northwest of the Acropolis) had jurisdiction over homicide cases, but came to have "extensive supervisory powers over the important aspects of political life" (*Ath.* VIII 4 10–12). Since its members were drawn from the richer classes, it was a powerful oligarchic element in the constitution.

Note 13

Distort (*diastrephein*): The distortion is the sort that feelings generally produce because of their involvement with pleasure and pain: "What is pleasant or painful does not ruin or distort (*diastrephei*) every sort of supposition (for example, that triangles do or do not contain two right angles) but it does do this to the one about what is doable in action" (*NE* VI 5 $1140^{b}13$–16); "Depravity produces distortion and false views about practical starting-points" (12 $1144^{a}35$–36); "Spirit [or anger] distorts (*diastrephei*) [the judgment of] rulers even when they are the best men" (*Pol.* III 16 $1287^{a}31$–32). That is why, to correct these distortions, and produce a virtuous mean in our feelings we should investigate "what we ourselves are easily drawn toward, since different people are naturally inclined toward different things. This will become known to us from the pleasure and pain that the things bring {162} about in us. And it is in the contrary direction that we should drag ourselves off, since it is by pulling

well away from error that we shall attain the mean—as people do in rectifying distortions (*diestrammena*) in pieces of wood" (*NE* II 9 $1109^{b}1$–7).

Standard (*kanon*): "Each state [of character] has its own special set of things that are pleasant or noble, and an excellent person is perhaps distinguished most by his seeing what is true in each case, since he is like a standard and measure of them" (*NE* III 4 $1113^{a}31$–33).

Note 14

Whatever the legislator has not defined: See I 13 $1374^{a}26$-$^{b}1$. The point being made here is that the juror should determine where justice lies for himself, not allow the litigants to shape his judgment by manipulating his feelings.

Recognize (*gignôskein*): See I $1354^{a}3$n.

Note 15

It is fitting for laws that are correctly laid down to define everything themselves, wherever possible: "Those who think it advantageous to be ruled by a king hold that laws speak only of the universal, and do not prescribe with a view to particular circumstances, so that it is foolish to rule in any craft in accord with what is written down. And so it is a good thing that in Egypt the doctors are allowed to change the treatment [prescribed by the manuals] after the fourth day—although, if they do so earlier, it is at their own risk. It is evident, therefore, that the best constitution is not one that is in accord with what is written down and laws, due to the same cause. But then, the rulers should possess the universal account as well. And something to which the passionate element is wholly unattached is better than something in which it is innate. This element does not belong to the law, whereas every human soul necessarily possesses it. But presumably it should be said, to balance this, that a human being will deliberate better about particular cases. Is it not clear, therefore, that he must be a legislator, and that laws must be laid down, but they must not be in control insofar as they deviate from what is best, although they should certainly be in control everywhere else?" (*Pol.* III 15 $1286^{a}10$–25). See also *Rh.* I 15 $1375^{b}23$–25.

It is easier to find one or a few than to find many who are practically-wise (*eu phronountas*) **and are capable of legislating and judging** (*dikazein*): "While it is possible for one or a few to be superior in

virtue, where more people are concerned it is already difficult for them to be exact practitioners of every sort of virtue" (*Pol.* III 7 1279^{a}38–^{b}1). The point here, then, must also be based on considerations of virtue. This makes it likely that *eu phronountas* is not just a capacity to think well in general (which is one meaning of the phrase) but to think well about matters that require ethical virtue in the thinker. Thus at I 11 1371^{b}27 *to phronein* is an exercise of practical wisdom (*phronêsis*).

Note 16

Assemblyman (*ekklêsiastês*): The assembly (*ekklêsia*) of adult male citizens had ultimate decision-making power in a city. Its membership and frequency of meetings varied from constitution to constitution.

{163} **The judgment of a legislator is not a particular one** (*kata meros*), **but is rather about future things and indeed what is universal** (*katholou*): See also 1354^{a}29–30n.

Adequately seeing (*theôrein*) **the truth:** See I 1 1354^{a}10n.

Their own private pleasure or pain overshadows their judgment: See 1354^{a}24n on *diastrephein*.

Note 17

Attempting to treat matters outside the thing at issue as within the province of craft: The verb is *technologein*, used again at I 1 1354^{b}26, 1355^{a}19, 2 1356^{a}11, 17.

The other things (*talla*): As at I 1 1354^{a}13–14.

The introduction (*to prooimion*), **the narration** (*hê diêgêsis*), **the other parts:** The other parts include the *pistis* ("persuasion"), and *epilogos* ("epilogue," "conclusion"). See III 13–19.

Note 18

Public oratory (*dêmêgorikê*): Also referred to as deliberative oratory (*sumbouleutikê*), which often takes place before the public assembly.

Nobler (*kallionos*): See I 3 1358^{b}25n.

More suited to a citizen (*politikôteras*): Alternatively: "more suited to a politician or statesman (*politikos*)."

Note 19

Public oratory is less malicious than judicial oratory, because more common in its scope: The point is cognate with the one made in contrasting legislation, which is universal in scope, with judgment which deals with particular cases in which the judge's emotions and interests are already involved (I 1 1354^{b}1–11).

Malicious (*kakourgon*): See also III 2 1404^{b}37–39.

Note 20

There the person making a judgment is judging about his own affairs: Because he is a citizen of the city about whose course of action he is making his judgment, and so his own interests are at stake as well as its: "A human is by nature a political animal, and that anyone who is without a city, not by luck but by nature, is either a wretch or else better than human" (*Pol.* I 2 1253^{a}2–4); "One should in no way think that any citizen belongs to himself alone, but that all of them belong to the city, each being a part of the city" (VIII 1 1337^{a}27–29). See also *NE* I 7 1097^{b}8–11.

His advisor (*sumbouleuôn*): "Deliberation is found . . . in the sphere of what holds for the most part but where it is unclear what way things will turn out and where there is an element of indefinability. And we call on partners in deliberation [or advisors] on important questions, when we mistrust ourselves as not being adequate to determine the answer" (*NE* III 3 1112^{b}8–11). See also I 2 1357^{a}2n.

Note 21

Listening with a view to gratification (*pros charin*): See I 1 1354^{b}11.

{164} Note 22

As we said previously: At I 1 1354^{b}22–23.

Note 23

Demonstration (*apodeixis*): See I 1 1354^{a}3n(6).

Note 24

[1] An enthymeme . . . is (one might almost say) unconditionally the most controlling means of persuasion: The adjective *haplous* means "simple" or "single-fold." The adverb *haplôs* thus points in two somewhat opposed directions. (1) To speak *haplôs* sometimes means to put things simply or in general terms, so that qualifications and conditions will need to be added later. (2) Sometimes to be
F *haplôs* means to be F unconditionally, or in a way that allows for no "ifs," "ands," or "buts" (as at *Top.* II 11 115^{b}29–35). In this sense, things that are F *haplôs* are F in the strictest, most absolute, and most unqualified way (*Met.* V 5 1015^{b}11–12), so that what is unconditionally F is what is intrinsically F (*NE* VII 9 1151^{b}2–3).

At I 2 1356^{a}13 we are told that "[2] character is pretty much (*schedon*) (one might almost say) the most controlling factor in

persuasion." This appears inconsistent with [1], but need not be, provided we take *schedon* seriously and, more importantly, bear in mind that the listener's belief that the speaker is of good character, and his consequent trust in him, "should come about through the speech, . . . not through prior belief that the speaker is of a certain quality" (1356^{a}8–10). For the latter makes it clear that the character referred to in [2] is one established —in the best case—though an enthymeme. See also: "Means of persuasion come about not only through demonstrative argument but also through argument expressive of character" (I 8 1366^{a}8–10); "If you possess demonstrations, you should speak both in a way expressive of character and demonstratively, but if you do not possess enthymemes, in a way expressive of character" (III 17 1318^{a}38–40).

Most controlling (*kuriôtaton*): What is *kurios* (or has control) in a sphere determines or partly determines what happens within it; it is thus one of the most estimable or important elements in the sphere, so that what is inferior or less important than it cannot control it (*NE* VI 12 1143^{b}33–35, 13 1145^{a}6–7). When Aristotle contrasts natural virtue of character with the *kurios* variety (VI 13 1144^{b}1–32), the control exerted by the latter seems to be teleological: the natural variety is a sort of virtue because it is an early stage in the development of mature virtue (compare *Met*. IX 8 1050^{a}21–23). Hence *kuria aretê* is "full virtue" or virtue in the full or strict sense of the term. Similarly, *ta kuria* are the words that are in prevalent use among listeners: "By prevalent (*kurion*) I mean [a name or word] a given group would use, and by exotic one that others would. So it is evident that the same name can be both prevalent and exotic, although not for the same groups" (*Po*. 21 1457^{b}3–5). *Kuriôs* and *haplôs* ("unconditionally") are often used interchangeably, for example, *Cat*. 13 14^{b}24, as are *kuriôs* and *kath' hauta* ("intrinsically"), for example, *Cat*. 6 5^{b}8.

Note 25

Deduction (*sullogismos*): See I 1 1354^{a}3n(3–4).

{165} Note 26

Differences (*diaphoras*): The noun *diaphora* sometimes refers to the differentiae which, together with a genus, make up the scientific definition of an animal species or the like. Here, however, as often elsewhere, it is used in a more general sense.

Logico-linguistic deductions (*logikous sullogismous*): "If an argument depends on false but reputable beliefs, it is *logikos*" (*Top*. VIII 12 $162^{b}27$), suggesting that *logikos* arguments overlap with dialectical ones, since both rely on reputable beliefs (*endoxa*) or—more or less equivalently—on things said (*legomena*) about the topic. The next sentence—"For it belongs to the same capacity to see the truth and what is like the truth"—makes it clear that this is the relevant sense here. Enthymematic competence involves being able to distinguish rhetorical arguments from dialectical ones, which involves understanding both enthymemes and apparent enthymemes. See also *Rh*. II 24 $1402^{a}5$n.

Note 27

It belongs to the same capacity to see the truth and what is like the truth: It is uncontroversial that the capacity that enables us to know the truth enables us to know what is like it. But because human beings are naturally adequate as regards the truth and in most cases hit upon it, that capacity is reasonably reliable, the things that appear true to us, and so are like the truth, in most cases are true. Hence, a capacity that enables us to know what is like the truth also enables us to know the truth.

Human beings are naturally adequate as regards the truth and in most cases hit upon it: "Theoretical knowledge concerning the truth is in one way difficult to get and in another way easy. A sign of this is that while none is capable of hitting upon it in the way it deserves, neither do all completely fail to hit it, but rather each has something to say about the nature of things, and whereas taken individually they contribute little or nothing to it, a gathering together of all results is a contribution of some magnitude" (*Met*. II 1 $993^{a}30$–$^{b}4$); "Some of these views are held by many and are of long standing, while others are held by a few reputable men. And it is not reasonable to suppose that either group is entirely wrong, but rather that they are right on one point at least or even on most of them" (*NE* I 8 $1098^{b}27$–29); "Things that seem to be so to everyone, these, we say, are" (X 2 $1172^{b}36$–$1173^{a}1$). But the confused truths that are readily grasped by us should not be confused with scientifically perspicuous ones: "In all methodical inquiries in which there is knowledge, that is, scientific knowledge, of things that have starting-points, causes, or elements, it comes from knowledge of these (for we think that we know each thing when we know its first causes and first starting-points, all the way to its elements), so it is clear that in the

scientific knowledge of nature our first task must be to try to determine the starting-points. And the natural route is from things that are knowable and more perspicuous to us to things that are more perspicuous and more knowable by nature, since the same things are not knowable to us as are knowable unconditionally. That is why we must in this way advance from things that are less perspicuous by nature but more perspicuous to us to the things that are more perspicuous by nature and more knowable" (*Ph.* I 1 184^{a}1–21); "For it {166} advances the work to proceed toward what is more knowable. For learning comes about for all in this way—through things by nature less knowable toward ones that are more knowable. . . . But the things that are knowable and primary for particular groups of people are often only slightly knowable and have little or nothing of the being in them. Nonetheless, beginning from things that are poorly known, but known to ourselves, we must try to know the ones that are wholly knowable, proceeding, as has just been said, through the former. And the things that are in the first instance clear and perspicuous to us are rather confused. It is only later, through an analysis of these, that we come to know their elements and starting-points" (*Met.* VII 3 1029^{b}3–12).

Note 28

Reputable beliefs (*endoxa*): "*Endoxa* are things that seem to be so (*dokounta*) to everyone, to the majority, or to the wise—either to all of them or to most or to the most notable and most *endoxos* (reputable)" (*Top.* I 1 100^{b}21–23; repeated 101^{a}11–13). Appeals to *endoxa* mark a discussion as dialectical in nature; appeals to truth mark it as scientific (I 14 105^{b}30–31). Since reputable beliefs typically have some—albeit often partial and often un-perspicuously expressed—truth in them, they are "like" the scientific truth (*Rh.* I 1 1355^{a}14).

Note 29

If judgments are not in accord with what is fitting, it must be because of these [their contraries] that they are defeated, and this merits criticism: Reading δι᾽αὐτῶν with Grimaldi and the mss. for OCT δι᾽αὑτῶν and Kassel δι᾽αὑτον. The referent is "their contraries." So the point, as Grimaldi (vol. 1, p. 28) notes, is like that at *NE* X 1 1172^{a}34–^{b}1: "Accounts of matters that lie in the sphere of actions and feelings carry less conviction than the facts, and so when they clash with

what is in accord with the perceptible facts, they are despised and undermine the truth as well."

Fitting (*prosêkon*): *To prosêkon* is what is fitting, appropriate, proper or seemly—especially, perhaps in the sense of what belongs (*prosechein*) to something to do because it is the sort of thing it is.

Note 30

The most exact scientific knowledge: "Wisdom in crafts we ascribe to the most exact practitioners of the relevant craft (for example, calling Phidias a wise sculptor in stone and Polyclitus a wise sculptor in bronze), here signifying nothing else by wisdom, indeed, than that it is the virtue of a craft. There are, however, some people we think are wise about things as a whole, not wise in some area or wise in some other particular way, as Homer says in the *Margites*: 'him the gods made neither a digger nor a ploughman nor wise in any other particular way.' So, it is clear that theoretical wisdom must be the most exact of the sciences. Hence a -theoretically-wise person not only must know what follows from the starting-points but also must grasp the truth where the starting-points are concerned. So theoretical wisdom must be understanding plus scientific knowledge—scientific knowledge, having a head as it were, of the most estimable things" (*NE* VI 7 1141^{a}9–20).

{167} **Most exact** (*akribestatên*): A science's degree of exactness (*akribeia*) is measured along three different dimensions: "One science is more *akribês* than another, and prior to it, if [1] it is both of the that and the why, and not of the that separately from the why; or if [2] if it is not said of an underlying subject and the other is said of an underlying subject (as, for example, arithmetic is more *akribês* than harmonics); or if [3] it proceeds from fewer things and the other from some additional posit (as, for example, arithmetic is more *akribês* than geometry). By from an addition I mean, for example, that a unit is substance without position and a point is substance with position—the latter proceeds from an addition" (*APo*. I 27 87^{a}31–37). The upshot is thus twofold. First, the most *akribês* version or formulation of a science is the most explanatory one—the one consisting of demonstrations from starting-points. Second, of two sciences, formulated in the most *akribês* way, one is more *akribês* than the other, if it demonstrates facts that the other deals with but does not demonstrate. Because a natural science has to posit sublunary matter in addition to such starting-points, the strictly theoretical sciences

(theology, astronomy, and mathematics) are more *akribês* than any natural science. Hence it is among these that the most *akribês* one will be found. And it will be the one that explains what the others treat as a fact or undemonstrated posit. The association of *akribeia* with demonstration from starting-points makes "exact" seem a good translation of it, as does its association with abstraction (mathematics), with what we think of as pure (solid geometry) as opposed to applied sciences (mechanics), and with the idea that the *akribeia* of a science or type of argument depends on its subject matter (*NE* I 3 $1094^{b}24$). As applied to craftsmen and their products, *akribês* comes closest to meaning "refinement" or "finish" or "sophistication." Applied to perceptual capacities, such as seeing or smelling (*DA* II 9 $421^{a}10$), it means "discriminating." Applied to virtue and nature, it may have more to do with accuracy—hitting a target (*NE* II 5 $1106^{b}14$–15)—as it may when applied to definitions (VIII 7 $1159^{a}3$) or distinctions (II 9 $1107^{b}15$–16) or units of measurement (*Met*. X 1 $1053^{a}1$). *Top*. II 4 $111^{a}8$–9 offers *saphês* ("perspicuous") as an equivalent: "it is well to replace a word with a better known equivalent, for example, instead of *akribês* in describing a supposition, *saphês*."

Note 31

Teaching (*didaskalia*) **is impossible [in their case]:** "Certain animals share naturally in some learning and teaching, some from each other, some from humans, these are the ones that have hearing—not just those that hear sounds but those that further perceive the differences between signs" (*HA* IX 1 $608^{a}17$–21; also *Pol*. I 2 $1253^{a}1$–18, *Po*. 19 $1456^{b}5$–7). In the full sense, then, teaching is a linguistic activity that involves giving formal instruction in a craft or science. Hence the present claim. "It is from things already known, however, that all teaching proceeds, . . . since some is through induction and some by deduction" (*NE* VI 3 $1139^{b}26$–28). Consequently, listeners that lack such prior knowledge cannot be taught.

Note 32

Common things: See I 1 $1354^{a}2$n.

{168} **As we said in the *Topics* about encounters** (*enteuxeôs*) **with ordinary people:** "[Dialectic] is useful, then, in three areas—in training, in encounters (*enteuxeis*), and in the philosophical sciences. Now, it is immediately evident that it is useful in training, since if we have a method of inquiry we shall more easily be able to attack whatever is

proposed. It is useful in encounters, because once we have catalogued the beliefs of the many we shall do battle with them, not by proceeding from the beliefs of others, but from their own, changing the course of any argument that they appear to us to be stating incorrectly. It is useful in the philosophical sciences because the capacity to go through the puzzles on both sides of a question will make it easier to discern what is true and what is false in each" (*Top*. I 2 101^{a}26–36).

Note 33

One should be capable of persuading people of contraries, just as in the case of [dialectical] deductions: Since these must be usable either in attacking a proposition as questioner or in defending it as answerer (I 1 1354^{a}1n).

Not so as to do both in action (for one should not persuade people of base things): See I 1 1355^{b}15–21.

So as to be able to refute (*luein*) **them for ourselves:** To refute an argument is to untie (also, *luein*) the knot or puzzle (*aporia*) that it produces when it conflicts with another argument, as here an unjust argument is diagnosed as such because it conflicts with (our own) just one: "For those who wish to be puzzle-free it advances the work to go through the puzzles well. For the subsequent puzzle-free condition is reached by untying the knots (*luein*) produced by the puzzles raised in advance, and it is not possible to untie a knot you are unaware of. But a puzzle in thought makes clear the existence of a knot in the thing at issue" (*Met*. III 1 995^{a}27–31). *Luein* sometimes differs from *elegchein* (also "refute") by involving a diagnosis of what is wrong with the target argument: "The person, then, who does away with the thing through which the falsehood comes about has entirely resolved the argument, but it is the person who knows that the argument proceeds through it who knows the resolution" (*Top*. VIII 10 160^{b}33–35). But in the *Rhetoric* this is not so: "It is possible to refute (*luein*) either by stating a counter-deduction or by bringing an objection" (II 25 1402^{a}31–32). Indeed, the two seem to be used more or less interchangeably, and have been translated accordingly. See, for example, II 22 1397^{a}1–6 (*elegktikous* at ^{a}1, *luseôn* at ^{a}5).

Note 34

None of the other crafts deduces contraries: "All the capacities that involve reason are such that the very same one is a capacity for contraries,

whereas the non-rational ones are such that one capacity is for one of them. For example, the hot is for heating only, but the craft of medicine is for both disease and health. The cause of this is that scientific knowledge is an account, and the same account makes clear both the positive thing and its lack, except not in the same way—that is, in a way it is of both, but in a way it is rather of the positive thing. And so it is also necessary that these sorts of sciences should be of contraries, but of one intrinsically and of the other non-intrinsically. For the account too is of one intrinsically and of the {169} other, in a way, coincidentally. For it is by denial and removal that it makes the contrary clear. For the contrary is the primary lack, and this is the removal of the other [and positive] contrary" (*Met.* IX 2 $1046^{b}4$–15). Thus there is a way in which all crafts or sciences are of contraries, and a way in which they are not. Hence the following contrast between sciences and states: "Capacities and sciences do not operate in the same way as states. For the same capacity or science seems to result in contraries, whereas a state that is contrary to another does not result in contraries—for example, from health we do not do contrary actions but, rather, healthy ones only (for we say that someone is walking in a healthy way when he walks in the way a healthy person would)" (*NE* V 1 $1129^{a}11$–17).

Note 35

Speech . . . is more special to a human being than the use of the body: "The voice is a signifier of what is pleasant or painful, which is why it is also possessed by the other animals (for their nature does extend this far, namely, to having the perception of pleasure and pain and signifying them to each other). But speech is for making clear what is advantageous or harmful, and so also what is just or unjust. For this is special to humans, in comparison to the other animals, that they alone have perception of the good and the bad, the just and the unjust, and the rest. And it is community in these that makes a household and a city" (*Pol.* I 2 $1253^{a}9$–18).

Special (*idion*): "A special attribute (*idion*) is one that does not reveal the essence of a thing yet belongs to that thing alone and is predicated convertibly of it. Thus it is a special attribute of a human to be receptive of grammar, since if someone is human he is receptive of grammar, and if he is receptive of grammar he is human" (*Top.* I 5 $102^{a}18$–22).

Note 36

Virtue (*aretê*): Anything that has a function or *ergon* (I 1 1354^{a}11n) has a correlative *aretê*, which is that state of it that enables it to perform its function well. Thus it is possible to speak of the *aretê* of thieves, scandalmongers, and other bad things that are good at doing what they do (*Met.* V 16 1021^{b}12–23), as well as of the *aretê* of nonliving tools and instruments. For this reason *aretê* is sometimes found translated as "excellence."

Note 37

Rhetoric does not deal with a definite genus (*genos*): The various ways in which the noun *genos* is used are discussed in *Met*. V 28. Aristotle uses it in a technical sense to refer to a genus, which is studied by a single science, as he uses *eidos* (*Rh*. I 2 1356^{a}1) to refer to the species of a genus, to form (as opposed to matter), to a separate Platonic Form, and to a certain sort of rhetorical topic (1358^{a}31). But he also uses both terms in a more general sense to mean "kind." The same is true of *diaphora*, which is sometimes the differentia of a species, and sometime a difference of a less specific sort. Transliterations are added where needed for precision.

Its function is not to persuade but to see the persuasive factors belonging in each case, just as in all the other crafts: See I 2 1355^{b}25–31.

{170} Note 38

Sophistic (*sophistikê*): "Sophistic appears to be wisdom but is not wisdom" and a practitioner of it—a sophist—is "one who makes money from what appears to be wisdom but is not really wisdom" (*SE* 1 164^{b}21–22).

Deliberate choice (*prohairesei*): Deliberate choice (*prohairesis*) is a matter of choosing (*haireisthai*) one thing before or in preference to (*pro*) another (*NE* III 2 1112^{a}16–17), and so of deliberating about what things should be done earlier than or in preference to others in order to further the desired end: "someone with understanding chooses the better of two things in all cases" (*EE* VII 2 1237^{b}37–38). We wish for the end or target, we "deliberate about and deliberately choose what furthers it" (*NE* III 5 1113^{b}3–4).

Sophistic is what it is in virtue not of the capacity but of the deliberate choice: The deliberate choice, that is, of using dialectic (the capacity) in a dishonest way.

Note 39

In dialectic, a sophist is so called in virtue of his deliberate choice, and a dialectician is so called not in virtue of his deliberate choice, but in virtue of the capacity he has: "Dialectical arguments are those that deduce from reputable beliefs in a way that reaches a contradiction; peirastic arguments are those that deduce from those beliefs of the respondent that anyone must know (*eidenai*) who pretends to possess scientific knowledge. . . . Contentious (*eristikos*) arguments are those that deduce or appear to deduce from what appear to be reputable beliefs but are not really such" (*SE* 2 $165^{b}3$–8). If we think of dialectical deductions in this way, a dialectician, in contrast to a contender is an honest questioner, appealing to genuinely reputable beliefs and employing valid deductions. And a similar contrast exists between him and a sophist: "Contenders and sophists use the same arguments, but not to achieve the same goal. . . . If the goal is apparent victory, the argument is contentious; if it is apparent wisdom, sophistic" (11 $171^{b}27$–33). As we see from the present text, however, Aristotle also recognizes something we may call plain dialectic, which is the craft or capacity that sophists and honest dialecticians both practice, albeit for different ends, determined by the different deliberate choices they make.

Note 40

The manner in which and the materials on the basis of which we will be capable of achieving the goals we set down: See I 1 $1355^{a}10$–12.

Note 41

Let rhetoric, then, be a capacity to get a theoretical grasp on what is possibly persuasive (*to endechomenon pithanon*) **in each case:** Compare *ta huparchonta pithana* at I 1 $1355^{b}10$–11.

Note 42

The coincidental attributes (*ta sumbebêkota pathê*) **of magnitudes:** In particular these are the *kath' hauta sumbebêkota* or so-called *per se* accidents, which belong to a subject intrinsically and thus demonstrably, but are not part of its *ousia*, or essence (*Met.* V 30 $1025^{a}30$–32, XIII 3 $1078^{a}5$–9, *APo.* I 7 $75^{b}1$, 22 $83^{b}19$). They are to be contrasted with non-intrinsic coincidents which belong to a subject {171} contingently and non-demonstrably, and so lie outside the scope of any craft or science: "About the coincidental sort . . . there can be no theoretical

knowledge. . . . A sign of this is that no science, whether practical, productive, or theoretical, supervises it" (*Met.* VI 2 1026^{b}3–5).

Note 43

That is why we say that, as craft-like (*to technikon*), **it is not concerned with a special, definite genus:** See I 1 1355^{a}8–9.

Note 44

By outside the province of craft I mean those that are not provided by ourselves [as orators] but are there at the start: All crafts presuppose the existence of suitable materials: "Just as the producer does not make the underlying subject (the bronze), so he does not make the sphere either, except coincidentally, because the brazen sphere is a sphere and he does make the former. For to make the this something is to make a this something from what is wholly the underlying subject. I mean that to make the bronze round is not to make the round or the bronze but a distinct thing, namely, this form in something else. For if the producer makes something, he must make it from something else (for we assumed this). For example, he makes a brazen sphere, but in such a way that from this, which is bronze, he makes this, which is a sphere. If, then, he also made this [matter] itself, it is clear that he will make it in the same way, and the productions will go on without limit. It is evident, therefore, that neither does the form—or whatever we ought to call the shape that is in the perceptible thing—come to be, nor is there any process of coming to be of it, and the essence does not come to be either (for it is this that comes to be in something else, whether as a result of craft or as a result of nature or of some capacity). But the producer does make a brazen sphere to exist. For he produces it from bronze and sphere. For in this specific thing he produces this specific form, and the result is a brazen sphere" (*Met.* VII 8 1033^{a}28–^{b}10). Some crafts, moreover, produce suitable materials for other crafts to work on, so that a hierarchy of crafts emerges: "But since there are many sorts of actions and of crafts and sciences, their ends are many as well. For health is the end of medicine, a ship of shipbuilding, victory of generalship, and wealth of household management. Some of these fall under some one capacity, however, as bridle making falls under horsemanship, along with all the others that produce equipment for horsemanship, and as it and every action in warfare fall under generalship, and, in the same way, others fall under different ones. But in all such cases, the ends of the architectonic ones are

more choiceworthy than the ends under them, since these are pursued for the sake also of the former" (*NE* I 1 1094^{a}6–16). It is at the pinnacle of this hierarchy that politics is found, directing and arranging all of them, so that they further human happiness to the greatest extent possible in the circumstances (*Pol.* I 1 1252^{a}3–7n).

Witnesses, results of torture, contracts, and the like: Discussed in I 15.

Results of torture (*basanoi*): In Athenian law, slaves could not appear in court, but a slave's statement, which had to be made under torture, could be produced as evidence. The idea seems to have been that a slave would not testify contrary to the {172} instructions or interests of his or her owners except under torture. See MacDowell, pp. 245–247.

Note 45

Of the means of persuasion that proceed through speech, there are three kinds (*eidos*): Compare III 1 1403^{b}6–13.

Kinds (*eidê*): See I 1 1355^{b}8n.

Note 46

Appearing (*phainesthai*) **to show something:** The verb *phainesthai* ("appear") with (1) a participle is endorsing of what appears to be so and is translated "it is evident," "or it is seen to be," or the like, and the cognate adjective *phaneron* as "evident." *Phainesthai* with (2) an infinitive, as here, is neither endorsing nor rejecting of what appears to be so and is translated "appears." When *phainesthai* occurs without a participle or an infinitive, it may be endorsing or rejecting. Appearances (*phainomena*) are things that appear to be so but that may or may not be so. Things that appear so to everyone or to wise people who have investigated them are *endoxa,* or reputable beliefs.

Note 47

Decent people (*epieikesi*): *Epiekês* ("decent") is sometimes used interchangeably with *agathos* ("good") (*NE* V 10 1137^{a}34–^{b}2). In a narrower sense (defined at 1137^{b}34–1138^{a}3), an *epieikês* person is characterized in particular by an attitude to legal justice that pays more attention to fairness than to the letter of the law. *Epieikeia*, in this sense, is also discussed in *Rh.* I 13 1374^{a}26–^{b}1. What makes an *epieikês* person decent is that he is fair-minded and considerate of others (*NE* VI 11 1143^{a}19–24). When contrasted with the ordinary people (*hoi polloi*), the

epieikeis are the ones who are better off and more respectable (IX 6 1167[a]35–[b]1).

No belief either way (*to amphidoxein*): The adjective *amphidoxos* means "doubtful," "ambiguous," "ambivalent." At *SE* 17 176[b]14–17 things about which people *amphidoxousin* are contrasted with things that are "determined" (*diôristai*): "About some of the things people say, ordinary people would say that anyone who did not concede them was speaking falsely, whereas about others they would not say it, for example, those where they have no belief either way (for to ordinary people the question of whether the soul of living things can pass away is not something that has been determined)."

Note 48

Character is pretty much (one might almost say) (*schedon hôs eipein*) **the most controlling factor in persuasion:** See I 1 1355[a]7–8n.

Note 49

When we speak about feelings: At II 2–11.

Note 50

What each of them is (*ti hekaston estin*) **and what sort of thing** (*poion ti*): The account or definition of what something is consists of its genus and its differentia {173} (*Met.* VII 12 1027[b]29–30), of which the genus is stated first: "the genus is intended to signify the what-it-is, and is placed first of the things said in the definition" (*Top.* VI 5 142[b]27–29). Sometimes both elements are included in the what something is or the essence: "genera and differentiae are predicated in the what-it-is" (VII 3 153[a]17–18; also *APo.* II 5 91[b]28–30, 13 97[a]23–25). But sometimes the genus tells us what the thing is while the differentiae tell us what sort or quality of thing it is: "a thing's differentia never signifies what-it-is, but rather some quality (*poion ti*)" (*Top.* IV 2 122[b]16–17; also 6 128[a]26–27, *Met.* V 14 1020[a]33). What Aristotle is saying, then, is that in the case of the feelings we must know their definitions by genus and differentia.

Note 51

Work in ethics (*tês peri ta êthê pragmateias*): Or "work concerned with character."

Which it is right to call politics: "Even if the good is the same for an individual and for a city, that of a city is evidently a greater and at any rate a more complete good to acquire and preserve. For while it should content us to acquire and preserve this for an individual alone, it is nobler

and more divine to do so for a nation and city. And so our methodical inquiry seeks the good of these things, since it is a sort of politics" (*NE* I 2 $1094^{b}7$–11); "Someone who wishes to make people—whether many or few—better because of his supervision should also try to acquire legislative science, if it is through laws that we can become good. For producing a noble disposition in anyone whoever—in anyone put before him—is not a matter for some random person, but if indeed anyone can do it, it is a person who has knowledge, just as in medicine and in all other matters that involve a sort of supervision and practical wisdom" (X 9 $1180^{b}23$–28).

Politics (*politikê*): *Politikê* is the practical science—notice *politikê[i] epistêmê[i]* at I 4 $1359^{b}17$)—used in ruling a city (*NE* I 9 $1099^{b}29$–32, 13 $1102^{a}18$–25, II 1 $1103^{b}3$–6, VI 8 $1141^{b}23$–33, VII 11 $1152^{b}1$–3, X 9 $1180^{b}23$–$1181^{b}23$). Someone who knows *politikê* is a true *politikos*—a true politician or true statesman.

Note 52

Rhetoric cuts the same figure as (*hupoduetai hupo to schêma*) **politics:** Compare: "Dialecticians and sophists in fact cut the same figure as (*hupoduontai schêma*) the philosopher. For sophistic is only apparently wisdom" (*Met*. IV $1004^{b}17$–19).

Lack of educatedness (*apaideusian*): This is what pegs someone as not being a well-educated person (*pepaideumenos*). On whom, see II 6 $1384^{a}33$n.

Boastfulness (*alazoneia*): See II 6 $1384^{a}6$n.

Human (*anthrôpikas*): An *anthrôpos* in the most general sense is a human being of either sex, whereas an *anêr*, by contrast, is specifically a male human being—a man. The associated adjective *anthrôpinos*, while it can certainly mean "human," often seems to mean something more like "*merely* human": "We should not, however, in accord with the makers of proverbs, 'think human things (*anthrôpina*), since you are human' or 'think mortal things, since you are mortal' but, rather, we should as far as possible immortalize, and do everything to live in accord with the element in us that is most excellent" (*NE* X 7 $1177^{b}31$–33). *Anthrôpikos* often, as {174} here, has similar connotations (X 8 $1178^{a}9$–22). But even *anthrôpos* itself is sometimes used to refer to the whole human animal, sometimes to the human element in human beings by contrast with the divine one: "But such a [contemplative] life would be more excellent than

one in accord with the human element (*anthrôpon*), since it is not insofar as he is a human being (*anthrôpos*) that someone will live a life like that but insofar as he has some divine element (*theion ti*) in him, and to the degree that this element is superior to the composite, to that degree will its activity also be superior to that in accord with the other sort of virtue" (X 7 $1177^{b}26$–29). At the same time, however, it is also used to refer to that divine element itself, since it is what makes human beings distinctively human: "Of those pleasures that seem to be decent, however, which sort or which particular one should we say is characteristic of a human being? Or isn't this clear from the corresponding activities, since the pleasures are entailed by these? So whether the activities of a complete and blessed man are one or more than one, the pleasures that complete these will be said to be characteristically human (*anthrôpou*) pleasures in the full sense, and the rest will be so in a secondary or many-times-removed way, as are the activities" (X 5 $1176^{a}24$–29).

Note 53

[Rhetoric] is a part of dialectic, and similar to it, as we also said at the start: At I 1 $1354^{a}1$.

And similar to it: Reading ὁμοία with Kassel, Grimaldi, and the better mss. for OCT ὁμοίωμα.

Note 54

Induction (*epagôgê*): See Introduction, pp. xlii–lii.

Note 55

Rhetorical deduction: "Not only dialectical and demonstrative deductions are formed by means of the figures we mentioned [see I 1 $1354^{a}3$n(3–4)], but also rhetorical deductions and simply any means of persuasion whatsoever, and in accord with any methodical inquiry whatsoever. For we are persuaded about everything through deduction or by induction" (*APo*. II 23 $68^{b}8$–14).

Note 56

This is clear to us from the *Analytics*: "All teaching and all learning involving thought result from already existing knowledge. This is evident if we look at all the cases, since the mathematical sciences arise in this way and so do each of the crafts as well. The same holds too where arguments are concerned, whether those that proceed by deduction or those that proceed by induction, since it is from things previously known that they both do their teaching—the former getting hold of them as if

from discerning people, the latter showing the universal through the particular's [already] being clear. (And rhetorical arguments too persuade in the same way, since they do so either through paradigms, which is induction, or through enthymemes, which is just deduction)" (*APo*. I 1 $71^{a}1$–11). See also *APr*. II 23, *NE* VI 3 $1139^{b}26$–28.

{175} Note 57

The difference (*diaphora*) **between a paradigm and an enthymeme is evident from the *Topics*:** Because deduction (= enthymeme) and induction (= paradigm) are defined there: "A deduction, then, is an argument in which, certain things being posited, something distinct from the things laid down results of necessity because of them. It is a demonstration when the deduction proceeds from things that are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has a starting-point in things that are true and primary. A dialectical deduction, by contrast, proceeds from reputable beliefs" (*Top*. I 1 $100^{a}25$–30); "Induction is a route from particulars to the universal. For example, if the navigator who has scientific knowledge is the best one, and so with a charioteer, then in general the person who has scientific knowledge about anything is the best. Induction is more persuasive, more perspicuous, more knowable by perception, and common with ordinary people, while deduction is more forceful and effective with those skilled in contrary argument (*antilogikous*)" (I 12 $105^{a}10$–19).

Something beyond them follows through them by their being so: Kassel secludes διὰ ταῦτα ("through these").

For the most part (*hôs epi to polu*): The fact that things in a given area hold for the most part does not preclude there being a demonstrative science of them (*APr*. I 13 $32^{b}18$–22, *APo*. I 30 $87^{b}19$–27, *Met*. VI 2 $1027^{a}19$–21). Theorems of natural sciences hold for the most part (*APr*. I 13 $32^{b}4$–8), as do those of ethics or politics (*NE* V 10 $1137^{b}13$–19, IX 2 $1164^{b}31$–33). Only strictly theoretical sciences, such as mathematics, astronomy, and theology, have theorems that hold universally and with unconditional necessity (VI 3 $1139^{b}18$–24). *Hôs epi to polu* is not equivalent in meaning, however, to "most," since a universally quantified statement can hold in that way: "*hôs d' epi to polu* all crabs have the right claw bigger and stronger than the left" (*HA* IV 3 $527^{b}6$–7). Instead, it seems to be a special type or grade of modality that is in between contingency and unconditional necessity: "from this of necessity this

('from this' either unconditionally or *hôs epi to polu*)" (*Ph.* II 7 $198^{b}5$–6). See also Introduction, pp. lxxvii–lxxxi.

To show that if some things are so, something beyond them follows through them by their being so, whether universally or for the most part, is called in dialectic a deduction and in rhetoric an enthymeme: Should "for the most part" be taken (1) with "their being so" or (2) with "follows"? Elsewhere, "for the most part" applies to propositions not to the relation between premises and conclusion of an inference, and the logic of for the most part propositions is the same as that for propositions that hold with unconditional necessity: "It should be stated that not only dialectical and demonstrative deductions come about through the figures [of the syllogism] previously mentioned but also rhetorical ones, and unconditionally any means of persuasion (*pistis*) whatsoever, in accord with whatever methodical inquiry. For everything we prove is either through deduction or induction" (*APr.* II 23 $68^{b}9$–14); "Every deduction proceeds either through necessary premises or through premises that hold for the most part. If the premises are necessary, the conclusion is also necessary, but if they hold for the most part, the conclusion does also" (*APo.* I 30 $87^{b}22$–25). This strongly favors (1). But (2) is {176} also—though somewhat remotely in my view—possible. Exploration of it should begin with Allen, pp. 13–86, and Rapp vol. II, pp. 160–167.

Note 58

Methodics (*tois methodikois*): DL V **[23]**, 307 mentions a *metodika* in eight books, while **[25]**, 336 mentions a *methodikon* in one book. Both works are lost.

Note 59

Speeches (*rhetoreiai*): See *Pr.* XVIII 3 $916^{b}26$–31, quoted in II 20 $1394^{a}12$–13n.

Note 60

Enthymematic ones are more applauded (*thoroubountai*): See II 23 $1400^{b}29$–33.

Note 61

Socrates: Socrates of Alopece (469–399 BC), son of Sophroniscus, historical prototype for the protagonist of most of Plato's dialogues.

Callias: Probably, Callias, son of Hipponicus, also of Alopece (c. 450–367/6 BC), who was one of the richest men in Greece, and a patron

of the sophists. Both Plato's *Protagoras* and Xenophon's *Symposium* are set in his house.

What is particular is unlimited and is not scientifically knowable: "It is impossible to have knowledge until we come to indivisibles . . . we cannot understand without making a stop" (*Met.* II $994^{b}21$–24); "How is it possible to get scientific knowledge of unlimited many things? For it is insofar as they are one and the same thing, and insofar as something universal belongs to them, that we know all things" (III 4 $999^{a}26$–29). This is because the starting-points of knowledge must have finite definitions (VIII 3 $1043^{b}34$–36) and demonstrations (deductions) from them—like the chains of causes they describe—must be of finite length.

Note 62

From things [that appear to be so] to those in need of argument, as rhetoric does from things [that appear to be so] to those already accustomed to deliberate among themselves: Reading ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνη μὲν ἐκ τῶν λόγου δεόμενοις, ἡ δὲ ῥητορικὴ ἐκ τῶν ἤδη βουλεύεσθαι εἰωθόσιν with Kassel for OCT ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνη μὲν ἐκ τῶν λόγου δεομένων, ἡ δὲ ῥητορικὴ ἐκ τῶν ἤδη βουλεύεσθαι εἰωθότων ("from things that are in need of argument, as rhetoric does from things that are customary *topics* of deliberation"). The OCT reading is inconsistent with the claim that both dialectic and rhetoric argue from reputable beliefs (*endoxa*) which, as such, require neither argument nor deliberation. Kassel's reading is further supported by *Top.* I 11 $105^{a}3$–5: "Not every problem, nor every thesis, should be [dialectically] examined, but only one that might puzzle one of those in need of argument (*tôn logou deomenôn*), not punishment or perception."

Note 63

The sorts of things we deliberate about and have no crafts for: "We deliberate about things that are up to us and doable in action. . . . [And] among human beings each group deliberates about what is doable in action through itself. There is no deliberation, however, where sciences that are both exact and self-sufficient are {177} concerned—where writing the letters of the alphabet is concerned, for example, since we have no hesitation about what way to write them. We do deliberate, however, about those things that come about through ourselves but not always in the same way (for example, about the things that medicine or moneymaking deals with). And we deliberate more about navigation than

about athletic training, insofar as navigation has been less exactly worked out. Further, deliberation is involved in a similar way where the rest are concerned but more where crafts are concerned than sciences, since we are more hesitant about them. Deliberation is found, then, in the sphere of what holds for the most part but where it is unclear what way things will turn out and where there is an element of indefinability. . . . We deliberate not about ends, though, but about the things that further ends. For a doctor does not deliberate about whether to cure or an orator about whether to persuade or a politician about whether to produce good government, nor do any of the rest deliberate about their end. Rather, they take the end for granted and investigate in what way and through which things it will come about. And if it appears that it can come about through several, they investigate through which ones it will most easily and best come about. But if it is brought to completion through only one, they investigate in what way it will come about through this and through which things it, in turn, will come about, until they arrive at the first cause, which is the last thing in the process of discovery. . . . Also, if people encounter something impossible, they give up (for example, if wealth is needed but there is no way to provide it), whereas if it appears possible, they set about doing the action. But possible things are ones that could come about through ourselves. . . . It seems, then, as we said, that a human being is a starting-point of actions and that deliberation is about what is doable in action by him, while the actions are for the sake of other things. For what is deliberated about is not the end but the things that further ends, and neither, of course, is it particulars (for example, whether this thing is a loaf or whether it is cooked in the way it should be), since these are matters for perception. And if we deliberate at every point, we shall go on without limit" (*NE* III 3 $1112^{a}30$–$1113^{a}2$).

In the presence of such listeners as are not capable of getting a comprehensive view of many things or of rational calculation from a distant [starting-point]: See II 22 $1395^{b}25$–27.

Rational calculation (*logizesthai*): "Deliberating is the same as rationally calculating" (*NE* VI $1139^{a}12$–13).

Note 64

No one deliberates about things that they take to be incapable of being otherwise than they were, will be, or are: Compare: "Nobody deliberates about what happened in the past but they deliberate about

what will happen in the future and what admits of being otherwise, and what is past does not admit of not having happened" (*NE* VI 2 1139^{b}7–9).

Note 65

The primary deduction: The fully explicit deduction that is known to the speaker and shapes his speech.

{178} Note 66

If one of these is known, there is no need to state it, since the listener himself supplies it: Compare: "As sometimes happens in asking [dialectical] questions, however, so here [in practical deliberation] thought does not stop to consider the other premise, the one that is clear. For example, if taking walks is good for a man, he does not linger over the thought that he is a man" (*MA* 7 701^{a}26–29).

Note 67

Dorieus: The son of Diagoras of Rhodes, to whom Pindar's seventh Olympian ode is inscribed.

Note 68

Since things that happen for the most part and are possible must be deduced from other such things, and necessary ones from necessary ones (and this is clear to us from the *Analytics*): See Introduction, pp. lxxvii–lxxix.

Note 69

Enthymemes are based on likelihoods (*eikotôn*) **and signs** (*sêmeiôn*): "A likelihood and a sign are not the same, but rather a likelihood is a premise that is a reputable belief. For what people know happens or does not happen for the most part, or is or is not for the most part, is a likelihood—for example, 'people hate those they envy' or 'people love those they sexually desire.' A sign, on the other hand, is meant to be a demonstrative premise, whether a necessity or a reputable belief. For whatever is such that if it is, a certain thing is, or if it happened earlier or later, the thing in question would have happened, is a sign of the thing's happening or being. (An enthymeme is composed of likelihoods and signs.) A sign, though, may be taken in three ways, corresponding to the ways in which the middle terms in the figures is taken. For it is taken either as in the first figure, as in the middle, or as in the third. . . . If one premise alone is stated, it is only a sign, but if the

other is taken along with it, it is a deduction" (*APr.* II 27 70^{a}2–25). On the figures of a syllogism, see. *Rh.* I 1 1354^{a}3n(3).

Note 70

A likelihood is what comes about for the most part, not however simply so, as some people define it, but rather when it concerns things that admit of being otherwise: Some truths that hold for the most part (such as the theorems of natural sciences) are necessary, though not unconditionally necessary, and so do not admit of being otherwise (I 2 1356^{b}17n). Since rhetoric deals with things we deliberate about, and these are things that we take to be capable of being other than they are (1357^{a}5–7), a likelihood, as composing an enthymeme (rhetorical deduction) in particular, does not deal with them, but only with those that do admit of being otherwise.

As some people define it: The precise reference is unclear.

Standing in relation to that in relation to which it is a likelihood as the universal stands to the particular: See Introduction, pp. lxxvii–lxxxi.

{179} Note 71

Particular (*kath' hekaston*) **. . . universal** (*katholou*): Aristotle usually contrasts particulars as things that are severally one in number and jointly many (*Met.* III 4 999^{b}34–1000^{a}1), with universals, which belong to many numerically distinct particulars (VII 13 1038^{b}11–12). But sometimes what is *kath' hekaston* is what is less universal than something else. Thus while true particulars are indefinable (15 1039^{b}27–29, 1040^{a}27–^{b}4), it is "easier to define *to kath' hekaston* than the universal" (*APo.* II 13 97^{b}28), and a definition of a universal "divides it into *kath' hekasta*" (*Ph.* I 1 184^{b}2–3), where these are things that are particular in the sense of being "indivisible in species" (*PA* I 4 644^{a}30–31).

Note 72

***Tekmar* and *peras* are the same in the ancient tongue:** Both refer to a limit or end-point. "Come to an end" in the previous sentence is *peperasmenon*.

Note 73

In the *Analytics*: The reference is to *APr.* II 27. See I 2 1357^{a}31–33n.

Note 74

We have said that a paradigm is an induction and what sorts of things it is an induction about: At I 2 1356^{b}12–1357^{b}21.

Note 75

Dionysius is aiming at tyranny in demanding a bodyguard: Dionysius I, the ruling tyrant of Sicily (406–367 BC). For discussion of the demand for bodyguards, see *Pol.* III 15 1286^{b}27–40.

Pisistratus: The Athenian leader of the pro-democratic "hill-dwellers," against the rich landowning "plains-dwellers" (*Pol.* IV 15 1300^{a}25). In 561 BC he was able to persuade the Athenians to give him a bodyguard and make himself tyrant. See *Ath.* 13–14, Herodotus I.59.

Theagenes: Theagenes became tyrant of Megara in the latter half of the seventh cent BC, from which he was eventually driven out. See Thucydides I.126, Plutarch, *Aetia Roman et Graeca*, 295c–d.

Note 76

Just as some are in accord with the dialectical methodical investigation of deductions: Reading ὥσπερ καὶ κατὰ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν μέθοδον τῶν συλλογισμῶν with OCT; Kassel secludes.

Note 77

The difference escapes the notice of the listeners, and the more they grasp in accord with a mode [of inquiry], the more they stray beyond these [namely, rhetoric or dialectic]: Reading διὸ καὶ λανθάνουσίν τε [τοὺς ἀκροατὰς] καὶ μᾶλλον ἁπτόμενοι κατὰ τρόπον μεταβαίνουσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν with Cope and Grimaldi for OCT διὸ καὶ λανθάνουσίν τε τοὺς ἀκροατὰς καὶ [μᾶλλον] ἁπτόμενοι κατὰ τρόπον μεταβαίνουσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν. Kassel inserts a lacuna after ἀκροατὰς.

Perspicuous (*saphes*): See III 2 1404^{b}2n.

{180} Note 78

What we call topics (*topous*): "Topic" is the standard translation of *topos*, which means "place." The name may stem from a mnemonic device in which particular forms of argument or particular views were associated with particular places. See Introduction, pp. lxx–lxxii.

Topics . . . are common when . . . : Reading κοινοὶ with OCT and most mss.; Kassel reads κοινῇ with ms. F ("topics concern in common just things and natural ones").

The topic of the more and the less: Discussed in II 23 1397^{b}12–29 and *Top.* V 8.

The more and the less (*to mallon kai hêtton*): Corresponding to our notion of degree, and so connected to the notion of increasing and decreasing—tightening and loosening (*epiteinein kai aniêsin*). Thus as a

musician tightens or loosens his instrument's strings until a certain target note is struck (*Pol.* IV 3 1290^{a}22–29), so too with vocal cords, sinews, and other string-like things (*GA* V 7 787^{b}10–24). Hence Aristotle employs the notion of tightening and loosening wherever a certain tripartite structure is thought to exist, consisting of a continuous underlying subject (*to mallon kai hêtton*), a pair of opposed attributes that can vary in degree, and a target, typically a mean condition of some sort, that can be achieved by tightening or loosening the underlying subject to change the degree of the attributes. As a result, he speaks of tightening and loosening in characterizing a wide range of phenomena, from the parts of animals to political constitutions (*Pol.* V 9 1309^{b}18–31, *Rh.* I 4 1360^{a}23–30). In the case of noses and other such parts, the continuous underlying subject is flesh and bone (or its shape), the pair of opposite attributes is hooked and snub, and the target—which lies somewhere in between the two, and so (as in political constitutions) in a mean of some sort—is being a straight nose, or at the very least a nose of some sort. In the case of colors too, while many are constituted out of white and black in some definite ratio, others are constituted in "some incommensurable ratio of excess or deficiency," and so are apt for tightening and loosening (*Sens.* 3 439^{b}30). Because *to mallon kai hêtton* is found in many different genera, it cannot be the subject matter of any of the first-order sciences, since these are restricted to a single genus (I 1 1354^{a}3n(5)).

Note 79

It is no less possible (*ouden . . . mallon*): Literally, "none the more," but that would reverse the meaning here.

Note 80

Premises (*protaseis*): A *protasis*—the word occurs here for the first time, though is implicitly in use earlier—is at once a proposition and a premise in a deduction or argument. Unless context demands otherwise, it is translated as "premise."

Note 81

The common topics will not make someone wise about any genus, since they are not concerned with any underlying subject: "The genus . . . is the underlying subject of the differentiae" (*Met.* V 6 1016^{a}26)

{181} Note 82

The better someone is at selecting premises: Retaining τὰς προτάσεις ("premises") with Kassel; OCT secludes. Compare: "Unconditionally, then, it is better to try to make what is posterior known through what is prior. For proceeding in this way is more scientific. Nevertheless, in relation to those who cannot know through things of the latter sort it is presumably necessary to produce the account through things knowable to them. . . . One must not fail to notice, however, that it is not possible for those who define in this way to make clear the essence of the definiendum, *unless it so happens that the same thing is more knowable both to us and also unconditionally more knowable*, if indeed a correct definition must define through the genus and the differentiae, and these are among the things that are unconditionally more knowable than the species and prior to it" (*Top.* VI 4 $141^{b}15$–28).

Note 83

If he hits upon starting-points, it will no longer be dialectic or rhetoric, but instead will be that science whose starting-points he possesses: Compare I 4 $1359^{b}12$–18.

That science whose starting-points he possesses: He possesses them, but without realizing that they are scientific starting-points. That is why the fact that he is producing a science distinct from rhetoric and dialectic is unnoticed by him.

Starting-points (*archais*): An *archê* ("starting-point," "first principle") is a primary cause: "This is what it is for something to be a starting-point, that it is itself the cause of many things, with nothing above it being a cause of it" (*GA* V 7 $788^{a}14$–16). On scientific starting-points, see *Rh.* I 1 $1354^{a}3$n(5).

Note 84

By species (*eidê*) **I mean the premises special to a given genus, and by topics those equally common to all:** This is perhaps best understood as drawing a distinction between two sorts of *topics*, specific ones (called *eidê*), which are special to a given genus, and common ones that apply in all genera. Thus the *topics* referred to, for example, at I 15 $1376^{a}32$, seem to be specific *topics*.

Note 85

Elements (*stoicheia*): A *stoicheion* was originally one of a row (*stoichos*) of things and later a letter of the alphabet or an element of any complex whole (Plato, *Tht.* 201e). Aristotle uses it in these ways, and to refer to

the five primary elemental bodies (earth, water, air, fire, and ether), from which all others are composed: "Let an element of bodies be (1) that into which other bodies are divisible, (2) present (*enuparchon*) in them potentially or actually (which of the two is a matter of dispute), and (3) something that is itself indivisible into things of another kind (*eidos*). Something like this is what everybody in any context means by 'element'" (*Cael.* III 3 $302^{a}15$–19). At *Rh.* II 22 $1396^{b}20$–22 *stoicheion* will reappear as meaning "topic."

Note 86

Whereas a spectator is [a judge] concerned with capacity: Secluded in Kassel. A spectator is a sort of judge (II 1 $1377^{b}1$–2) but not an unconditional one (18 $1391^{b}16$–17).

{182} **Concerned with capacity:** Is this (1) the capacity of whomever is being praised or blamed in the speech? Or (2) the capacity of the speaker? Three pieces of evidence favor (1): the definition of virtue as a *dunamis* in I 9 $1366^{a}36$–37; the definition of the function of epideictic rhetoric, which is to show that the object of praise (blame) possesses virtue (vice); the use of the verb *epideiknunai* in that very context at $1367^{b}28$–29. In favor of (2) is the natural thought that it is the speaker's command of the art that the audience of an epideictic speech is interested in. Perhaps, then, we should take a leaf from both (1) and (2): the speech is excellent to the degree that it succeeds in making its subject look the requisite way: good if praising; bad if blaming.

Note 87

Epideictic: A speech made on typically ceremonial occasions on which someone or something is either praised or blamed.

Note 88

A deliberative one (*sumboulês*) **is either exhortation** (*protropê*) **or dissuasion** (*apotropê*): Thus what a deliberative speaker does is give advice (*sumbouleuein*) for or against some course of action, so that a deliberative speaker is an advisor (*sumbouleuôn*).

Note 89

Those who speak publicly in the common assembly (*koinê dêmêgorountes*): And so employ the techniques of deliberative oratory.

Note 90

To the epideictic speaker the present has the most control: That is, the most control over the contents of his speech, and so over the reactions

of the spectators. On control, see I 1 1355^{a}7n.

Note 91

The noble (*kalon*) **and the shameful** (*aischron*): The adjective *kalos* is often a term of vague or general commendation ("fine," "beautiful," "good"), with different connotations in different contexts: "*to kalon* in the case of an animal *to aischron* ["ugly in appearance"] is contrary, but in the case of a house it is *to mochthêron* ["ramshackle"], and so *kalon* is homonymous" (*Top*. I 15 106^{a}20–22). (Similarly, the adverb *kalôs* often means something like "well," or "correct.") Even in the general sense, however, *kalos* has a distinctive evaluative coloration suggestive of "order (*taxis*), proportion (*summetria*), and determinateness (*hôrismenon*)" (*Met*. XIII 3 1078^{a}36–^{b}1), making a term with aesthetic connotation, such as "beauty," seem a good equivalent: to bear the stamp of happiness one must have *kallos* as opposed to being "very ugly (*panaischês*)" (*NE* I 8 1099^{b}3–4; also *Pol*. V 9 1309^{b}23–25). Moreover, just as a thing need not have a purpose in order to be beautiful, a *kalon* thing can be contrasted with a purposeful one: a great-souled person is one "whose possessions are more *kalon* and purposeless (*akarpa*) than purposeful and beneficial" (*NE* IV 3 1125^{a}11–12). At the same time, it seems wrong to associate {183} *kalon* with beauty in general, since to be *kalon* a thing has to be on a certain scale: "greatness of soul requires magnitude, just as *to kallos* ('nobility of appearance') requires a large body, whereas small people are elegant and well-proportioned but not *kaloi*" (1123^{b}6–8); "any *kalon* object . . . made up of parts must not only have them properly ordered but also have a magnitude which is not random, since what is *kalon* consists in magnitude and order (*taxis*)" (*Po*. 7 1450^{b}34–37; also *Pol*. VII 4 1326^{a}33–34). It is this requirement that makes "nobility" in its more aesthetic sense a closer equivalent than "beauty," although I have sometimes translated it as "noble beauty," when, for example, it is applied to bodies, and the like. See *Rh*. I 5 1361^{b}7–14.

In ethical or political contexts, which are particularly relevant to rhetoric, the canonical application of *kalon* is to ends that are intrinsically choiceworthy and intrinsically commendable or praiseworthy (*epaineton*) —"Of all goods, the ends are those choiceworthy for their own sake. Of these, in turn, the *kalon* ones are all those praiseworthy because of themselves" (*EE* VIII 3 1248^{b}18–20; also *NE* I 13 1103^{a}9–10)—and that, as such, are contrasted with things that are compulsory. In the same

way, what is ethically *kalon* is contrasted with what is compulsory: "we should be courageous not because of compulsion, but because it is noble" (*NE* III 8 1116^{b}2–4). It is because ethically *kalon* actions are intrinsically choiceworthy ends, indeed, that a good person can do virtuous actions because of themselves (II 4 1105^{a}32) *and* for the sake of what is *kalon* (III 7 1115^{b}12–13). What makes such actions choiceworthy (VI 1 1138^{a}18–20) and praiseworthy (II 6 1106^{b}24–27), however, is that they exhibit the sort of order (X 9 1180^{a}14–18), proportionality (II 2 1104^{a}18), and determinateness (II 6 1106^{b}29–30, IX 9 1170^{a}19–24) that consists in lying in a mean (*meson*) between two extremes. This brings us full circle, connecting what is ethically *kalon* to what is aesthetically noble, lending the former too an aesthetic tinge.

Finally, what is ethically *kalon* includes an element of self-sacrifice that recommends "nobility," in its more ethical sense, as a good equivalent for it as well: "It is true of an excellent person too that he does many actions for the sake of his friends and his fatherland, even dying for them if need be. For he will give up wealth, honors, and fought-about goods generally, in keeping for himself what is *kalon*" (IX 8 1169^{a}18–22). One reason people praise a *kalon* agent, indeed, is that his actions benefit them: "It is necessary, though, for the greatest virtues to be those that are most useful to others, if indeed virtue is a capacity productive of benefaction. Because of this, people most honor the just and the courageous, since courage is useful to others in war, and justice both in war and in peace" (*Rh*. I 9 1366^{b}3–7). But since what is *kalon* is a greater good than those an excellent person gives up or confers on others, there is also a strong element of self-interest in what he does: "The greater good, then, he allocates to himself" (*NE* IX 8 1169^{a}28–29). An excellent person does *kalon* actions for their own sake, not for an ulterior motive, because it is only as done in that way that they constitute the doing well in action (*eupraxia*) that just *is* happiness. An account of *kalon* tailored to rhetoric is given at *Rh*. I 9 1366^{a}33–36.

{184} Note 92

But often they give no thought to [showing] it not unjust to enslave neighbors: Reading οὐκ ἄδικον with Kassel, Grimaldi; OCT secludes οὐκ. The idea is that in advising a course of action, they do nothing to address the injustice involved.

Note 93

They praise Achilles because he went to aid of his companion Patroclus, knowing that he himself must die, though he could have gone on living: For example, Plato, *Smp*. 179e–180a: "The honor the gods gave to Achilles, the son of Thetis, is another matter. They sent him to the Isles of the Blest because he dared to stand by his lover Patroclus and avenge him, even after he had learned from his mother that he would die if he killed Hector, but that if he chose otherwise he'd go home and end his life as an old man. Instead he chose to die for Patroclus, and more than that, he did it for a man whose life was already over. The gods were highly delighted at this, of course, and gave him special honor, because he made so much of his lover." See Homer, *Il.* XVIII.94–137.

Note 94

By nature (*phusei*): "Of the beings, some exist by nature, while others are due to other causes. Those that exist by nature are animals and their parts, plants, and simple bodies—for example, earth, fire, air, and water (for we say that these and things like them are by nature). All these things evidently differ from things that are not composed by nature. For each of them has within itself a starting-point of moving and being at rest—some with respect to place, some with respect to increase and decrease, others with respect to alteration. A bed, by contrast, or a cloak, or anything else of that kind (*genos*), insofar as each such predicate applies to it—that is, to the extent that it is a product of craft—has no innate impulse to change. But insofar as it is coincidentally made of stone, earth, or a mixture of the two, to that very extent, it *does* have one. This is because nature is a sort of starting-point and cause of moving and being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, intrinsically, and not coincidentally. . . . Nature, then, is what has been stated. And things that have a nature are those that have this sort of starting-point. Also, each of them is a substance. For a substance is a sort of underlying subject, and a nature is always in an underlying subject. And these things are also in accord with nature, as too is whatever belongs intrinsically to them, as spatial movement upward belongs to fire—for this neither is nor has a nature but is by nature and in accord with nature" (*Ph*. II 1 $192^{b}8$–$193^{a}1$).

By luck (*apo tuchês*): What happens by luck in the broad sense is what happens coincidentally or contingently (*APo*. I 30 $87^{b}19$–22, *Met*. X 8 $1065^{a}24$–28). What happens by luck in the narrow sense of *practical*

luck or fortune is what has a coincidental final cause. If a tree's being by the back door is the sort of thing that might be an outcome of deliberative thought, it is a candidate final cause of action—an end we aim at (*Ph*. II 5 197^{a}5–8, 6 197^{b}20–22). If wish (*boulêsis*), which is the desire involved in deliberation and deliberate choice, is what causes it to be there, the tree's being by the back door is a genuine final cause. If not, its {185} being there is a coincidental final cause. Unlike chance (*to automaton*), which applies quite generally to whatever results from coincidental efficient causes, practical luck applies only to what could come about because of action and deliberate choice. Hence it is the sphere relevant to action: "Luck and what is by luck belong to whatever good fortune and in general action also belong. That is why luck is of necessity concerned with what is doable in action" (II 6 197^{b}1–2). The sphere of practical luck is also that of the practical and productive sciences (*PA* I 1 640^{a}27–33, *Rh*. I 5 1362^{a}2). Goods external to the soul are controlled by luck (*MM* VII 3 1206^{b}33–34), goods internal to it, such as virtue, are not (*NE* I 10 1100^{b}7–21, *Pol*. VII 1 1323^{b}27–29). See also I 1 1354^{a}10n.

Note 95

What we deliberate about: See I 2 1357^{a}2n.

The starting-point of whose coming to be is up to us: "Of action, then, the starting-point—the source of the movement, not what it is for the sake of—is deliberate choice, and of deliberate choice, the starting-point is desire and reason that is for the sake of something. . . . Thought by itself, however, moves nothing. But the one that is for the sake of something and practical does. . . . For doing well in action is the end, and the desire is for it. That is why deliberate choice is either desiderative understanding or thought-involving desire, and this sort of starting-point is a human being" (*NE* VI 2 1139^{a}31–^{b}5).

Up to us (*eph' hemin*): See *NE* III 1 generally and in particular 1111^{a}22–24: "what is voluntary would seem to be what has its starting-point in the agent himself, when he knows the particulars in which the action lies."

Note 96

We investigate . . . until we discover whether something is possible or impossible for us to do in action: "A deliberator seems to inquire and analyze . . . just as though he were dealing with a diagram—but whereas

it is evident that not all inquiry is deliberation (for example, mathematical inquiry), all deliberation is inquiry. And the last thing found in the analysis seems to come first in bringing about the result. Also, if people encounter something impossible, they give up (for example, if wealth is needed but there is no way to provide it), whereas if it appears possible, they set about doing the action. But possible things are ones that could come about through ourselves" (*NE* III 3 $1112^{b}20$–27).

Note 97

The things that people are accustomed to deliberate about in public (*chrêmatizein*): The verb *chrêmatizein*, which often has the narrower connotation of having business- or money-related dealings with someone (in the *Politics, chrêmatistikê* is the craft or science of wealth acquisition) is here used as equivalent in meaning to *bouleuesthai* but with the emphasis on its public character.

A more thought-involving (*emphronesteras*) **and more truth-focused** (*alêthinês*) **one:** "Of theoretical science the end is truth, whereas of practical science it is work (since, whenever practical people investigate the how of things, what {186} they get a theoretical grasp on is the cause not intrinsically but in relation to something and now)" (*Met.* II 1 $993^{b}20$–23); "The present work [= *NE*] is not undertaken for the sake of a theoretical science, as our others are (for we are not engaging in the investigation in order to know what virtue is but in order to become good people, since otherwise there would be nothing of benefit in it), we must investigate what relates to actions, that is, in what way they are to be done" (*NE* II 2 $1103^{b}26$–30). A similar claim might be made about the *Rhetoric*.

Note 98

Just (*hoper*) **what we said earlier is true, namely, that rhetoric is composed of [1] the science of analytics and [2] the [part of] politics concerned with ethics, and is like [3] dialectic on the one hand and [4] sophistical arguments on the other:** What Aristotle said earlier is that "[a] rhetoric is a sort of offshoot of dialectic and [b] of work in ethics, which it is right to call politics" (I 2 $1356^{a}25$–27). So what he says now is not "just" what he said earlier. Instead, [2] = [b], and [3] = [a], while [1] and [4] unpack [a]. Thus dialectic, since it is a capacity concerned with providing arguments (I 2 $1356^{a}33$), must be equipped

with [1] "the science of analytics," since it is the science that deals with arguments generally, whether deductive or inductive—in other words, with the contents of the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*. Moreover, it must know its way around even [4] the sophistical arguments, studied in the *Sophistical Refutations*, not in order to use them, but in order to see how to refute them (I 1 355^a29–33).

Politics: The word πολιτικῆς is secluded by Kassel.

Note 99

To the extent that someone tries to establish dialectic or rhetoric not just as capacities but as sciences: That is as sciences "of how things stand with some definite [genus]" as opposed to "capacities concerned with providing arguments" (I 2 1356^a32–33).

Re-establishing (*episkeuazôn*) **them as sciences of certain underlying things:** See I 2 1358^a21–26. The verb *episkeuazein* sometimes (and perhaps in our text too) carries implications of deception or falsehood. For example, at *SE* I 1 164^a26–27 it is used to illustrate the difference between genuine deductions and merely apparent ones: "some people are in good condition, while others appear to be so, like tribesman choristers puffing themselves up and *episkeuasantes* themselves."

Rather than only of arguments: See I 2 1356^a25–27.

Note 100

Speak in the assembly about (*agoreuousin*): Or "proclaim about," as at I 1 1354^a22, 13 1374^a20.

Note 101

Experience (*empeirias*): *Empeiria* is not quite what we mean by experience: for us experience gives rise to memory; for Aristotle memory gives rise to *empeiria*. A person A perceives that when X_1 is sick with a fever giving him honey-water is followed by a reduction in fever (*Met.* VI 2 1027^a23–24). He retains this {187} connection in his memory. Then he perceives that giving honey-water to X_2, X_3, . . . X_n is also followed by a reduction in their fever. He also retains these connections in his memory. When as a result of retaining them A associates drinking honey-water with fever reduction, he has "one experience," since "from memory (when it occurs often in connection with the same thing) comes experience. For memories that are many in number form an experience that is one in number" (*APo*. II 19 100^a4–6).

Note 102

And which sorts imported: Rejecting with Kassel the OCT insertions of ἢ and καὶ παρὰ τίνων.

Note 103

Constitution (*politeia*): The U.S. Constitution is the highest law of the land and is embodied in a document. A *politeia* is something like that, but is not simply a set of laws, written or otherwise. Instead, it is the community of people whose laws those are. (The English word "constitution" has a parallel sense, as in "He has a strong constitution.") Aristotle gives a number of characterizations of a *politeia* which show this clearly: a *politeia* is "a sort of way of life (*bios*) of a city" (*Pol.* IV 11 $1295^{a}40$–$^{b}1$); "a certain ordering of a city's inhabitants" (III 1 $1274^{b}38$) or of its various offices, "above all, the one with control of everything" (III 6 $1278^{b}8$–10). At the same time, however, the term *politeia* sometimes refers to (1) a political system of any sort, whether constitutional or not (II 10 $1271^{b}20$ with $1272^{b}9$–11), sometimes to a system of a particular sort, namely, a *polity* (II 6 $1265^{b}26$–28, II 11 $1273^{a}4$–5, III 7 $1279^{a}37$–$^{b}4$, 15 $1286^{b}13$, IV 1 $1289^{b}28$), and often to any political system defined by and governed in accord with universal laws ($1289^{a}18$–20).

Kinds of constitution: "There are three kinds of constitution and an equal number of deviations—ruined versions, as it were—of these. The kinds of constitution are kingship, aristocracy, and, thirdly, one based on property assessments, which it seems proper to call 'timocracy,' though most people usually call it 'polity'" (*NE* VIII 10 $1160^{a}31$–35). Each of these is studied in the *Politics*, as are the ways in which they are preserved or destroyed.

Note 104

The best constitution: "The best constitution is necessarily that order in accord with which anyone might be able to do best and live blessedly" (*Pol.* VII 2 $1324^{a}23$–25). This is because the best life is the life of virtue, so that the constitution "consisting of those who are unconditionally best in accord with virtue . . . is the best constitution" (IV 7 $1293^{b}3$–19). It is described in *Pol.* VII–VIII.

By being destroyed by things proper to itself I mean that except for the best constitution, all the others are destroyed by loosening or tightening: Thus in an oligarchy, where citizenship and access to political office and power are based on a property assessment, tightening consists

in raising the assessment, so that fewer and fewer are qualified. This makes the constitution more oligarchic, since an oligarchy is precisely rule by the few rich citizens, and so is a case of a constitution being destroyed by something "proper to itself": "If they [the ruling group] tighten {188} it by becoming fewer and owning larger properties, the third stage of oligarchy is reached, where they keep the offices in their own hands, but do so in accord with a law requiring deceased members to be succeeded by their sons. But when they now tighten it excessively by their property holdings and the number of their friends, a dynasty of this sort comes close to being a monarchy, and human beings are in control, not the law. This is the fourth kind of oligarchy" (*Pol.* IV 6 1293^{a}26–33).

Democracy becomes weaker not only when loosened, so that finally it ends up being an oligarchy, but also when tightened to excess, just as both a hook nose and a snub nose do not only reach the mean when loosened, but if they become exceedingly hooked or snub they are arranged in such a way that they do not seem to be noses at all: "In addition to all these features, one thing must not be overlooked, which is in fact overlooked by the deviant constitutions, namely, the mean. For many of the features that are believed to be democratic destroy democracies, and many that are believed to be oligarchic destroy oligarchies. Those who think that this is the one and only virtue pull the constitution toward the extreme. They are ignorant of the fact that just as a nose that deviates from the most noble straightness toward being hooked or snub can nevertheless still be noble and please the eye, if it is 'tightened' still more toward the extreme, the part will first be thrown out of due proportion, and in the end will appear not to be a nose at all, because it has too much of one and too little of the other of these contraries. And it is the same way with the other parts [of the body] as well. This, then, can also happen in the case of the constitutions. For it is also possible for an oligarchy or a democracy to be adequate even though it has diverged from the best order. But if someone tightens either of them more, he will first make the constitution worse, and in the end make it not be a constitution at all. That is why legislators and politicians should not be ignorant about which democratic features preserve a democracy and which destroy it, or which oligarchic features preserve or destroy an oligarchy. For neither of these constitutions can exist and

endure without rich people and the multitude, but when a leveling of property occurs, the resulting constitution is necessarily of a different sort, so that by destroying these by laws carried to excess, they destroy their constitutions" (*Pol.* V 9 1309^{b}18–1310^{a}2).

Note 105

The person who has a theoretical grasp on the matter: Reading θεωροῦντι with Kassel for OCT θεωροῦντα. On the issue, see *Pol.* VI 7.

Note 106

Nations (*ethnôn*): An *ethnos* occupied a larger territory than a city, had a larger population, and a less tight political order. It need not have a single town or urban center, and may consist of many scattered villages. See *Pol.* VII 2 1324^{b}11–12 for examples.

Note 107

All these are a function of politics, however, not of rhetoric: See I 1 1354^{a}11n (on function), 2 1356^{a}27n (on politics), and 1355^{b}25–27 (on function of rhetoric).

{189} Note 108

Both for each private individual and for all people in common there is pretty much a sort of target they aim at in what they choose and avoid: "Everyone able to live in accord with his own deliberate choice should posit some target for living nobly, whether it is honor, reputation, wealth, or education, which he will look to in doing all his actions, since not to order one's life in relation to some end is a sign of great foolishness" (*EE* I 2 1214^{b}6–11); "It is evident . . . that the same life is necessarily best both for each human being and for cities and human beings collectively" (*Pol.* VII 3 1325^{b}30–32).

Target (*skopos*): The notion of a *skopos*, which belongs primarily to archery, is used metaphorically to refer to an end, particularly one pursued in deliberate action (*EE* I 2 1214^{b}6–9, II 10 1227^{a}5–7, *Pol.* VII 13 1331^{b}6–8, *Rh.* I 6 1362^{a}15–20).

Note 109

Happiness (*eudaimonia*) **and its parts:** The account of these that follows is suited to rhetoric, which like dialectic relies on reputable beliefs. See I 1 1354^{a}1n.

Note 110

The things that provide happiness or some part of it, or which produce more rather than less of it, are the things that one should do

in action: "Someone with understanding chooses the better of two things in all cases" (*EE* VII 2 1237^{b}37–38); "The person who thinks correctly at any rate must order his affairs by looking to the better target—and this applies to each human being and to the constitution communally" (*Pol.* VII 2 1324^{a}33–35).

Note 111

Doing well in action involving virtue (*met' aretês*): "Let us take it as agreed, then, that to each person falls just as much happiness as he has virtue, practical wisdom, and action done in accord with them. We may use the [primary] god as evidence of this, who is happy and blessedly so, not because of any external goods but because of himself and by being in his nature of a certain quality" (*Pol.* VII 1 1323^{b}21–26).

Doing well in action (*eupraxia*): *Eupraxia* is often used by Aristotle himself as a synonym of *eudaimonia*: "Living well and doing well in action are the same as being happy" (*NE* I 4 1095^{a}19–20); "If the things we have said are correct, and we should take it that happiness is doing well in action, then the best life, both for the whole city collectively and for each individual, would be an action-involving life" (*Pol.* VII 3 1325^{b}14–16).

Action (*praxis*): The noun *praxis* (plural: *praxeis*; verb: *prattein*) is used in a broad sense to refer to any intentional action, including one performed by a child or wild beast (*NE* III 1 1111^{a}25–26, 2 1111^{b}8–9), and in a narrower one, which is the one employed here, to refer exclusively to what results from deliberation (*bouleusis*) and deliberate choice (*prohairesis*), of which neither beasts nor children are capable (I 9 1099^{b}32–1100^{a}5, *EE* II 8 1224^{a}28–29).

What distinguishes a *praxis* from a *poiêsis* ("production"), with which it is often contrasted, is that the latter is always performed for the sake of some further end, whereas a *praxis* can be its own end: "Thought by itself, however, moves nothing. {190} But the one that is for the sake of something and practical does. Indeed, it even rules productive thought. For every producer produces for the sake of something, and what is unconditionally an end (as opposed to in relation to something and for something else) is not what is producible but what is doable in action. For doing well in action (*eupraxia*) [= *eudaimonia* or happiness] is the end, and the desire is for it. That is why deliberate choice is either

desiderative understanding or thought-involving desire, and this sort of starting-point is a human being" (*NE* VI 2 1139^{a}35–^{b}5).

Thus the distinction between a *praxis* and a *poiêsis* is a special case of a more general distinction that Aristotle draws between an *energeia* ("activity") and a *kinêsis* ("movement"; plural: *kinêseis*): "Since, though, of the actions that have a limit none is an end, but all are in relation to an end (for example, making thin), and since the things themselves, when one is making them thin, are in movement in this way, [namely,] that what the movement is for the sake of does not yet belong to them, these [movements] are not cases of action, at least not of complete action, since none is an end. But the sort in which the end belongs *is* an action. For example, at the same time one is seeing [a thing] and has seen [it], is thinking and has thought, is understanding [something] and has understood [it], whereas it is not the case that [at the same time] one is learning [something] and has learned [it], nor that one is being made healthy and has been made healthy. Someone who is living well, however, at the same time has lived well, and is happy and has been happy [at the same time]. If this were not so, these would have to come to an end at some time, as when one is making [something] thin. But as things stand it is not so, but one is living and has lived. Of these, then, one sort should be called movements and the other activities. For every movement is incomplete, for example, making thin, learning, walking, building. These are movements and are certainly incomplete. For it is not the case that at the same time one is walking and has taken a walk, nor that one is building [something] and has built [it], or is coming to be [something] and has come to be [it], or is being moved [in some way] and has been moved [in that way], but they are different, as are one's moving and having moved [something]. By contrast one has seen and is seeing the same thing at the same time, or is understanding and has understood. The latter sort, then, I call an activity, the former a movement" (*Met.* IX 6 1048^{b}18–35). Expressed linguistically, the contrast is one of aspect rather than tense. Roughly speaking, a verb whose present tense has imperfective meaning designates a *kinêsis*, while one whose present tense has perfective meaning designates an *energeia*. The distinction itself is ontological, however, not linguistic: an *energeiai* and *kinêseis* are types of beings, not types of verbs. A *poiêsis* or *kinêsis* is something that takes time to complete and, like the time it takes, is infinitely divisible (*Ph.* III 7

207^{b}21–25, *Met.* V 13 1020^{a}26–32). It has a definite termination point or limit, before which it is incomplete and after which it cannot continue (*NE* X 4 1174^{a}21–23). A *praxis*, by contrast, does not take time to complete, and so does not really occur "in time" (*Ph.* VIII 8 262^{b}20–21) but is temporally point-like (*NE* X 4 1174^{b}12–13). Having no definite termination, while it may stop, it need never finish (*Met.* IX 6 1048^{b}25–27).

{191} The paradigm cases of *actions*, as we understand them, are temporally extended bodily movements appropriately related to (perhaps by being caused by) beliefs, desires, and intentions. Hence "action" is clearly a somewhat misleading translation of *praxis*. Nonetheless, there is one type of action that *praxeis* seem to resemble quite closely, namely, so-called *basic actions*—actions we do directly without having to do anything else. This is especially true, if, as Aristotle himself seems to believe, these are thought to be mental acts of willing, deciding, or trying: "we say that in the most controlling sense the ones who above all do actions, even in the case of external actions, are the ones who by means of their thoughts are their architectonic craftsmen" (*Pol.* VII 3 1325^{b}21–23). Like *praxeis*, in any case, these sorts of mental acts are not bodily movements and do not seem to take time to perform. Moreover, just as we do not perform basic actions by doing something else first, the same seems true of *praxeis*, so that a human being "is a starting-point and begetter of *praxeis* just as he is of children" (*NE* III 5 1113^{b}18–19; also VI 2 1139^{b}5). As in the case of productions, where the form in a craftsman's soul is transmitted to the matter via the movements of his hands and instruments (*GA* I 22 730^{b}12–23), so the results of such *praxeis* may be transmitted via bodily movements to other things that are capable of being changed by them. These results, and the bodily movements involved in bringing them about, are what we think of as paradigm actions.

When a group of dramatic actions have a plot-structure (*mythos*) of the sort a good tragedy possesses, Aristotle says that they constitute a single action that is "one, whole, and complete" (*Po.* 23 1459^{a}19). By being enactments of the real-life equivalent of the relevant sort of plot or plan, therefore, the same should also be true of a group of non-dramatic actions. As a group of actors can set out to perform *Oedipus Tyrannus*, so a single agent can set out to enact a unified plan of action, which involves doing many different things in some sort of sequence. The complex

action that fits this plan may be what constitutes his acting well—his *eupraxia*.

To understand why the agent is doing any of the things specified by the plan, we will typically need to see it in relation to the plan as a whole. For many of these, taken individually, might not be ends or goods choiceworthy for their own sakes: some might be otherwise valueless means to ends, some might be productions of needed equipment, some might be actions whose status as intrinsically choiceworthy, because constitutive of *eupraxia*, nonetheless depends on their role in the plan. As parts of the whole complex action they help constitute, however, all *are* intrinsically choiceworthy, since the complex action is itself so. Hence the unified plan itself might be likened to the form of health in the soul of the doctor, which dictates the bodily movements that constitute, for example, producing the uniform state in a tense muscle, which is the relevant defining mark of health (*Met.* VII 7 $1032^{b}6$–10). The actualization of the plan, the setting of it in motion, is an action, as is the carrying out of the subsequent steps. In performing each of them, the agent is achieving the goal of acting well. For acting well, since it is not an external end, is not something achieved only when the plan is fully executed, as health is produced only when the muscles relax and the patient becomes healthy. {192} At the same time, it does not seem to be an entirely internal end, either, since the plan may fail to be completely carried out.

We set the associated plan in motion, which is a basic action, but whether we will succeed in carrying it out fully is in part a matter of luck. If we fail through no fault of our own, we have in one way done what is required of us—we have tried, we have done all that we could do. In another way, though, we have failed, and may now have something more to do, such as try again or make amends of some sort. The possibility of failure of this sort taints complex actions with unleisure, since it means there are usually obstacles or resistances to overcome in order to carry them out. Many—perhaps most—actions are surely complex. They would be unleisured, therefore, and subject to a sort of incompleteness, even if they had no additional external ends. We might think of a political constitution as a plan for a very complex action, with the citizens, who act in obedience to its laws and so on, as its executors or agents. Similarly, a household, which is part of a city with such a

constitution, is also such an executor (*Pol.* I 13 1260^{b}8–20), and its "constitution"—its operating instructions—is itself a plan of action, which the members of the household put into effect by doing what it prescribes. Thus even when what it prescribes is a production, rather than an action proper, that production too becomes part of the complex action that is the household in activity.

Self-sufficiency (*autarkeia*) **for living** (*zôês*): "The complete good seems to be self-sufficient. By 'self-sufficient,' however, we mean not self-sufficient for someone who is alone, living a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, friends, and fellow citizens generally, since a human being is by nature political" (*NE* I 7 1097^{b}7–11); "Happiness, then, is apparently something complete and self-sufficient, since it is the end of what is doable in action" (1097^{b}20–21).

The pleasantest life (*bios*) **involving security:** Two Greek words correspond to the English word "life," namely, *bios* and *zôê*, both of which occur here. *Zôê* usually refers to the sorts of life processes and activities studied by biologists, zoologists, and so on, such as growth, reproduction, perception, and understanding. *Bios* usually refers to the sort of life a natural historian or biographer might investigate—the life of the otter, the life of Pericles—and so to a span of time throughout which someone possesses *zôê* at least as a capacity (*NE* I 13 1102^{b}5–7). Hence we are reminded that a certain *zôê* will not be happiness for a human being unless it occurs "in a complete *bios*" (I 7 1098^{a}18–20).

Abundance of possessions and bodies (*sômatôn*): The *sômata* referred to are presumably the living beings (wife, slaves, farm animals) that make up a household.

Note 112

The internal ones are those relating to the soul and those in the body: Aristotle recognizes three sorts of goods: those of the body, those of the soul, and external goods (*NE* I 8 1098^{b}12–14), which are usually so-called because they are external to the soul (*EE* II 1 1218^{b}32–33), although sometimes, as here, goods relating to the body are also classed as internal goods.

Whereas good breeding, friends, wealth, and honor are external: "Just as we perform many actions by means of instruments, we perform many by means of {193} friends, wealth, and political power. Then again

there are some whose deprivation disfigures blessedness, such as good breeding" (*NE* I 8 1099^{a}34–^{b}3).

Note 113

For that way his life would be most secure: Reading οὕτω γὰρ ἀσφαλέστατος ὁ βίος εἴη with Kassel and Grimaldi for OCT οὕτω γὰρ ἀσφαλέστατος ὁ βίος.

Note 114

Let us now, in a similar way, get hold of what each of these is: That is, in a way similar to the one in which we got hold of happiness and its parts.

Note 115

Good breeding (*eugeneia*): "Good breeding is a virtue of stock (*genos*), and virtue is among the excellent things; and a stock is excellent in which there have by nature come to be many excellent individuals. And this happens when there is an excellent starting-point in the stock. For a starting-point has a capacity of this sort—to establish many things like itself. For that is the function of a starting-point—to produce many others like itself. Hence, when there has been one individual of this sort in the stock and he is so excellent that many generations receive his goodness, this stock is necessarily excellent. For there will be many excellent humans if the stock is human, [many excellent] horses if it is equine, and similarly also with regard to the other animals. Thus it is reasonable that neither the rich nor the good but those who are from old money or from old goodness would be of good breeding. For the account seeks the truth, since a starting-point is higher than everything. But it is not even the case that those born from good ancestors are well-bred in every case, but as many as happen to have among their ancestors starting-points that are good. When a man is good himself, but does not have the natural capacity to give birth to many men similar [to himself], the starting-point does not have in those cases this sort of capacity" (F94 R^{3} = Barnes, pp. 2423–2424). See also *Rh.* II 15 1390^{b}21–31.

Note 116

Being un-free (*aneleutherias*): In relation to money, *eleutheria* is generosity, and its contrary is *aneleutheria* in the sense of acquisitiveness (*NE* IV 1 1119^{b}27). Since women are presented as being more prone than men to lack of self-control (VII 7 1150^{b}6–16) and intemperance (*Pol.* II 9 1269^{b}22–23, quoted in *Rh.* I 5 1361^{a}9–11n), its pairing with

industriousness (*philergia*—literally, "love of work") here suggests that this sort of un-freedom may be the salient one here. The industry is, as it were, being motivated by the acquisitiveness. If the broader sense is intended, then Cope's "unladylike," though now outdated, may capture it quite well. On freedom, see I 5 1361[a]16n.

Being industrious: The word *philergia* occurs only here in Aristotle.

Note 117

And alike for the individual and for the community, both with regard to women and with regard to men, each of these qualities must be sought: "Since every household is part of a city, and these [namely, man, woman, and child] are parts {194} of a household, and the virtue of the part must look to the virtue of the whole, it is necessary to look to the constitution in educating both women and children, if indeed it makes any difference to the excellence of a city that its children be excellent, and its women too. And it must make a difference. For the women are half of the free population, and from children come those who share in the constitution" (*Pol.* I 13 1260[b]12–20).

Note 118

Those, like the Spartans, in which the qualities of the women are bad, are pretty much half not happy: "The license where their women are concerned is also detrimental both to the deliberate choice of the constitution and to the happiness of the city as well. For just as part of a household is a man and part a woman, it is clear that a city too should be regarded as being divided into two nearly equal parts, namely, the multitude of the men and that of the women. So in all constitutions in which matters relating to women are badly handled, half the population should be regarded as not being regulated by any law. And this is just what has happened in Sparta. For the legislator, wishing the whole city to have resilience, makes this evident where the men are concerned, but has been negligent in the case of the women. For they live free of discipline, giving in to every sort of intemperance, and luxuriously" (*Pol.* II 9 1269[b]12–23).

Note 119

The parts of wealth are a quantity of money, land: Rejecting with Kassel the OCT addition of καὶ.

Privately owned (*oikeia*): Οἰκεῖα is not in the mss. but is added in OCT, Kassel, and most editions. Though *oikeios* often means "belonging

to one's household or family," it here, as often elsewhere, is equivalent in meaning to *idios*.

Free (*eleutheria*): A free person (*eleutherios*) is, in the first instance, someone who is not a slave. In this sense the farmer citizens of a democracy are free people. But a farmer must work in order to get the necessities of life—he is not a man of leisure. So there is another sense in which he is not free. A person who is free in this second sense has distinctive character traits, education, and outlook. Unlike a slavish or vulgar person, he is not obsessed with practical or useful things (*Pol.* VII 14 $1333^{b}9$–10, $1338^{b}2$–4), but is rather the sort of person "whose possessions are more noble and purposeless than purposeful and beneficial, since that is more characteristic of self-sufficient people" (*NE* IV 4 $1125^{a}11$–12). The fact that he is well-educated gives him a broad perspective on the world, rather than a narrow-minded or overly specialized one (*Rh.* I 2 $1356^{a}29$n). Hence he is able to judge or assess the credibility and appropriateness of discussions belonging to different professions and disciplines in which he is not himself an expert, so as to be able to choose competent advisors when he needs them. Only this sort of free person can have practical wisdom and the virtues of character, so that he alone has what it takes to be an unconditional citizen in the best kind of city (*Pol.* VII 9 $1329^{a}2$–17). Since that city ensures that he has the resources needed for leisure ($1329^{a}17$–26), he does not need to work for a living, and so does not "live in dependence on another," which is another important mark of being free (*Rh.* I 9 $1367^{a}32$–33). The {195} art and music he enjoys, and the use he makes of his leisure, further distinguish him from those who are vulgar or un-civilized (*Pol.* VII 15 $1334^{a}11$–40, VIII 7 $1342^{a}19$–32, *Po.* 26 $1461^{b}26$–$1462^{a}4$). But even such a citizen is often under the control of others, whom he must obey, so that there are often substantial limitations on his freedom or self-determination too. In relation to money, *eleutheria* is generosity, and its contrary is *aneleutheria* in the sense of acquisitiveness (*NE* IV 1 $1119^{b}27$). Here—as the next sentence shows—the term refers to property of the sort that a free and generous person needs for a leisured and happy life—or "to live temperately and generously" (*Pol.* II 6 $1265^{a}33$).

Useful (*chrêsima*): That is, useful for living a happy and—in Aristotle's view—a virtuous life: "We should not think that a person who is going to be happy needs many things and grand ones, even if it is not

possible for him to be blessed without external goods. For self-sufficiency does not lie in an extreme amount of these and neither does action. But it is possible to do many noble actions even without ruling land and sea, since even from moderate resources a person can do actions in accord with virtue" (*NE* X 8 $1179^{a}1$–6).

Note 120

By related to enjoyment (*apolaustika*) **I mean those from which nothing at all worth mentioning comes about beyond the use** (*para tên chrêsin*): (1) "In the cases, then, where what comes to be is some other thing beyond the use (*para tên chrêsin*), in those cases the activity (*energeia*) is in what is being produced—for example, the activity of building is in what is being built, the activity of weaving is in what is being woven, and similarly in the other cases, and in general the movement is in what is being moved. But in all the cases where there is not some other work beyond the activity, the activity is in the relevant things—for example, the seeing is in the one who sees, the contemplating in the one who contemplates, and the living in the soul (which is why happiness is also in it, since it is a certain sort of living)" (*Met.* IX 8 $1050^{a}30$–$^{b}2$); (2) "Now, what are commonly said to be instruments are instruments for production, whereas a piece of property is action-involving. For something comes from a shuttle beyond the use of it (*para tên chrêsin*), but from a piece of clothing or a bed we get only the use. . . . Life, though, is action not production" (*Pol.* I 4 $1254^{a}1$–7); (3) "Something is said to be the function of something in two ways. For of some things the function is something beyond their use (*para tên chrêsin*) —for example, the function of the craft of building is not building, but a house, and that of the craft of medicine is not healing or treating, but health. Of other things, their use is the function—for example, the function of sight is seeing and the function of the science of mathematics is contemplating. So, where a thing's use is its function, the use is necessarily better than the state" (*EE* II 1 $1219^{a}13$–18). The effect of the phrase *para tên chrêsin* is to restrict our focus to that class of activities—notice *energeia* at $1361^{a}24$—that we do for their own sake, not for some end beyond them: "The activities that are intrinsically choiceworthy . . . are those from which nothing is sought beyond the activity. And actions in accord with virtue seem to be like this, since doing noble and excellent actions is one of the things that are choiceworthy because of {196}

themselves. Pleasant amusements, though, also seem to be like this. For we do not choose them because of other things" (*NE* X 6 1176^{b}6–10). It is the fact that pleasant amusements, and activities engaged in solely for pleasure, fall within this class that connects them to enjoyment: "For ordinary people, the most vulgar ones, suppose happiness to be pleasure. And that is why the life they like is the life of enjoyment (*apolaustikon*)" (I 5 1095^{b}16–17).

Note 121

Activation (*energeia*): The term *energeia* is an Aristotelian coinage, translated as "activation," when, as here, it is of something, and as "activity," when it is not. The etymology of the coinage is unclear, but Aristotle is explicit that it has been extended from movement to other things (*Met.* IX 1 1046^{a}1–2, 3 1047^{a}30–32), and that it related to another term with an *erg-* root, namely, *ergon*: "The *ergon* ('function,' 'work') is the *telos* ('end'), and the *energeia* is the *ergon*, and that is why the name *energeia* is said [of things] with reference to the *ergon* and extends to the *entelecheian* ('actuality')" (8 1050^{a}21–23). Putting all this together: the activation or actualization of X is an activity, which is X active or actual, which is X achieving its end, which—since "the for-the-sake-of-which is the function" (III 2 996^{b}7)—is X fulfilling its function, and being actively or actually X.

Note 122

Good reputation (*eudoxia*): Referred to simply as *doxa* ("reputation") at I 5 1360^{b}22.

Excellent (*spoudaios*): Often, as here, *spoudaios* is a synonym of *agathos* ("good"). But sometimes, when predicated of things, it means "serious," "weighty," or "important," as at *NE* X 6 1177^{a}1–2.

Practically-wise (*phronimoi*): Practical wisdom (*phronêsis*) is defined for the purposes of rhetoric at I 9 1366^{b}20–22.

Note 123

Benefaction (*euergesia*) **is either with regard to security [of life] and to whatever is a cause of life** (*einai*): Literally, "of being," "of existence."

Whenever: Reading πότε with Kassel, Grimaldi, and the mss. for OCT τότε ("at this time").

Note 124

Many are healthy in just the way Herodicus was said to be: "[*Socrates*:] Herodicus was a physical trainer who became ill and, through

a combination of physical training and medicine, tormented first and foremost himself, and then lots of other people as well. [*Glaucon*:] How did he do that? [*S.*:] By making his death a lengthy process. You see, although he was always tending his illness, he was not able to cure it, since it was terminal. And so he spent his life under medical treatment, with no free time for anything else whatsoever. He suffered torments if he departed even a little from his accustomed regimen; but, thanks to his wisdom, he struggled against death and reached old age" (Plato, *Rep.* 406a–c).

{197} Note 125

And, in relation to enjoyment, pleasant to look at: That is, a source of pleasure to someone who wants to look at him simply to indulge in the pleasure of doing so. See I 11 $1371^{a}17$–19n.

Note 126

Pentathletes: The pentathlon comprised running and jumping, throwing the discus and javelin, and wrestling.

Note 127

In someone in his prime (*akmazontos*): The prime time (*akmê*) for a man's military service is that of his body, which is somewhere between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, while the prime time for that of his soul or his potentiality for thought is forty-nine or fifty (*Pol.* VII 16 $1335^{b}32$–35, *Rh.* II 14 $1390^{b}9$–11), and it is not until then that he has the experience required for practical wisdom (*Pol.* VII 9 $1328^{b}34$–$1329^{a}17$).

Note 128

Not painful [to look at] (*alupon*): The pain may be that of the old man himself, as I 5 $1361^{b}27$ might suggest. But if it is to be parallel with the pleasure in the other cases, as presumably it should be, it is the pain of those who look at him.

Note 129

Virtue of stature consists in exceeding ordinary people in height, depth, and breadth: Reading ὑπερέχειν . . . μείζονι with Kassel, Grimaldi, and the mss. for OCT ὑπάρχειν . . . μεῖζον'.

Note 130

Pancratist: *Pancration* was a mixture of boxing and wrestling combined with kicking and strangling.

Note 131

Many are long-lived without the virtues of body: "We might get a theoretical grasp on the cause of all these facts [about length of life] as follows. We must grasp that a living being is by nature moist and hot, and life also has such a nature, whereas old age is cold and dry as is a dead body. For it is evident that things are this way. But the matter of the bodies of animals consists of these: the hot, the cold, the dry, and the moist. Thus as they grow old they must become dry, which is why the moisture in them must not be too easily dried" (*Long.* 5 466^{a}17–23); "Coming to be [for an animal] is its first participation—by means of heat (*en tô[i] thermo[i]*)—in nutritive soul; and life is the remaining of this participation. . . . Violent death or passing away occurs through the extinction or exhaustion of the heat (for passing away may occur though either of these causes), whereas natural death is the exhaustion of the heat coming about through length and completeness of time" (*Juv.* 24 479^{a}29–^{b}3).

But an exact account of these things is not at all useful for present purposes: Since most audiences will not be sufficiently informed about such subjects for arguments based on them to carry much weight.

{198} Note 132

Decent people: See I 2 1356^{a}6n.

Note 133

Luck is a cause of some things that craft is a cause of too: "But we might raise a puzzle as to why it is that some things come to be both by craft and by chance (for example, health), whereas others do not (for example, a house). The cause is that the matter that serves as the starting[-point] of the process of coming to be in some cases of producing something, or of something's coming to be by craft, and that has some part of the thing present in it, is of [1] a sort that can be moved by itself, whereas in others [2] it is not; and, of the former sort of matter, [1a] some can be moved in the particular way required, whereas [1b] some is incapable of it (for many things are capable of being moved by themselves but not in the particular way required—for example, so as to constitute dancing). The things, then, whose matter is of [1b] the latter sort—for example, stones—cannot be moved in the particular way required except by something else, although they can in another way, as can fire. That is why some things will not exist without someone possessing the relevant craft, whereas others will exist. For movement will be started by those

things that do not possess the craft but can be moved by other things that do not possess the craft either, or else from a part [of the product]" (*Met*. VII 9 $1034^{a}9$–21).

Those of which nature (*phusis*) **is the cause:** (1) Many of the things Aristotle means by *phusis* ("nature") are discussed in *Met*. V 4. But he uses the term more widely than that discussion suggests. In the "primary and full way" a being that is or does something by nature has a nature—an internal starting-point of movement and rest ($1015^{a}13$–15; *Cael*. III 2 $301^{b}17$–18). The world of nature, investigated by natural science, is a world of such beings, all of which have perceptible matter as a constituent (*Met*. VI 1 $1025^{b}30$–$1026^{a}6$). This world is roughly speaking the sublunary one. Beyond it lies the world of the heavens studied by astronomy and theology ($1026^{a}7$–22), where beings either have no matter, or matter of a different sort (*Cael*. I 2 $269^{b}2$–6, 3 $270^{b}19$–25, *Mete*. I 3 $339^{b}25$–27). Although, strictly speaking, these beings do not have natures, since "nature is the proper order of perceptible things" (*Cael*. III 2 $301^{a}5$–6), Aristotle nonetheless speaks of them as if they do (III 1 $298^{b}23$, *Met*. VI 1 $1026^{a}20$, 25 are nice, because particularly unfortunate, examples). We use the term "nature" in a similar way when we speak of the nature of the numbers or the nature of fictional entities, not meaning to imply at all that these things are parts of the natural world (compare XIII 4 $1078^{a}10$). (2) Sometimes, instead of using *phusis* to refer to the or a *phusis of* X, Aristotle uses the term and its plural *phuseis* to mean something we translate as "a nature" (Greek has no indefinite article) or "natures." The thing or things referred to may or may not have natures in the strict sense; they are pretty much just entities of some sort. (3) He also speaks of *phusis* or *hê phusis* in agentive terms—for example, when he says, as he frequently does, that nature does nothing pointlessly (for example, *Cael*. I 4 $271^{a}33$, *DA* II 5 $415^{b}16$–17, III 9 $432^{b}21$, 12 $434^{a}31$, *PA* I 1 $641^{b}12$–29) or that it does something correctly (*Cael*. I 3 $269^{b}20$), or for {199} the best (II 5 $288^{a}3$), or, as here, is the cause of something. Just as when he speaks of "the nature of the All" (I 2 $268^{b}11$) or "the nature of the whole" (*Met*. XII 10 $1075^{a}11$) it is not entirely clear how exactly or how literally these words are to be taken.

Note 134

Virtue . . . most properly belongs with the topic of praises: "Of all goods, the ends are those choiceworthy for their own sake. Of these, in

turn, the noble ones are all those praiseworthy because of themselves" (*EE* VIII 3 1248^{b}18–20). But while many things—including "honor, pleasure, and understanding" (*NE* I 7 1097^{b}2)—have the first of these features, only "the virtues and the deeds resulting from virtue" have the second (*EE* VIII 3 1248^{b}36–37): "among the states—it is the praiseworthy ones that we call virtues" (*NE* I 13 1103^{a}9–10); "praise is properly given to virtue, since we are doers of noble actions as a result of it, whereas encomia are properly given to its works, in like manner both to those of the body and those of the soul" (I 12 1101^{b}31–34).

Virtue must be defined when we give an account of praise: At I 9.

Note 135

People deliberate not about the end but about the things that further the end: See I 2 1357^{a}2n.

And these are the advantageous ones as regards actions: Since action (or doing well in action = happiness) is the end. See I 5 1360^{b}14n.

The elements: See I 2 1358^{a}35n.

In a simple way (*haplôs*). See I 1 1355^{a}7n.

Note 136

[Good is] what all things seek: "Every craft and every method of inquiry and likewise every action and deliberate choice seems to seek some good. That is why they correctly declare that the good is 'that which all seek'" (*NE* I 1 1094^{a}1–3). See also *Top*. III 1 116^{a}19–20, *Pol*. I 1 1252^{a}1–7.

Understanding (*nous*): In the broadest sense of the term, which is probably the one most relevant here, someone with *nous* is someone with sound common sense, and the cognate verb *noein*, like *dianoeisthai*, means "to think" (*Mete*. I 3 340^{b}14, *Ph*. IV 1 208^{b}25, *NE* III 1 1110^{a}11). *Nous*, in this sense, is what enables a soul to suppose, believe, deduce, calculate, reason, and believe, so that it is possible to *noein* something false (*DA* III 3 427^{b}9). In the narrow sense, *nous* is what makes possible a type of knowledge of universal scientific starting-points that, unlike scientific knowledge proper, is not demonstrable from anything further: "About the starting-point of what is scientifically known there cannot be scientific knowledge . . . since what is scientifically known is demonstrable . . . the remaining alternative is for *nous* to be of starting-points" (*NE* VI 6 1140^{b}33–1141^{a}8); "*Nous* is of the terms or definitions (*horoi*) for which there is no reason (*logos*)" (8 1142^{a}25–26). This *nous* is a

divine substance (I 6 1096^{a}24–25, X 7 1177^{b}19–1178^{a}8), or anyway the most divine one in human beings (X 7 1177^{a}16), and so it shares in the immortality that is characteristic of gods: "it alone [of the parts of the human soul] {200} is immortal and eternal" (*DA* III 5 430^{a}23). Consequently, it alone of these parts is separable from the human body and can survive its death: "*Ho nous* seems to be born in us as a sort of substance, and not to pass away . . . understanding (*noein*) and contemplating (*theôrein*) are extinguished because something else within passes away, but it itself is unaffected" (I 4 408^{b}18–25; also *Long*. 2 465^{a}26–32). Among sublunary animals this sort *nous* is fully possessed only by human beings (*PA* II 10 656^{a}7–8, *NE* X 8 1178^{b}24–25). In fact, a human being simply is most of all his *nous* (IX 8 1168^{b}31–32, X 7 1178^{a}2–8).

No English term is a precise equivalent for *nous* or *noein* in this narrow sense. "Intellect," which is in many ways the best choice, lacks a cognate verb in current use. "Understanding" is better in this respect but shares with "intellect," "intelligence," "intuitive reason," "apprehension," and other common translations the defect of not being factive or truth entailing, since *nous* is one of the five states of the soul "in which the soul grasps the truth by way of affirmation and denial" (*NE* VI 3 1139^{b}15–17).

Note 137

This for each is a good: Rejecting with Kassel the OCT addition of γάρ.

Note 138

Things follow along (*akolouthei*) **in two ways:** The same division is given at *Top*. III 2 117^{a}11–13; a threefold one at *Rh*. I 7 1363^{b}28–32.

Note 139

Some in the way that being healthy (*to hugiainein*) **is of health:** "Well, first, let us say that these states [namely, practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom] . . . do indeed produce something; not, however, as medicine produces health but as health does. *That* is also how theoretical wisdom produces happiness, since as a part of virtue as a whole, by being possessed and actualized, it produces happiness" (*NE* VI 12 1444^{a}1–6). Here *to hugiainein* is the state actualized.

Note 140

To the extent that the greater exceeds the less, to this extent there is an acquisition of the one and deliverance from the other: "The lesser evil in the ratio becomes a good in relation to the greater evil (for the lesser evil is more choiceworthy than the greater, what is choiceworthy is a good, and what is more so is a greater one)" (*NE* V 3 1131^{b}20–23).

Note 141

We must speak separately: In I 9.

About what, and what sort of thing, each of them is: See I 2 1356^{a}23–24n.

Note 142

Of the noble ones, some are pleasant, others intrinsically choiceworthy: The first lot are presumably those that are noble (nobly beautiful) in the more aesthetic sense; the second those that are so in the ethical one.

{201} Note 143

Happiness . . . is both intrinsically choiceworthy and self-sufficient and we choose [all] the other things for the sake of it: "Honor, pleasure, understanding, and every virtue, though we do choose them because of themselves as well (since if they had no further consequences, we would still take each of them), we also choose for the sake of happiness, supposing that because of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these things or because of anything else in general" (*NE* I 7 1097^{b}1–6). See *Rh*. I 3 1358^{b}25n.

Happiness is . . . self-sufficient: "We posit that what is self-sufficient is what, on its own, makes a life choiceworthy and lacking in nothing, and this, we think, is what happiness is like" (*NE* I 7 1097^{b}14–16).

Note 144

Justice, courage, temperance, greatness of soul, magnificence, and the other such states (*hexeis*) **(for they are virtues of soul):** A state (*hexis*) is the penultimate stage in the development or bringing to completion of a capacity (*dunamis*), and is a relatively stable condition (*Cat*. 8 8^{b}25–9^{a}13) ensuring that a thing is "either well or badly disposed, whether intrinsically or in relation to something—for example, health is a state, since it is a disposition of this sort" (*Met*. V 20 1022^{b}10–12). Thus in defining the virtues of soul (more specifically, of character) listed here, each of which is focally studied in *NE*, Aristotle first specifies their genus

(*NE* II 5 1106^{a}12–13), namely, states (*hexeis*)—where a state is a condition "by dint of which we are well or badly off in relation to feelings" (1105^{b}25–26). Then, making use of the so-called doctrine of the mean, he goes on to tell us what the differentiae are of the states that are virtues: "Virtue . . . is a deliberately choosing state, which is in a medial condition in relation to us, one defined by a reason and the one by which a practically-wise person would define it" (II 6 1106^{b}36–1107^{a}1). At that point he implies he has discovered virtue's "substance (*ousia*) and the account that states its what it is to be (*to ti ên einai*)" (1107^{a}6–7).

Note 145

Health . . . is the cause of the two things most honored by most people, namely, pleasure and living: "It is clear that most human beings are willing to endure much misery in order to cling to living, on the supposition that there is a sort of joy in it and a natural sweetness" (*Pol.* III 6 1278^{b}27–30).

Note 146

Wealth (*ploutos*) **. . . is virtue of possession:** Begin with possessions and ask what would the best quantity and kind of those be. We answer, the quantity and kind that constitute true wealth. Then we consider that these things could not constitute true wealth unless correctly used, since "it is the activation and use of such things that wealth consists in" (I 5 1361^{a}24). By transference, then, the state of the person insuring such correct use gets called "wealth" too. Elsewhere it is generosity: "Things that have a use can be used well or badly, and wealth is {202} something that has a use. But the best user of each thing is the one who has the virtue concerned with it. Wealth, then, will also be best used by a person who has the virtue concerned with wealth. And this is a generous person" (*NE* IV 1 1120^{a}5–8).

Note 147

A good natural disposition (*euphuia*): Something is *euphuês* if it is well (*eu*)-grown (*phuê*), or favored by nature in capacities, appearance, or some other respect: the situation of a bodily organ can be *euphuês* (*PA* III 4 666^{a}14), as can that of a city (*Pol.* V 3 1303^{b}8); an animal can be *euphuês* as regards a function, such as reproduction (*GA* II 8 748^{b}8, 12), or the acquisition of a capacity, such as bearing the cold (*Pol.* VII 17 1336^{a}20), becoming a poet (*Po.* 17 1455^{a}32), or a musician (*EE* VIII 2 1247^{b}22). The sort relevant here may in particular be the one described

in the following texts: "Where knowledge (*gnôsin*) and philosophical wisdom are concerned, the ability to discern and hold in one view the consequences of either hypothesis is no insignificant tool, since then it only remains to make a correct choice of one of them. But a task of this sort requires *euphuia*. And true *euphuia* consists in just this—the ability to choose the true and avoid the false. For people with *euphuia* are the very ones who can do this well, since they judge correctly what is best by a correct love or hatred for what is set before them" (*Top.* VIII 14 163^{b}9–16); "We must be born possessed of a sort of sight by which to discern correctly and choose what is truly good, and a person in whom this by nature operates correctly is naturally well-disposed (*euphuês*). For this is what is greatest and noblest and is not the sort of thing we can get from someone else or learn but the sort of thing whose condition at birth is the one in which it will later be possessed and, when it is naturally such as to be in a good and noble condition, will be the naturally good disposition (*euphuia*) in its complete and true form" (*NE* III 5 1114^{b}6–12). See also III 2 1405^{a}9–10n.

Readiness of wit (*agchinoia*): "Being ready witted is a sort of good guesswork (*eustochia*)" (*NE* VI 9 1142^{b}6)—for example, of the sort that hits on "the middle term in an imperceptible amount of time," once "the extreme terms are recognized" (*APo.* I 34 89^{b}10–15).

Note 148

Justice . . . is something advantageous to a community (*sumpheron ti koinê[i]*): "the just is the political good, and this is the common advantage (*to koinê[i] sumpheron*)" (*Pol.* III 12 1282^{b}17–18).

Note 149

"Now might Priam rejoice": Homer, *Il.* I.255. Priam will rejoice at Achilles' threat to withdraw from fighting on the side of the Greeks.

Note 150

The end is a good: As that for the sake of which other things are chosen. See I 6 1362^{a}22.

{203} Note 151

"They would leave it to Priam to glory over . . .": Homer, *Il.* II.160. Hera is speaking to Athena, saying that the Greeks would abandon Troy and leave Helen for Priam and the other Trojans to glory over unless she did something to prevent it.

"It is disgraceful to wait long . . .": Homer, *Il.* II.298. Odysseus is encouraging the Greeks to stay and fight, because they have already been fighting so long that it would be disgraceful to go home empty-handed.

Note 152

The proverb about the pitcher at the door: Having carried it all the way from the well to break it at the door of the house.

Note 153

What is praised (*to epaineton*): Or, "what is praiseworthy."

Note 154

Especially the base (*phaulos*) **ones:** Καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι, which is secluded by Kassel and many editors, can be retained if, with Grimaldi, καὶ is understood as adverbial.

Base (*phaulos*): *Phaulos* is often, as probably here, an antonym of *kalos* ("noble") and is translated as "base." Sometimes, though, it is an antonym of *agathos* ("good") and is translated as "bad."

If even those who are badly affected (*kakôs peponthotes*) **[praise it]:** As the addition makes clear, I take this phrase to refer back to the base enemies, who are badly affected because base. The idea is that if enemies, even base or ignoble ones, praise a thing, that is a strong rhetorical basis for arguing that it is good.

Note 155

Simonides: A poet from Iulis on Ceos (c. 556/532–466/442 BC).

"Ilium does not blame the Corinthians": Fr. 67 Page = Fr. 572 Campbell. The abuse seems to be this: The Corinthians fought with the Achaeans (Homer, *Il.* II.570) on the side of the Greeks at Troy (Ilium). Proud of doing so, they will want to be blamed by the Trojans. However, Glaucus, head of the Lycians (876–877), and on the Trojan side, had a great-grandfather from Corinth (VI. 150–211). Apparently relying on this, Simonides in effect represents the Corinthians as Trojan allies, thereby abusing them.

Note 156

What one of the practically-wise or one of the good men or good women has preferred: "Each state [of character] has its own special set of things that are pleasant or noble, and an excellent person is perhaps distinguished most by his seeing what is true in each case, since he is like a standard and measure of them" (*NE* III 4 $1113^{a}31$–33). See also *Rh.* II 11 $1398^{b}20$–$1399^{a}6$.

Athena preferred Odysseus: For example, Homer, *Od.* I.44–63, XIII.299–440.

Theseus Helen: See Isocrates, *Helen* 18–22. Theseus was the legendary king of Athens; Helen, Helen of Troy.

{204} **The goddesses preferred Paris:** The goddesses are Aphrodite, Hera, and Athena. Paris (or Alexandros) is son of Priam, king of Troy. What they preferred was to have Paris judge their relative beauty. See Homer, *Il.* XXIV.25–30.

Homer [preferred] Achilles: Palpable throughout the *Iliad*.

Note 157

The things that are deliberately chosen: See I 1 1355^{b}18n.

Note 158

Those that are possible: Further discussed in II 19 1392^{a}8–^{b}14.

Note 159

This will be the case if the cost (*timôria*) **is unnoticed or slight:** Reading ἐὰν ᾖ λανθάνῃ ἡ τιμωρία with Grimaldi and the mss. for OCT and Kassel ἐὰν ᾖ λανθάνῃ ἢ ἡ τιμωρία. A *timôria* is often retribution or vengeance (I 10 1369^{b}12), but here seems to be simply the cost that makes something seem not less bad than good.

Note 160

Special (*idia*): See I 1 1355^{b}1n.

Note 161

Capacity (*dunamis*): In particular, the sort of "political capacity" discussed at *Pol.* III 13 1284^{a}3–11: "If, however, there is one person, or more than one (though not enough to fill up a city), who is so outstanding in extreme virtue that neither the virtue nor the political capacity of all the others is comparable to his (if there is only one) or theirs (if there are a number of them), then such people can no longer be taken to be part of the city. For they would be treated unjustly if they were thought worthy of equal shares despite being so unequal in virtue and political capacity. For anyone of that sort would probably be like a god among human beings."

Note 162

Being easy they are also possible: Reading ὡς ῥᾴδια with Kassel for OCT καὶ ῥᾴδια.

Note 163

Whatever they happen to have an appetite for, since it appears not only pleasant but also better: "The [primary] object of appetite is the apparently good (*kalon*), and the primary object of wish is the really good" (*Met.* XII 7 $1072^{a}27$–28); "Appetite is concerned with what is pleasant and what is painful" (*NE* III 2 $1111^{b}16$–17); "Pleasure . . . appears to be a good thing" (4 $1113^{a}34$–$^{b}1$).

Note 164

For each group that with reference to which he is a lover of such things (*philotoioutoi*): Reading φιλοτοιοῦτοι with Kassel and OCT but correcting the accentuation of the latter. Compare: "Being pleased is among the things that belong to soul, and to each person what is pleasant is that thing by reference to which he is said to be a lover of such (*philotoioutos*)—as, for example, a horse in the case of a lover of horses, and a play in that of a lover of plays. In the same way, just things {205} are pleasant to a lover of justice and the things in accord with virtue as a whole are pleasant to a lover of virtue" (*NE* I 8 $1099^{a}7$–11).

Note 165

I 7: Many of the views in this chapter are discussed in *Top.* III 1–5.

Note 166

Understanding: See I 5 $1362^{a}24$n.

Practical wisdom (*phronêsis*): *Phronêsis* (verb *phronein*) is used (1) in a broad sense to refer to thought or (roughly speaking) intelligence of any sort (as at *Met.* IV 5 $1009^{b}13$, 30); (2) in a narrower sense to refer to the distinctively practical wisdom discussed in *NE* VI 5, which is the virtue or excellence of the rationally calculative or deliberative part of the soul, which ensures that we aim at and hit the best good—happiness; and (3) as equivalent in meaning to *sophia* or theoretical wisdom (*Met.* XIII 4 $1078^{b}15$, and throughout *Protr.*). (2), in its fullest form, and (3) are distinctively human possessions. But Aristotle does sometimes attribute a weaker form (*HA* VII 1 $588^{a}18$–31) of (2) to non-human animals, such as deer, hare, cranes, bees, and ants (I 2 $488^{b}15$, IX 5 $611^{a}15$–16, IX 10 $614^{b}18$, *PA* II 2 $648^{a}5$–8, 4 $650^{b}18$–27, *GA* III 2 $753^{a}10$–17).

And since the end is the for-the-sake-of-which, and what the other things are for the sake of is an end: Retaining τὸ δ' οὗ ἕνεκα τὸ τέλος ἐστίν with Grimaldi; OCT secludes; Kassel secludes τέλος δέ ἐστιν οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ ἄλλα.

To an individual himself a good is what has received these attributes in relation to himself: That is, what a person will take to be a good is what seems to him to be choiceworthy for its own sake, and so on. That is why "unconditionally and in truth the proper object of wish is the good, but to each person it is the apparent good" (*NE* III 4 $1113^{a}23$–24).

It necessarily follows that more is a greater good than one or fewer, provided that the one or the few are counted within it: A claim cognate with the following ones: "We think happiness is the most choiceworthy of all things, when not counted among them—for if it is counted among them, it clearly would be more choiceworthy with the addition of the least of goods. For what is added would bring about a superabundance of goods, and of goods, the greater one is always more choiceworthy" (*NE* I 7 $1097^{b}16$–20); "How should we look for the best good? Is it to be counted among good things? Surely, that would be absurd. For the best is the complete end, and the complete end, unconditionally speaking, seems to be nothing other than happiness, and happiness is constituted out of many goods. So if in looking for the best one, you count it among the goods, it will be better than itself, because it itself is the best one. For example, take healthy things and health, and look to see which is the best of all these. But the best one is health. So if this is the best one, it will be better than itself, which is a strange outcome" (*MM* I 3 $1184^{a}15$–21).

Note 167

If what is greatest [in one kind] exceeds what is greatest [in another], the one [kind] exceeds the other: "If the best human being is better than the best horse, then [the kind] human is unconditionally (*haplôs*) better than [the kind] horse" (*Top*. III 2 $117^{b}37$–39). *Haplôs* here ≈ *holôs* at *Rh*. I 7 $1363^{b}24$.

{206} Note 168

The excess of the kinds is proportional to that of the greatest in them: Compare: "It is generally clear too, we shall say, that the best condition of each thing relative to others is in accord with the superiority of those things whose conditions we say they are. So, if indeed the soul is more estimable, both unconditionally and to
us, than property and the body, its best condition must be proportionally better than theirs. Further, it is for the sake of the soul that these things

are naturally choiceworthy and every practically-wise person should choose them for its sake, not the soul for theirs" (*Pol.* VII 1 1323^{b}13–20).

The kinds (*genôn*): A case where *genos* cannot mean "genus," since male and female human beings belong to the same species and genus. See *Met.* X 9.

Note 169

Follows: Reading ἔπεται with Kassel and the mss. for OCT ἔπηται.

Note 170

Living follows being healthy, but not vice versa, and does so simultaneously: Therefore, being (or living) healthily is better than mere living.

Scientific knowing follows learning and does so subsequently: But not vice versa. So knowledge is better: "it is quite reasonable that those who have attained knowledge should pass their time more pleasantly than those who are looking for it" (*NE* X 7 1177^{a}26–27).

Stealing follows violating a holy place and does so potentially: Therefore, stealing is better (for the robber) than violating a holy place without stealing anything.

Note 171

For it necessarily also exceeds the lesser of the greater [pair]: Reading <ἧττον> μείζονος μείζονος with Kassel for OCT μείονι. Compare: "If the excess of one thing is more choiceworthy than the excess of another, the one is more choiceworthy than the other" (*Top.* III 3 118^{b}3–4).

Note 172

This, we saw, is what it is to be productive of the greater: At I 7 1363^{b}15, 18–20.

Note 173

If being healthy is more choiceworthy than being pleased and a greater good: If X is more choiceworthy that Y, X is a greater good than Y. See I 7 1363^{b}12–14, 18–20.

Health is also a greater good than pleasure: Since health is productive of being healthy (I 6 1362^{a}32n), which is a greater good than being pleased.

Note 174

What is intrinsically more choiceworthy: Reading τὸ αἱρετώτερον καθ' αὑτὸ with Grimaldi and the mss. for OCT αἱρετώτερον τὸ καθ'

αὐτὸ and Kassel τὸ αἱρετὸν καθ' αὐτὸ ("what is intrinsically choiceworthy").

Which, as we saw, is just what the good is: At I 7 1363^{b}12–14, 18–20.

{207} Note 175

What has less need of a second thing or of other things: Reading ἢ with Grimaldi and the mss.; OCT and Kassel seclude.

Note 176

Starting-point (*archê*): See I 2 1358^{a}25n.

Note 177

A starting-point: Rejecting with Kassel and Grimaldi the OCT addition of ἡ ("the starting-point"). The end, as the for-the-sake-of-which, appears better than a starting-point that leads to or furthers it.

Note 178

Leodamas: A fourth-cent statesman and orator from Acharnae and a pupil of Isocrates. He accused both Callistratus and Chabrias of treachery in connection with the occupation of the town of Oropus in northeast Boeotia which was under Athenian control. In 366 a Theban garrison aided by exiles from Oropus seized the town. Athens sent Chares as general against them. Callistratus and Chabrias intervened and worked out a compromise that left Oropus in Theban hands until matters were settled, which led Leodamas to prosecute them. The point of the example is that a starting-point can be represented as worse (better) than an end-point, as with Callistratus, or the other way around, as with Chabrias.

Callistratus: A fourth-cent Athenian politician.

Note 179

Chabrias: A professional Athenian soldier, c. 420–357/6 BC.

Note 180

This is what plotting (*epibouleuein*) **is for the sake of, namely, in order for people to act on it:** In contrast to advising (*sumbouleuin*).

Note 181

"Water is best": Pindar, *Olympian* I.1.

Note 182

The easier is a greater good than the more difficult, since it is how we wish it to be: See I 6 1362^{a}24–25. We wish things to be easy, not difficult.

Note 183

That whose contrary is greater is itself greater, and that whose lack is greater: If X, the contrary of Y, is greater, it doesn't follow that X is a greater *good*. The idea may be, though, that whether it is in fact a greater good or a greater bad, it can figure in rhetorical arguments as the former, since the greater bad for an enemy is the greater good for a friend. See I 6 $1363^{a}20$–21.

Lack (*sterêsis*): "One of a pair of contraries is a lack no less [than a contrary], or a lack of substance, and a lack is the denial [of a predicate] to some definite kind (*genos*)" (*Met.* IV 6 $1011^{a}18$–20). Thus, while a lack can be of one of a pair of contraries, it can also be the lack of something—such as substance—that strictly {208} speaking has no contrary: "It also belongs to substances that there is nothing contrary to them. For what could be contrary to a primary substance? For example, there is nothing contrary to a particular human [a primary substance], nor yet is there anything contrary to human or animal" (*Cat.* 5 $3^{b}24$–27). Lack of substance (or form) is evidenced in cases of existence changes, where a substance either comes to be or passes away. See also *Met.* X 4 $1055^{b}11$–29, V 22.

Note 184

Virtue is greater than non-virtue and vice than non-vice: Reading καὶ ἀρετὴ μὴ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακία μὴ κακίας μείζων with Kassel and the mss. for OCT καὶ ἀρετὴ μὴ κακίας καὶ κακία μὴ ἀρετῆς μείζων ("and virtue is greater than non-vice and vice than non-virtue"). The idea, as with contraries, is not that a vicious person is greater, in the sense of better, than a non-vicious one, but that, for rhetorical purposes, the effects of representing someone, such as an enemy, as vicious are greater than those of representing him as non-vicious. When you attribute a virtue or a vice to someone you describe his motives and his deliberate choice—you say what sort of person he is and what sorts of actions he might do. By contrast, if you say of someone what he is *not* (non-virtuous, non-vicious) you do not properly describe him or his actions.

For the one is an end and the other is not an end: See I 7 $1364^{a}3$. The idea is not that vice is an end at which people aim, but that in relation to mere non-vice it is an end—a terminus in the direction of badness.

Note 185

If indeed as the starting-points and causes are, so too are the consequences: See I 7 1364^{a}10–23.

Note 186

For example, seeing with exactness is more choiceworthy than smelling with exactness, since sight is also more choiceworthy than smell; and to love companions is far more noble than to love wealth, so that love of companions is also nobler than love of wealth: Reading οἷον τὸ ἀκριβῶς ὁρᾶν αἱρετώτερον τοῦ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, καὶ γὰρ ὄψις ὀσφρήσεως· καὶ τὸ φιλέταιρον εἶναι τοῦ φιλοχρήματον μᾶλλον κάλλιον with Grimaldi and the mss. for OCT οἷον τὸ ἀκριβῶς ὁρᾶν αἱρετώτερον τοῦ ὀσφραίνεσθαι (καὶ γὰρ ὄψις ὀσφρήσεως), καὶ τὸ φιλεταιρώτερον εἶναι τοῦ φιλοχρηματώτερον [μᾶλλον] κάλλιον. Kassel secludes the entire sentence.

Sight is also more choiceworthy than smell: "It is not only in order to do an action, but even when we are not going to do anything whatsoever, that we choose sight over (one might almost say) all the others. The cause of this is that of all perceptual capacities it enables us to know most fully and makes clear many differences" (*Met*. I 1 980^{a}24–27).

Note 187

The reality (*to alêthes*) **[that is its object]:** Or, "the true [things that are its objects]."

Note 188

The sciences of more excellent and nobler things are proportional: "The most estimable science must deal with the most estimable genus of beings" (*Met*. VI 1 {209} 1026^{a}21–22); "The best kind (*genos*) of science is that of the theoretical sciences, and of these themselves the last named one [theology]. For it is concerned with the most estimable of beings, and each science is said to be better or worse in accord with the scientifically knowable object that properly belongs to it"(XI 7 1064^{b}3–6).

More excellent (*spoudaioterai*): See I 5 1361^{a}25n.

Note 189

The good or the greatest good: Reading ἀγαθὸν ἢ μεῖζον with Grimaldi and the mss. for OCT and Kassel ἀγαθὸν μεῖζον ("the greatest good").

Either unconditionally or insofar as they make their judgment in accord with practical wisdom: "What is unconditionally better or more choiceworthy is what is in accord with the best science; what is relatively

better is what is in accord with the one proper to the subject matter" (*Top*. III 1 116^{a}21–22).

The practical wisdom by which they made their judgment: In addition to the familiar practical wisdom, which is the virtue of thought belonging to the rationally calculative part of the soul, Aristotle also recognizes a sort that is special to, and marks a level of achievement in, a particular craft or productive science: "We also speak of people as practically-wise in some area, when they rationally calculate well about what furthers some excellent end, concerning which no craft exists" (*NE* VI 5 1140^{a}28–30). A judgment stemming from the latter can, for example, tell us what to do to breach an enemy's defenses, but it cannot tell us what to do all things considered, as practical wisdom proper can.

Note 190

For something also is what it is, is a quantity, or is a quality, in the way in which scientific knowledge and practical wisdom would affirm it to be: The claim is one about epistemic authority not about truth making, as the following texts show clearly: "For whereas scientific knowledge may seem to be the measure and the scientifically knowable what is measured, the fact is that all scientific knowledge is scientifically knowable but not all that is scientifically knowable is scientific knowledge, because in a way it is scientific knowledge that is measured by the scientifically knowable" (*Met*. X 6 1057^{a}9–12); "It does not seem to be true of all relatives that they are by nature at the same time. For the scientifically knowable would seem to be prior to scientific knowledge, since for the most part it is of things that hold antecedently that we acquire scientific knowledge, and in few cases, if any, do we see the scientific knowledge coming to be at the same time as the thing that is scientifically knowable. Further, doing away with the scientifically knowable thing does away with the scientific knowledge too, but doing away with the scientific knowledge does not do away with the scientifically knowable thing. For if there is not a scientifically knowable thing there is no scientific knowledge either, since there will not be anything for scientific knowledge to be of, whereas if there is not scientific knowledge, nothing prevents there from being a scientifically knowable thing. Take, for example, the squaring of the circle, *if* it is scientifically knowable. There is not yet scientific knowledge of it, but it is scientifically knowable" (*Cat*. 7 7^{b}22–33).

Is what (*ti*) **it is, is a quantity, or is a quality:** These are categories. See I 1 1354^{a}3n(7).

{210} Note 191

We defined that to be good: At I 7 1363^{b}12–15.

Which each and every thing, if it had practical wisdom, would choose: Reading λαβόντα τὰ πράγματα with Kassel, Grimaldi, and the mss. for OCT λαβὸν [τὰ πράγματα].

Note 192

As courage is better than strength: Courage is a virtue of soul, strength one of body (I 5 1360^{b}22). But "if indeed the soul is more estimable, both unconditionally and to us, than property and the body, its best condition must be proportionally better than theirs" (*Pol.* VII 1 1322^{b}16–18).

Note 193

To suffer injustice rather than to do injustice: "[*Socrates to Polus*] I certainly wouldn't wish either, but if it had to be one or the other, I would choose suffering over doing what's unjust" (Plato, *Grg.* 469c). Also Plato, *Rep.* 357b–368c.

Note 194

It is in terms of this: Reading αὐτοῦ with OCT and Grimaldi for Kassel and the mss. αὐτοῦ.

That the good and the end were defined: That is, in terms of being desired for its own sake and pursued by all. See I 7 1363^{b}13–14.

Note 195

The noble is either the pleasant or the intrinsically choiceworthy: See I 6 1362^{b}8–9n.

Note 196

What they wish to be least of all a cause of: Reading ἥκιστα with Kassel and the mss. for OCT ἧττον ("what they wish less to be a cause of").

Note 197

Just as certain things would follow along from co-ordinates and similar inflections: Reading καὶ ὡς ἂν ἐκ . . . with Grimaldi and the mss. for OCT καὶ ὡς ἂν ἓν . . . ; Kassel reads καὶ ὡς ἂν ἓν ἐκ. . . .

Co-ordinates (*sustoichôn*) **and similar inflections** (*homoiôn ptôseôn*): *Sustoicha* and *ptôsis* are technical terms: "Things such as the following, for example, are said to be co-ordinates: just things and the just person are

co-ordinates of justice, and courageous things and the courageous person are co-ordinates of courage. Similarly, the things that produce something or that safeguard it are co-ordinates of what they produce or safeguard—for example, things conducive to health are co-ordinates of health, and things conducive to the good state are co-ordinates of the good state. And the same way in the case of the others. Things of this sort, then, are usually said to be co-ordinates, whereas things said to be inflections are, for example, justly, courageously, and healthily, and such as are said of things in that way. But inflections also seem to be co-ordinates—for example, justly seems to be a co-ordinate of justice, and courageously of courage. All things said in the {211} same column (*sustoichia*), then, are co-ordinates—for example, justice, just person, just thing, justly. Hence it is clear that whenever any one member, whatever sort it is, that belongs in the same column, is shown to be good or praiseworthy, then all the rest also come to be shown so—for example, if justice is something praiseworthy, then a just person, a just thing, and what is justly done are praiseworthy things" (*Top*. II 9 $114^{a}27$–$^{b}3$). The *sustoichia* referred to is a "line or column of predication (*sustoichia tês katêgorias*)" (*Met*. X 3 $1054^{b}35$, 8 $1058^{a}13$). Thus a column is a complete set of co-ordinate predicates, some of whose members are inflections.

Note 198

Fewer: Reading οἱ ἐλάττους with Kassel and the mss. for OCT ὃ οἱ ἐλάττους ("what fewer [choose]").

Good, we saw, is what all seek: At I 7 $1363^{b}14$.

Note 199

Discerning people (*krinontes*): "But each person correctly discerns the things he knows and is a good discerner of these" (*NE* I 3 $1094^{b}27$–28).

In the former two cases it would be as if all people would say so: See I 6 $1363^{a}11$–14.

Those in control (*kurioi*): Of the given subject matter. See I 1 $1355^{a}7$n.

Note 200

Since it is rarer: See I 7 $1364^{a}23$–26.

Note 201

Things that are more praiseworthy, since they are nobler: See I 3 $1358^{b}25$.

Note 202

There seems to be superiority in a greater number of things: Reading πλειόνων with Kassel and the mss. for OCT πλεῖον ("for it seems to be more superior").

Note 203

"All the sorrows that come to human beings whose city is taken . . . away": Homer, *Il.* IX.592–594. Aristotle cites, or quotes from memory, a text slightly different from ours.

Note 204

Epicharmus: An early fifth-cent writer of comedies from Sicily. A quotation of some of his lines nicely exemplifies the figures of speech—combination and building to a climax—that Aristotle attributes to him: "After the sacrifice, a feast; after the feast, drinking; after the drinking, derision; after derision, swinish insults; after the insults, a law suit; after the verdict, chains, stocks, a fine" (Athenaeus, II.3).

Note 205

"In the past, with a rough yoke on my shoulders . . . Tegea": Attributed, with doubtful warrant, to Simonides.

{212} Note 206

Iphicrates: A distinguished Athenian general (c. 415–353 BC). See also I 9 $1367^{b}18$, where the phrase attributed to him here is quoted in a fuller form.

Note 207

The poet too says, "But I am self-taught": The poet is Homer, but the words are those of the bard Phemius. See Homer, *Od.* XXII.347.

Note 208

Pericles (c. 495–429 BC): The leading Athenian politician during the heyday of Athens' empire.

Pericles said in his Funeral Oration: Probably the one given in Athens in 431 BC in honor of those killed in the first year of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides' version of the speech (II.35–46) does not contain the phrase Aristotle cites here, and cites again in a slightly different form at III 10 $1411^{a}2$–4.

Note 209

Of two goods, the one closer to the end [is greater]: "Also, the end seems to be more choiceworthy than what furthers the end, and of two

things that do so, the one that is closer to the end" (*Top*. III 1 116^{b}22–23).

Note 210

The one for the individual himself [is a greater good] than the unconditional one: Reading καὶ τὸ αὐτῷ τοῦ ἁπλῶς with OCT and Kassel; Grimaldi and the mss. read καὶ τὸ αὐτῷ καὶ ἁπλῶς ("the good relative to a person simply and solely [is a greater good than what is not relative to him in this way]"). The context is one of giving advice, in this case to a particular person. For him what is most choiceworthy is what benefits him most, which may or may not be what is unconditionally good: "We should pray that unconditionally good things will also be good for us, while choosing the ones that are good for us" (*NE* V 1 1129^{b}5–6). It is thus compatible with *Top*. III 1 116^{b}8–10: "What is unconditionally good is more choiceworthy than what is good for a certain thing or person—for example, becoming healthy than having surgery. For the former is unconditionally good, the latter only for a certain person, namely, the one who needs surgery." See also *Rh*. I 15 1375^{b}19, II 13 1289^{b}37–1390^{a}1.

Note 211

The former is good for the individual himself, whereas the latter is not: As before, the context is one of giving advice, in this case to a particular person. A good that is possible for him is one that is a good for him, whereas an impossible one is not, since there is nothing he can do to get it. Advice, after all, has the same scope as deliberation, on which see I 2 1357^{a}2n.

Note 212

Things included in the end life aims at, since the end is a greater good than what is close to the end: Reading <ἤ> τὰ πρὸς with Kassel for OCT τὰ πρὸς. "In general, what is related to the end of life is more choiceworthy than what is related {213} to something else—for example, what contributes to happiness than what contributes to practical wisdom" (*Top*. III 1 116^{b}23–26).

Note 213

People say that even justice is a small thing, because it seems to be more choiceworthy rather than being more choiceworthy: For the background, see Plato, *Rep*. 358a–368c.

Note 214

What involves pleasure: Reading τὸ μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς with Kassel and Grimaldi for OCT μεθ᾽ἡδονῆς.

So that pleasure is present as a good as well as painlessness: Reading ὅτι ὑπάρχει καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθὸν with Kassel, Grimaldi, and the mss. for OCT ὅτι ὑπάρχει καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ [ἀγαθὸν].

Note 215

And things whose presence does not escape notice are greater than those whose presence does. For they tend toward the truth. That is why being wealthy would appear to be a greater good than seeming to be so: In the case of justice, for example, seeming to be just can appear to be a greater good than actually being just. This is because it is hard to distinguish those who seem just from those who are just. Now consider being wealthy. The real possession of wealth does not escape notice. So in its case the best way to appear wealthy is actually to be wealthy, since for the most part only those who are wealthy appear so. The goods relevant to rhetoric are for the most part the apparent goods—the ones that appear good to the audience. Among these goods being wealthy is a greater good than seeming to be wealthy. Why? Because for the most part it is only those who are wealthy that appear so.

Note 216

Constitutions: See I 4 1360^{a}21n.

Characters (*êthê*): "Now, no one would dispute that legislators should be especially concerned with the education of the young. For in fact in cities where this does not occur, its absence is harmful to the constitutions. And education should, in fact, have a view to the particular constitution. For the character (*êthos*) that properly belongs to each constitution usually both safeguards it and puts the constitution in place from the start (for example, the democratic character does so for a democracy, and the oligarchic one for an oligarchy), and a better character is a cause of a better constitution in all cases" (*Pol.* VIII 1 1337^{a}11–18). In part on the basis of this text from *Pol.*, I follow OCT and ms. A in reading ἤθη; Kassel reads ἒθη ("habits") with the other mss. But since habits result in character and character is expressed in habits, the outcome is much the same, whichever reading we choose.

Customs (*nomima*): Including those encoded in written laws (*nomoi*). Notice *nomou* at I 8 1365^{b}34.

Note 217

There are as many controlling elements as there are constitutions: See *Pol.* IV 14–16.

{214} Note 218

The controlling and deciding element (*to krinon*): Referred to as "the deliberative (*to bouleuomenon*) and controlling element" at *Pol.* II 6 $1264^{b}33$–34, VI 1 $1316^{b}31$–32.

Note 219

Oligarchy [is a constitution] in which [offices are distributed] on the basis of a property assessment: Reading ἐν ᾗ [οἱ] ἀπὸ τιμημάτων with Kassel; OCT retains οἱ.

Education (*paideia*): In particular with the sort of education that makes one a *pepaideumenos*, or well-educated person: "[the offices are filled from] the well-educated in aristocracies" (*Pol.* IV 15 $1299^{b}25$). See I 2 $1356^{a}29$n.

Note 220

The one that is in accord with some order is a kingship: In particular, constitutional order and law: "Kings rule in accord with law and rule voluntary subjects, whereas tyrants rule involuntary ones" (*Pol.* III 14 $1285^{a}27$–28). The various sorts of kingship are discussed in *Pol.* III 14–16.

The indefinite one is a tyranny: The various sorts of tyranny are discussed in *Pol.* IV 10. The one referred to here is the one there described as follows: "There is, though, a third kind (*eidos*) of tyranny, which is the very one that seems most of all to be a tyranny, because it is a counterpart to absolute kingship. And any monarchy is necessarily a tyranny of this sort if the monarch rules in a non-accountable way over people who are his equals or betters, with a view to his own advantage, not that of the ruled. That is precisely why it is rule over involuntary subjects, since no free person voluntarily puts up with such rule" ($1295^{a}17$–23).

Note 221

People choose what furthers the end: See I 1 $1355^{b}18$n on deliberate choice and I 2 $1357^{a}2$n on deliberation.

Note 222

[The end aimed at] by tyranny [is] keeping guard: This is because it rules over involuntary or unwilling subjects, and so is always in danger of being overthrown. See *Pol.* V 11 $1313^{a}34$–$1314^{a}29$.

Note 223

Characters, customs, and advantages: Reading ἤθη with OCT; Kassel and the mss. read ἔθη ("habits"). See I 8 1365^{b}23n.

Note 224

Argument expressive of character (*êthikou*): See I 2 1356^{a}4–6.

Goodwilled (*eunous*): See II 1 1378^{a}12n.

Note 225

Characters are made apparent in accord with deliberate choice: "[Deliberate choice seems to be] a better discerner of people's characters than their actions are" {215} (*NE* III 2 1111^{b}5–6); "It is by deliberately choosing good things or bad things that we are people of a certain sort" (1112^{a}1–2).

Deliberate choice is referred back to the end: See I 1 1355^{b}18n.

Note 226

Where the characters and the customs belonging to constitutions are concerned: Reading περὶ τῶν with Kassel and Grimaldi for OCT τῶν.

Note 227

The second sort of means of persuasion: See I 2 1356^{a}4–6.

Note 228

People . . . in jest (*chôris spoudês*) **. . . often praise not only a human being:** Literally, "quite apart from, or separate from, seriousness." As for example in the social practice of jibing at (*skôptein*) someone as a way of praising him: "There are some things that it is appropriate for a decent and free person to say as part of amusement, and also to listen to, and the amusement of the free person differs from that of the slavish one, and that of the well-educated person from that of the uneducated one. We can also see this from old-style and new-style comedies, since in the former what caused laughter was shameful language, whereas in the latter it is more innuendo, and there is no small difference between these as regards graciousness" (*NE* IV 9 1128^{a}19–25); "The one who can produce jibes of the sort that gives pleasure to a person of good discernment, even though the joke is on himself, will be a mean between the vulgar person and the one who is prim. This definition is better than the one saying that the jibe must not be painful to the person who is the butt of it, no matter what sort of person he is. Rather, it should please the person in

the medial condition, since he is the one who discerns well" (*EE* III 7 1234^{a}18–23). See also I 9 1367^{a}32–^{b}7.

Or a god: "It is evident that we should also banish looking at pictures or stories that are unseemly [from the best city]. Let the officials take care, then, that no statue or picture be an imitation of such actions, except in the precincts of certain gods at whose festivals custom permits even licentious raillery to occur" (*Pol.* VII 17 1336^{b}13–17). Ritualized obscenity and scurrilous mockery played a role in certain religious festivals honoring Dionysus, Demeter, and other gods. See also *Rh.* II 24 1401^{a}16–19.

God: Aristotle recognizes the existence of a number of different divine beings or gods, among which he distinguishes a primary god, usually referred to as *ho theos* ("the god"), which is the one under discussion in *Met.* I 2 and in XII 8–10.

But also inanimate things or a random animal: Isocrates, *Helen* 12 mentions speeches in praise (encomia) of salt and bumble bees. See also *Rh.* II 24 1401^{a}13–14.

In the same way: That is, regardless of what is being praised.

Note 229

Virtue is a capacity, so it seems (*hôs dokei*): Compare I 6 1362^{b}12–14, where virtues are—correctly in Aristotle's own view—classified as states rather than capacities. But, as evidenced in the associated note, states are capacities of a sort. The qualification *hôs dokei* should therefore be borne in mind, as should the fact that {216} for most audiences the distinction between states and capacities will be of no significance, and so will be useless for rhetorical purposes.

Note 230

The parts of virtue: The various virtues mentioned are focally discussed in *NE* III–VI.

Generosity (*eleutheriotês*): See I 5 1361^{a}16.

Mild-manneredness (*praotês*): Reading πραότης with Kassel and the mss., which OCT omits. "There is also excess and deficiency and a mean where anger is concerned, but, since these are pretty much nameless, and since a medial person is said to be mild-mannered, let us call the medial condition 'mild-manneredness.' Of those at the extremes, let an excessive one be irascible and his vice irascibility, and a deficient one inirascible and his vice inirascibility" (*NE* II 7 1108^{a}4–9). See *Rh.* II 3 1380^{a}5–^{b}1.

Practical wisdom: See I 7 1363^{b}14n.

Theoretical wisdom (*sophia*): *Sophia* is mentioned again at I 8 1371^{b}28, II 10 1387^{b}31, 33, and 11 1388^{b}17, but is not defined or significantly discussed in the *Rhetoric*. In *NE* VI 7 it is defined as "understanding plus scientific knowledge—scientific knowledge, having a head as it were, of the most estimable things" (1141^{a}18–20), and in *Met.* I 2 is identified as the science dealing with and used by Aristotle's primary god (983^{a}3–11).

Note 231

It is necessary, though, for the greatest virtues to be those that are most useful to others, if indeed virtue is a capacity productive of benefaction: In Aristotle's ethical treatises, the primary focus of the virtues is the agent's own happiness, though understood to involve the happiness of at least certain others (family, friends, fellow citizens, and so on) by extension. The *Rhetoric*, on the other hand, though it begins with several criteria of what is noble or good, stresses just one of them: the one that concerns benefaction. This is because its primary focus is on the reasons for publicly praising or blaming someone. That means that the speaker should highlight those virtues of the person being praised which have a visible impact on the life of the listener and the ones that the listener himself primarily values.

Note 232

Because of this: Rejecting the OCT addition of καὶ.

And justice both in war and in peace: Reading ἡ δὲ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ with OCT for Kassel and the mss. ἡ δὲ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ ("the former in peace as well").

Note 233

Money (*chrêmatôn*): *Chrêmata* is wealth generally, as at I 5 1359^{b}28, but often, as here, money in particular.

Note 234

Generosity is the disposition to do good things in money matters; acquisitiveness the contrary: In Aristotle's ethical works virtue is in a mean between two extremes, one of excess, the other of deficiency: cowardice (deficiency), courage {217} (mean), rashness (extreme) (see *NE* II 6). In the case of generosity, and of other virtues too, one extreme (acquisitiveness rather than wastefulness) is more common. Rhetoric will

narrow its focus accordingly, studying the more common extreme rather than the less common one.

Note 235

Practical wisdom is virtue of thought (*dianoias*): In contrast to the others, which are virtues of character: "We say that some virtues are of thought, others of character. Theoretical wisdom, comprehension, and practical wisdom are virtues of thought; generosity and temperance virtues of character. For when we talk about someone's character we do not say that he is theoretically-wise or has comprehension but that he is mild-mannered or temperate. But we do also praise a theoretically-wise person with reference to his state, and—among the states—it is the praiseworthy ones that we call virtues" (*NE* I 13 $1103^{a}4$–10). See also, *Rh*. III 16 $1417^{a}26$–28n.

The goods and evils we mentioned: At I 9 $1366^{b}3$–20 and in I 6.

Note 236

The other things: See I 9 $1366^{a}23$–24.

Note 237

The signs (*sêmeia*) **and works** (*erga*) **of virtue:** See I 2 $1357^{b}1$–25 (signs), I 1 $1354^{a}11$n (works).

Are like this (*toiauta*): Works of virtue—that is, of the sort that a virtuous person would do—are (1) productive of virtue: "people must do just actions to become just, and temperate ones to become temperate" (*NE* II 4 $1105^{a}17$–19). But they are also, of course, (2) productive of such acts: "Actions are said to be just and temperate, then, when they are the sort that a just or a temperate person would do" ($1105^{b}5$–7). Signs of virtue are brought about by it and causative of it for parallel reasons. I take *toiauta* to refer to both (1) and (2), since I think both are relevant to rhetoric and within its ambit. In the case of (1), for example, we can imagine a speaker appealing to facts about someone's upbringing and education as part of showing how good his character is. For a contrary view, see Rapp II, p. 413, and for relevant discussion, Introduction, pp. xxvii–xxxii.

Note 238

The works done or things undergone (*pathê*) **that are characteristic of a good person:** In general the *pathê* in question are feelings, since it is with these as well as actions that virtue is concerned: "I am speaking of virtue of character, since it is concerned with feelings and actions and it is

in these that there is excess, deficiency, and the mean. For example, it is possible to feel fear and confidence, appetite, anger, pity, and pleasure and pain generally, both too much and too little and in both ways well. To feel such things when we should, though, about the things we should, in relation to the people we should, for the sake of what we should, and as we should is a mean and best and precisely what is characteristic of virtue. Similarly where actions are concerned, there is excess, deficiency, and the mean. But virtue is concerned with feelings and actions in which excess is in error and {218} subject to blame, as is deficiency, whereas the mean is subject to praise and is on the correct path (and both these features are characteristic of virtue). Hence virtue is a sort of medial condition because it is able to aim at and hit the mean" (*NE* II 6 $1106^{b}16$–28). Here, however, as the reference to punishment as a *pathos* makes clear, we must understand the latter in the broader sense, which includes feelings proper, but also other things that we are passive rather than active with respect to and so undergo. See I 1 $1354^{a}17$n.

Note 239

Things are done well (*eupragiai*): See I 5 $1360^{b}14$n on *eupraxia*.

Note 240

Alcaeus: A lyric poet from Mytilene in Lesbos (born c. 620 BC).

Sappho: Also a lyric poet from Lesbos (born c. 612 BC). Aristotle quotes Fr. 137 Campbell I. The words attributed to Alcaeus are probably also part of Sappho's poem.

Note 241

The virtues and actions of those who are by nature more excellent are more noble—for example, those of a man than those of a woman: A common view, no doubt, on which a speaker could rely, but also one that Aristotle holds: "A man's and a woman's courage and temperance are distinct. For a man would seem a coward if he were courageous in the way a woman is courageous, and a woman would seem garrulous if she were moderate in speech in the way a good man is" (*Pol.* III 4 $1277^{b}20$–23).

Note 242

Victory and honor are among the noble things (for they are choiceworthy even if purposeless (*akarpa*)**):** *Akarpa* literally means "fruitless," but the contrast with "beneficial things" and the attribution of *akarpa* possessions to self-sufficient people at *NE* IV 4 $1125^{a}11$–12 makes

"purposeless" a better translation, since it better captures the connection to choiceworthiness. The things do not simply turn out to be fruitless, rather the agent chooses them without regard to their fruits, or without further purpose.

Note 243

Possessions that are purposeless (for they are freer): See I 5 1361^{a}16n.

Note 244

[1] The things special to each people are noble: Alternatively (Rapp vol. II, pp. 416–417) "[2] The noble things special to each people are noble." The following text supports [1]: "In the same way too it is noble in some places to sacrifice one's father, for example, among the Triballi, whereas it is not unconditionally noble" (*Top.* II 11 115^{b}22–24). The idea is that rhetoric can (must) use local standards of nobility, whether correct or not, not unconditional ones (unless these happen to be the same): when praising someone to the Triballi, mention that he sacrificed his father, but do not mention that to an Athenian audience.

{219} **Characteristic of a hired laborer** (*thêtikon*): *Thêtes* were free landless laborers, who were not craftsmen, and who worked for hire. See next note.

Note 245

Vulgar (*banauson*) **craft:** An exact English equivalent for *banausos* is now difficult to find. Here is Herodotus on the subject: "The Thracians, Scythians, Persians, Lydians, and pretty much all the barbarians think that those of their fellow citizens who learn crafts—and their descendants too—are inferior in esteem, and regard as well-born those who keep themselves clear of any form of manual work, and above all those who are free to engage in warfare. All the Greeks have learned this, especially the Spartans" (II.167). See also II 23 1397^{b}25–27n.

Note 246

A surly one (*authadê*) **[is] magnificent** (*megaloprepê*): *Authadês* means "stubborn," "self-willed," "surly": "The one who lives without regard for others, contemptuous of them, is *authadês*" (*EE* III 7 1233^{b}35–36). A magnificent person is someone who "is able to get a theoretical grasp on what is appropriate and spend great sums in a suitable way" (*NE* IV 2 1122^{a}34–35). Thus it is unclear how one could make a surly person seem magnificent. It would be easier, it seems, to represent him as being

great-souled, since—among other things—a great-souled person is "incapable of fashioning his way of living to suit another person" (IV 4 $1124^{b}31$) and is "not given to praise" ($1125^{a}7$–8).

Rash (*thrasus*): "One who is excessively confident concerning frightening things is rash. A rash person also seems to be a boaster and a pretender to courage. At any rate, the way that a courageous person is concerned with frightening things is the way a rash person wishes to appear to be concerned with them, and thus he imitates a courageous person in those situations where he is able. . . . Rash people are also impetuous and wish for dangers ahead of time but shrink from them when in their midst, whereas courageous people are quick spirited when there are things to be accomplished but at peace beforehand" (*NE* III 7 $1115^{b}28$–$1116^{a}9$).

Note 247

A fallacious argument proceeding from the cause: Reading ἐκ with Kassel and the mss.; OCT secludes.

Note 248

As Socrates said: "[Socrates] If one had to speak well of Athenians to Peloponnesians, or of Peloponnesians to Athenians, he would have to be a very good speaker indeed to be persuasive. But when one is performing before the very people one is praising, it is no great thing to seem to speak well" (Plato, *Mx.* 235d). Aristotle repeats and expands this comment at III 14 $1415^{b}30$–33.

Note 249

Something is noble if it goes beyond what is fitting but toward the better and the nobler: Reading δὲ ἐπὶ with Kassel and the mss. for OCT ἐπὶ δὲ.

Note 250

Iphicrates' remark: See I 7 $1365^{a}28$–29n.

{220} **That of the Olympic victor:** See I 7 $1365^{a}26$–27.

Simonides: A poet from Iulis on Ceos (c. 556/532–466/442 BC).

"She whose father, husband, and brothers were tyrants": A fuller version, without attribution, is given in Thucydides V 59: "The dust covers Archedice daughter of Hippias, the best man in Greece of his time; though her father, husband, brothers, and sons were tyrants, her mind did not puff itself up with vanity."

Note 251

Praise is based on actions: "We praise the just person and the courageous one—in fact, the good person and his virtue generally—because of his actions and his works" (*NE* I 12 1101^{b}14–16).

Actions: See I 5 1360^{b}14n.

Note 252

Now praise is speech . . . : Kassel double-brackets (1) this paragraph and the next (I 9 1367^{b}28–1368^{a}9) as a late addition by Aristotle, and within them secludes (2) 1367^{b}29–30 (on encomia) and 34–35 (on blessing); Rapp vol. II, pp. 423–427 rejects (1), but accepts (2). Both paragraphs are repeated at III 16 1416^{b}29, where all editors indicate a lacuna.

Note 253

Hence one should show that the person's actions (*praxeis*) **have been of the requisite sort. An encomium, on the other hand, is concerned with works** (*ergôn*): "Praise is properly given to virtue, since we are doers of noble actions as a result of it, whereas encomia are properly given to its works, in like manner both to those of the body and those of the soul" (*NE* I 13 1101^{b}31–34); "Awards of praise characteristic of virtue are due to its works, and it is to its works that encomia are properly given; and it is the winners who get the victory crowns, not those who have the capacity to win but do not win. And it is on the basis of his works that we discern what sort of person someone is. Further, why is happiness not praised? It is due to the fact that the other things are praised because of it. That is why felicitation, praise, and encomium are all distinct. For an encomium is a speech about a particular work, whereas praise is for a person who is universally of the relevant sort, and felicitation concerns the end" (*EE* II 1 1219^{b}8–11).

Note 254

Blessing people (*makarismos*) **and felicitating** (*eudaimonismos*) **them are the same as each other:** *Makarios* is often a synonym for "happy," but sometimes with the implication of being extremely happy (*NE* I 10 1101^{a}7) or in a condition like that of the gods (X 8 1178^{b}25–32).

Just as happiness encompasses virtue, so felicitation encompasses these: See *EE* II 1 1219^{b}8–11 (quoted in *Rh*. I 8 1365^{b}28–30n).

Note 255

Praise and speeches of advice (*hai sumboulai*) **belong to a common kind** (*eidos*): See I 3 1358^{a}36.

{221} **The things one might propose in advising become encomia when their expression is changed:** We advise people *to do* what will earn the encomia; we praise them for *having done* them.

Encomia (*egkômia*): "The encomiastic kind (*eidos*) is the amplification of reputable deliberate choices and actions and the bringing of them into combination with [similar] ones that do not belong" (*Rh. Al.* 4 [3] 1425^{b}36–38).

Note 256

Proposals (*hupothêkas*): That is, things that advise.

Note 257

"He thinks highly not of what comes due to chance but due to oneself": Isocrates, *Evagoras* 45.

Note 258

The expression, though, will of necessity be the opposite when a preventative proposal and a non-preventative proposal are altered: The meaning seems to be this: when A would make a proposal preventing B from X, he will praise him for not doing it; when he would make a proposal not preventing B from doing X, he will not praise him for doing it.

Note 259

Things based on times and opportunities: Reading τὰ with Kassel for OCT τῷ

If these go beyond what is fitting: Reading ταῦτα with Kassel for OCT τούτῳ. See I 9 1367^{b}14–15.

Note 260

Due to the person himself: Reading δι᾽αὐτὸν with Kassel and the mss. for OCT δι᾽ αὐτοῦ.

Note 261

The first to whom: Reading εἰς ὃν with the mss. for OCT εἰς τοῦτον πρῶτον.

Hippolochus: Otherwise unknown. Kassel secludes the entire reference to him.

Harmodius and Aristogeiton: Hipparchus, son of Pisistratus (the ruling tyrant of Athens), tried to seduce Harmodius the boyfriend of Aristogeiton. When his advances were twice repulsed, he took revenge by arranging to have Harmodius' sister publicly humiliated. In revenge Harmodius and Aristogeiton plotted to kill Hipparchus and his brothers,

but succeeded in killing only Hipparchus (514 BC). In the process Harmodius was killed, as, later, was Aristogeiton. Hippias survived as tyrant for four more years, until his expulsion by the Athenians, aided by the Spartans. Harmodius and Aristogeiton were later celebrated in Athens as tyrannicides. See *Ath.* XVIII, Herodotus V.55–65, Thucydides VI.54–59, Plato, *Sym.* 182c.

Note 262

Isocrates: An important Athenian orator and educator (436–338 BC). His speeches, apart from those he wrote for others to deliver in the law-courts, were meant to be read, rather than listened to. See Roisman, pp. 48–52 (Pseudo-Plutarch), 284–287 (Photius), 329–330 (Suda).

{222} **Because of his familiarity with judicial oratory** (*dikologein*): Reading συνήθειαν with Kassel for OCT and the mss. ἀσυνήθειαν ("lack of familiarity"). In the *Antidosis* 2–3 and *Panathenaicus* 9–14, Isocrates makes clear that he did not think of himself as a writer of judicial speeches. But he was surely familiar with such speeches, even if he did not deliver them himself. Moreover, his *Helen* contains a lengthy comparison between Helen and Theseus of the sort that Aristotle is recommending and to which he apparently refers at I 6 1363^{a}18. It is very difficult, in any case, to see how "lack of familiarity" would fit the context in any natural way.

Note 263

Ordinary people: Reading τοὺς πολλοὺς with Kassel for OCT and τοὺς ἄλλους ("other people").

Note 264

Amplification is best suited to the epideictic [speeches]: Compare II 18 1391^{b}30–1392^{a}1.

Enthymemes to judicial ones: See III 17 1418^{a}2–5.

Lack of perspicuousness (*asaphes*): See I 2 1358^{a}9n.

Note 265

Reproaches (*ta oneidê*): Speeches that blame rather than praise.

Note 266

By special I mean . . . by common I mean . . . : See also I 13 1373^{b}4–18a.

Note 267

Of the things they do voluntarily: Reading ἑκόντες with Kassel and the mss. for OCT εἰδότες ("of the things they do knowingly"). Compare

NE III 2 $1111^{b}6$–10: "Deliberate choice, then, is apparently something voluntary, although not the same as what is voluntary, which extends more broadly. For children and other animals share in what is voluntary but not in deliberate choice, and sudden actions are voluntary, we say, but are not in accord with deliberate choice." Also $1112^{a}14$–15.

Note 268

Lack of self-control (*akrasia*): Or "weakness of will," "incontinence." Discussed in *NE* VII 1–10.

Note 269

It is with respect to the depravity they happen to have: Reading περὶ δὲ τοῦτο with Kassel and the mss. for OCT περὶ τοῦτο, and translating with Grimaldi.

Depravity (*mochthêrian*): *Mochthêria* is much the same as vice, so that a *mochthêros* person is a vicious one. Sometimes, though, *mochthêros* is simply equivalent to *kakos* ("bad") (for example, *NE* VII 14 $1154^{a}11$).

Note 270

The soft (*malakos*) **[does injustice] where comfort is concerned:** Softness, the contrary of resilience (*karteria*), is the state of someone easily overcome by pain. See *NE* VII 7 $1150^{a}9$–$^{b}28$.

{223} **For they abandon their comrades in danger because of fear:** Kassel secludes this clause.

Note 271

The one who lacks practical wisdom (*aphrôn*): *Aphrôn* often means "foolish," but here it probably has its more specific meaning. See I 7 $1363^{b}14$n.

Contempt (*oligôrian*): See II 2 $1378^{b}10$–15.

Note 272

What we said about virtues: In I 9.

What we will say about feelings: In II 1–11.

Note 273

Of those due to necessity, some occur by force: "By force and contrary to nature are the same" (*Cael.* III 2 $300^{a}23$); "what is forced [is] contrary to natural impulse" (*Met.* XII 7 $1072^{b}12$; also V 5 $1015^{b}15$). See also I 10 $1369^{b}5$–6.

Some by nature: See I 10 $1369^{a}35$–$^{b}4$.

Note 274

Desire (*orexin*): "Desire comprises appetite, spirit, and wish" (*DA* II 3 $414^{b}2$).

Rationally calculative desire: Since "deliberating is the same as rationally calculating" (*NE* VI 1 $1139^{a}12$–13), this desire is the same as "thought-involving desire" (2 $1139^{b}5$) and "deliberative desire" (III 4 $1113^{a}11$), where "I mean by something's being 'deliberative' that deliberation is its starting-point and cause—that is, the agent desires because of having deliberated" (*EE* II 10 $1226^{b}19$–20).

Note 275

In one case, then, there is wish, a desire for some good: That is, when the desire is rationally calculative. For "wish is always found in the rationally calculative part" (*Top*. IV 5 $126^{a}13$), whereas spirit and appetite are in the non-rational part: "in the rationally calculative part there will be wish, and in the non-rational part appetite and spirit. And so if the soul is tripartite there will be desire (*orexis*) in each part" (*DA* III 9 $432^{b}5$–7); "Wish is a desire, and when movement is in accord with rational calculation, it is in accord with wish, and desire causes movement even contrary to rational calculation, since appetite is a sort of desire" (10 $433^{a}23$–26).

Wish (*boulêsis*): "Unconditionally and in truth the proper object of wish is the good, but to each person it is the apparent good" (*NE* III 4 $1113^{a}23$–24).

Whereas anger (*orgê*) and appetite are non-rational desires: Since desire comprises appetite, spirit (*thumos*), and wish (*DA* II 3 $414^{b}2$), *orgê* is here the same thing as *thumos*. Indeed, Aristotle often uses *thumos* and *orgê* ("anger") interchangeably (*Rh*. I 10 $1369^{a}7$, $^{b}11$) and very often uses *thumos* in contexts where its aggressive side is highlighted (*NE* III 8 $1116^{b}15$–$1117^{a}9$). In other places, however, he says only that anger is "in (*en*)" the spirited part (*Top*. II 7 $113^{a}36$–$^{b}1$, IV 5 $126^{a}10$), alongside other feelings, such as fear and hatred (IV 5 $126^{a}8$–9). In one passage, indeed, he identifies spirit as the source not just of "negative" feelings but also of love and friendship: "spirit (*thumos*) is what produces friendliness {224} (*philêtikon*), since it is the capacity of the soul by which we love (*philoumen*)" (*Pol*. VII 7 $1327^{b}40$–$1328^{a}1$). This is in keeping with his claim that if hatred is in the spirited part, then love, as its contrary, must be there too (*Top*. II 7 $113^{a}33$–$^{b}3$). Presumably, then, we should think of

spirit as passionate—as "hot and hasty" (*NE* VII 6 1149ª30)—rather than as always aggressive.

Appetite: See I 6 1363ª37n.

Note 276

An appetite for unnecessary pleasures (*mê anagkaiôn hêdonôn*): In the *Rep*. VIII, Plato distinguishes between unnecessary appetites (and the attendant unnecessary pleasures of satisfying them) and necessary ones as follows: "[*Socrates*] Well, then, wouldn't those we cannot deny rightly be called necessary? And also those whose satisfaction benefits us? For we are by nature compelled to try to satisfy them both. Isn't that so? . . . What about those someone could get rid of if he started practicing from childhood, those whose presence does no good but may even do the opposite? If we said that all of them were unnecessary, would we be right? . . . Let's pick an example of each, so that we have a pattern to follow. . . . Wouldn't the desire to eat to the point of health and well-being, and the desire for bread and relishes be necessary ones? . . . The desire for bread is surely necessary on both counts, in that it is beneficial and that unless it is satisfied, we die. . . . And so is the one for relishes, insofar as it is beneficial and conduces to well-being. . . . What about an appetite that goes beyond these and seeks other sorts of foods; that, if it is restrained from childhood and educated, most people can hold in check; and that is harmful to the body or harmful to the soul's capacity for wisdom and temperance? Wouldn't it be correct to call it unnecessary?" (558d–559c). In *NE* VII 14 a similar distinction is drawn: "Or are the necessary pleasures good in this way, namely, that even what is not bad is good? Or are they good up to a point? For of some states and processes there cannot be an excess that is better, and so there cannot be an excess of their pleasure either, whereas of others there can be such an excess, and so there can be one of their pleasure too. Of the goods of the body, however, there can be an excess, and it is by pursuing the excess, not the necessary pleasures, that a base person is base. For everyone enjoys gourmet dishes, wines, and sexual relations in some way or other, although not everyone does so in the way he should" (1154ª11–18).

Note 277

Due to feeling: That is, non-rational spirit (anger) or appetite. See I 1 1354ª17n.

Note 278

Nothing is regulated (*tetaktai*) **so as to follow from such things:** The verb *tattein* means "draw up in order (*taxis*) of battle," and hence "prescribe," "order," "ordain," and so on. Here the emphasis is not on the imperatival aspect of the verb, however, but rather on the order or regularity conveyed by the adverb *tetagmenôs* ("in an orderly way") used at I 10 1369^{a}34.

{225} Note 279

We shall discuss these issues later on: At II 12–17.

What remains: See I 10 1368^{b}3–5.

Note 280

As for those that occur contrary to nature, nothing need be argued in an exact way as to whether they are in accord with nature or due to some other cause: Only substances are by nature, in the sense of having a nature. But non-substantial phenomena, such as the upward movement of fire, can occur by or in accord with nature, although they do not have a nature. See I 4 1359^{a}35n.

Note 281

Through the doers themselves: Reading δι' with Grimaldi and the mss.; OCT and Kassel seclude.

Note 282

The goods mentioned: Those discussed in I 6.

The intemperate also do advantageous things, not because of the advantage, though, but because of pleasure: "A person who pursues the excesses of pleasures (or does so to excess) and does so because of deliberate choice, because of the pleasures themselves and not because of any further consequence, is intemperate" (*NE* VII 7 1150^{a}19–21).

Note 283

In order that he get satisfaction: Reading ἀποπληρωθῇ with Kassel for OCT πληρωθῇ.

Note 284

What anger is will become clear in the discussion of the feelings: See II 2 1378^{a}30–32.

Note 285

We spoke previously about the advantageous in the case of deliberative oratory: In I 6.

Note 286

If they neither lack perspicuousness nor are [too] exact: "Not defining correctly has two parts. One consists in doing so by using an expression that is not perspicuous (for the definer must use the most perspicuous expression possible, since it is to make the thing known that the definition is being assigned). The second is if he has stated the account in a more extended form than is necessary (for any additional component in the definition is superfluous)" (*Top*. VI 2 $139^{b}12$–17). See, on perspicuousness, I 2 $1358^{a}9$n and, on exactness, I 1 $1355^{a}25$n.

Note 287

Pleasure is a sort of movement (*kinêsis tina*) **of the soul, an intensive** (*athroan*) **and perceptible settling down** (*katastasin*) **into its original natural state:** The {226} view is, or is noticeably like, the view expressed by Plato: "But when things are restored to their own nature again, this restoration . . . is pleasure" (*Phlb*. 48d). In *NE* VII 12, Aristotle criticizes this view: "Since one sort of good is an activity and another sort is a state, settlings down into our natural state are only coincidentally pleasures. The activity in the case of the appetites belongs to the residual state and nature, although there are in fact pleasures without pain or appetite, such as the activities of contemplation, where there is no lack in the natural state" ($1152^{b}33$–$1153^{a}2$); "For pleasures are not comings to be nor do they all involve comings to be, but, rather, they are activities and an end, and they do not occur when we come to be something but when we use something. Also, not all pleasures have something else as end but only those that lead to the completion of our nature. That is why it is not correct to say that pleasure is a perceived coming to be, but we should better say that it is an activity of a natural state and that it is unimpeded instead of perceived. But it seems to some people to be a coming to be, because it is fully good. For they think an activity is a coming to be, whereas in fact it is a distinct thing" ($1153^{a}9$–17). But though the distinction between a movement (*kinêsis*) or coming to be and an activity (*energeia*) is of fundamental importance in Aristotle's entire philosophy (*Met*. IX 6), the two are intimately connected: "The name 'activity,' which is connected to 'actuality,' has been extended to other things from applying most of all to movements. For activity seems most of all to be movement" (3 $1047^{a}30$–32). There is no reason, therefore, not to accept the claim that "pleasure is a *sort of* movement of the soul," as one Aristotle would himself accept—certainly for rhetorical

purposes. His own considered view, though, is that pleasure is not so much even an activity as it is what completes a certain sort of activity in a certain distinctive way: "With every perceptual capacity there is a pleasure connected, and the same holds for both thought and contemplation. But the most pleasant is the most complete, and the most complete is the activity of a subject that is in good condition in relation to the most excellent of the relevant objects. And pleasure is what completes the activity. But pleasure does not complete it in the way that the perceptible object and the perceptual capacity do when they are both excellent, just as health and a doctor are not in the same way a cause of being healthy. . . . Pleasure completes an activity not as the state does by being present in something but as a sort of supervenient end, like the bloom on men in their prime of youth" (*NE* X 5 1174^{b}20–33). Compare: "To feel pleasure or pain is to be active with regard to the perceptual mean in relation to what is good or bad, as such" (*DA* III 7 431^{a}10–11).

Note 288

The contrary settling down (*tês enantias katastaseôs*): Though *katastasis* may here simply be equivalent in meaning to *diathesis* ("condition"), used in the previous clause, it is noteworthy that it there refers back to the *katastasis* in the definition of pleasure. It seems more likely, therefore, that the term has its more specific meaning. The idea, then, would be that while a perceptible intensive settling down into an antecedent natural condition from a non-natural (painful) one is pleasure, the contrary perceptible intensive settling down is pain.

{227} Note 289

Habit is something like nature: "What often occurs produces nature" (*Mem.* 2 452^{a}30).

Note 290

"Every necessary thing, indeed, has a troublesome nature": Evenus of Paros (fifth cent BC), who is described as a poet (Plato, *Phd.* 60c8–e1) and as an orator (*Phdr.* 267a1–5); a few fragments of his elegies survive. This line—F8 West—is also quoted at *Met.* V 5 1015^{a}29–30 and *EE* II 7 1223^{a}32.

Note 291

Things that require supervision (*epimeleias*): Supervision (*epimeleia*) of X, which involves taking care of (*epimeleisthai*) it, is often exercised by a type of craft or science that has X's welfare as its end or goal. For

example, a king supervises his subjects to ensure that they do well (*NE* VIII 11 1161^{a}13), and medicine supervises the sick with the aim of making them healthy (X 9 1180^{b}17). Similarly the gods supervise the person "whose activity is in accord with understanding," since they love and take pleasure in what is best and "most akin to themselves" (X 8 1179^{a}22–32).

[Things that require] effort (*spoudas*): See I 5 1361^{a}25n.

Note 292

Appetite (*epithumia*): In Aristotle's own somewhat technical use of the term, an *epithumia* is one sort of *orexis* (desire). See I 6 1363^{a}37n. Here, however, and throughout this chapter, the term seems to be used in its loose and popular sense to refer to any sort of desire. Notice, for example, "an appetite for learning" (I 11 1371^{a}32–33).

Note 293

On the basis of taking something to be the case: Reading ὑπολαμβάνειν τι with Kassel for OCT ὑπολαμβάνειν.

Note 294

Those that involve reason . . . are those where people have an appetite on the basis of being persuaded (*peistênai*): "Every case of belief implies conviction, conviction implies being persuaded, and persuasion implies reason, and while some beasts have imagination, none has reason" (*DA* III 3 428^{a}22–24); "All imagination is either rationally calculative or perceptual" (10 433^{b}29); "Perceptual imagination . . . also belongs to the other animals, but the deliberative sort exists [only] in the rationally calculative ones (for whether to do this or that is already a work of rational calculation; and we must measure by one [standard], since we are pursuing the greater [good]; and so we must be able to make one appearance that results from many)" (11 434^{a}5–10).

Note 295

Imagination is a sort of weak perception: "Imagination [is] a movement that comes about as a result of the activity of perception. And since sight is perception to the highest degree, imagination (*phantasia*) derives its name from light (*phaos*), {228} because without light it is not possible to see. And because its objects persist and are similar to perceptions, animals do many things in accord with them, some because they lack understanding (for example, beasts) and others because their understanding is sometimes obscured by feeling, disease, or sleep (for

example, human beings)" (*DA* III 3 429^{a}1–8). When one imagines something, the content of one's imagination—the analogue of a visual image—is an appearance (also *phantasia*).

And some sort of imagination of what he remembers or expects always follows along with the perception in the person expecting or remembering: Reading κἀεὶ ἐν with Grimaldi for OCT ἀεὶ ἐν; Kassel reads καὶ ἐν.

Remembers (*memêmenô[i]*): "Memory is not perception or supposition, but a state or affection connected with one of these, when time has elapsed. . . . And that is why all memory involves time. So only animals that perceive time remember, and they do so by means of that with which they perceive [namely, the primary perceptual part and imagination, which belongs to it]. . . . And it is not possible to understand without an appearance (*phantasmatos*) [= an object of imagination]. . . . So memory will belong to thought coincidentally, but intrinsically to the primary perceptual part. And that is why some other animals too have memory, and not only humans and those animals that have belief or practical wisdom. But if memory were one of the understanding parts, not many of the other animals would have it, and perhaps no mortal animal would have it, since even as things stand they do not all have memory, because they do not all have perception of time. For when someone is activating his memory . . . , he perceives in addition that he saw this, or heard it, or learned it earlier; and the earlier and the later are in time. It is evident, then, to which part of the soul memory belongs, namely, the very same part as that to which imagination belongs. And it is appearances [= objects of imagination] that are remembered intrinsically, whereas things that are not grasped without appearances are remembered coincidentally" (*Mem.* 1 449^{b}24–450^{a}25).

Note 296

"But pleasant it is when rescued to remember one's sufferings": Euripides' lost *Andromeda*. Fr. 131 Nauck.

"For afterward . . . accomplishes": An inexact quotation of Homer, *Od.* XV.400–401.

Note 297

"[Spirit] is much sweeter than dripping honey": Homer, *Il.* XVIII.109. Quoted more fully at II 2 1378^{b}6–7.

Note 298

No one is angry at someone on whom it is apparently (*phainomenô[i]*) **impossible to take revenge:** See II 2 1378ª30–32n.

Nor at those who are greater than themselves in capacity: Reading οὐδὲ τοῖς for OCT τοῖς.

Note 299

Writing (*graphontes*), **and doing something** (*kai poiountes ti*) **concerning the beloved:** Or "drawing [likenesses of] and composing poems about the beloved."

{229} **Lovers** (*hoi erôntes*) **. . . beloved** (*tou erômenou*): *Paiderasteia*, or boy love, between an older man (*erastês*) and an adolescent boy (*erômenos*) was an accepted practice in classical Athens. Sex was common in such relationships, with the boy playing the passive role. Once the boy reached manhood, however, and his bloom of youth faded, that was supposed to change. On pain of losing his citizen rights, he could no longer be a passive sexual partner. Instead, he was expected to marry, have children, and become an *erastês* in his turn. Though erotic in nature, the relationship was conceived as primarily educative. By associating with someone who was already a man, a boy learned virtue or excellence and how to be a man himself. Rites of passage in some primitive warrior societies also involve sexual contact between men and boys, and it is sometimes suggested that Greek *paiderasteia* also had its roots in a warrior past.

Note 300

The starting-point of love is the same for all: "Pleasure from sight is the starting-point of erotic love. For without first being pleased by the appearance of the other, no one falls in love, but someone who does enjoy another's appearance is none the more in love unless he also longs for the other when he is absent and has an appetite for his presence" (*NE* IX 5 1167ª3–7).

When they not only enjoy the beloved when he is present, but also remember him when he is absent, though pain would attach to his not being present: The Greek text of this clause is corrupt. I follow OCT in reading μεμνημένοις λύπη προσγένηται τῷ μὴ παρεῖναι. The mss. read μεμνημένοι ἐρῶσιν, which Kassel follows, making some additions of his own, to read: μεμνημένοι· ἐρῶσι δὲ δή, ὅταν καὶ λύπη προσγένηται τῷ μὴ παρεῖναι ("when they not only enjoy the beloved

when he is present, but also remembering him when he is absent; and they are in love also when there is pain at his absence").

Note 301

"Thus he spoke, and stirred in all of them the longing for weeping": Homer, *Il.* XXIII.108, *Od.* IV.183

Note 302

An appearance (*phantasia*) **of superiority results:** Or "an imagination of superiority." Similarly, at I 11 1371^{a}9, 19.

Whether mild or more intense: Reading μᾶλλον with Kassel, Grimaldi, and the mss. for OCT μάλα

Note 303

Warlike ones (*machêtikas*): "Contact sports," as we might call them, such as football or rugby, but also those like baseball or cricket, which foster team spirit as well as involving elements of the sorts of physical training and eye-hand coordination that are also useful for soldiers.

Contentious arguments (*eristikas*): See I 1 1355^{b}20–21n, also II 24 1402^{a}3–17 (= T9*).

Games of knucklebone (*astragaliseis*): An *astragalos* is an ancient form of die made from the knucklebone of a sheep (Google "astragalus" for images).

{230} **Checkers** (*petteias*): A *pettos* (plural: *pettoi*) is an oval-shaped stone used in playing checkers (drafts), backgammon, or the like. Since any game played with a *pettos* is a game of *petteia*, it is not clear to which game in particular Aristotle is referring.

Note 304

When others say so whom the person thinks to be truthful. And of the latter sort are: "Ordinary people enjoy being honored by those in positions of authority because of what they expect, since they think that if they need something they will get it from these. It is as a sign of benefits to be received, then, that they enjoy the honor. Those who desire honor from decent and knowledgeable people, on the other hand, are seeking to confirm their own beliefs about themselves. What they enjoy, then, is that they are good, and that happens thanks to their trusting the discernment of those who say this" (*NE* VIII 8 1159^{a}18–24).

Note 305

One cares nothing about the honor or opinion of those one greatly despises (*polu kataphronein*), **such as small children** (*paidiôn*) **or**

beasts (*thêriôn*): A *thêrion* is usually a wild beast, but as with "beast" it can also be a derogatory term for a human being: "whenever we see someone completely base, we do not say he is a human being, but rather a beast (*thêrion*), implying that there is a vice of beastliness (*thêriotêta*)" (*MM* II 5 1200^{b}9–11); "We do not see the kind of vice we called beastliness in wild beasts, but in human beings" (6 1203^{a}18–19); "The things having to do with character that are to be avoided are of three forms: vice, lack of self-control, and beastliness" (*NE* VII 1 1145^{a}16–17). Similarly, *paidion*, which is a diminutive of *pais*, may be a very childish person of whatever age, or—another meaning of *paidion*—a male or female slave, or someone who is "childish (*paidikon*)" (*NE* X 6 1176^{b}33). The latter two would better explain *polu kataphronein*, just as the derogatory understanding of *thêrion* better explains how it is that a non-speaking *thêrion* could be a source of honor or reputation. Similarly, at II 6 1384^{b}23–24, we have *paidia kai thêria* as examples of things whose "reputation for telling the truth" people despise—a description which fits small children (and, no doubt, slaves) but not beasts. See also the next part of this note and, on despising, II 2 1378^{b}15–18.

At any rate for the sake of one's reputation: The implication is that one might care about the honor or opinion of a *paidion* or a *thêrion* for reasons not having to do with reputation.

Note 306

As we saw, what one is accustomed to is pleasant: At I 10 1369^{b}16–18.

Note 307

And [then] change is pleasant, since change is to one's natural condition, since always doing the same thing produces an excess of the state settled down into: Not all change is to one's natural condition, since one can change from it as well as to it (I 11 1369^{b}33–35). So the claim here, as the "since" clause shows, is a restricted one. When always doing the same thing produces an excess of the state {231} established by the repetition, then change from that state is pleasant. The following text explains why: "In no case, though, is the same thing always pleasant, because our nature is not simple but also has another element in it, in that we are mortals. As a result, if one of the two is doing something, it is contrary to the nature of our other nature, and when the two are equally balanced, what we are doing seems neither painful nor pleasant. For if the

nature of some being were simple, the same action would always be most pleasant" (*NE* VII 14 1154^{b}20–25).

The state settled down into (*tês kathestôsês hexeôs*): See I 11 1370^{a}1n.

Note 308

"In all things change is sweet": Euripides, *Orestes* 234. *NE* VII 14 explains that this is so "because of a sort of wickedness. For just as a wicked human being is an easily changeable one, a nature that needs change is also wicked, since it is neither simple nor decent" (1154^{b}28–31).

Note 309

What comes at intervals is also pleasant: Reading καὶ with Kassel and the mss. for OCT γὰρ καὶ.

Note 310

What comes at intervals is also rare: See I 7 1364^{a}23–26.

Note 311

In wondering (*thaumazein*) **there is an appetite for learning** (*mathein*): The verb *thaumazein*, which means "admire" at I 11 1371^{a}22, here has the meaning it has the related sentence of *Met.* I 2 982^{b}12–13: "It is because of wondering (*thaumazein*) at things that humans, both now and at first, began to do philosophy." Thus while admiration may give rise to a desire to emulate, wonder gives rise to a desire to learn and acquire knowledge.

In learning there is a settling down (*katistasthai*): "But the acquisition of scientific knowledge at the start is not a coming to be or an alteration. For it is when the soul comes to a rest and a settling down that someone comes to be a scientific knower and a practically-wise person. Likewise, if someone who wakes up from sleeping, sobers up from drinking, or recovers from sickness did not become a scientific knower, even though before he was not capable of using or activating his scientific knowledge, as soon as he is freed from his restlessness and his thought has come to a rest and a settling down, the capacity to use his scientific knowledge belongs to him. This is the sort of thing, then, that also comes about when scientific knowledge is acquired at the start, namely, a sort of calming of the restlessness and a coming to a stop" (*Ph.* VII 3 247^{b}22–28)

That is in accord with nature: Because "all humans by nature desire to know" (*Met.* I 1 980^{a}21). The comparable claim that "a human is by

nature a political animal" (*Pol.* I 1 1253^{a}2–3) means, in part, that "an impulse toward this sort of community exists by nature in everyone" (2 1253^{a}29–30)—nature and impulse (*hormê*) are again associated at *Met.* V 23 1023^{a}9. So presumably the desire to know need not be understood as one that all humans are either conscious of having or act on. It may exist simply as an impulse or conatus, which, granted leisure and the {232} various cultural developments needed for it (I 1 981^{b}20–23), will find expression in human life.

Note 312

To do good implies both having and superiority: That is, both having the resources needed to do good and being superior to the one who needs good things to be done for him. Thus the great-souled person is "the sort of person who is a benefactor but is ashamed to be a beneficiary, since the former is characteristic of a superior, the latter of an inferior" (*NE* IV 3 1124^{b}9–10).

Note 313

It is pleasant for human beings to rectify (*epanorthoun*) **their neighbors and make up for their deficiencies** (*ta ellipê epitelein*): The deficiencies in question may be in their property, but may also be, as the context of learning requires, in their beliefs, judgments, or moral character. *Epitelein* means "discharge a duty" or "pay a debt in full," but also "bring to perfection." See also I 11 1371^{b}25–26.

Note 314

Everything that is well-imitated, even if what is imitated is not pleasant, since it is not it that one enjoys, but the deduction that *this* is *that*, so that the result is that one learns something: "We enjoy looking at the most exact likenesses of things that in themselves may be painful to see, such as the shapes of the least estimable of the wild beasts or dead bodies. And the cause of this is that learning is most pleasant, not only to philosophers, but also for others likewise (although they share in it to a small extent). For because of this they enjoy seeing likenesses, namely, because the result is that they learn as they look, and deduce what each is—for example, that *this* person [in the painting etc. represents] *that* one. For if one has not seen the thing before, its image will not produce pleasure as an imitation, but because of its execution, color, or some other cause" (*Po.* 4 1448^{b}10–19).

Note 315

Reversals (*peripeteiai*): "A reversal is a change of the actions to their contrary . . . and that, as we are claiming, in accord with likelihood or necessity—for example, in the *Oedipus*, the man who comes to gladden Oedipus, and to rid him of his fear regarding his mother, does the contrary by revealing who Oedipus is" (*Po.* 11 1452ª22–26).

Note 316

All that is like oneself or the same in kind is pleasant to oneself: Reading ὸ συγγενὲς ἡδὺ ἑαυτῷ ἅπαν with Kassel and the mss. for OCT ὸ συγγενὲς ἑαυτῷ ἡδὺ ἅπαν.

All are more or less self-lovers (*philautous*): "Now those who reduce it to a term of reproach call 'self-lovers' those who allocate to themselves the greater share in money, honors, and bodily pleasures. For these are the things ordinary people desire and take seriously, on the supposition that they are the best goods—which {233} is why they are fought about. Those people, then, who are greedy where these things are concerned gratify their appetites and their feelings and the non-rational part of the soul generally. And ordinary people are like this, which is why the term has come about, deriving from the most ordinary case, which really is a base one. Those who are self-lovers in this way, then, *are* justly objects of reproach. That it is those who allocate goods of this sort to themselves that most people are used to calling 'self-lovers' is clear enough. For if someone were always taking more seriously than anything else the doing of just actions or temperate ones or whatever else might be in accord with the virtues, and in general were always keeping for himself what was noble, no one would call *this* person a 'self-lover' or blame him. A person of this sort, though, would seem to be *more* of a self-lover. At any rate, he allocates to himself the good things that are noblest and the ones that are best of all and gratifies the element in himself that has most control, obeying it in everything. But just as a city too or any other complex system, seems to be most of all its most controlling part, so also does a human being. A person is most of all a self-lover, then, who likes this part and gratifies this part. Also, a person is called 'self-controlled' or 'lacking in self-control' depending on whether or not his understanding is in control, on the supposition that this is what each person *is*, and it is actions involving reason that people seem most of all to do themselves and to do voluntarily. So it is clear enough that this part is what each person is or is most of all and that a decent person likes this part most.

That is why a decent person is most of all a self-lover, but of a different form than the one that is reproached and differing from it as much as living in accord with reason does from living in accord with feeling and as much as desiring what is noble does from desiring what seems advantageous" (*NE* IX 8 1168^{b}15–1169^{a}6).

Note 317

All such things belong, in the highest degree, to his relation to himself: "We should love most the one who is most a friend, and the one who is most a friend is the one who wishes good things to the person he wishes them to for that person's own sake, even if no one will know. But these features are found most in a person's relations to himself, as of course are all the others by which a friend is defined. For, as we said, it is from oneself that all the features fitted to friendship also extend to others" (*NE* IX 8 1168^{b}1–6).

Note 318

Lovers . . . of lovers (*philerastai*): See I 11 1379^{b}19–22n.

Of honors: Reading φιλότιμοι with the mss. for OCT φιλόμαιμοι.

Note 319

To make up for deficiencies: See also I 11 1371^{b}4.

Note 320

Since to rule is most pleasant, seeming to be theoretically-wise (*sophon*) **is also pleasant:** The idea is that seeming to be wise gives one the sort of apparent authority or control in an area that a ruler in the strict sense has in the political realm. {234} This is what allows the slide from theoretical wisdom, which has the former but not the latter sort of rule, to practical wisdom, which does have the latter.

For what is practically-wise (*phronein*) **is fitted to rule** (*archikon*): *Politikê* (politics, political science) is "the science with the most control, and the most architectonic one," because "it is the one that prescribes which of the sciences need to exist in cities and which ones each group in cities should learn and up to what point. Indeed, we see that even the capacities that are generally most honored are under it—for example, generalship, household management, and rhetoric. And since it uses the other practical sciences and, furthermore, legislates about what must be done and what avoided, its end will encompass those of the others, so that it will be the human good" (*NE* I 2 1094^{a}26–^{b}7). But "politics and practical wisdom are the same state [of the soul]" (VI 8 1141^{b}23–24), so

that "practical wisdom [is] the only virtue special to a ruler (*archontos*)" (*Pol.* III 4 1277^{b}25–26). This is what makes it fitted to rule.

Theoretical wisdom (*sophia*) **is the scientific knowledge of many wondrous things:** "It is evident too that theoretical wisdom cannot be the same as politics. . . . [For] theoretical wisdom is clearly scientific knowledge combined with understanding of the things that are naturally most estimable. That is why Anaxagoras and Thales and people of that sort are said to be wise (*sophous*)—but not practically-wise when we see them to be ignorant of what is advantageous to themselves—and why what they know is said to be extraordinary, wondrous, difficult, and worthy of worship but useless, because it is not human goods they seek" (*NE* VI 7 1141^{a}28–^{b}8).

Note 321

It is pleasant to criticize one's neighbors, and to rule [in that way]: καὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ("and to rule"), which does not appear in some mss., should perhaps be secluded with Grimaldi.

Note 322

"Toward this he presses hard . . . in": From Euripides' lost *Antiope.* Fr. 183 Nauck. The opening line, κἀπὶ τοῦτ' ἐπείγει is part of the quotation, not, as in OCT, Aristotle's own words.

Note 323

The ridiculous has been discussed separately in the *Poetics*: "Comedy . . . is the imitation (*mimêsis*) of people who are rather base—not, however, in accord with every sort of vice, but rather the ridiculous is a part of what is ugly (*aischrou*). For the ridiculous is a sort of error and ugliness that is not painful and destructive, just as, to go no further (*euthus*), a ridiculous mask is one that is ugly and distorted but without causing pain" (*Po.* 5 1449^{a}32–37). A longer discussion of comedy is advertised at 6 1449^{b}21–22, but is not extant. An attempted reconstruction of it from fragments can be found in Janko. See also III 18 1419^{b}6–7.

Note 324

These, then, are things for the sake of which people do injustice; let us now discuss the way in which they are disposed and whom they do injustice to: In keeping with the program described at I 10 1368^{b}3–4 and 1369^{b}20–32.

{235} Note 325

Whether they think either: Reading εἴτε ἂν with Kassel and the mss. for OCT εἶτ' ἄν.

Note 326

What sorts of things appear possible or impossible will be discussed later: At II 19 1392^{a}8–^{b}14.

Note 327

The ones likely to escape notice: Reading λαθητικοὶ with Kassel, Grimaldi, and the mss. for OCT λαθητικά.

And a poor or ugly one: Retaining the initial καὶ with Kassel and the mss.; OCT secludes.

Note 328

The one for whom the retribution is not equal to the benefit, as seems to be the case with tyranny: Double-bracketed by Kassel as a later addition by Aristotle. The "crime" is overthrowing a government and establishing a tyranny for oneself. If it succeeds, the benefit will be huge and there will be little or no fear of retribution, since the power will be in one's own hands.

Note 329

The case of Zeno: About which nothing is known with any certainty.

Note 330

People do injustice for either reason and in either condition [of mind]: That is, either because the unjust actions bring solid gains or because the injustice is for the sake of a noble cause.

Note 331

Benefit: Rejecting with Kassel and Grimaldi the OCT addition of τὸ.

Note 332

Those who may possibly seem to have acted due to . . . habit: Actions done from habit may be voluntary (I 10 1369^{b}6–7), but if the habit came about in a certain way, they may not be. Thus *NE* VII 5 mentions "morbid conditions arising from habit—for example, plucking out one's hair, chewing on one's nails or even on charcoal and earth, and besides these, sexual intercourse between males. In some cases, these come about naturally; in some as a result of habit—for example, those who have suffered wanton aggression from childhood on" (1148^{b}27–31).

And, in general, to have committed an error rather than an injustice: See I 13 1374^{b}4–6n.

Note 333

Decent consideration (*epieikous*): See I 2 1356[a]6n.

Note 334

Carthaginians: Inhabitants of Carthage in present-day Tunisia, on the eastern shore of Lake Tunis, across from the city of Tunis. Aristotle discusses their constitution in *Pol.* II 11.

{236} Note 335

Prone to shame (*aischuntêlous*): Or, shy, bashful. "We praise those young people who have a sense of shame. No one would praise an older person for being prone to shame (*aischuntêlos*), however, since we think that he shouldn't do any action that gives rise to shame. For shame is not something characteristic of a decent person either, if indeed it is a response to base actions. (For these actions should not be done. And whether they are truly shameful or reputed so makes no difference, since neither should be done, and so a decent person should not feel shame.) In fact, shame is characteristic of a base person, since he is the sort to do shameful actions. But to be the sort of person who feels ashamed once he does an action like that and then thinks himself to be decent because of it, is strange" (*NE* IV 9 1128[b]18–28).

Note 336

"Mysian spoil": Easy prey. The source of the proverb is not entirely clear.

Note 337

Treats a person in an insulting way (*aikisaito*): A *dikê aikias* was a legal action for assault (as at I 12 1372[a]22). But to be cognate with *hubrizein*, it must here have its less technical meaning.

Committing wanton aggression (*hubrizein*): In the definition of *hubris* at II 2 1378[b]23–29, notice, "the wantonly aggressive person (*hubrizôn*) also shows contempt (*oligôrei*)." It is the contempt that licenses the retaliatory insulting treatment.

Note 338

And those by doing injustice to whom they gratify friends: Reading οὗς with Kassel and Grimaldi for OCT οἷς.

Note 339

As Calippus did in the Dion affair: Calippus was a friend of Dion (c. 408–354 BC), who freed Syracuse from the tyranny of Dionysius II (*Pol.* V 10 1312[a]4–6). Later he was involved in Dion's death. It is not entirely clear what Calippus did.

Note 340

Aenesidemus: One of the bodyguards of Hippocrates, the tyrant of Gela on the south coast of Sicily (died 491 BC), and the father of Theron, tyrant of Acragas (c. 489–473 BC). See Herodotus VII.154.

***Kottabos*:** A game involving flicking wine lees at targets. The prizes (*kattabeia*) were usually sweets.

Gelon: Tyrant of Syracuse 485–478 BC (see *Pol.* V 10 1312^{b}9–17).

After the latter had enslaved the city: I follow Kassel in not indicating a hiatus after ἀνδραποδισαμένῳ ("enslaved") with OCT.

Note 341

Jason the Thessalian: Tyrant of Pherae in Thessaly (c. 387–370 BC), a region bordering the Aegean on the east, Macedonia on the north, and central Greece on the south.

{237} Note 342

Sympathetic consideration (*suggnômês*): *Suggnômê*, which is like pardon or forgiveness, is discussed in *NE* VI 11.

Note 343

By mixing (*krasesin*): As one might conceal one's theft of wine by mixing water with what was left behind in the bottle.

Note 344

Special being what each [community] has defined relative to itself, and common what is in accord with nature: "Of what is politically just, one part is natural, the other legal. The natural one is the one that has the same force everywhere and not because it does or does not seem to have it, whereas the legal is the one where at the start it makes no difference whether it enjoins one thing or another, but once people establish it, it does make a difference—for example, that a mina is the amount of a ransom, or that a goat should be sacrificed and not two sheep. Further, what is legally just includes both laws passed for particular cases (for example, that sacrifices be offered to Brasidas) and enactments in the form of decrees" (*NE* V 7 1134^{b}18–24). See also *Rh.* I 10 1368^{b}7–9.

Note 345

There is, what all people have a hunch (*manteuontai*) **. . . that there is:** Reading ὃ μαντεύονται τι with Kassel and the mss. for OCT τι ὃ μαντεύονται. A mantis is a prophet, so the verb *manteuesthai* literally means "to prophesy" or "to divine." Aristotle's use of it in similar contexts in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, however, suggests that "have a hunch" better

captures its meaning here: "We have a hunch (*manteuometha*) that the good is something that properly belongs to us and is difficult to take away" (I 5 1095^{b}25–26); "All people somehow have a hunch (*manteuesthai*) that this sort of state is virtue—the one in accord with practical wisdom" (VI 13 1144^{b}24–25).

Note 346

Sophocles: Athenian tragic playwright (c. 496–406 BC), author of *Oedipus Tyrannus.*

"For not just now or yesterday . . . appeared": Sophocles, *Antigone* 456–457.

Note 347

Empedocles: A Presocratic philosopher from Acragas in Sicily (c. 492–432). See DK 31 = TEGP pp. 326–433. Aristotle quotes DK B135 = TEGP 196 F141.

Note 348

Alcidamas: A fourth-cent rhetorician and student of the sophist Gorgias.

The *Messianicus*: Quoted from again at II 23 1397^{a}11–12.

"God has made all people free . . . slave": The OCT supplies the quotation, which is not in Aristotle's text as we have it, from a scholiast (*CAG* XXI:2, p. 74, 31–32 = Gagarin & Woodruff, p. 276). For the idea, see *Pol.* I 3 1253^{b}20–23.

{238} Note 349

Others in relation to one person or in relation to several persons: Reading πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους with Kassel, Grimaldi, and the mss. for OCT πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ πρὸς ἄλλους, but treating καὶ as linking alternatives.

Note 350

For doing injustice was previously defined to be a voluntary thing: At I 10 1368^{b}6–7.

Note 351

Harmed involuntarily: Reading ἀκουσίως βλάπτεσθαι with Kassel, Grimaldi, and the mss. for OCT ἑκουσίως βλάπτεσθαι ("harmed voluntarily"). That is, against the will of the one who suffers the injustice.

Intrinsic goods and evils have been discussed previously: Primarily, but not exclusively, in I 6.

As have things that are done voluntarily: In I 10.

Note 352

Spirit will be spoken about in the account of the feelings: In II 2. On spirit (anger), see I 10 1369^{a}4n.

What sorts of things are deliberately chosen and the way those who do them are disposed were spoken about earlier: In I 11–12.

Note 353

The dispute is about whether the accused is unjust and base or not unjust: Reading ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις with Kassel, Grimaldi, and the mss. for OCT [ἡ] ἀμφισβήτησις.

Notes 354

Additionally signify (*prossêmainei*): That is, they signify the particular sort of action—stealing something, striking the first blow—and, in addition, that it involved the deliberate choice that makes it a case of theft or wanton aggression. See *Int.* 3 16^{b}6–25.

Note 355

If someone has struck another a blow, he has not in all cases committed wanton aggression against him, but rather if he has done so for the sake of something: See I 12 1373^{a}13n.

Note 356

If he took it for the purpose of harm and for the use and advantage of himself: Reading εἰ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ καὶ σφετερισμῷ ἑαυτοῦ with Kassel for OCT εἰ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τούτου ἀφ' οὗ ἔλαβε καὶ σφετερισμῷ ἑαυτοῦ. The mss. have ἔκλεψεν, secluded by Kassel, following βλάβῃ.

Note 357

But since, as we saw: Most recently at I 13 1373^{b}4–6.

{239} **There are two kinds of just and unjust actions (for some are written, others unwritten), the ones the laws proclaim have been spoken about:** At I 13 1373^{b}18–1374^{a}17.

Note 358

The ones that are in accord with a superiority of virtue or vice (*ta kath' huperbolên aretês*): We are looking at just and unjust actions as determined by unwritten law. Since "the [written] law prescribes living in accord with each virtue and forbids living in accord with each sort of depravity" (*NE* V 3 1130^{b}23–24), the phrase *ta kath' huperbolên aretês*—however exactly it should be translated—clearly refers, as the examples show, to actions that go beyond what such written law prescribes in relation to each virtue and vice (depravity). The excess, then, is not of

virtue or vice *tout court*, as in the cases of heroic virtue or beastliness (VII 1 1145^{a}18–22), but of these as determined by written law. Thus one is not unjust or depraved, as determined by written law, for being ungrateful to benefactors, nor is one virtuous, as so determined, for being grateful to them. The written law is simply silent on this matter. The unwritten law, by contrast, is not silent, since it licenses praise, blame, and other such rewards and sanctions, in response.

Note 359

Decency (*epieikeia*) **seems to be something just, and decency is justice that lies beyond the written law:** "While what is decent is just, it is not what is just according to the law but, rather, a rectification of what is legally just" (*NE* V 10 1137^{b}11–13). See next note and I 2 1356^{a}6n.

Note 360

It is necessary to speak in universal terms, . . . [but] the definition does not hold universally: "Definition is of the universal" (*Met.* VII 11 1036^{a}28–29); "Particulars cannot be defined" (15 1040^{a}7).

The definition does not hold universally, but rather for the most part: "All law is universal, but about some sorts of things it is not possible to pronounce correctly in universal terms. So in the sorts of cases where it is necessary to pronounce in universal terms but not possible to do so correctly, the law picks what holds for the most part, not unaware of the error involved. And it is no less correct for doing so, since the error is not in the law or in the legislator but in the nature of the thing itself. For what is doable in action consists of this sort of subject matter right from the outset. So whenever the law makes a universal pronouncement and a particular case arises that is contrary to the universal pronouncement, at that time it is correct (insofar as the legislator has omitted something and he has made an error in pronouncing unconditionally) to rectify the deficiency—to pronounce what the legislator himself would have pronounced had he been present and would have put into his law had he known about the case. That is why what is decent is just and better than what is in a certain way just. It is not better than what is unconditionally just, however, but only better than the sort that, because it pronounces universally, makes an error. And this is the very nature of what is decent—a rectification of law insofar as it is deficient because of its universality. For this is also the cause of not everything's {240} being regulated by law—namely, that there are some cases where it is impossible to establish a

law, so that decrees are needed. For the standard of what is indeterminate is itself indeterminate, just like the lead standard used in Lesbian building. For the standard is not fixed but adapts itself to the shape of the stone, and a decree adapts itself to the things themselves" (*NE* V 10 $1137^{b}13$–32). Though this comment applies primarily to the context of political deliberation by members of a city's ruling deliberative body, it is the model for Aristotle's account of an individual agent's deliberation as well. This is particularly clear when an individual's action-controlling beliefs—the guiding premises of his deliberative reasoning—are analogized to decrees (VII 9 $1151^{b}15$, 10 $1152^{a}20$–21). But it is similarly in operation when the last thing reached in deliberation is identified as a decree (VI 8 $1141^{b}26$–28).

Note 361

Decency . . . consists in not judging errors (*hamartêmata*) **and unjust actions** (*adikêmata*) **as deserving of the same [penalty], or misfortunes** (*atuchêmata*) **either:** "There are three sorts of harm . . . that are found in communities. Those involving ignorance are *errors* when the one affected, what he is doing, the instrument, or the end is not as the agent thought. For he thought, for example, that he was not hitting or not with this or not this person or not for the sake of this, but, instead, the actual result happened not to be as he thought (for example, he hit not in order to wound but in order to provoke) or not the person he thought or not with the instrument he thought. When the harm is contrary to reasonable expectation, it is a *misfortune*. By contrast, when it is not contrary to reasonable expectation but involves no vice, it is an error. For someone commits an error when the starting-point of its cause is in himself, but it is a misfortune when the starting-point is outside him. When an agent harms knowingly but without prior deliberation, it is an *unjust action*—for example, acts done because of spirit or other feelings that are necessary and natural to human beings. For people who do these sorts of harms and commit these sorts of errors are doing what is unjust, and their actions are unjust actions; however they are not yet unjust or wicked because of this. For the harm was not done because of depravity. But when it is done as a result of deliberate choice, the agent is unjust and depraved" (*NE* V 8 $1135^{b}11$–25).

Deserving (*axioun*): The verb *axioun* in connection with something bad or undesired, such as punishment, is translated as "deserve," while in

connection with something good or desired it is typically translated as "is worthy of." In other contexts it also means "think."

Or misfortunes (*atuchêmata*) **either:** Reading τὰ ἀτυχήματα with Kassel, Grimaldi, and the mss. for OCT τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀτυχήματα.

Note 362

Unjust actions are whichever ones are not contrary to reasonable expectation and do result from depravity: Omitting τὰ γὰρ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἀπὸ πονηρίας ("for those due to appetite result from depravity") with Kassel and some mss., but read by OCT and other mss. The clause finesses the distinction between an {241} unjust action, which might be caused by spirit or appetite rather than deliberate choice, and an action due to the settled bad character of a depraved agent. See *NE* V 1135^{b}19–25 (quoted in previous note).

Note 363

Human weaknesses (*tois anthrôpinois*): Literally, "merely human things."

Note 364

To be willing to be judged by a word (*logô[i]*) **rather than by a work** (*ergô[i]*): The idea might be that one shows decency by having an issue settled by word or argument or reason rather than by (violent) deed. Or it might be that one shows it by being content with a nominal sentence rather than a real one. On *ergon*, see I 1 1354^{a}11n.

Note 365

The arbitrator (*diaitêtês*) **looks to what is decent, whereas the juror looks to the law:** Hippodamus of Miletus thought that "court judgments should not be rendered by casting ballots," as they were in Athenian courts, "but rather each juror should deposit a tablet: if he simply convicts, he should write the penalty on it; if he simply acquits, he should leave it blank; if he convicts to some extent and acquits to some extent, he should make the relevant distinctions" (*Pol.* II 8 1268^{a}1–5). Aristotle's criticism of his proposal is this: "The law about judgments is not good either, requiring judging to consist in making distinctions, while the charge is written in unconditional terms—that is, making a juror into an arbitrator. This is possible in arbitration, even if there are many arbitrators, since they can confer together over their judgment. But it is not possible with juries, and, indeed, most legislators do the contrary and

establish things so that the jurors do *not* confer with each other" (1268^{b}4–11). The post of arbitrator in Athens is discussed in *Ath.* LIII.

Note 366

Callistratus: See I 7 1364^{a}19n.

Melanopus: Ambassador to Thebes in 370/71 BC with Callistratus (Xenophon, *Hellenica* VI.3.2–3) and his rival (Plutarch, *Demosthenes* 13).

He defrauded the officials in charge of temple upkeep of three consecrated half-obols: Melanopus' act of injustice, stealing three half-obols, was very small (an obol was one-sixth of a drachma, which was the average daily wage), but it implied a state of character that was very corrupt.

The officials in charge of temple upkeep: See *Pol.* VI 8 1322^{b}18–22.

Note 367

Penalty (*timôria*): "Revenge," as distinguished from "punishment" (*kolasis*) at I 10 1369^{b}12, but here equivalent in meaning to it. Notice *kolasis* at I 14 1374^{b}33.

Note 368

Since it is difficult, indeed impossible: Rejecting with Kassel and Grimaldi the OCT *obeli* on καὶ ἀδύνατον, marking it as corrupt.

{242} Note 369

Sophocles, when pleading on behalf of Euctemon: The event is otherwise unknown.

Sophocles: It is unclear whether the reference is to the dramatist, or (if he is a different person) the member of the preliminary council referred to at III 18 1419^{a}26, or the fifth-cent general and son of Sostratides referred to at Thucydides III.115.5.

Euctemon: Perhaps the archon of that name referred to at Xenophon, *Hellenica* I.2.1.

Note 370

When someone is the only, the first, or among the few, to have done it: See I 9 1368^{a}10–11.

Note 371

To commit the same error often is a great thing: Reading μέγα with Grimaldi and the mss.; both OCT and Kassel seclude. See I 9 1368^{a}13–14.

Note 372

In Argos: Nothing is known about these events. Argos is an ancient city in the eastern Peloponnese.

Due to whom a prison was built: Imprisonment was not a standard legal penalty in Greece. People were usually imprisoned only for a short time pending trial, as in the case of Socrates.

Note 373

An unjust action is greater, the more beast-like (*thêriôdesteron*) **it is:** "Temperance and intemperance are concerned with the sorts of pleasures that the rest of the animals share in as well (which is why they appear slavish and beast-like (*thêriôdeis*)), namely, touch and taste" (*NE* III 10 1118^{a}23–26); "Intemperance . . . is related to the most widely shared of the perceptual capacities [namely, touch] and so would justly seem to be disgraceful, because it characterizes us not insofar as we are human beings but insofar as we are animals. To enjoy such things, then, and to like them most, is beast-like (*thêriôdes*)" (1118^{b}1–3); "We also use 'beast-like' as a term of abuse for those who exceed human beings in their vice" (VII 1 1145^{a}32–33); "Other things are not naturally pleasant but come to be so—some because of a disability, some because of habit, some because of depraved natures. That is why where each of these is concerned, we also see corresponding states. I mean the beast-like ones (*thêriôdeis*)—for example, that of the female who people say used to rip open pregnant women and devour their children; or the pleasures said to be enjoyed by some of the savages who live around the Black Sea, some of whom eat raw meats, some human flesh, while others are said to reciprocally lend their children to each other to be eaten at festivities; or what they say about Phalaris. These states are beast-like" (5 1148^{b}19–24). It seems, then, that a *thêriôdes* action need not be "brutal," if by that we mean unusually violent, but that it must trace back to appetites that we share with wild beasts, and so be (another possible translation) "inhuman." See also I 11 1371^{a}15n.

{243} Note 374

What those who hear about it fear more than pity: "It is clear too that what we fear are frightening things and that these—unconditionally speaking—are bad things. That is why people define fear as expectation of what is bad" (*NE* III 6 1115^{a}7–9). On pity, see *Rh*. II 8 1385^{b}13–16.

Note 375

The rhetorically relevant facts (*rhêtorika*): *Rhêtorika* are those things the knowledge of which makes one *rhêtorikos* ("skilled at speaking") rather than *adunatos eipein* ("incapable in speaking") (II 2 1379^{a}2). Here they seem to be facts, but they could also presumably be devices, such as amplification, or enthymematic ability.

The person has abrogated or exceeded many [parts of] justice (*dikaia*): Reading πολλὰ δίκαια ἀνῄρηκε ἢ ὑπερβέβηκεν with Kassel, Grimaldi, and ms. F for OCT πολλὰ ἀνῄρηκεν ἢ ὑπερβέβηκεν.

Oaths (*horkous*), **handshakes** (*dexias*), **promises** (*pisteis*), **marriage agreements** (*epigamias*): The idea seems to be that in doing what he did, namely, reneging on an agreement to marry that took the form of a handshake, the accused did many unjust actions at once: breaking an oath, a handshake, a promise, and a marriage agreement. This makes his one unjust action greater than if he had violated only one element of justice. And so will make it something for which people fear the accused more and pity the victim more.

Note 376

He does not do good: As the unwritten law about doing good to those who have done good to us requires (I 13 1374^{a}23–24).

Note 377

It is characteristic of a better person to be just without being compelled: If X is better in the relevant sense than Y, then X is more virtuous (or closer to being virtuous) than Y. "The end characteristic of virtue" is acting for the sake of the noble (*NE* III 6 1115^{b}12–13). What is noble is contrasted with what is compulsory: "we should be courageous not because of compulsion, but because it is noble" (III 8 1116^{b}2–4). See also *Rh*. I 3 1358^{b}25n.

The written parts compel: "The [written] law, however, does have the power to compel, being reason that derives from a sort of practical wisdom and understanding" (*NE* X 9 1180^{a}21–22).

Note 378

The means of persuasion that are called "outside the province of craft": See I 2 1355^{b}35–39.

Note 379

The means of persuasion that are outside the province of craft are special to judicial speeches: Apparently, then, I 15 should be considered an addendum to the account of judicial rhetoric in I 10–14. This does

not exclude either the presence of elements of deliberative rhetoric in judicial contexts (see I 15 1375^{a}26 and {244} next note) or the presence of elements of judicial rhetoric in other contexts (see 1376^{a}1–8).

Note 380

Exhorting and dissuading: These especially belong to deliberative oratory, not to the judicial oratory that is the explicit focus of the chapter. For this reason some editors seclude καὶ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα, despite its being read by all the mss. However, there is clearly room for deliberative oratory in a judicial context—for example, in exhorting the jurors to attend not just to the written but also to the unwritten law, and so on.

Note 381

If the written law is contrary to the thing at issue, one should use common law and what is decent as being more just: Reading καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ὡς δικαιοτέροις with Kassel and Cope for OCT καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικεστέροις καὶ δικαιοτέροις. See I 13 1374^{a}26–^{b}22.

Contrary to the thing at issue: That is, if the written law alone were to guide the jurors, they would find the accused guilty on the basis of the facts, whereas if decency and the unwritten law were to guide them, they would find him innocent.

Thing at issue: See I 1 1354^{a}16n.

Common law: See I 10 1368^{b}7–9, 13 1373^{b}4–18a.

Note 382

And [one should say] that (*kai hoti*): The Greek leaves the [ ] empty, so that we could supply *phaneron* from I 15 1375^{b}27 or—as I have done—*lekteon* from 1375^{b}17, or perhaps *chrêsteon* from 1375^{a}28, ^{b}8.

"The best consideration" requires (*estin*) **this:** A pertinent interpretation of "the best consideration" is being offered here; another at I 15 1375^{b}16–17; another at 1376^{a}18. So *estin* ("is") has the force of "means" or "requires."

The best consideration (*gnômê[i]*): Athenian jurors swore an oath whose gist seems to have been something like this: "I will cast my vote according to the laws (*kata tous nomous*) and using my most just consideration (*gnômê[i] tê[i] dikaiotatê[i]*)." See Demosthenes, *Against Aristocrates* 96. Aristotle is presumably referring to this clause in the oath (as I 15 1375^{b}18 more or less implies). He uses the phrase *tê[i] dikaiotatê[i] gnômê[i]* in a different but related context at *Pol.* III 16: "As

for the things that *the law* seems unable to determine, they could not be known by a human being either. Rather, the law, having designedly educated the rulers for these eventualities, hands over the rest to be judged and managed in accord with the most just consideration of the rulers" ($1287^{a}23$–27).

Consideration: "What is called 'consideration (*gnômê*),' due to which, people are said to be sympathetically considerate (*sungnômones*) and to have consideration, is the correct discernment of what is decent" (*NE* VI 11 $1143^{a}19$–20).

Note 383

"For not just now or yesterday, but always, ever . . .": Sophocles, *Antigone* 456, 458; 457 is quoted at I 13 $1373^{b}12$.

{245} Note 384

And that the just is something true and advantageous: Reading ἀληθές τι καὶ συμφέρον with Kassel and Cope for OCT ἀληθές τε καὶ συμφέρον.

Note 385

It is characteristic of a better man to use and abide by the unwritten laws rather than the written ones: The better man is more virtuous, and so more decent, and so—because of the connection between decency and unwritten law—more a follower of the latter than the written law.

Note 386

Also [one should look to see] whether (*kai ei*): This shift from *kai hoti* raises parallel issues of how best to complete Aristotle's only partially expressed thought. Hence my addition.

The [written] law is in some degree contrary (*enantios*) **to popular** (*eudokimounti*) **law:** I take the participle *eudokimountos* (verb: *eudokimein*) to signal a reference to unwritten law, as the law that is popular or that has the highest reputation. Notice *hoi sphodra eudokimounte*s ("those who are very reputable") at I 12 $1372^{b}21$, and *ta asteia kai ta eudokimounta* ("elegant and popular expressions") at III 10 $1410^{b}6$–7. But *eudokimountos*, as applied, for example, to money, can also mean "genuine," so that Aristotle may be continuing the simile between judges and assayers of silver (I 15 $1375^{b}5$). The contrast in either case is between the written law ($1375^{b}8$), as implicit subject of *enantios*, and the unwritten one—something required, in any case, by the next

clause *ê kai autos hautô[i]* ("or even contrary to itself") in which *autos* must refer to the written law (as the example shows).

Note 387

If it is ambiguous, so that one can turn it about and see which construal (*agôgên*) **will fit either what is just or what is advantageous, then this is the construal to use:** The reference, as in the previous sentence, is to the written law as it is used in judicial rhetoric. If it is ambiguous, it admits of construal. Which construal a speaker should choose depends on his goal. And, in the context of judicial rhetoric, the goal might be either justice or advantage.

Note 388

The written law is in accord with (*pros*) **the thing at issue:** That is, if the written law alone were to guide the jurors, they would find the accused innocent on the basis of the facts, whereas if decency and the unwritten law were to guide them, they would find him guilty. Here they must be persuaded not to give too much weight to decency.

He does not violate his oath: See I 15 1375^{b}29–30n.

Note 389

In the other crafts there is no profit in being "wiser than the doctor": So one should obey the laws, since they are the prescriptions of a legislator, skilled in the craft of legislation.

{246} **No one chooses what is unconditionally good, but what is good for himself:** This seems still to be something a speaker should say to jurors. But this time the situation is one in which an innocent verdict would go against the interests of the jurors themselves. Bringing that to light reminds them that their oath, even in such cases, requires them to judge in accord with the written laws. See I 7 1365^{a}35n.

Note 390

There is no difference between a law's not being laid down and its not being used: So that not to apply the law in this case is tantamount to not having the law at all. Again, where the speech is against the accused, this serves to encourage the jury to apply the written law to the case at hand, and find the defendant guilty.

Note 391

In the other crafts there is no profit in being "wiser than the doctor": So one should obey the laws that are praised, since they are the prescriptions of a legislator, skilled in the craft of legislation.

An error on the part of a doctor does not do so much harm as getting in the habit of disobeying the ruler: "For the law has no strength to secure obedience except habit, and habit does not develop except over a long period of time" (*Pol.* II 8 1269ª20–21).

The ruler: Here the source or embodiment of the law.

Note 392

Share in the risk: Namely, the risk of punishment if their testimony is deemed perjurious. See I 15 1376ª12–13.

Others are outside it: See I 15 1376ª16–17.

Note 393

The Athenians used Homer as a witness concerning Salamis: In the struggle between Athens and Megara for possession of Salamis, Solon allegedly cited Homer, *Il.* II.257–258, which refers to Ajax as bringing his ships from Salamis and placing them "next to where the Athenian battalions were drawn up," suggesting that Salamis had ancient ties to Athens.

Salamis: An island in the Saronic gulf near Athens.

The Tenedians recently (*enagchos*) **used Periander of Corinth against the Sigeans:** If this is Periander of Corinth (625–585 BC), who did arbitrate a dispute between Athens and Mytilene over Sigeum, it is not clear why Aristotle would describe it as *enagchos* ("recently," "just now"). The event, though, is otherwise unknown.

Tenedians: Inhabitants of Tenedos, an island in the northeastern part of the Aegean, now belonging to Turkey.

Sigeans: Inhabitants of Sigeum (also: Sigeion), a city in the northwest of the Troad region of Anatolia.

Note 394

Cleophon: A prominent late fifth-cent BC democratic leader in Athens, who attacked both Critias and Alcibiades.

{247} **Critias:** The cousin of Plato's mother and distant relative of Solon. He was a leader of the so-called Thirty Tyrants (II 23 1400ª18n), and so an enemy of the democratic Cleophon. See *Ath.* XXXIV–XXXVIII, Plato, *Ap.* 32c–d, Xenophon, *Hell.* II.3–4, Diodorus XIV.3–6.

Solon: (c. 640–560 BC) was an Athenian statesman and poet, and architect of the Athenian constitution.

"Tell the fair-haired Critias from me to listen to his father": Fr. 22a West.

Note 395

Themistocles said that "the wooden wall" meant that a naval battle must be fought: Reading ὅτι ναυμαχητέον τὸ ξύλινο λέγειν τεῖχος for OCT ὅτι ναυμαχητέον, τὸ ξύλινο τεῖχος λέγων. The words were part of an oracle sent from Delphi. See Herodotus, VII.141–144.

Themistocles: Athenian politician and general (c. 529–459 BC). In 480 BC he commanded the Greek forces against the Persians.

Note 396

Proverbs, as has been said, are witnesses: Though proverbs are used as witnesses or evidence at I 11 $1371^{b}14$–17 (also I 6 $1363^{a}5$–7), they have not been said to be such. The proposed alternative readings are discussed in Grimaldi.

Note 397

"Never do good to an old person": See II 13 $1389^{b}13$–$1390^{a}23$.

Note 398

"Foolish is he who having killed the father leaves behind the sons": Attributed by Clement of Alexandria, *Stommata* VII.2.19, to the early *Cypria* of Stasinus (c. eighth cent BC).

Note 399

Eubulus, when attacking Chares in court, made use of what Plato said against Archibius, namely, that "confessions of wickedness have increased in the city": The allusion is unclear. The idea may be this: Chares confessed to wickedness, hoping thereby to lessen his penalty. Eubulus points out that the use of such a tactic is on the rise and should not be tolerated, citing Plato in support.

Eubulus: Important Athenian statesman and financier (c. 405–c. 335 BC).

Chares: Famous Athenian general (c. 400–c. 325 BC).

Plato: Probably not Plato the philosopher, but Plato the comic Athenian poet and contemporary of Aristophanes.

Archibius: Otherwise unknown.

Note 400

Outsiders are most persuasive also about such matters; but most persuasive are the ancient witnesses: Reading οἱ δ' ἄπωθεν καὶ περὶ τοιούτων πιστότατοι, πιστότατοι δ' οἱ παλαιοί with the mss. for OCT οἱ δ' ἄπωθεν περὶ τούτων πιστότεροι, πιστότατοι δ' οἱ παλαιοί. Kassel brackets the first πιστότατοι as a dittograph.

{248} Note 401

Other points about a witness . . . should be based on the very same topics on which we state enthymemes: See I 2 1358[a]26–35.

Note 402

In control: See I 1 1355[a]7n.

Note 403

Whatever sorts of people signatories and custodians are, in these reside the persuasiveness of the contracts: Reading τοιούτοις αἱ συνθῆκαι πισταὶ εἰσιν with Kassel, Grimaldi, and the mss. for OCT τοιούτως αἱ συνθῆκαι πισταὶ εἰσιν.

Note 404

Other contracts, whether later or earlier: Reading ἄλλαις συνθήκαις with Kassel for OCT ἢ ἄλλαις συνθήκαις.

Note 405

Further, one should see what is advantageous—whether the contract is in any way contrary to the interests of the judges: Compare I 15 1375[b]19n.

Note 406

Results of torture: See I 2 1355[b]37n.

Note 407

For many slow-witted . . . in the results of torture: Cope and Kassel omit; others, including Grimaldi, read but seclude.

Note 408

To offer one and accept one: That is, to give the opponent an opportunity to swear an oath that, for example, he has not done what he is accused of doing, or to take such an opportunity oneself when he offers it.

Note 409

And that this risk will be better: Retaining ὡς with Kassel; OCT secludes.

Note 410

An oath is a substitute for things (*chrêmata*): "Money" is the usual translation of *chrêmata*, though the literal meaning is "things." Here it refers to whatever the one who takes the oath to win the case will be awarded. This could be money, but it could also be the exile or execution of his opponent.

It is better to be base for something than for nothing: Reading κρεῖττον γὰρ ἕνεκά του with Kassel and most mss. for OCT κρεῖττον γὰρ ἂν <ἦν> ἕνεκά του.

Note 411

Xenophanes: A Presocratic philosopher from Colophon in Ionia (c. 570–470 BC). See DK 21 = TEGP pp. 95–134.

"A challenge to accept an oath made to a pious man is not itself the equal of one made to an impious man": DK A14 (omitted in TEGP). Reading ἀσεβεῖ with Kassel and the mss. for OCT τἀσεβεῖ. The idea is that the opponent, by taking {249} an oath, shows that he is an impious person who takes oaths lightly, whereas the speaker, by not taking one, shows that he is a pious person who takes them seriously.

Note 412

Judges: Reading κριτῶν with Kassel for OCT δικαστῶν ("jurors").

For one is offering him the judgment: Reading αὐτῳ γὰρ δίδωσι κρίσιν with Kassel for OCT αὐτοῖς γὰρ δίδωσι κρίσιν.

Book II

Note 413

Premises useful in relation to the means of persuasion belonging to these: That is, to the three kinds of oratory or speeches (deliberative, epideictic, and judicial) whose goals (exhort, dissuade; praise, blame; accuse, defend) have just been listed.

Note 414

Enthymemes special to (one might almost say) each kind of speech are concerned with these and composed of (*ek*) **these:** The preposition *ek* can (among other things) mean either "composed of" or "on the basis of." Enthymemes are composed of propositions and based on topics which are represented by these propositions. See Introduction, pp. lxv–lxxvii.

Note 415

A trial (*dikê*) **is a judgment** (*krisis*): Compare: "*Dikê* is a *krisis* of what is just and what is unjust" (*NE* V 10 1134^{a}31–32); "*Dikê* is a *krisis* of what is just" (*Pol.* I 2 1253^{a}38–39).

It is necessary for the speaker to look . . . also to himself, that he be of a certain quality, and to the judge, to produce a certain quality in him too: See I 3 1358^{b}1–4.

Note 416

To those who love (*philousi*) **and those who hate** (*misousin*): Discussed in II 4.

Note 417

To the one who feels none (*apathêi*) **and is disgusted** (*duscherainonti*): Reading τῷ δ' ἀπαθεῖ καὶ δυσχεραίνοντι with Kassel and Grimaldi for OCT τῷ δ' ἀπαθεῖ <ἢ> καὶ δυσχεραίνοντι ("the one who feels nothing or is even disgusted"). I take τῷ δ' ἀπαθεῖ καὶ δυσχεραίνοντι to contrast with τῷ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντι καὶ εὐέλπιδι in the previous clause, and so understand *apathêi* as having a more focused meaning than the usual one. That way there is no conflict between *apathêi* and *duscherainonti*.

Note 418

Speakers are deceptive (*diapseudontai*) **in what they say or advise due to all of these or due to one of them** (*toutôn ti*): In the case of a failure of practical wisdom the deception may be unintentional, since the false beliefs the speakers express {250} may be genuinely their own. But in the other cases, the deception must clearly be intentional. See next note.

Note 419

For either it is due to a lack of practical wisdom that they do not form beliefs correctly; or, though forming beliefs correctly, it is due to depravity that they do not say what seems to be so to them; or they are practically-wise and decent people, but not people of goodwill, so that it is possible for them not to give the best advice though they know it: On Aristotle's own view, practical wisdom and virtue of character, when properly understood, must always go together: "It is neither possible to be fully good without practical wisdom nor practically-wise without virtue of character" (*NE* VI 13 $1144^{b}31$–32). He may, in fact, be presupposing this when he writes that "speakers are deceptive in what they say or advise due to all of these *or due to one of them*." Moreover, goodwill too is at least generally connected to these other states: "Goodwill (*eunoia*) arises, on the whole, because of virtue and some sort of decency, when one person appears to another to be noble, brave, or something like that" (*NE* IX 5 $1167^{a}18$–20). The separation between the states countenanced here, then, is between these states as they are generally or popularly conceived.

Note 420

Our discussions of the virtues: In I 9.

Note 421

Our discussion of the feelings: Friendliness is discussed in II 4; goodwill is not further discussed. Though Aristotle distinguishes the two, they are closely allied, so that for the purposes of rhetoric they may not differ very much: "Goodwill seems to be a feature fitted to friendship, but friendship it is surely *not*. . . . [Nonetheless, it seems] to be a starting-point of friendship. . . . For . . . it is not possible for people to be friends without first having goodwill, but those who have goodwill are none the more friends. For they only *wish* good things to those for whom they have goodwill but would never join in their actions or go to any trouble on their behalf. Hence by transference of the term we might say that goodwill is inactive friendship, which—if it lasts through time and arrives at intimacy—becomes friendship" (*NE* IX 5 $1166^{b}30$–$1167^{a}12$).

Note 422

The feelings (*ta pathê*) **are [1] those things due to which** (*hosa*) **people, by undergoing a change** (*metaballontes*), **differ in their judgments, and [2] that entail pain and pleasure:** "By feelings I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, enjoyment, love, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity, and generally whatever entails pleasure and pain" (*NE* II 5 $1105^{b}21$–23). The fact that this definition includes no reference to [1], but relies entirely on [2], suggests that our text is defining not feelings in general, but those feelings that are of special relevance to rhetoric (I 1 $1354^{a}16$–18n), precisely because they do cause people to differ in their judgments, and can be influenced by rhetorical means. The reference of the pronoun *hosa*, then, is not to all feelings (for example, it does not include appetites such as hunger and thirst), but only to the rhetorically relevant sub-class.

{251} **And that entail** (*hepetai*) **pain and pleasure:** The verb *hepesthai* means "follow." So pleasure and pain follow on or accompany feelings and actions. But they do not do so in a merely temporal sense or accidentally, rather, feelings essentially involve or entail pleasures and pains. The same verb is used to express the same thought at *NE* II 3 $1104^{b}14$–15: "every feeling and every action entails pleasure and pain."

Note 423

With respect to each a division into three must be made: However, as we shall see, the discussion on friendliness and hatred (II 4) altogether ignore this triparite division.

Note 424

[1] By being disposed in which way people are angry, [2] at whom they are usually angry, and [3] for which sort of things: [1] is systematically expressed as *pôs echontes* or *pôs diakeimenoi*. Aristotle is not interested in a static description of what happens when one already has a certain feeling but in how the speaker can make a listener feel it and see or judge correspondingly. For example, *orgizomai* means "being angry" but also "getting angry." [2] and [3], on the other hand, are expressed in different ways and it is sometimes not easy to distinguish one from another. For in some cases the object of a feeling just is the person toward whom we feel it. But [2] is usually expressed by *tinas*, that is, a direct object, and rarely by *epi tisi* ("in regard to"), whereas [3] is usually expressed by *poia* ("which sort of things") but also by *dia poia* ("because of which sort of things") or by *epi tisi.*

Note 425

Just as we have given a catalogue of premises in the case of the things discussed earlier: In I 3–15.

We have given a catalogue of premises (*diegrapsamen*): See Introduction, pp. xli–lii.

Let us divide them in the way mentioned: At II 1 1378^{a}22–24.

Note 426

Let anger be desire, involving pain, for apparent (*phainomenês*) **revenge, because of apparent** (*phainomenên*) **contempt:** Retaining φαινομένης with Kassel and the mss., which OCT secludes, and rejecting the addition of τι. In the case of both the revenge and the contempt what is important is that it should appear to be such to the angry person, and to the person at whom it is directed (II 3 1380^{b}20–30), not that it be evidently or manifestly such in some objective sense (another meaning of *phainesthai*). For a genuine slight that does not appear to him to be such will not make him angry, nor will a genuine revenge that does not seem such to him and his victim slake his anger. The following texts shows this quite clearly: "Acts done as a result of spirit are correctly judged not to be premeditated, since their starting-point is not the agent who acts as a result of spirit but the one who made him angry. Further, the dispute is

not about whether the event took place or not but about what is just, since *the anger is at the apparent injustice*. For the parties are not disputing about whether the event took place or not, as in transactions, where—unless they are doing it because of forgetfulness—one of the parties must be depraved. Instead, the parties agree about the things themselves {252} but dispute about which action was just (whereas a person who deliberately harms another is not ignorant about this), so that one party thinks he has been done an injustice, whereas the other denies it" (*NE* V 8 1135^{b}25–1136^{a}1). Notice also *Top*. IV 6 172^{b}30–32: "Both pain and supposition (*hupolêpsis*) seem to be predicated of anger in the what-it-is, for the angry person both feels pain and supposes (*hupolambanei*) he is being treated with contempt."

Involving pain (*meta lupês*): "When the person who is feeling anger is pained, the pain has come about in him beforehand. For the anger is not the cause of the pain, but rather the pain of the anger" (*Top*. IV 5 125^{b}33–34); "Anger is pain plus a supposition of being treated with contempt. For that the pain comes about because of a supposition of this sort, *this* is what the definition wishes to make clear" (VI 13 151^{a}15–17).

On the part of someone unfitted to treat the person himself, or one of those close to him, with contempt: Reading ὀλιγωρίαν τῶν εἰς αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ προσηκόντων with Kassel for OCT ὀλιγωρίαν εἰς αὐτὸν ἢ <τι> τῶν αὐτοῦ, τοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ προσήκοντος.

Note 427

Cleon: See III 5 1407^{a}27n.

All anger must entail some sort of pleasure, namely, the one from the hope of being revenged: "Taking revenge puts a stop to their anger by producing pleasure in place of pain" (*NE* IV 5 1126^{a}21–22).

Note 428

Apparently (*phainomenôn*) **impossible for him to attain:** Again, as in the cases of revenge and contempt (II 1 1378^{a}30–31), what matters is whether the thing appears possible to the agent, not whether it is actually possible.

The angry person seeks what is possible for him to attain: Compare: "No one is angry at someone on whom it is apparently impossible to take revenge" (I 11 1370^{b}13).

Note 429

"Far sweeter than dripping honey . . . men": Homer, *Il.* XVIII.109–110. Quoted in part at I 11 1370^{b}12.

Note 430

The appearance (*phantasia*) **that occurs at that time produces pleasure:** That is, the imagined revenge. On *phantasia*, see I 11 1370^{a}28n.

Note 431

Contempt is an activation (*energeia*) **of belief concerned with what appears to be worth nothing:** That is, it is the active expression in thought, word, or deed of a belief concerned with what appears worthless to the one who feels the contempt.

There are three kinds (*eidos*) **of contempt** (*oligôrias*): **despising** (*kataphronêsis*), **spite** (*epêreasmos*), **and wanton aggression** (*hubris*): The difference between these must be gleaned from what Aristotle says about them, especially in the cases of {253} *oligôria* (sometimes appearing in translations as "belittling") and *kataphronêsis* (sometimes appearing in translations as "contempt").

Note 432

What is worth nothing receives no honor, whether for good or for bad: As one might be honored for doing something bad to an enemy. See I 6 1362^{b}30–32.

Note 433

"He has dishonored me . . . it": Homer, *Il.* I.356.

"Like some dishonored vagabond": Homer, *Il.* IX.648. Also quoted at *Pol.* III 5 1278^{a}37.

Note 434

In capacity (*kata dunamin*): See I 6 1363^{a}29n.

Skilled at speaking (*legein rhetorikos*): To be skilled at speaking is to speak in accord with the craft of rhetoric.

One who thinks himself worthy of rule: Reading οἰόμενος with Kassel and the mss., OCT secludes.

Note 435

"Great is the spirit of Zeus-cherished kings": Homer, *Il.* II.196.

"Yet it may be that even afterwards he has a grudge": Homer, *Il.* I.82.

Note 436

It is already evident from these considerations by being disposed in which way people are angry, at whom they are angry, and because of what sorts of things: Having discussed contempt in a preliminary way, Aristotle now returns to the tripartite schema introduced at II 1 1378[a]24–26. However, there is no focused discussion of the sorts of things because of which one gets angry, because here the people we are angry at also represent the things because of which we are angry.

Note 437

For they are angry when they are pained: "The angry person is pained because the pain comes about in him prior to the anger. For the anger is not the cause of the pain, but the pain is the cause of the anger, so that anger is not simply pain" (*Top*. IV 5 125[b]32–34).

For the one who is pained seeks something: Namely, relief from pain: "when it [the soul] says, as there, pleasant or painful, here it pursues or avoids—and so in cases of action generally" (*DA* III 7 431[b]8–9).

Note 438

Because of things (*tois pros*): The syntax is ambiguous and the reference might instead be to the things because of which one feels anger or the people who show contempt in relation to these things.

In the other cases: Rejecting with Kassel and the mss. the OCT addition of εἰ δὲ μή, κἂν ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο ὀλιγωρῇ τις ("but if there is none of this, then something else that one would despise").

{254} Note 439

Prepared . . . to follow the path toward: Reading προωδοποίηται with Kassel, Cope, and ms. A; OCT reads προοδοποιε ῖται. The meaning is pretty much the same.

Note 440

[A person is angry], if he happened to be expecting the contrary, since what is to a high degree contrary to belief pains more: On the connection between anger and pain, see II 2 1379[a]10–11.

Note 441

Jibe (*skôptousin*): *Skôptein* is often translated as "joking" but seems closer in meaning to "jibing" or "mocking," or "putting down," since "the person who jibes (*skôptôn*) is the one who aims to expose faults of soul or body" (*Po*. II = Janko, p. 37). Wit—jibing well—is thus "well-educated wanton aggression (*pepaideumenê hubris*)" (*Rh*. II 12 1389[b]11–12). It is discussed at *NE* IV 8.

Note 442

Anger characteristic of contempt is assumed to be at those unfitted to show it: See II 1 1378[a]32.

Note 443

Plexippus in Antiphon's *Meleager*: The play itself, which is quoted from at II 1399[b]26–28, is not extant, but according to the story told in Diodorus Siculus IV.34.1–6 and Ovid, *Metamorphosis* VIII.420–444, Plexippus, the uncle of Meleager, was angry at the latter for insensitively giving his prize (the skin of the Calydonian boar) to Atalanta, with whom he was in love.

Antiphon: A tragic poet, whose death at the hands of Dionysius I of Syracuse (430–367 BC) is mentioned—if, as seems likely, it is the same Antiphon—at II 6 1385[a]9–13. See Roisman, pp. 40–44 (Pseudo-Plutarch), 292–295 (Photius), 323 (Suda).

Note 444

All are pained when they contemplate (*theômenoi*) **base things that are properly their own:** The idea seems to be that a friend—as "another yourself" (*NE* IX 9 1169[b]6–7)—would be as pained by base things of yours as he would be by his own, and so would not want to contemplate them.

Note 445

Those they admire (*thaumazousin*): Or, "those they wonder at, or find wondrous."

Those in front of whom they feel shame (*aischunontai*): Or, "those they respect, or revere."

Note 446

Those they rule (*archomenous*): As, for example, a male head of household rules all its members (*Pol.* I 12–13), or as a political ruler rules his subjects.

{255} Note 447

For then self-deprecation (*eirôneia*) **is [a sign of] despising:** "Because self-deprecators (*hoi erônes*) play down their qualities in what they say, they appear to have more sophisticated characters, since they do not seem to speak for the sake of profit but, rather, to avoid pomposity. But it is most of all the reputable qualities that they utterly deny, as indeed Socrates used to do" (*NE* IV 7 1127[b]22–26). Socrates is, of course, the canonical *eirôn*, whose disavowal of expert craft knowledge of

virtue is a commonplace in Plato's portrait of him (*Ap.* 20d6–e3, 21b4–5, *Hp. Ma.* 286c8–d2, 304d5–e3, *La.* 190b7–c5, *Ly.* 212a4–7, 223b4–8, *Men.* 71b1–3, *Prt.* 361c2–6, *Rep.* 354c1–3). As a result many of his interlocutors—especially hostile ones—charge him with *eirôneia* ("irony" as it is usually translated in this context), thinking that he must have such knowledge if he is able to refute others (*Ap.* 38a1, *Grg.* 489e3, *Rep.* 337a4, *Smp.* 216e4). Aristotle, however, takes these disavowals at face value (*SE* 34 $183^{b}7$–8), making "self-deprecation" a better translation. The idea in our text, then, is perhaps something like this: A is proud of, and so takes seriously, his courage or philosophical ability. B (who is perhaps more obviously courageous or philosophically able than A) is self-deprecating where these qualities are concerned, thereby making A seem like a boaster, or an unsophisticated person. By doing this B shows that he despises A.

Note 448

Mild-manneredness (*praotês*): *Praotês*, which is a feeling in our text, is in the ethical treatises a state of character concerned with feelings: "Mild-manneredness is a medial condition concerned with anger (the mean is actually nameless, as pretty much are the extremes, so we transfer the term 'mild-mannered' to the mean, although it leans toward the deficiency, which is itself actually nameless). The excess might be said to be a sort of irascibility (*orgilotês*), since the feeling here is anger (*orgê*), although the things that produce it are many and various" (*NE* IV 5 $115^{b}26$–31). See also *EE* III 3. "Mildness" and "calmness" are common alternative translations.

Note 449

Becoming mild-mannered (*praünsis*): This rare noun, which occurs only here in Aristotle, seems to denote some sort of process, and so to be close in meaning to the middle-passive infinitive *praünesthai* used at II 3 $1380^{a}6$. For if *praünsis* just were mild-manneredness, so that there is nothing more to the latter than the calming down of anger, it is not clear that it itself would be a feeling of any sort.

Note 450

Shamelessness (*anaischuntia*): "Shame (*aischunê*) is not a virtue, yet a person with a sense of shame is praised as well. And in these cases, in fact, one person is said to be medial, whereas another is said to be excessive (as in the case of a bashful person, who is ashamed of everything). Someone

who is deficient in shame or who does not feel it at all is shameless. And a medial person is said to have a {256} sense of shame" (*NE* II 7 1108^{a}31–35); "Not every action or every feeling admits of the medial condition, since in some cases they are named in such a way that they are united with baseness from the start—for example, spite, shamelessness, and envy, and (in the case of actions) adultery, theft, and murder. For all these and things like them—and not the excessive varieties of them or the deficient ones—are said to be what they are because they are base" (II 6 1107^{a}8–14). See also *Rh*. II 6.

Note 451

Those who are sitting: And so seem to pose no threat. See Homer, *Od*. XIV.26–38.

Note 452

Those who have shown them greater favor: Probably, greater favor than the mild-mannered ones have shown to them, as II 2 1379^{b}6–7 suggests. Alternatively, favor greater than the present disfavor that would otherwise inspire anger.

Note 453

Good people (*chrêstous*): *Chrêstos,* which often means "useful," or "serviceable," is here, as often elsewhere, equivalent in meaning to *agathos* ("good").

The things that inspire mild-manneredness: Reading πραΰνοντα with OCT; Kassel and Cope read πραϋντικά. The meaning is pretty much the same.

Note 454

Philocrates: A well-known fourth-cent orator and statesman. He was prosecuted for bribery in the peace negotiations between Athens and Macedonia in 348 BC.

Note 455

Ergophilus: An Athenian general active in the Hellespont in 363/2 BC.

Note 456

Callisthenes: Another fourth-cent Athenian general active in the Hellespont.

Note 457

[People become mild-mannered] if they pity [the offenders], especially if . . . : Reading καὶ ἐὰν ἐλεῶσιν, καὶ with Cope, Grimaldi,

and ms. A^2 for OCT καὶ ἐὰν ἕλωσιν. καὶ ("if they convict [the offenders]. And if . . . ").

Note 458

This, we saw, is what anger requires: At II 2 1378^a30–32.

Note 459

One should inflict a preliminary punishment by words (*logos*) **(for even slaves are less vexed when so punished):** "Those people do not speak correctly who withhold reason from slaves, but tell us to make use only of prescriptive commands. For slaves should be warned more than children" (*Pol.* I 13 1260^b5–7). The reference is to Plato: "It is certainly necessary to punish slaves, in a just way, and not to spoil them by warning them like free people. And in speaking to a household one should pretty much always use a prescriptive command" (*Lg.* VI 777e4–778a1).

{257} Note 460

If the offended think that the punished persons will not perceive that the punishment suffered is due to [the offended] themselves and is in return for what they [the punished persons] have suffered (*hoti di' hautous kai anth' hôn epathon*): The subject of *epathon* might equally well be the offended and then the phrase would mean: "If the offended think that the punished persons will not perceive that the punishment is due to [the offended] themselves and is in return for what they themselves [the offended] have suffered." However, the same syntax occurs a few lines later (II 3 1380^b24–25) and clearly favors the former alternative. The topic itself is analyzed in the example given in the next lines and seems to be this: We get angry towards particular individuals. Anger goes together with revenge. If the person we want to take revenge on will not be aware of our being the agent of that revenge, the revenge fails to achieve its goal. So getting angry at such a person is futile.

Note 461

Anger is directed at a particular individual, as is clear from the definition: See II 2 1378^a33–34.

Note 462

"Say it was Odysseus, sacker of cities": Homer, *Od.* IX.504.

Note 463

They . . . do not feel pain or have perception, which is what angry people seek: The pain is the revenge and the perception is required in

order that the revenge be apparent to both parties. See II 2 1378[a]30–31n.

Note 464

"For it is senseless clay that he outrages in his wrath": Homer, *Il.* XXIV.504. The speaker is Apollo, who is appealing to the other gods to allow Hector to be buried.

Note 465

Making . . . the listeners be of that sort: Reading αὐτούς with Kassel for OCT αὐτούς.

Note 466

Let us say whom people love (*philousi*) **and hate** (*misousi*), **and because of what, after having defined friendliness and being friendly:** Liking someone, having friendly feelings for him, being his friend, being his good friend, and loving him are all things a *philos* would do, so that all of them are forms of *philia*, and their contraries (from mild dislike to intense hatred) forms of *misos*. It is worth noting too that in the case of friendliness, the tripartite structure—(a) by being disposed in which way people are X, (b) at whom they are usually X, and (c) for which sort of things (II 1 1378[a]22–24)—is complicated by the fact friendliness implies a sort of mutuality, so that (a) is inherent in (b), and (b) and (c) are for the most part co-extensive.

Friendliness (*philia*) **and being friendly** (*philein*): *Philia* is better translated as "friendliness" than by "friendship," since in the *Rhetoric*, it denotes a feeling and {258} not a relationship that may be long-term and involve intimacy and a shared life. Moreover, the modern notion of friendship captures just one sort of feeling that Aristotle includes under the umbrella of *philia*. By the same token, translating *philein* by "being friendly" misses the action-focus of the verb, while if one translates with verbs "love," or "like," one loses the common root of *philia* and *philein*. But since no verb corresponds to "friend" as *philein* does to *philos*, the latter loss, having given due warning, one must simply sustain.

Note 467

These others wish for the things that are good for themselves, which is just the thing, as we saw, that is characteristic of a friend: At II 4 1380[b]36–37. Throughout the passage, *autois* ("themselves') denotes the persons who are friendly and *toutois* ("these others") the ones who are the object of their friendliness.

Note 468

Also, to those who are just: Reading a period before καὶ τούς δικαίους with Kassel. If, with OCT, one reads τιμῶσι καὶ τούς δικαίους, then the meaning is: "they also honor those who are just." Though the OCT reading is supported by I 9 1366^{b}5–6 ("people most honor the just and the courageous"), the phrase "Also, to those who are just" begins a new topic, which is expanded upon in the next five lines.

Note 469

The ones who work the land themselves: As opposed to employing slaves or hired laborers to do it.

Note 470

Those who are temperate: See I 9 1366^{a}13–15.

Note 471

Those who mind their own business (*apragmonas*): The key to understanding the notion of being *apragmôn* is found in the following contrast: "It certainly seems that someone who knows about and spends his time on the things that concern himself is practically-wise and that politicians are busybodies (*polupragmones*). That is why Euripides says: 'How can I be practically-wise, when I could have minded my own business (*apragmonôs*), and been numbered among the ranks of the army, sharing equally?'" (*NE* VI 8 1142^{a}1–6).

Note 472

[We are friendly] to those who are pleasant to pass the time with and spend our days with: "Nothing is so fitted to friendship as living together, since while people who are in need desire benefit, even the blessed desire to spend their days together, since a solitary life suits them least of all. But passing the time with each other is not possible for people who are not pleasant and do not enjoy the same things, which is precisely what companionate friendship seems to involve" (*NE* VIII 6 1157^{b}19–24).

Note 473

[We are also friendly] to dexterous people in mocking (*tôthasai*) **and standing one's ground [when mocked]** (*hupomeinai*): Mocking and jibing are much the same.

{259} **Dexterous people** (*epidexioi*): "It is characteristic of a person who is dexterous to say and to listen to the sorts of things that are fitting for those who are decent and free" (*NE* IV 9 1128^{a}17–19).

Both strive: Reading ἀμφότεροι with Grimaldi and the mss. for OCT and Kassel ἀμφοτέρως. The idea is that we like two lots of people, those who jibe well and those who take a jibe well. For when one does one and the other does the other, the two strive for the same thing, namely, gracious jibing. Compare: "Wit is of two sorts—one consists in enjoying a joke, even one directed at oneself, so long as it is funny, where even a jibe may be included; the other consists in being capable of producing things of this sort" (*EE* III 7 1234^{a}14–16).

Capable of jibing and of taking a jibe in a gracious way (*emmelôs*): "Since life also includes relaxation and the latter includes pastimes that involve amusement, it seems that here too there is a sort of social interaction that is gracious (*emmelês*), and sorts of things we should say and ways we should say them, and similarly for listening. The sort of people we speak to or listen to also makes a difference. And clearly where these things are concerned there is also excess and deficiency in relation to a mean. People who go to excess in trying to cause laughter seem to be buffoons and vulgar, doing anything to cause a laugh and aiming at producing laughter rather than at saying things that are gracious and do not cause pain to the butt of their jibing. But those who never say anything to cause laughter themselves and are repelled by those who do seem boorish and stiff. People who are amusing in a gracious way (*emmelôs*), on the other hand, are called 'witty (*eutrapeloi*),' as they are quick on the return (*eutropoi*)" (*NE* IV 8 1127^{b}33–1128^{a}10). On jibing, see II 2 1379^{a}31n.

Note 474

Potter versus potter: See II 10 1388^{a}16 and *Pol.* V 10 1312^{b}5 where the phrase is attributed to Hesiod.

Note 475

Those they wish to be emulated by, not envied: On envy, see II 10, and, on emulous jealousy, II 11.

Note 476

And to those: Reading καὶ τοῖς with Grimaldi and the mss. for OCT and Kassel καὶ οἳ.

All are friendly to those who are such even toward dead friends: This does not conflict with the requirement that friendship be mutual (II 4 1381^{a}1–2), since presumably the mutuality once existed: "we should

allocate something to former friends too, because of our former friendship" (*NE* IX 3 1165^{b}34–35).

Note 477

Companionship (*hetaireia*), **intimate** (*oikeiotês*), **familial** (*suggeneia*): "Whereas brothers and companions have everything in common, others have only specified things—more in some cases [of friendship], fewer in others, since some friendships are in fact greater in extent, others less. What is just differs too, since it is not the same for parents toward children as for brothers toward each other or the {260} same for companions as for fellow citizens, and similarly in the case of the other sorts of friendships as well" (*NE* VIII 9 1159^{b}32–1160^{a}3); "It is in community, then, that every form of friendship lies. . . . But we might distinguish the cases of familial and companionate friendship. Political friendships, by contrast, as well as tribal friendships, friendships between fellow sailors, and all friendships of this sort do seem to be more like communal ones, since they seem to be in accord with some sort of agreement. Guest-friendship might also be ranked with these. Familial friendship too appears to be of many kinds. . . . Joint nurture and being of an age are major factors in friendship, since 'age makes for fellowship,' and those who live intimately (*sunêtheis*) become companions. That is also why fraternal friendship and companionate friendship are similar. And cousins and other relatives (*suggeneis*) derive their intimate attachment (*sunô[i]keiôntai*) from that of brothers, since it exists because they come from the same ones. But some are more intimate (*oikeioteroi*) and others more distant depending on their closeness to or distance from their initial common ancestor" (12 1161^{b}11–1162^{a}4).

Note 478

Hate is also directed against kinds (*genos*) **(for everyone hates the thief and the sycophant):** "Something is said to be the circle homonymously, [since the term is applied] both to the one said to be such unconditionally and to the particular one, because there is no name special to the particular ones" (*Met.* VII 10 1035^{b}1–3). In the same way, noun phrases consisting of the definite article plus a noun ("The N") are ambiguous (homonymous) in English, since they can be either singular terms referring to unique particulars ("The dog bit me") or generic terms ("The bat is a nocturnal creature"). Here "the thief" and "the sycophant" are the latter.

The sycophant (*sukophantên*): Athenian laws provided rewards to those who successfully prosecuted cases that enriched the city (such as recovered tax revenues or property confiscated because of the offense). By the late fifth cent BC this led to the practice of sycophancy, which consisted in bringing (often bogus) suit against someone in hopes either of getting a bribe from him for dropping the suit or of getting a reward from the city if the suit proved successful.

Note 479

The greatest evils are the least perceptible ones: The idea is that the more painful something is the more perceptible it is, whereas this is not true of evils.

[For example,] injustice, lack of practical wisdom: An injustice does not have to be perceived to be unjust; lack of practical wisdom may even militate against its being perceived.

Note 480

The angry person is pained, whereas the one who hates is not: Hate is a *pathos* ("feeling, "affection") (*DA* I 1 403^{a}18) and a feeling is "generally whatever entails pleasure and pain" (*NE* II 6 1105^{b}23; also *EE* II 4 1221^{b}37–39). But whereas an angry person is motivated by the pain he antecedently feels to take revenge, the one who hates is not pained in that way. Instead, he is pained as a result of hating. {261} For hateful things are painful (*NE* X 6 1176^{a}12) rather than pleasant or enjoyable (III 11 1118^{b}25).

Note 481

The angry person may feel pity when many [revengeful] things have happened: See II 3 1380^{b}14–15.

Note 482

Let fear, then, be a sort of pain or disturbance coming from the appearance of a future destructive or painful evil: "People define fear as expectation (*prosdokian*) of what is bad" (*NE* III 6 1115^{a}9). Since expectation involves an appearance (*Rh*. I 11 1370^{a}27–35), the two definitions are pretty much equivalent.

Pain or disturbance: One should understand "disturbance" as a specific sort of "pain," caused by the object of fear being close at hand.

Note 483

For it is clear that they wish to do it: Reading δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι βούλονται with Kassel, for OCT δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι βούλονται τε καὶ

δύνανται (“for it is clear that they wish to and are also capable of”).

For the unjust person is unjust by deliberate choice: And so he will do the fearsome thing that, as an unjust person, he has the wish to do, since by hypothesis he is capable of doing it.

Note 484

Since ordinary people are worse (*cheirous*) **[than they should be], subjugated** *(hêttous*) **to profit:** *Cheirous* and *hêttous* are comparatives of *kakos* (“bad”) and *mikros* (“small,” “inferior”). To be inferior regarding profit amounts to being subjugated to it.

Note 485

This was assumed to be something fearsome: That is, unjust people with a capacity to do fearsome things, as at II 5 1382^{a}34–35.

Note 486

The unscrupulous ones (*panourgoi*): “There is, then, a capacity called cleverness, and this is the sort of thing that, when it comes to the things that further hitting a proposed target, is able to do these and to hit upon them. If, then, the target is a noble one, this capacity is praiseworthy, but, if it is a base one, it is unscrupulous” (*NE* IV 12 1144^{a}23–27).

Note 487

Pitiable: Pity is discussed in II 8.

Note 488

Capacity: See I 6 1363^{a}29n.

Note 489

Flogged to death (*apotumpanizomenoi*): Or, perhaps, “crucified on a plank.” Also used at II 6 1385^{a}10.

{262} **For them to be afraid there must be some hope of being saved from what they are anxious about:** The idea is that if they have no hope of being saved what they feel is despair not fear, since fear makes people inclined to deliberate, but no one deliberates about hopeless impossibilities. See I 2 1357^{a}2n.

Note 490

Others like them: Reading τούς ὁμοίους with Kassel and Grimaldi for OCT τούς τοιούτους (“other of the same sort”).

Things they did not expect, and at a time they did think [it possible]: Reading καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τότε with Kassel and the mss. for OCT καὶ ταῦτα <ἃ> καὶ τότε.

Note 491

The closeness of what provides safety: Reading τὰ σωτήρια ἐγγύς with OCT; most of the mss. read θαρραλέα ("the things that inspire confidence"), which Kassel obelizes as suspect.

Note 492

[People are confident] if they have done no injustice to anyone, or not to many, or [1] not to those in front of whom they have anything to fear, and, in general, [2] if their relations with the gods are good, both as told in other ways and from signs and oracles (for [3] anger is something inspiring confidence, [4] not do injustice but to suffer injustice is productive of anger, and [5] the divine is supposed to help those who have suffered injustice): To see the line of thought, which is not immediately obvious, focus first on [1]. Who is included in this class? Initially, we might think that it is only those who are powerless in terms of money, supporters, friends, and the other secular sources of power mentioned at II 5 $1383^{b}1$–3. But, in generalizing, [2] reminds us that there are also non-secular sources of power. Thus to be confident that in doing injustice to those included in [1] we need to remember that [5] the gods are supposed to be on the side of victims of injustice. Moreover, we also need to remember that [4] injustice inspires anger in its victims, and that [3] anger inspires confidence. The worm may turn, in other words, and may have help from the gods in addition.

Note 493

Let shame (*aischunê*) **be a sort of pain or disturbance concerned with the evils—whether present, past, or future—that appear to bring a person into disrepute** (*adoxian*): "Shame (*aidôs*) is defined as a sort of fear of disrepute (*adoxias*) at any rate, and its effects are somewhat similar to those of the fear of frightening things. For people who are ashamed of themselves blush, and those who fear death turn pale. Both shame and fear appear, then, to be somehow bodily, which seems to be precisely what is characteristic of a feeling rather than a state" (*NE* IV 9 $1128^{b}10$–15). *Aidôs* and *aischunê* seem to be pretty much interchangeable in Aristotle. See, for example, *Rh*. I 9 $1347^{a}6$–14, II 6 $1384^{a}34$.

Note 494

Refusing to return a deposit: Accepting the OCT seclusion of ἤ ἀδικῆσαι; Kassel and Cope omit; Grimaldi reads.

{263} Note 495

Acquisitiveness (*aneleutheria*): The vice corresponding to generosity (*eleutheria*).

Note 496

And praising in order not to seem to be asking: Reading καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἵνα δόξῃ αἰτεῖν with Kassel for OCT καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἃ δόξει αἰτεῖν. In other words, a request for a loan thinly disguised as, for example, praise for someone's generosity.

Note 497

Praising those present: Praising people "to their face," as we would say.

Note 498

Effeminate (*truphôntes*): "Effeminacy (*truphê*) is a sort of softness" (*NE* VII 7 1150^{b}3).

Of higher rank (*en exousia mallon*): And so less used to exertions and hardships.

Softness (*malakaia*): See I 10 1368^{b}17n.

Note 499

Smallness of soul (*mikropsuchias*): "Where honor and dishonor are concerned, the medial condition is greatness of soul, whereas the excess is called a sort of conceitedness, and the deficiency smallness of soul" (*NE* II 7 1107^{b}21–23).

Humbleness (*tapeinotêtos*): See II 3 1380^{a}22–26, 12 1389^{a}30, and for its connection to smallness of soul, 13 1389^{b}25–26. In rhetorical contexts, *tapeinoun* is the contrary of *auxein* ("amplifying") (III 19 1419^{b}12), and *tapeinos*, when applied to a style, is translated as "low."

Note 500

Boastfulness (*alazoneias*): "Where truth [particularly, about oneself] is concerned, then, let us call a medial person 'a truthful sort,' and let us call the mean 'truthfulness.' Pretense that exaggerates will be boastfulness and a person who has it will be boastful. Pretense that minimizes will be self-deprecation and a person who has it will be a self-deprecator" (*NE* II 7 1108^{a}19–23).

Note 501

For these are shameful and productive of shame: Reading αἰσχρὰ γὰρ καὶ αἰσχυντικά with Kassel and some mss. for OCT αἰσχρὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀναίσχυντα ("for these are shameful and shameless things").

Note 502

People feel shame when they suffer, have suffered, or are going to suffer such things as lead to dishonor and reproaches . . . (for enduring them and not defending oneself against them is due to a lack of manliness (*anandreias*) **and cowardice):** The people under discussion are almost certainly men, as the reference to a lack of manliness suggests. And the shame is at allowing oneself to be forced to provide bodily services, in particular sexual ones, of which one sort is forced sexual intercourse, or wanton aggression in the shape of rape, without (as in the following examples) taking revenge: "Some attacks are directed against the body of the rulers, others against the office. Those caused by wanton aggression {264} are directed against the body. And though wanton aggression is of many sorts, each of them is a cause of anger; and most angry people act for the sake of revenge, not for the sake of attaining superiority. For example, . . . [p]eople plotted against Periander, tyrant of Ambracia, because once while drinking with his boyfriend, Periander asked whether he was pregnant by him yet. Philip was attacked by Pausanias because he allowed him to be treated with wanton aggression by Attalus and his coterie. Amyntas the Little was attacked by Derdas because he boasted of having deflowered him" (*Pol.* V 10 $1311^{a}31–^{b}4$).

Note 503

Shame is an appearance concerning disrepute, and this for its own sake and not for the sake of its consequences, and since no one cares about reputation [by itself], but rather does so because of those who have the pertinent opinion, necessarily a person feels shame in front of those he takes account of: To care about loss of reputation (*doxa*) for its own sake, not for it consequences, is to care about the opinion (*doxa*) of those on whom reputation depends, and these are people one regards as being of some account. And the reason for this is that reputation by itself, without regard to the nature of the people on whom it depends, is not something anyone cares about. For example, no one cares about the opinion of people they despise or consider worthless. Aristotle makes a parallel point about honor as follows: "People seem to pursue honor in order to be convinced that they are good—at any rate, they seek to be honored by practically-wise people, among people who know them, and for virtue" (*NE* I 5 $1095^{b}26–29$).

Note 504

Well-educated people (*pepaideumenoi*): Aristotle's own account of what truly well-educated people are like may be inferred from the following texts: "Regarding every sort of theoretical knowledge and every methodical inquiry, the more humble and more estimable alike, there appear to be two ways for the state to be, one that may be well described as scientific knowledge of the subject matter, the other a certain sort of educatedness. For it is characteristic of a person well educated (*pepaideumenos*) in that way to be able accurately to discern what is well said and what is not. We think of someone who is well-educated about the whole of things as a person of that sort, and we think that being well-educated consists in having the capacity to do that sort of discerning. But in the one case, we consider a single individual to have the capacity to discern in (one might almost say) all subjects, in the other case, we consider him to have the capacity to discern in a subject of a delimited nature—for there might be a person with the same capacity as the person we have been discussing but about a part of the whole. So it is clear in the case of inquiry into nature too that there should be certain defining marks by reference to which we can appraise the way of its demonstrations, separately from the question of what the truth is, whether thus or otherwise" (*PA* I 1 639^{a}1–15); "Some people do not accept what someone says if it is not stated mathematically, others if it not based on paradigms, while others expect to have a poet adduced as a witness. Again, some want everything expressed exactly, whereas others are annoyed by what is exact, either because they cannot string all the bits together or because {265} they regard it as nitpicking. For exactness does have something of this quality, and so just as in business transactions so also in arguments it seems to have something unfree or ungenerous about it. That is why we should already have been well-educated in what way to accept each argument, since it is absurd to look for scientific knowledge and for the way characteristic of scientific knowledge at the same time—and it is not easy to get hold of either" (*Met.* II 3 995^{a}6–14); "A doctor, however, may be either an ordinary practitioner of the craft, an architectonic one, or thirdly, someone well-educated in the craft. For there are people of this third sort in (one might almost say) all crafts. And we assign the task of judging to well-educated people no less than to those who know the craft" (*Pol.* III 11 1282^{a}3–7).

Note 505

"Shame is in the eyes": The proverb can refer either to the eyes of the person who feels shame or, as clearly here, to the eyes of those before whom he feels it. But the people need not be present or be particular people. It is enough, perhaps, to think of someone watching.

Note 506

Which is why Euripides' reply to the Syracusans is apropos: A medieval scholiast tells us that Euripides was sent to negotiate peace with the Syracusans, and finding them unwilling said: "Men of Syracuse, even if because of nothing else, then at least because we are just now [for the first time] in need of you, you should be ashamed to reject us, your admirers."

Euripides: The famous Athenian tragic playwright (c. 480–407/6 BC), author of some ninety plays, including the *Bacchae* and *Medea*.

Note 507

No one feels shame before small children and beasts: On the meaning of this phrase, see I 11 1371^{a}15n.

Before acquaintances they are ashamed of what seems shameful in relation to truth (*pros alêtheian*), **and before those from far away they are ashamed of what seems shameful in relation to custom** (*pros ton nomon*): The point is cognate with the one made about good breeding in the following text: "It is the same way with good breeding. For people think of themselves as well-bred not just when they are in their own country, but wherever they are, whereas they think of barbarians as well-bred only at home, on the supposition that it is one thing to be *unconditionally* well-bred and free, and another to be so but not unconditionally" (*Pol.* I 6 1255^{a}32–35). In other words, we take our own local values to be the true ones, but when we are in Rome we would be ashamed not to do as the Romans do.

Note 508

As we saw: At II 6 1384^{a}21–31.

Note 509

As Cydias said publicly (*edêmêgorêsen*) **about the allotment of land in Samos:** Cydias was an Athenian orator, about whom Aristotle, who mentions him only {266} here, is our primary source. Samos was captured by the Athenians in 356 BC and Cydias is probably referring to a proposed allocation of land in it to Athenian citizens.

Samos: An island in the eastern Aegean, south of Chios, and separated from the coast of Anatolia by the one-mile-wide Mycale Strait.

Note 510

Those who feel jealous are admirers: Jealousy is discussed in II 11.

Note 511

Whenever they have works or things upon which will bring shame on them: Reading ἅ καταισχυνοῦσιν with Kassel and the mss. for OCT ἃ καταισχύνουσιν.

Note 512

The ones mentioned: At II 6 1385^{a}2–3.

Those who refer themselves (*anapheromenoi*) **to them, either those whose teachers or advisors they have been, or if there are other like themselves whose rivals they are:** Thus if X would claim to be Y's student, advisee, or rival, Y would feel shame in front of X.

Note 513

Antiphon the poet, Dionysius: See II 2 1379^{b}15n.

Those who were about to die with him covered their faces as they passed through the gate: Because they were ashamed to be seen by those gathered at the gate leading from the prison to the place of execution.

Note 514

Those toward whom people feel grateful (*charin echousin*), **and why, and how—by being disposed in the relevant way [they feel it], will be clear after having defined favor** (*charin*): *Charis* means "benevolence," "favor," "gratitude," and "grace," among other things. In the accusative case (*charin*), it can be used as a preposition and means "for the sake of." Here, though, it has the more restricted meaning of feeling grateful for a favor received (see Striker, p. 301, n15).

Note 515

The person is in desperate need: Reading σφόδρα δεομένῳ with Kassel and the mss. for OCT σφόδρα δέόμενος.

Note 516

Desires: On desires, appetites, and the differences between them, see I 10 1369^{a}1–4n.

Note 517

The one who gave the mat in the Lyceum: Nothing is known about this incident. The Lyceum may be Aristotle's school or something else altogether, such as a play or speech.

Note 518

In these sorts of cases: Reading εἰς τοιαῦτα (preferred by Grimaldi) with some mss. for OCT εἰς ταὐτὰ and Kassel εἰς ταῦτα.

{267} Note 519

Categories (*katêgoriai*): See I 1 1354[a]3n(7).

Note 520

About feeling gratitude and feeling ingratitude . . . and by being disposed in which way they feel it: I follow Kassel in reading these sentences here; OCT reads them at the beginning of II 8.

Note 521

13 1453[a]5).

At [1] an apparently destructive or painful bad thing . . . [2] when it appears close at hand: [1] and [2] also feature in the account of fear (II 5 1382[a]21–25). In general, there is a partial symmetry between pity and fear.

Note 522

The sort of people who think they might suffer: Omitting OCT's comma after παθεῖν ἄν with Cope and Kassel.

Those who are well-educated (*pepaideumenoi*): See II 6 1384[a]33n.

They rationally calculate well (*eulogistoi*): See I 2 1357[a]4n.

Note 523

Able to suffer the things mentioned: At II 8 1385[b]13–14.

Note 524

Those who are not in a courageous state of feeling, such as anger or confidence (for these feelings do not rationally calculate (*alogista*) **about future things):** "Another sort of courage is due to non-rationally-calculating feeling (*pathos alogiston*), such as love or anger. For someone in love is confident [or daring] rather than cowardly, and withstands many dangers" (*EE* III 1 1229[a]20–23). At *NE* VII 6 1149[a]9–10, those who are "naturally without rational calculation (*ek phuseôs alogistoi*)" are said to "live by perception alone."

Note 525

Instead, it is only those who are intermediate between these who feel pity: Reading ἀλλ' οἱ μεταξὺ τούτων here with Kassel rather than at II 8 1385[b]32 prior to "nor, conversely, those feeling intense fear" with OCT and the mss.

Between these: That is, between those in a courageous state of feeling of some sort and those feeling intense fear.

Note 526

As they do if they think that certain people are among the decent ones: Compare *Po.* 13 1452^{b}30–1453^{a}17.

Note 527

When the gifts from the king were sent to Diopeithes after he had died: The Diopeithes referred to is probably, but not certainly, the Athenian general, who led Athenian settlers to the Chersonese in c. 343 BC. If so, the king referred to is Artaxerxes III of Persia (358–338 BC).

{268} Note 528

That is why Amasis, so it is said, did not weep when his son was led to execution, but did weep when he saw his friend begging: Herodotus III.14 tells this story about Psammenitus (= Psammetichus III, king of Egypt c. 525 BC), son of Amasis. Aristotle has apparently mistaken the father for the son. The idea is the son was a close enough relative for his future sufferings to inspire in the father, not pity, but fear or dread, as if he himself were going to experience them.

[The dreadful] is often useful to the opponent (*tô[i] enantiô[i] chrêsimon*): That is, what the speaker introduces as pitiable, and so productive of pity in the audience, his opponent may make seem dreadful and so productive of hostile fear.

Note 529

The things people fear (*phobountai*) **for themselves are the ones they pity when they are happening to others:** *Phobeisthai* here as the sense of "negatively expect." If they feared the things as they do terrible ones, they would not feel pity. See II 8 1386^{a}22–24.

Note 530

Necessarily those who contribute to the effect by their gestures, voice, dress, and, in general, by their dramatic manner are more pitiable (*eleeinoterous*): The "those" in question are often taken to be speakers trying to elicit pity in an audience; *eleeinoterous* must then be taken to mean "more excite pity." Of course, the ones to be pitied might actually be produced by a speaker for the defense in, for example, a trial, in order to move the jurors to pity. Socrates refers to this practice in his speech of defense, and makes subtle negative use of it himself: "Well then, gentlemen, those, and perhaps other similar things, are pretty much

all I have to say in my defense. But perhaps one of you might be resentful when he recalls his own behavior. Perhaps, when he was contesting even a lesser charge than this charge, he positively entreated the jurors with copious tears, bringing forward his children, and many other relatives and friends as well, in order to arouse as much pity as possible. And then he finds that I'll do none of these things, not even when I'm facing what might be considered the ultimate danger. Perhaps, someone with these thoughts might feel more willful where I'm concerned, and, made angry by these very same thoughts, cast his vote in anger. Well, if there's someone like that among you—of course, I don't expect there to be, but *if* there is—I think it appropriate for me to answer him as follows: I do indeed have relatives, my excellent man. As Homer puts it, I too 'wasn't born from oak or from rock,' but from human parents. And so I do have relatives, sons too, men of Athens, three of them, one already a young man, while two are still children. Nonetheless, I won't bring any of them forward here, and then entreat you to vote for my acquittal" (Plato, *Ap.* 34b–d).

Dramatic manner (*hupokrisei*): See III 1.

Setting it before our eyes: See III 2 $1405^{b}11$–12, 11 $1411^{b}22$–$1412^{a}10$.

Note 531

That is why signs and actions: Reading διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰς πράξεις with the mss. for OCT <καὶ> διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ σημεῖα, οἷον ἐσθῆτάς τε τῶν πεπονθότων καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰς πράξεις. Kassel secludes καὶ τὰς πράξεις.

{269} Note 532

What people call being indignant (*nemesan*): "Indignation (*nemesis*) is a medial condition between envy (*phthonou*) and spite (*epichairekakias*), all of which are concerned with pleasure and pain at what happens to neighbors. The indignant person is pained by those who do well undeservedly. The envious person exceeds him in being pained by everyone's doing well, whereas the spiteful person is so deficient in being pained that he even enjoys this" (*NE* II 7 $1108^{a}35$–$^{b}6$). Though this description seems pretty much in line with what is said in the *Rhetoric*, it treats *nemesis* as a virtuous state of feeling, whereas the *Rhetoric* treats it simply as a feeling. A further difference is suggested by *EE* III 7 $1233^{b}24$–26: "The mean . . . is the person prone to feel indignation, and the

ancients called 'indignation' being pained at undeserved failures or successes, and being pleased by those that are deserved. That is why people believe that Nemesis is actually a god." If Aristotle agrees with the ancients, then indignation includes pain at undeserved misfortunes, something the *Rhetoric* ascribes to pity.

Note 533

What happens contrary to what is deserved is unjust, which is why we ascribe indignation even to the gods: Would Aristotle agree? The first and second of the following passages suggests that he would not, the third that he might: "The divine, however, cannot be envious" (*Met.* I 2 $983^{a}2$); "What sorts of actions should we assign to the gods? Just ones? Won't they appear ridiculous if they engage in transactions, return deposits, and so on? Courageous ones, then, enduring what is frightening and facing danger because it is a noble thing to do? Or generous ones? To whom will they give? It will be a strange thing, if they actually have money or anything like that. And their temperate actions, what would they be? Or isn't the praise vulgar, since they do not have base appetites? If we were to go through them all, it would be evident that everything to do with actions is petty and unworthy of gods. Nonetheless, everyone supposes them to be living, at least, and hence in activity, since surely they are not sleeping like Endymion. If, then, living has doing actions taken away from it and still more so producing, what is left except contemplating?" (*NE* X 8 $1178^{b}10$–21); "If the gods exercise a sort of supervision over human affairs, as indeed they seem to, it would also be quite reasonable both that they should enjoy what is best and most akin to themselves (and this would be understanding) and that they should reward those who most like and honor it for supervising what they themselves love and for acting correctly and nobly" ($1179^{a}24$–29).

Note 534

It might seem, though, that envy is also opposed to feeling pity in the same way, as being of the same kind (*genos*)**—even the same thing—as indignation; but it is a distinct thing:** "Envy tends toward injustice (for the actions that stem from it are in relation to another), indignation to justice, shame to temperance" (*EE* III 7 $1234^{a}30$–32). Envy is discussed more fully in II 10.

{270} Note 535

People are indignant at wealth, capacity, and the like—at, simply speaking, all those things that good people—and those who possess the things that are good by nature (for example, good breeding, noble beauty, and the like)—deserve: It is easy to see why people are indignant at undeserved wealth, because the notion of undeserved wealth is itself easy to understand, but what is *undeserved* good breeding, or undeserved noble beauty? How can one deserve or not deserve such things? In response, some editors (for example, Freese) seclude "and those who possess the things that are good by nature (for example, good breeding, noble beauty, and the like," while others (for example, Dufour) propose a modification of the text—where OCT reads οἱ τὰ φύσει ἔχοντες ἀγαθά they read οὐδ᾽εἰ τὰ φύσει ἔχουσιν ἀγαθά ("and not those who possess the things that are good by nature"). But perhaps Aristotle's thought is that we can be indignant if people have not lived up to what nature has given them (for example, have squandered their talents). With all those natural advantages they should have been good people, but they are not. So we are indignant at their having those natural goods, since they have failed, by living up to them, to deserve them.

Good breeding, noble beauty: See I 5 $1360^{b}30$–37, $1361^{b}7$–14.

Note 536

Nobly beautiful weapons are fitting not for the just person but for the courageous one: "Where flute players are equally proficient in their craft, better flutes are not given to those who are better bred (since they will not play the flute any better); rather it is the one who is superior with respect to his function who is to be given the superior instruments. If what has been said is not yet clear, it will become still more evident if we take it further. For if someone is superior in flute playing, but is very inferior in good breeding or beauty, then, even if each of these (I mean birth and beauty) is a greater good than flute playing, and is proportionally more superior to flute playing than he is superior in flute playing, he should still be given the superior flutes. For it is to the function that the superiority should contribute, and superiority in wealth and in good breeding contribute nothing to it" (*Pol.* III 12 $1282^{b}31$–$1283^{a}3$).

It follows that if a good person gets what is not fitting, it is a cause of indignation: The "not fitting" is here not something bad (that would be a case for pity) but something good. The idea is that each deserves

specific goods according to his specific virtues (for example, courage or justice). It thus presuppose the separability of ethical virtues in the way in which the passage from the *Politics* (above) does the separability of different crafts.

Note 537

"But he avoided doing battle with Ajax, son of Telemon . . . man": The first line is Homer, *Il.* 11.542; the second is not in our text of the poem, but is quoted in Plutarch.

Note 538

Even if it is in any way whatsoever that an inferior person disputes with a superior one . . . it is a cause of indignation: See I 7 $1363^{b}35$–$1364^{a}3$, $1364^{a}31$–$^{b}23$.

{271} Note 539

Envy (*phthonos*): A similar definition is given at II 9 $1386^{b}21$–24. At *NE* II 7 $1108^{b}4$–5, envy concerns any sort of doing well on the part of someone else, while at *EE* $1233^{b}19$–20 it concerns only the deserved sort. In the *Rhetoric* it concerns the goods possessed by those who are our equals. At *NE* II 6 $1107^{a}9$–12 envy is one of the feelings that do not admit of any medial condition, since they are, from the outset, base.

The goods mentioned: In I 5–6 and more recently in II 9 $1387^{a}6$–23. "In general, the goods that result from luck are the sort that cause envy" (I 5 $1362^{a}5$–6).

Note 540

Familial relationship (*suggeneia*): *Suggeneia* is a sort of friendship at II 4 $1381^{b}34$.

Note 541

Those who fall just short of having everything . . . are envious, since they think that everyone is taking what is [rightfully] theirs: If someone is very successful in action or in some other way, he thinks he deserves to have all the good things that he thinks his success merits. If he falls just short of getting them, he is envious of those who get the missing ones. For example, if someone thinks he should win all of the prize money, even if he is awarded the lion's share, he is envious of those who get the remainder, since he thinks it is rightfully his.

Note 542

Theoretical wisdom (*sophia*): See I 9 $1366^{b}3$n.

Happiness: See I 5 $1360^{b}14$n.

Note 543

The seemingly wise (*doxosophoi*): The word *doxosophos* appears only here in Aristotle. In Plato, it occurs in the passage in which Thamus is criticizing Theuth on the subject of teaching his students to write: "To your students you give what seems to be wisdom (*sophias doxan*), not true wisdom; having heard much, in the absence of teaching, they will seem to know much when for the most part they know nothing, and they will be difficult to get along with, because they have become seemingly wise (*doxosophoi*) instead of wise" (*Phdr*. 275b).

Note 544

The small-souled: See II 6 1384^{a}4n.

Note 545

The good things that make people envious have already been stated: See II 10 1387^{b}23–24n.

Note 546

Things whose possession makes them slightly superior or slightly inferior: So that they do not disturb the requisite equality between envier and envied.

Note 547

Whom people envy is also evident, since these have just now been stated: At II 10 1387^{b}23–27.

{272} Note 548

"For what is the same in kind also knows how to envy": Aeschylus, Fr. 305 Nauck.

Note 549

Whereas no one rivals people who lived ten thousand years ago: Compare the case of pity (II 8 1386^{a}29–32).

The Pillars of Hercules: The Strait of Gibraltar, but here the limits of the known world.

Note 550

And in the same way those concerned with the same things: Reading a full stop before ὡσαύτως with Kassel for OCT's comma.

Note 551

"Potter versus potter": Hesiod, *Works and Days* 25. See also II 4 1381^{b}16.

Note 552

For it is clear that it is because of themselves that they did not attain the relevant good: The idea is that if those like us and in a similar situation could achieve a good, then our failure to achieve it must be our own fault.

Note 553

Which is why the older envy the younger. And . . . quickly: Reading διὸ πρεσβύτεροί νεωτέρους. καὶ with Cope, Kassel, and some mss. for OCT διὸ πρεσβύτεροί τε νεωτέροις καὶ.

Note 554

Thought themselves deserving: Reading with Kassel ἀξιούμενοι for OCT ἀξιοῦντες.

Those with the controlling vote (*tôn kuriôn*): That is, the judges in whom the envious disposition has been established by the speaker.

Note 555

Feel jealous (*zêlousi*): Jealousy is here emulous jealousy, not greedy jealousy.

Note 556

Those people are jealous who think themselves worthy of good things they do not have: Rejecting the OCT addition of <ἐνδεχομένων αὐτοῖς λαβεῖν> ("but are possible for them to obtain"). The next parenthetical clause ("for no one thinks himself worthy of things that appear to be impossible"), which Kassel double-brackets as a late addition by Aristotle, makes the addition otiose. Throughout the present chapter, the verb *axiousin* means at the same time "to be worthy" and to "deserve something."

Note 557

Young people and great-souled ones [think themselves worthy of good things]: "A great-souled person seems, then, to be someone who thinks himself worthy of great things and is worthy of them. For a person who does the same but not in {273} accord with his worth is silly, whereas no one who is in accord with virtue is silly or lacks understanding" (*NE* IV 3 $1123^{b}1$–4).

Note 558

They are jealous of such goods, because such goods are fitting for those who are good: Reading ὅτι προσήκει with Grimaldi and the mss. for OCT οἷα προσήκει; Kassel reads ὅτι <ἅ>. On either reading, the meaning is almost the same.

Note 559

And that they are worthy of them: Rejecting with Kassel and Grimaldi the OCT addition of εἶναι.

Note 560

Whatever goods give enjoyment to neighbors—for example, wealth and noble beauty rather than health: For the agent himself, however, health is more important. See I 6 1362^{b}15–18.

Note 561

Praises and encomia: On the difference, see I 9 1367^{b}27–35.

Professional speechwriters (*logographôn*): The term *logographos* applies in a somewhat derogatory sense to those who wrote speeches for others to deliver in court, which is its meaning at III 8 1408^{a}34, but also to prose writers (historians, geographers) and to those who wrote eulogies, panegyric, or epideictic literature. The reference here to praises and encomia suggests that the latter meaning is the relevant one.

Note 562

And to do so because of these (*epi toutois*): Or "for these reasons," or "on these occasions," or "about these people."

Note 563

And from which the means of persuasion concerning them come about: Reading καὶ ἐξ ὧν with Kassel for OCT ἐξ ὧν.

Note 564

II 12: The role of Chapters II 12–17 is a matter of controversy. They may constitute a further account of the character of the speaker, which has been mentioned only in passing at II 1 1378^{a}6–19. This is what II 13 1390^{a}24–27, which summarizes the usefulness of II 12–13, suggests. But since the term "character" is not confined in the *Rhetoric* to that of the speaker himself but includes that of the audience, of political communities (I 8), or character as a cause of the ethically relevant actions (I 10), II 12–17 might also be taken instead as an appendix to II 2–11. Aristotle's main idea, however, is that there should be a symbiotic relation between the character of the speaker and that of the audience, so that our knowledge about the latter is also relevant to the former. Thus, Chapters II 12–17 might also—and perhaps better—be understood as a confirmation of this mutual dependence.

{274} Note 565

Next let us discuss people's characters, that is, of what sorts people are with regard to [1] their feelings and [2] states, as well as with regard to [3] their stages of life and fortunes: Since [1] and [2] states (= virtues and vices) have already been discussed (next note), Aristotle now focuses on [3].

Fortunes (*tas tuchas*): The things that come to them due to luck. See II 15 1390^{b}14.

Note 566

By feelings I mean anger, appetite, and the like, about which we spoke previously: Retaining πρότερον ("previously") with Kassel and the mss., which OCT secludes. The reference is to II 2–11.

By states I mean virtues and vices, which have also been spoken about previously: In I 9.

Note 567

Prime (*akmê*): The prime time (*akmê*) for a man's service in the military is that of his body, which is somewhere between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, while the prime time for that of his soul or his capacity for thought is forty-nine or fifty (*Pol.* VII 16 1335^{b}32–35, *Rh.* II 14 1390^{b}9–11), since it is typically not until then that he has the experience required for practical wisdom (*Pol.* VII 9 1328^{b}34–1329^{a}17).

Note 568

The young, with regard to their character, are inclined to be appetitive and to do whatever they have an appetite for: Compare: "A young person is not a suitable audience for politics. For he has no experience of the actions of life, and the accounts are in accord with these and concerned with these. Further, since he tends to follow his feelings, it will be pointless and not beneficial for him to be in the audience, since the end is not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or immature in character, since the deficiency is not a matter of time but is due to living and pursuing each thing in accord with his feelings. For to people like that, knowledge turns out to be profitless in just the way it does to those who lack self-control. For those who form their desires and do their actions in accord with reason, however, it will be of great benefit to know about these things" (*NE* I 3 1095^{a}2–11).

Note 569

They are inclined to be spirited (*thumikoi*) **and quick-tempered** (*oxuthumoi*) **and apt to follow their anger** (*orgê[i]*): On spirit and anger and the relations between them, see I 10 1369^{a}4n.

Note 570

As the pithy remark of Pittacus about Amphiaraus puts it: The remark is unknown.

Pittacus: One of the fabled seven sages, Pittacus was appointed tyrant of Mytilene in 589 BC to restore order. He is mentioned again at II 25 1402^{b}8–12.

Amphiaraus: An early Greek hero; one of the famous seven who fought against Thebes.

{275} Note 571

Not cynical (*kakoêtheis*) **but naïve** (*euêtheis*): See the definition of *kakoêtheia* at II 13 1389^{b}21–22. The literal meaning of the terms is "with badly disposed character" and "with well-disposed character."

Note 572

Like those drinking wine the young are warmed through and through due to their nature: "Because their bodily condition is hot, children are naturally well-suited to being trained to bear the cold" (*Pol.* VII 17 1336^{a}20–21); "During their youth—because they are growing—people are in a condition that is like tipsiness, and so youth is a pleasant thing" (*NE* VII 14 1154^{b}9–11); "Heat around the region in which we think and are hopeful makes us cheerful. And that is why everyone is eager to drink to the point of drunkenness, because a lot of wine makes everyone hopeful, just as youth does children. For old age is despondent, whereas youth is full of hope. . . . In fact, this is why children are more cheerful while old people are more cheerless. For children are hot, old people cold, since old age is a sort of cooling down" (*Pr.* XXX 1 954^{b}39–955^{a}18).

Note 573

They are prone to shame (for they do not yet grasp other aspects of nobility, but have been well-educated by the laws alone): (1) "Shame is not properly spoken about as a sort of virtue, since it is more like a feeling than a state. Shame is defined as a sort of fear of disrepute. . . . The feeling is fitting not to every age, however, but to the young. For we think that young people should have a sense of shame because they live by their feelings and so make many errors but are

restrained by shame. Also, we praise those young people who have a sense of shame. No one would praise an older person for being prone to shame, however, since we think that he shouldn't do any action that gives rise to shame" (*NE* IV 9 $1128^{b}10$–21). (2) "Ordinary people naturally obey not shame but fear, and abstain from base things not because of their shamefulness but because of the sanctions involved. For living by feeling as they do, they pursue the pleasures that are properly their own as well as the things through which these come about, and avoid the opposing pains. Of what is noble and what is truly pleasant, however, they have no understanding at all, not having tasted it. What sort of argument, then, could reform such people? For it is not possible—or not easy—to alter by argument what has long since been locked up in traits of character" (X 9 $1179^{b}11$–16). Putting (1) and (2) together, and adding to (2) the contrast between those who obey the laws out of fear of painful sanctions and those who do so from fear of disrepute, what we have is this. Young people who have been brought up under the laws and have been educated in the values embodied in them, are ashamed to break them. But they are motivated solely in that way to do what is noble, because as yet they do not have the sort of grasp on the noble that allows them to see its—or its full—intrinsic value (see *Rh*. II 12 $1389^{a}32$–35). For this grasp comes only with the acquisition of full virtue: "Everyone thinks that each character trait is possessed in some way naturally, since we are in fact just, disposed to temperance, courageous, and the rest straight from birth. All the same, we look for what is fully good to be something else and for such qualities to be possessed in {276} another way. For to both children and wild beasts these natural states also belong; but without understanding they are evidently harmful. At any rate, this much we can surely see: that just as a heavy body moving around without sight suffers a heavy fall because it has no sight, so it happens in this case too. But if someone should acquire understanding, it makes a difference in his action; and his state, though similar to the one he had, will then be full virtue" (*NE* VI 13 $1144^{b}4$–14).

Other aspects of nobility (*kala hetera*): Or, "other standards of nobility"—in contrast, in any case, to the aspect or standard embodied in the laws and customs.

They have been well-educated (*pepaideuntai*) **by the laws:** "Each official judges well if he has been well-educated (*pepaideumenos*) by the

law" (*Pol.* III 16 1287^{b}25–26). See also, II 6 1384^{a}33n.

Note 574

Great-souled: See I 9 1366^{b}17.

Note 575

Rational calculation: See I 2 1357^{a}4n.

Virtue: See I 1 1355^{b}5n.

Noble: See I 3 1358^{b}25n.

Note 576

The maxim of Chilon: A Spartan sage (fl. 560–556 BC), to whom the maxim *mêden agan* ("nothing too much"), quoted at II 21 1395^{a}22, was attributed. The maxim was inscribed in the temple of Apollo at Delphi. See Plato, *Prt.* 343b.

Note 577

The unjust actions they commit are due to wanton aggression, not malice (*kakourgian*): "Whatever is hyper-noble, hyper-strong, hyper-well-bred, or hyper-rich, or the contraries of these, hyper-poor, hyper-weak, or exceedingly without honor has difficulty in obeying reason. For the first lot tend more toward committing wanton aggression and major vice, whereas the second lot tend too much to become malicious and pettily wicked. And injustices are caused in the one case by wanton aggression and in the other by malice" (*Pol.* IV 11 1295^{b}5–11). Thus malice is the lesser evil. Moreover, the sort of wanton aggression relevant here seems to be due to a trait of natural character rather than to vice as expressive of deliberate choice. For that reason too, then, the wanton aggression of the young, who are non-vicious (*Rh.* II 12 1389^{b}9), might be considered a lesser evil than malice.

Note 578

Wit (*eutrapelia*): See, on jibing, II 2 1379^{a}31n.

Witty: Reading εὐτράπελοι with Kassel, Cope, and Grimaldi for OCT φιλευτράπελοι ("love wit"). The same word reappears in a similar context at II 13 1390^{a}22.

Note 579

Such, then, is the character of the young: I follow Kassel in reading this sentence here rather than with OCT at the beginning of II 13.

{277} Note 580

They affirm nothing with assurance but everything with far less assurance than they should: Reading ἧττόν τε ἄγαν ἅπαντα ἢ δεῖ with

the mss. for OCT ἧττόν τε ἄγανται πάντα ἢ δεῖ, and translating with Grimaldi. Kassel obelizes ἄγαν.

Note 581

Believing either way (*amphidoxountes*): See I 2 1356[a]8.

Note 582

Bias: One of the so-called Seven Sages of the sixth cent BC; men famous for their wisdom. His advice about loving and hating is repeated at II 21 1395[a]26–27.

Note 583

Their disposition is the contrary of that of the young—for they are chilly, whereas the latter are warm: See II 12 1389[a]18–19n.

Has paved the way for: Reading προωδοποίηκε with Kassel, Cope, Grimaldi and all the mss. except A^1, which OCT follows in reading προωδοπεποίηκε. There is no change in the meaning.

Note 584

Their appetite is for what is absent, and also because what they need is what they most have an appetite for: I take this to be a claim specifically about old people, though it could be translated to be one about appetite generally: "Appetite is for what is absent, and also because what people need is what they most have an appetite for." Both claims, however, seem false of the appetites of the young, which are for things, such as attractive sexual partners, that are all the more desirable when actually present, and for other appetitive pleasures that may not satisfy any needs at all.

Note 585

They love themselves more than they should (for this too is a sort of smallness of soul): Those who love themselves too much, and not in proportion to their worth, do so in a way that merits reproach, and so "allocate to themselves the greater share in money, honors, and bodily pleasures" (*NE* IX 8 1168[b]15–17). Smallness of soul is evidenced by "accepting good deeds from another, doing so often, or reproaching someone for doing a good deed (for all these are signs of smallness of soul and humbleness)" (*Rh.* II 6 1384[a]1–4). Hence the connection between the two. On smallness of soul, see II 6 1384[a]4n.

Note 586

At any rate: Reading γοῦν with Kassel and Cope for OCT γὰρ.

Note 587

Rational calculation: See I 2 1357^{a}4n.

Virtues: See I 1 1355^{b}5n.

Note 588

A love of human beings (*philanthrôpian*): What is *philanthrôpos* is not philanthropic in our sense of the term but rather what exhibits a love of human beings. {278} Thus woodcocks are *philanthrôpos* in that they are easily domesticated (*HA* IX 26 617^{b}23–27), whereas we are *philanthrôpos* if, for example, we are moved by seeing even a very bad person falling from good fortune into bad (*Po.* 13 1453^{a}2) or a clever villain being deceived (18 1456^{a}21).

They think that all sorts of [bad] things are close at hand for themselves to suffer, and this, as we saw, tends to arouse pity: At II 8 1385^{b}13–19.

Note 589

Witty (*eutrapeloi*): See, on jibing, II 2 1379^{a}31n.

Note 590

Speeches adapted to, and reflecting, their own characters: Or, "speeches adapted to their own character and people like themselves."

Note 591

They have divided these between themselves: Reading διήιρηται with Kassel, Grimaldi, and the mss. for OCT διήιρηνται.

Note 592

The body is in its prime from the age of thirty to thirty-five, the soul at around forty-nine: "Thought is in its prime in most cases—as some of the poets who measure age in periods of seven years have said—around the time of the fiftieth year" (*Pol.* VII 16 1335^{b}32–35); "Those who divide the stages of life into seven-year periods are not for the most part incorrect. And one should follow the natural divide" (17 1336^{b}40–1337^{a}1).

Note 593

Luck (*tuchê*): Or, "fortune." See I 4 1359^{a}35n.

Note 594

[Men of such character] are inclined to despise even those who are the equals of their own ancestors, because the same things when they are further back in time rather than close at hand are more honorable and easier to boast about: The idea is that time makes an achievement of size X by A's ancestor B seem like an achievement of size X + Y. So if C

now seems to have achieved something equal in size to what B achieved, namely, X + Y, it is really only an achievement of size X, so that A can despise or look down on C, despite it.

Note 595

Being true to one's stock (*gennaios*) **is in accord with not being a degeneration from nature:** Which degeneration is not a matter of one's moral character, since it applies also to animals: "An animal is well-bred if it comes from good stock, it is true to its stock (*gennaios*) in not being a generation from its own nature" (*HA* I 1 $488^{b}18$–20).

Degeneration (*existasthai*): The verb is a neutral one meaning "displace," "change," "alter utterly." But it often has negative connotations, as at *NE* VII 7 $1149^{b}35$–$^{a}1$: "[certain wild beasts] are a degeneration (*exestêke*) from nature, like madmen among human beings."

{279} Note 596

Naturally clever stock (*euphua genê*) **degenerates into rather manic** (*manikôtera*) **characters:** "The craft of poetry is for the naturally clever (*euphuous*) or for the manic person (*manikou*)" (*Po*. 17 $1455^{a}32$–33); "Those in whom black bile is copious and cold become sluggish and dull, whereas those in whom it is exceedingly copious and hot become manic, naturally clever (*euphueis*), erotic, and easily moved to outburst of spirit and appetite" (*Pr*. XXX 1 $954^{a}31$–33). On *euphuia* more generally, see I 6 $1362^{b}24$n. Compare, Plato, *Men*. 93b–94e

Alcibiades: A controversial and brilliant Athenian general and statesman (452–404 BC). He was descended on both sides from very prominent families, and was a ward of the great democratic leader Pericles. In 415, during the Peloponnesian War with Sparta, he was appointed joint leader of a daring, perhaps foolhardy, military expedition against Sicily—an expedition he advocated and encouraged before the Athenian Assembly. He was recalled on religious charges, alleged to have mutilated statues of the god Hermes and parodied the secret initiation rites of the Eleusinian Mysteries. Rather than face these charges, he helped the Spartans against the Athenians. In 407, he rejoined the Athenians. Agents of Persia, with whom the Spartans had allied themselves, assassinated him in 404. He is Socrates' interlocutor in Plato, *Alc.* and has a prominent role in Plato, *Smp*.

The offspring of Alcibiades: With his wife Hipparete, he had a son, also called Alcibiades, and a daughter whose name is unknown. Their

disposition to madness is otherwise unknown.

Dionysius: See I 2 1357^{b}31n.

The offspring of Dionysius: With his wife Doris: Dionysius II, Hermocritus II, and a daughter, Dicaeosyne; with Aristomache: Hipparinus II, Nysaeus, and daughters, Sophrosyne, and Arete. Plato visited the court of Dionysius II in 366 BC, as he had that of his father (perhaps in 384/3), and returned for a third trip in 361/60, which ended badly, with Plato being kept as a virtual prisoner. He was able to return to Athens only due to the intercession of Archytas of Tarentum.

Cimon: Member of a wealthy and politically powerful family, he was —with his rival Themistocles—one of the most influential men in Athens in the 470s BC, and a very successful general.

The offspring of Cimon: With his wife Isodice: Cimon III, Lacedaemonius and his twin Oulius, and some others.

Pericles: See I 7 1365^{a}31n.

[The offspring of] Pericles: With his unnamed wife, a close relative: Paralus, Xanthippus; with his mistress Aspasia: Pericles II.

Socrates: See I 2 1356^{b}31n.

[The offspring of] Socrates: With his wife Xanthippe: Lamprocles, Sophroniscus, Menexenus.

Note 597

Their mode of life (*trophên*) **and their display of prosperity** (*eudaimonias*): *Trophê* also means "food," "sustenance," "livelihood," "upbringing," "education," and the like. *Eudaimonia* is usually "happiness," but here comes closer to meaning "the prosperity that they mistake for happiness."

{280} Note 598

Simonides: See I 9 1367^{b}20n.

Hiero: Mentioned at *Pol.* V 11 1313^{b}13–15, 12 1350^{b}35, succeeded his brother Gelon as tyrant of Syracuse in 478 BC. He was visited there by Simonides (c. 476) and died in 467. The same story is found in Plato, *Rep*. 489b–c.

Note 599

The unjust actions they commit are not malicious ones: See II 12 1389^{b}8n.

Note 600

Their worth (*axiôma*) **makes them more dignified:** Reading σεμνοτέρους ("more dignified") with OCT. Kassel and Grimaldi read ἐμφανεστέρους ("more conspicuous"), requiring us to understand *axiôma* as "position" or "rank."

Note 601

Good fortune in its various parts includes the sorts of characters of those just mentioned: The parts are good breeding, wealth, and capacity. See II 12 1389[a]1–2.

Note 602

Good fortune makes on able to get more with regard to good children and the goods of the body: See I 5 1360[b]19–29.

Note 603

The use of persuasive speeches is in relation to judgment: See II 1 1377[b]20–21. In Greek the entire paragraph is a single sentence beginning with a protasis, "Since the use . . . ," the apodosis of which does not arrive until "So" at II 18 1391[b]20. But even if this apodosis is otherwise unproblematic, it makes no sense, since it does not follow from the protasis. That is one reason why all the editors are suspicious about the whole paragraph. Many different solutions have been proposed: that some lines before "So" have been lost (Cope) or that the whole passage, though Aristotle's, is out of place (thus Kassel double-brackets it as such). Similar concerns arise about the position of the whole of II 18 and its transitory role. It seems, however, that II 18 refers back to II 1, where the notion of judgment was also prominent, and that, by differentiating two ways of using the term "judge," it clarifies the notion of judgment. If II 18 is in its correct place and does summarize II 2–17, it also retrospectively emphasizes that the chapters about the character of the speaker and the feelings of the audience concern all three kinds of rhetorical speech, even if they primarily apply to deliberative and judicial speech.

Note 604

Epideictic [speeches]: See I 3 1358[b]17n.

The speech is composed in relation to (*pros . . . sunestêken*) **the spectator as if in relation to a judge:** Translating in continuity with "in relation to judgment" at II 18 1391[b]7. The verb *sunistamai* with *pros* usually means "addressed to."

Note 605

Political debates (*politikois agôsin*): That is, debates, whether in court or political assemblies, that are of public interest.

{281} **He inquires into how things stand with the matters under dispute:** In a trial.

The ones being deliberated about: In the citizen assembly.

Note 606

The characters that are in accord with the constitutions were spoken about earlier in discussing deliberative speeches: In I 8.

Note 607

How and through what means one should make speeches expressive of character (*êthikous*) **has been determined:** The reference is most probably to II 12–17. But if *pathos* ("feeling") is being included under character, as its omission from the list given at II 18 1391^{b}22–26 might suggest, then the reference also includes II 2–11.

Note 608

Since, as we saw, there is a different end for each kind (*genos*) **of speech:** At I 3 1358^{b}20–29.

Disputatious speeches (*amphisbêtountes*): That is, judicial ones.

The common things: That is, the three common topics mentioned at I 3 1359^{a}11–16 and discussed in II 19.

Note 609

It is necessary for all [speakers] to in addition make use of the possible and the impossible: That is, in addition to the topics discussed in II 2–17.

Some to try to show that something will happen: Deliberative speakers.

Others that it has happened: Judicial speakers.

Note 610

All use diminishing and amplifying when deliberating (*sumbouleuontes*), **or when praising or blaming, accusing or defending:** Kassel reads ἢ ἀποτρέποντες ("or dissuading") post συμβουλεύοντες with ms. A, thereby making the first disjunct symmetrical with the other two. But Aristotle does not seem to use *sumbouleuein* to mean "exhorting."

Note 611

We may deliver over what was proposed at the start: The reference is presumably to the program outlined in I 1–3. At I 2 1356^{a}35–^{b}27,

enthymemes and paradigms are introduced. The more detailed discussion of them promised at 1356^{b}25–27 is fulfilled in II 20–22, with apparent enthymemes (mentioned at 1356^{b}3–4) and apparent persuasion (mentioned at I 1 1355^{b}15–16) discussed in II 24. At I 2 1358^{a}2–35, two sorts of *topics* are mentioned as sources of enthymemes, special and common. The former have already been discussed; the latter are discussed in II 19, with an appendix in II 22–24. It seems, then, that the outlined program is completed in Book II, not in Book III, which deals with style (*lexis*) and arrangement (*taxis*), subjects not mentioned as part of the program. On the various significant interconnections between I 2–3 and II 18–25, see the detailed analysis in Rapp II, pp. 722–724.

{282} Note 612

Possible and impossible (*dunatou kai adunatou*): *Dunaton* means both "capable" and "possible"; *adunaton*, both "incapable" and "impossible." What Aristotle has to say about these in this chapter reflects the sorts of generally held beliefs about them appropriate to rhetoric.

Note 613

Capacity (*dunamis*): The term *dunamis* (plural: *dunameis*) is used by Aristotle to capture two different but related things. (1) As in ordinary Greek, it signifies a power or capacity something has, especially one to cause movement in something else (productive *dunamis*) or to be caused to move by something else (passive *dunamis*). (2) It signifies a way of being F, being capable of being F (or being F in potentiality) as distinguished from being actively F (or F in actuality).

The same capacity is for contraries, insofar as they are contraries: "All the capacities that involve reason are such that the very same one is a capacity for contraries, whereas the non-rational ones are such that one capacity is for one of them. For example, the hot is for heating only, but the craft of medicine is for both disease and health" (*Met.* IX 2 1046^{b}4–7); "The same capacity or science seems to result in contraries, whereas a state that is contrary to another does not result in contraries" (*NE* V 1 1129^{a}13–15).

Note 614

If something can come to be excellent and nobly beautiful: Reading εἰ τι with Kassel for OCT εἰ τὸ ("if the excellent and nobly beautiful thing . . .").

It is more difficult for a house to be nobly beautiful than for it to be a house: "It is easier to do anything whatsoever than to do it correctly" (*Top*. VI 1 $139^{b}8$).

Note 615

The diagonal could not start to be, or be, commensurable: That is, the diagonal of a rectangle could not be commensurable with its sides. A favorite example of Aristotle's.

Note 616

Posterior in substance (*ousia[i]*) **or in coming to be:** A is prior in substance or in nature to B (B is posterior in nature or substance to A) if A can be without B but not B without A (*Met*. V 11 $1019^{a}1$–4, XIV 2 $1077^{b}2$–3).

Substance (*ousia*): *Ousia* is a noun formed from the present participle *ousa* of the verb *einai* ("to be"). "Substance" is the traditional translation. (1) The *substance of* something is its *to ti ên einai* or "what-it-was-to-be"—a phrase of Aristotle's coinage, of which "essence," from the Latin verb *esse* ("to be") is the standard translation. The imperfect tense *ên* ("was") may—as in the Latin phrase *quod erat demonstrandum* ("which was to be proved")—stem from an original context (such as a Socratic conversation) in which someone is asked to say or define what X is, and concludes by giving his answer in the imperfect tense to signal that he is giving the answer that *was* asked for. Apart from that it seems to have no special significance, so we could {283} equally well translate *to ti ên einai* as "the what-it-*is*-to-be." (2) *A substance*, on the other hand, is something that has the fundamental sort of being possessed by an ultimate subject of predication, which is not itself ever predicated of anything else (*Met*. V 8 $1017^{b}23$–26). It is usually but not always clear which of (1) or (2) is intended.

Note 617

That for which there is by nature a love or appetite is possible: "If then nature makes nothing incomplete and nothing pointlessly, it must be that nature made all of them [plants, animals, etc.] for the sake of humans" (*Pol*. I 8 1256b20–22). The nature referred to might be: (1) "the nature of the whole," as it is called at *Met*. XII 10 $1075^{a}11$–12, considered (though perhaps not even there) as something beyond the natures of the various things that constitute the whole; (2) the nature that is constituted by those natures, but not as something beyond them; (3)

some third option. The point here is that nature would not have planted a love or appetite in us if it was impossible to satisfy. The "for the most part" indicates that nature is not always successful: "Nature tends indeed to make the bodies of free people and slaves different. . . . But the contrary also often happens, namely, some have the bodies of freemen, whereas others have the souls" (*Pol.* I 5 1254^{b}27–34).

Note 618

Where there are sciences or crafts, it is possible for the subjects of these to be: Because crafts are productive sciences, and so must be productive of something, and because sciences posit the existence of the genus of beings they study. See I 1 1354^{a}3n (sciences), I 1 1354^{a}11n (crafts).

Or come to be: New crafts result in new craft products.

Note 619

Agathon: A distinguished Athenian tragedian of the late fifth cent BC. Plato's *Symposium* memorializes his victory at the Lenaia (one of the annual Athenian dramatic festivals) of 416 BC.

"And indeed . . . luck": Fr. 8 Nauck.

Note 620

Isocrates: See I 9 1368^{a}20n.

Euthynos: Two scholiasts, followed by Kassel, read Euthynous; some mss. read Euthymus. A speech, perhaps by Isocrates, is titled, *Against Euthymus*.

Note 621

A thing has or has not happened: Reading γέγονεν ἢ μὴ γέγονεν with Kassel and Cope for OCT γέγονεν.

Note 622

If a person was capable of something and wished to do it, he has done it . . . since there is no impediment: "And so whenever anything that is capable in accord with reason desires what it has a capacity for, in the way in which it has the capacity, it is necessary for it to do this. And it has the capacity for that thing in that way whenever the thing affected is present and in the relevant condition, and {284} if not, it will not be capable of acting. (For it is not further necessary to add to the definition 'provided nothing external prevents it.' For it has the capacity as a capacity to act, not in all circumstances, but under certain conditions, among which will be the exclusion of external things preventing it, since

these are precluded by some of the things present in the definition)" (*Met.* IX 5 1048^{a}13–21).

Note 623

For the most part people do what they desire (*oregontai*) **to do when they can:** Desire includes appetite, wish, and spirit (anger). See I 10 1369^{a}1–4n.

Note 624

If something was going to happen: Reading καὶ εἰ ἔμελλε γίγνεσθαι with Kassel and the mss.; OCT secludes γίγνεσθαι.

Note 625

For the most part: See I 2 1356^{b}17n.

Note 626

And those that also lie in an impulse: OCT reads ταῦτα καὶ ἐν ὁρμῇ. Though the meaning of the clause is clear, the syntax is strange, which is why Cope reads ὄντα. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ εἰ ἐν ὁρμῇι ("and, for the same reasons, if they are . . .") with ms. F. Kassel marks a lacuna prior to ταῦτα.

Note 627

In the discussion of deliberative speeches: In I 7.

Note 628

Of each sort of speech the proposed end is a good (that is to say, the advantageous, the noble, and the just): The advantageous is the end of deliberative oratory (I 7), the noble of epideictic (I 9), and the just of judicial (I 14).

Note 629

Among the things at issue (*tôn pragmatôn*)**, the particulars are more controlling factors in relation to needs than the universals:** "With a view to action, then, experience seems no different from craft knowledge—on the contrary, we even see experienced people being more successful than those who have an account but are without experience. The cause of this is that experience is knowledge of particulars, whereas craft knowledge is of universals, and actions and productions are all concerned with particulars. For the doctor does not cure [the kind] *human*, except coincidentally, but Callias or Socrates or someone else spoken of in that way, who happens coincidentally to be human. If, then, someone without experience has the account and knows the universal, but does not know the particular included under it, he will often make an

error in treatment, since it is the particular that admits of treatment" (*Met.* I 1 $981^{a}12$–24); "The truth in practical matters must be discerned from the facts of our life, since these are what have the controlling vote" (*NE* X 8 $1179^{a}18$–20).

Note 630

A maxim is a part of an enthymeme: See III 17 $1418^{b}33$–39.

Enthymeme: See I 1 $1354^{a}14$n, 2 $1356^{b}4$n.

{285} **Maxim** (*gnômê*): For a different sense of *gnômê*, see I 15 $1375^{a}29$n. Maxims are discussed in II 21.

Note 631

A paradigm is like an induction: See I 2 $1356^{b}2$–6n.

An induction is a starting-point: See I 2 $1357^{b}26$–36 and, on starting-points, I 2 $1358^{a}25$n.

Note 632

Comparison (*parabolê*): An argument by analogy based on similarity.

Fables (*logoi*): Another use of *logos*. See I 1 $1354^{a}5$n. Unlike parables, the fable is not made up by the speaker or speechwriter.

Aesopic: Aesop was a legendary figure, about whom little is known with certainty, and none of whose writings, if there were any, have survived. But by the fifth cent BC his name was permanently linked to fables.

Lybian: Little is known about this sort of fable.

Note 633

Darius: King of Persia (521–486 BC).

Xerxes: King of Persia (486–465 BC) and eldest son of Darius.

The present king: Artaxerxes III, Ochus (358–338 BC).

Note 634

Socratic arguments (*Sôkratika*) **are cases of comparison:** "Put forward your premise as a comparison. For people more readily accept one put forward because of something else and not made use of because of itself. Further, do not put forward the premise to be established, but rather one from which it necessarily follows. For people more readily concede the latter, because it is not so clear for it what the result will be, and when this premise is established, the other has been established too" (*Top.* VIII 1 $156^{b}25$–30).

Note 635

Like choosing by lot one of the sailors to act as captain, on the grounds that it should be the one to whom the lot falls and not the one with scientific knowledge: "A true captain must pay attention to the seasons of the year, the sky, the stars, the winds, and all that pertains to his craft if he is really going to be expert at ruling a ship" (Plato, *Rep.* 488d–e).

Note 636

Steisichorus: Poet (c. 632–556 BC) born in southern Italy, who lived and worked in Sicily. His work survives only in fragments. He is mentioned again at II 21 1395^{a}1, III 11 1412^{a}23.

Phalaris: Tyrant of Acragas in Sicily in the first half of the sixth cent BC. He allegedly roasted his enemies alive inside a bronze bull (Pindar, *Pythian* I.95–96), something Aristotle cites as the action of someone with a depraved (because savagely cruel) nature (*NE* VII 5 1148^{b}19–24).

Popular leader (*dêmagôgou*): *Dêmagôgos* is sometimes a fairly neutral term used to describe an influential democratic leader, such as Pericles, but more often, {286} as here, it has a negative connotation, referring to those who curry favor with (*dêmagôgein*) the people and undermine the rule of law (*Pol.* IV 4 1292^{a}4-37) in order to gain power.

Note 637

When the horse agreed: Reading συνομολογήσαντος with Kassel, Grimaldi, and the mss. for OCT συνομολογήσας.

Note 638

If you remove them: Reading ἀφέλῃς with Kassel and Grimaldi for OCT ἀφέλητε.

Note 639

"You too, then," Aesop said, "men of Samos": Reading "ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ ὑμᾶς," ἔφη, "ἄνδρες Σάμιοι" with Kassel and ms. F for OCT and ms. "Α ἀτὰρ καὶ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Σάμιοι."

Note 640

Your public funds: Reading τὰ κοινὰ with Kassel and the mss. for OCT τὰ λοιπὰ ("what you have left").

Note 641

Fables are suited to the speeches of public oratory (*logoi dêmêgorikoi*): That is, to deliberative ones made, for example, in the assembly. See I 1 1354^{b}23n.

Provided one is capable of seeing similarity, which is just what is easy on the basis of philosophy: See III 11 1412^{a}10–12.

Philosophy (*philosophia*): Aristotle sometimes applies the term *philosophia* to any science aiming at truth rather than action: "It is also correct that philosophy should be called scientific knowledge of the truth. For the end of theoretical science is truth, while that of practical science is the result (*ergon*) [of action]" (*Met.* II 1 993^{b}19–21). In this sense of the term, all the broadly theoretical sciences count as branches of philosophy, and *philosophia* is more or less equivalent in meaning to *epistêmê* ("science"). *Philosophia* also has a narrower sense, however, in which it applies exclusively to sciences providing knowledge of starting-points. Thus "natural—that is, secondary, philosophy" has the task of providing theoretical knowledge of the starting-points of perceptible substances (VII 11 1037^{a}14–16), whereas "the determination of the unmoving starting-point is a task for a different and prior philosophy" (*GC* I 3 318^{a}5–6). Since there are just "three theoretical philosophies, mathematical, natural, and theological" (*Met.* VI 1 1026^{a}18–19), theological philosophy must be primary, mathematical philosophy tertiary (although it is not ever referred to as such). Besides these theoretical philosophies, Aristotle occasionally mentions practical ones, such as "the philosophy of human affairs" (*NE* X 9 1181^{b}15). It is among these that his own ethical writings belong (*Pol.* III 12 1282^{b}18–23).

Note 642

Supplementary arguments (*epilogoi*): As part of a speech, an *epilogos* is an epilogue (for example, III 13 1414^{b}4), and so must come last in it. But here, since a {287} paradigm is itself an argument (I 2 1356^{b}2n), it is in particular a supplementary argument, which comes after the enthymeme, but not necessarily at the end of the speech as a whole. See II 21 1394^{b}8–26.

To the enthymemes: Reading ἐπί τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν with Kassel for OCT τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν.

Note 643

Induction does not properly belong in rhetorical speeches (*tois rhêtorikois*), **except in a few instances** (*en oligois*): Since paradigms are rhetorical inductions (I 2 1356^{b}5–6) and "arguments through paradigms are not less persuasive, but enthymematic ones are more applauded" (1356^{b}23–25), this claim has seemed to present difficulties. To which the

following text (though Aristotelian rather than Aristotle) might be taken to add: "Why do people enjoy paradigms and accounts more than enthymemes in speeches (*en tais rhetoreiais*)? Is it because they enjoy learning and quickly? But they learn more easily through paradigms and fables. For what they come to know are these particular things, whereas enthymemes are demonstrations from universals, which we know less than we do particulars" (*Pr.* XVIII 3 $916^{b}26$–31). Since *tois rhêtorikois* must mean "rhetoric" at II 24 $1402^{a}8$, it surely means the same here. *En oligiois* might mean "before small audiences," but that hardly helps, since it is unclear why inductions would be more effective with them than with large ones. A better response may be to distinguish between induction proper and rhetorical inductions (I 2 $1356^{b}1$n). The former has only a limited place in rhetoric, but that does not mean that the latter do. The problem is that if a speech begins with paradigms, this makes it look like an induction, so that a lot of them will be needed to convince the audience (II 20 $1394^{a}14$–15), which in turn weakens its impact (II 22 $1395^{b}22$–$1396^{a}4$). As a supplement to an enthymeme, in contrast, one paradigm, serving as a witness, can have a real impact.

Note 644

Even a single good one is useful: Reading χρηστὸς with OCT and ms. A; Kassel with ms. F reads πιστὸς "even a single trustworthy one is useful."

Note 645

As for the use of maxims (*gnômologias*): Or, the account or theory of maxims.

Note 646

A maxim is an affirmation, not though about particulars . . . but about universals: Compare *SE* 17 $176^{b}18$–20: "people call both true beliefs and general affirmations 'maxims'."

Iphicrates: See I 7 $1365^{a}28$n.

And not about all of them: Reading καὶ οὐ περὶ πάντων with Kassel and ms. A for OCT and ms. F οὔτε περὶ πάντων.

Note 647

Deduction (*sullogismos*): See I 1 $1354^{a}3$n(3).

Since the [relevant] enthymemes are pretty much a deduction about such things, the conclusions of the enthymemes or their starting-points, the {288} **deduction being omitted, are maxims:**

Reading τὰ ἐνθυμήματα with Kassel and the mss. for OCT τὸ ἐνθύμημα ("the enthymeme"). The relevant enthymemes are the ones whose premises and conclusions are universal and are about the objects of action, and while their conclusions and starting-points are maxims, some maxims, as we are about to find out, are not the premises or conclusions of enthymemes of any sort. See II 21 $1394^{b}8$–10.

Their starting-points: That is, their premises.

Note 648

"A man naturally of sound mind . . . wise": Euripides, *Medea* 194–195.

Note 649

The cause and the why (*dia ti*): "Experienced people know the that but do not know the why, whereas craftsmen know the why, that is, the cause" (*Met.* I 1 $981^{a}28$–30).

"For apart from the other charges of idleness . . . citizens": Euripides, *Medea* 296–297.

Note 650

"There is no man who is happy in everything": Euripides, *Stheneboea*, Fr. 661 Nauck.

Note 651

"There is none among men who is free . . .": Euripides, *Hecuba* 894–895.

Note 652

Contradoxical (*paradoxon*): What is *paradoxos* is not what is paradoxical in our sense of the term but what is contrary to or goes against (*para*) "the beliefs of ordinary people" (*Top.* I 10 $104^{a}11$–12). Hence the neologism, "contradoxical." It is typically sophists who try to "refute in a way that is contradoxical" (*NE* VII 2 $1146^{a}21$–24).

Note 653

"Being healthy is the best thing for a man, so it seems to me": Ascribed to Epicharmus (Fr. 262 Kaibel) by some and to Simonides (Fr. 146 Page) by others. Aristotle includes the sentiment as part of "the Delian inscription," which says, "The noblest thing is the most just; the best, to be healthy. The most pleasant, however, is to get the thing we desire" (*NE* I 8 $1099^{a}25$–29).

Note 654

"No one is a lover who does not love always": Euripides, *Trojan Women* 1051.

Note 655

Others are enthymematic but not part of an enthymeme: They give the cause and the why and could be expanded into enthymemes but, in their present form, they are not enthymemes.

Note 656

"Being a mortal, one should not hold fast to immortal anger": Source unknown.

{289} Note 657

"A mortal should think mortal not immortal thoughts": Advice, attributed by some to Epicharmus (Fr. 263 Kaibel), that Aristotle himself thinks that, in one important context at least, we should not follow: "We should not, however, in accord with the makers of proverbs, "think human things, since you are human" or "think mortal things, since you are mortal" but, rather, we should as far as possible immortalize, and do everything to live in accord with the element in us that is most excellent. For even if it is small in bulk, in its power and esteem it far exceeds everything" (*NE* X 7 $1177^{b}31$–$1178^{a}2$). The element referred to is the understanding. See I 5 $1362^{a}24$n.

Note 658

Laconic apothegms: Laconia was the land of the Spartans, noted for their hatred of verbosity but love of the notable terse remark. Hence our word, "laconic."

If someone were to say: Reading λέγοι with Kassel and the mss. for OCT λέγει ("if someone says").

Steisichorus: See II 20 $1393^{b}9$n.

Locrians: The inhabitans of Locri, a Greek settlement in southern Italy.

Lest their cicadas sing from the ground: That is, lest the city of the Locrians be razed to the ground. The epigram is quoted at III 11 $1412^{a}24$.

Note 659

Boors (*agroikoi*) **are especially fond of coining maxims and ready to show them off:** "Where what is pleasant in amusements is concerned, a medial person is witty and the disposition is wit. The excess is buffoonery and one who has it is a buffoon, whereas a deficient person is

a sort of boor and the state is boorishness" (*NE* II 7 1108^{a}23–26). At III 7 1408^{a}32 boorishness is contrasted with being well-educated.

Note 660

To speak in universal terms of what is not universal is especially fitting in outrage and indignation: "No good man is without enemies," said with application to oneself. "Frailty thy name is woman," said, for example, of a woman accused of adultery.

Outrage (*schetliasmô[i]*): *Scetliasmos* occurs only here in Aristotle. In Plato, *Grg.* we have *schetlia ge* ("really outrageous") at 466b10 and *aganaktountôn kai schetliazontôn* ("vexed and outraged") at 519b5; in *Hp. Ma. scetlios* at 289e7; and in *Lg.* 903c1 *schetle*.

Indignation (*deinôsei*): Or, perhaps, "exaggeration," as at II 24 1401^{b}3. When *deinôsis*, which is used by Aristotle only in the *Rhetoric*, refers to a feeling, it must, it seems, refer to the same one as *nemesis,* discussed in II 9. For at III 19 1419^{b}26 Aristotle refers to the topics concerning it as having been discussed earlier, yet no focused discussion of *deinôsis*, so named, otherwise occurs.

After the demonstration: See III 19 1419^{b}19–28.

Note 661

Because they are common: Reading κοινὰ with Kassel and most mss. for OCT κοιναὶ (there is no impact on the meaning of the phrase).

{290} Note 662

"One omen is best, to defend one's fatherland": Homer, *Il.* XII.243. Poulydamas, in trying to persuade Hector not to fight Achilles, represents himself as saying what someone "who knew in his mind the truth of portents" would say (229).

Note 663

"The War God is impartial": Homer, *Il.* XVIII.309.

Note 664

"Foolish is he . . . sons": See I 15 1376^{a}7n.

Note 665

"An Attic neighbor": Probably, in the negative sense, that with a neighbor like the aggressive inhabitants of Attica (the Athenians), one had no need of enemies. See Thucydides, I.70.

Note 666

"Know thyself": Inscribed in the temple of Apollo at Delphi. Plato, *Prt.* 343b.

"Nothing too much": See II 12 1389^{b}3n.

Note 667

***This* man, if he had known himself, would never have thought himself worthy to be a general:** The reference may be to Iphicrates. See I 7 1365^{a}28n.

Note 668

"One should not, as people say, love as if one will one day hate, but rather hate as if one will one day love": See II 13 1389^{b}23–25n.

Note 669

Deliberate choice: On it and its connection to character, see I 1 1355^{b}18n.

Note 670

The vulgarity (*phortikotêta*) **of the listeners:** "Ordinary people, the most vulgar ones (*phortikôtatoi*), suppose happiness to be pleasure. And that is why the life they like is the life of enjoyment" (*NE* I 5 1095^{b}16–17).

Note 671

The objects of deliberate choices: Reading προαιρετῶν with Kassel, Cope, and Grimaldi for OCT προαιρέσεων ("deliberate choices").

Note 672

Since each of these two is distinct in kind (*eidos*): Literally, "the kind (*eidos*) of each of these two is distinct." Reading ἑκατέρου with Kassel and Grimaldi for OCT ἑκάτερον.

Note 673

That the enthymeme is a deduction was stated earlier: At I 1 1355^{a}8 ("a sort of (*tis*) deduction"), 2 1356^{b}4–5 ("deduction"). *Tis* is again added at II 24 1400^{b}36–1401^{a}1, as in some mss. (followed by Kassel) it also is here.

In what respect it differs from those in dialectic: At I 2 1356^{b}28–1357^{a}21.

{291} Note 674

It should not draw its conclusion from far back, nor by necessarily including everything: See I 2 1357^{a}3–4, 17–21.

Note 675

"More accomplished at speaking (*mousikôterôs legein*) **before a crowd":** Euripides, *Hippolytus* 989. The term *mousikôterôs*, which means

"more musical," or "more skilled in music," has here an unusual meaning and denotes skillfulness in or accomplishment in doing something.

Note 676

The common things: See II 22 $1396^{b}10$–14, also I 2 $1354^{a}2$n.

What they know and things close at hand: Which, because they will tend to be particular things accessible to perception, will be far away from the universals used by the well-educated: "I call prior and more knowable to us what is closer (*ta egguteron*) to perception, unconditionally prior and more knowable what is further away (*porrôtatô*). What is most universal is furthest away, and particulars are closest" (*APo*. I 2 $72^{a}1$–5). Notice *porrôthen* at II 22 $1395^{b}25$.

Note 677

In fact it should be clear that what is said appears so to all or to most: Reading καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ὅτι οὕτως φαίνεται, δῆλον εἶναι ἅπασιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις with Grimaldi and many mss. for OCT καὶ τοῦτο διότι οὕτως φαίνεται δῆλον εἶναι ἅπασιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις.

Note 678

Whether the subject of the deduction is political or anything else whatsoever: Reading πολιτικῷ συλλογισμῷ with Ross and Grimaldi. Kassel reads <ἐν> πολιτικῷ συλλόγῳ ("in political assemblies").

Note 679

The sea battle at Salamis: Against the Persians in 480 BC. See Herodotus VIII.40–97.

The battle of Marathon: Also against the Persians in 490 BC. See Herodotus VI.109–117.

What they did for the children of Heracles: The Athenians and their king Demophon, the son of Theseus, were alone in defending Hyllus, son of Heracles, and his followers, who had taken sanctuary in the Temple of Zeus at Marathon, against the Argives. See Euripides, *The Children of Heracles*.

Note 680

They enslaved the Greeks and sold into slavery . . . the inhabitants of Aegina: In 431 BC Athens expelled the inhabitants of Aegina (an island in the Saronic Gulf, seventeen miles from Athens) and replaced them with Athenians. It was restored to them by the Spartan Lysander in 404. See Thucydides II.27.

And Potidaea: A colony of Corinth founded in 600 BC on the peninsula of Pallene in Chalcidice in northern Greece. The Athenians expelled its inhabitants in 430 BC and replaced them with Athenians. See Thucydides II.70.

{292} Note 681

The same is true of any thing at issue whatsoever—for example, about justice, whether it is good or not good, [one should speak] on the basis of the facts relevant to justice and the good: The question is not the abstract philosophical one that, for example, Socrates might raise (Plato, *Rep*. 354a–c), but rather one of the sort considered at I 15 $1375^{a}25$–$^{b}25$. See also I 1 $1354^{b}3$–4.

Note 682

Whether they deduce in a more exact or in a more loose fashion: Here the distinction between "more exact" and "more loose" deductions should be understood on the guiding idea of which and how many premises one should state in one's enthymeme, that is, how far one should go in mentioning all the relevant facts. See also I 1 $1355^{a}25$n.

It is first necessary, as in the *Topics*, to have selected [premises] relevant to the given case concerning possible points [of discussion] and the ones that are most opportune: See Introduction, pp. xl–lii.

Most opportune (*epikairotatôn*): Meaning here, both "most appropriate to the subject" and "most pertinent in the circumstances."

Note 683

Things happening on the spur of the moment (*tôn ex hupoguiou*): See I 1 $1354^{b}3$.

Note 684

The more of the relevant facts are in hand: Reading ἔχηται with Kassel, Cope, Freese, and Grimaldi for OCT ἔχῃ.

Note 685

Diomedes: Son of Tydeus and a lord of Argos. One of the greatest of the Greek heroes at Troy.

Note 686

Cycnus: The son of the sea god Poseidon. His death at the hands of Achilles is not mentioned in the *Iliad*, but is told in Ovid, *Metamorphosis* XII.64–168.

The one who went without having sworn: The other Greek lords went to Troy because they had sworn to defend Menelaus' right to Helen,

whom Paris had abducted (see Euripides, *Iphigenia in Aulis* 49–65); Achilles was the exception (Pausanias, *Description of Greece* III.24.11).

Note 687

By element and topic, I mean the same thing: Also II 25 1403^{a}17. See Introduction, pp. lxix–lxii.

Note 688

There are two kinds (*eidos*) **of enthymemes:** But these kinds are not distinct species (also *eidos*), that is, they do not use different topics and so do not require separate analysis. See II 26 1403^{a}24–33.

{293} Note 689

One lot are suited to showing (*deiktika*) **that something is or is not the case, while another lot are refutative** (*elegktika*), **and the difference is like that in dialectical ones between refutation and deduction:** "A refutation is a deduction . . . of the contradictory" (*SE* 10 171^{a}1–5). The terms used here, as commonly in the *Topics*, are *deiktikon* and *elegktikon*, while at II 23 1397^{a}9 we have *kataskeuazein* ("establish") and *anairein* ("do away with") and at II 24 1401^{b}3 *kataskeuazein* ("establishing") and *anaskeuazein* ("disestablishing").

Note 690

Each of the kinds (*eidos*) **that are useful and necessary:** The reference is almost certainly to the two kinds of enthymemes—the ones suited to showing and the refutative ones—that have just been distinguished (II 22 1396^{b}22–26). But it has also been taken to refer to each of the three kinds of rhetoric: deliberative, judicial, and epideictic. At II 26 1403^{a}24–30 Aristotle argues that refutative enthymemes are not a distinct species (also *eidos*) of enthymemes, since they both use the same forms of argument.

Note 691

The topics on the basis of which enthymemes should be derived . . . are already on hand: The reference is to I 4–14, where these so-called special topics (I 2 1358^{a}17) or species (1358^{a}31) are discussed, as well as to II 2–17, where character and feelings are discussed.

Note 692

Those belonging to apparent enthymemes: See II 24, also I 2 1356^{b}4.

Note 693

Refutations (*luseôn*): See I 1 1355^{a}33n.

We shall make determinations about refutations and objections: See II 25.

Note 694

II 23: This chapter lists and discusses twenty-eight topics, identified here as T1–T28, which are common to enthymemes in all three kinds of rhetoric: deliberative, judicial, and epideictic.

Note 695

In the *Messianicus*: See I 13 $1373^{b}18$n.

Note 696

"For if indeed it is not just . . . conferred": Source unknown.

Note 697

"But if indeed . . . mortals": Euripides, *Thyestes*, Fr. 396 Nauck. Reading ψευδῆ, γέρον with Kassel for OCT ψευδῆ.

Note 698

Another is based on the different inflections (*ptôseôn*) **of the same word, since it is necessary for them to belong or not belong in the same way [to the subject]—for** {294} **example, to say that what is just** (*dikaion*) **is not good in every respect, since then even what is done just*ly*** (*dikaiôs*) **would be good, while as things stand to be put to death justly is not choiceworthy:** "When things get their name from something, with a difference of inflection (*ptôsei*), they are said to be paronymous—for example, from grammar, the grammarian, and from courage, the courageous person" (*Cat.* 1 $1^{a}12$–15). Paronymy is not simply a linguistic phenomenon, then, but also an ontological one, since it is named things that are paronymously related not simply names. Thus the definition of a just person is a person in whom justice is present, and of a grammarian, a person in whom the knowledge of grammar is present. Similarly, in our text what is being claimed is that what is designated by the adjective "just (*dikaion*)" is paronymously related to what is designated by the adverb "justly (*dikaiôs*)" because the definition of justice (designated by the nouns *dikaiosunê* and *dikê*) is present in their definitions. It is this that underlies the crucial claim that "it is necessary for them to belong or not belong."

Note 699

Diomedon: Otherwise unknown.

"If it is not shameful for you sell, neither is it shameful for me to buy": Greek cities sometimes sold the right to collect taxes to individuals

who aimed to profit thereby. Our debt collection agencies provide a parallel.

Note 700

He has justly suffered: Retaining δικαίως πέπονθεν with Grimaldi and the mss.; secluded in OCT and Kassel.

Note 701

Theodectes: A mid-fourth-cent tragic poet who studied with Aristotle. His *Alcmeon* exists only in fragments. Alcmaeon, son of Amphiaraus, revenged his father's death by killing his mother, Eriphyle. Hounded by her Furies as a result, he was rescued by Phegeus, king of Psophis in Arcadia, who gave him his daughter Alphesiboa in marriage.

Note 702

The trial of Demosthenes and those who killed Nicanor: Demosthenes, who is pretty certainly not the famous orator of that name, is otherwise unknown, as is Nicanor.

Note 703

Also, the case . . . someone who died justly: Kassel and Cope consider this passage to be misplaced and to be read after II 23 1397^{a}23–28.

Note 704

The more and the less: See I 2 1358^{a}14n.

Note 705

And that someone who beats his father . . . depending on which of the two one needs to show: The largely harmless textual problems in this section, which is a single sentence in Greek, are discussed in Grimaldi, who follows Kassel's text and its lineation.

{295} Note 706

"Your father too is pitiable . . . offspring?": Perhaps from Antiphon's lost *Meleager*, which is cited at II 23 1399^{b}26–28. Oeneus was the father of Meleager, who killed Plexippus, the brother of Althaea and wife of Oeneus, and was in revenge killed by Althaea. The lines are thought to be addressed to Althaea by Oeneus.

Note 707

If Theseus did no injustice, neither did Paris: Both abducted Helen. On Theseus, see I 6 1363^{a}18n.

The sons of Tyndareus: Tyndareus was a legendary king of Sparta and husband of Leda, whom Zeus seduced in the form of a swan. On the

same day Tyndareus also had sex with her. From these unions four children were born, the twin sons, Castor and Pollux (the Dioscuri), and two daughters, Helen and Clytemnestra. Castor and Pollux wanted to marry the daughters of Leucippus, Phoebe and Hilaeira, but both women were already betrothed to the twin sons of Tyndareus' brother, Aphareus. Castor and Pollux abducted the women and carried them off to Sparta, thus beginning a family feud.

If Hector did none to Patroclus, Paris did none to Achilles: Hector killed Patroclus, the friend of Achilles, who killed Hector in revenge. Later Paris killed Achilles.

Note 708

If other craftsmen (*technitai*) **are not base** (*phaulos*), **neither are philosophers:** The term *technitês* is often accompanied in Aristotle by the term *banausos* ("vulgar"), as at *Pol.* I 11 $1258^{b}26$, which can be a near synonym of *phaulos*. Such people have a rather odd position in his scheme of things. Though they are somewhat free, and somewhat enslaved, they seem to be further removed from virtue than slaves are (I 13 $1260^{a}39$–$^{b}1$). Yet nothing in their nature fits them to do the work they do ($1260^{b}1$–2). Instead, it seems to be their work itself that prevents them from acquiring virtue and being happy (VIII 2 $1337^{b}4$–21), suggesting that if they had not become vulgar craftsmen, they might (other things being equal) have been capable of virtue. They are typically contrasted with farmers, tradesman, hired laborers (IV 2 $1289^{b}32$–33, VI 1 $1317^{a}24$–26), as also with free people (VIII 5 $1340^{b}9$–10) and hoplites (VII 4 $1326^{a}23$), and grouped together with wage earners (VIII 2 $1337^{b}13$–14). At the same time, crafts themselves are ranked in their level of vulgarity, with "the most vulgar, [being] those in which the body is most damaged; the most slavish, those in which the body is used the most; the most ill-bred, those least in need of virtue in addition" (I 13 $1258^{b}37$–39). At *SE* 6 $168^{b}6$, however, we find the phrase *hoi technitai kai hôlos hoi epistêmones* ("the craftsmen and, in general, those with scientific knowledge"), which suggests that the *technitai* being linked to philosophers in our text will be the more scientific ones, such as doctors, rather than handicraftsmen—at *Div. Somn.* 1 $463^{a}5$–7 "sophisticated doctors" are in fact referred to as *technêtai*.

Note 709

If generals are not base because they are often put to death, neither are sophists: Plutarch tell us that a decree (*psêphisma*) introduced by Diopeithes {296} sometime in the 430s BC provided for the impeachment of "those who do not believe in what has to do with the gods or teach theories about what is up in the sky" (Pericles XXXII.32)—teachings which pegged one as a sophist (Plato, *Ap*. 19b–d). It may be that this decree was the legal basis of Socrates' indictment in 399 BC, and for that of many other intellectuals, including, Anaxagoras, Diagoras, Protagoras, Euripides, and later, in 323/2, of Aristotle himself. The present text is sometimes cited in support of this view. So there is some evidence that sophists were put on trial. But very few of those listed were actually executed—indeed Socrates seems to be the sole exception. Similarly in the case of generals, we know that some were put to death after the battle of Arginusae in 406 BC (Plato, *Ap*. 32a–c). But there is little if anything to support the view they were "often" subject to execution. There is merit, therefore, in reading ἡττῶνται ("defeated") with Cope for the mss. θανατοῦνται ("put to death"), followed by OCT and Kassel.

Note 710

What Iphicrates said in the speech against Harmodius: Iphicrates (I 7 1365ª28n) was promised a statue in his honor because of his success in the battle of Lechaeum in the Gulf of Corinth against the Spartans in 390 BC. After his retirement in 372/1, with the statue still not erected, he apparently gave this speech.

Note 711

Philip: Philip II, king of Macedon (382–336 BC), architect of Macedonian greatness. Aristotle was tutor to his son Alexander the Great.

Against Thebans [not allowing] Philip to pass through into Attica: Thebes, an enemy of Athens, asked Philip for help against the Phocians in the Sacred War (356/5–346 BC), which he granted in 346 after the Peace of Philocrates. He entered Greece via Thermopyle and defeated the Phocians. Had he requested it, the Thebans would have allowed him to pass through their territory against Athens. Instead, he returned home. In 339 Philip reentered Greece at the invitation of some Greek cities who wanted his help in the Amphissean War. Philip sent ambassadors to Thebes to request what he had not requested earlier. The Thebans, who were now allies of the Athenians, refused. The result was the decisive

defeat of the Greeks, including the Athenians and Thebans, at the battle of Chaeronea in 338. The speech is that of Philip's ambassadors.

Note 712

The turn differs, for example, in the *Teucer* and in the argument Iphicrates used against Aristophon: Reading διαφέρει δὲ ὁ τρόπος, οἷον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳ <καὶ> ᾧ ἐχρήσατο with Kassel for OCT οἷον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳ. διαφέρει δὲ ὁ τρόπος ᾧ ἐχρήσατο. Thus we have one sort of turn in the *Teucer* and another sort in Iphicrates' argument.

The *Teucer*: Possibly, the lost play of that name by Sophocles. The nature of the turn it contains is unknown.

Aristophon: A leading Athenian statesman (431–404 BC).

{297} Note 713

If one were to say this to Aristides as accuser: Reading τις ἀντίπειεν, ἀλλὰ with Cope, Kassel, and the mss. ("as, for example, if someone else were to say this to Aristides as accuser against his trustworthiness").

Aristides: An Athenian statesman, known to all as Aristides the Just, who lived c. 520–c. 468 BC.

Note 714

Another is based on definition (*horismou*): See I 1 1354^{a}3n(5).

For example, of what the divine (*to daimonion*) **is . . . :** See III 18 1419^{a}8–12 where the reference is identified as being to Plato, *Ap*. 27b–e.

Note 715

As Iphicrates argued that the best person is the most well-bred one: Iphicrates (I 7 1365^{a}28n), unlike his opponent Harmodius (who claimed the hero Harmodius as an ancestor), was of lowly origins. So he argues that being truly well-bred is not a matter of blood, but of action. He, then, emerges as the true descendent of the hero, since his actions are better than those of his opponent. The double meaning of the word *suggenesteros* helps him to make his point in a telling way.

Harmodius and Aristogeiton: See I 9 1368^{a}18n.

Note 716

In the *Alexandros*: Paris (Alexandros) is defended against a charge of sexual immoderation, on the grounds that the definition of immoderation is "not being sexually satisfied with one woman's body," whereas Paris was satisfied with Helen's.

Moderate (*kosmious*): Opposed to intemperate at *NE* II 8 1109^{a}16.

Note 717

Archelaus: Archelaus II, king of Macedon c. 413–399 BC. For Plato (*Grg.* 470d–471d, 525d), he is the archetype of the corrupt tyrant, who gained the throne by murdering his uncle, cousin, and half-brother. Thucydides, however, praised him for strengthening his kingdom more than its previous eight kings put together (II.100.2). Though Socrates declined to join Archelaus' court (DL II **[25]**), the poets Agathon, Euripides (*Pol.* V 10 $1311^{b}30$–34), and Timotheus did join it. See Plutarch, *Amatorius* 23.

Note 718

Wanton aggression is a matter of not being able to repay (*amunasthai*) **equally even when one is treated well, as it also is when one is treated badly:** The idea is that X treats Y with wanton aggression when he treats him badly knowing that Y cannot defend himself (one meaning of *amunasthai*), which is the common definition of wanton aggression, but also—which extends the common definition—when he treats Y well knowing that Y cannot afford to repay (another meaning of *amunasthai*) him. The statement is not otherwise attributed to Socrates.

{298} Note 719

All these speakers by defining and grasping the what-it-is deduce things about the subject they are talking about: "Socrates . . . busied himself about the virtues of character, and in connection with these was the first to inquire into universal definition. . . . It was reasonable, though, that Socrates was inquiring into the what-it-is. For he was inquiring in order to deduce, and the what-it-is is a starting-point of deductions. . . . For there are two things that may be fairly ascribed to Socrates—inductive arguments and universal definition, both of which are concerned with a starting-point of scientific knowledge" (*Met.* XIII 4 $1078^{b}17$–30). On the what-it-is, see I 2 $1356^{a}23$–24n.

Note 720

Another is based on the many ways (*to posachôs*): Aristotle frequently says that X is said to be Y in many ways—most famously, in the case of being: "Something is said to *be* in many ways (*legetai pollachôs*), however, but with reference to one thing and one nature—that is, not homonymously. Rather, just as what is healthy all has reference to health, one by safeguarding it, another by producing it, one by being a sign of health, another because it is a recipient of it, and what is medical

all has reference to the craft of medicine (for one thing is said to be medical by possessing the craft of medicine, another by being naturally well-disposed to it, another by being a result of the craft of medicine), and we shall find other things that are said to be in ways similar to these, so, too, something is said to be in many ways, but all with reference to one starting-point. For some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are attributes of substances, others because they are a route to substance, or else by being passings away, lacks, or qualities of substance, or productive or generative either of substance or of things that are said to be with reference to substance, or denials of one of these or of substance (that is why we say even of not being that it *is* not being)" (*Met.* IV 2 $1003^{a}33$–$^{b}10$).

As, for example, in the *Topics* concerning "sharp": "Whether the ways in which something is said to be something are many or one in species is something one should get a theoretical grasp on through the following: First, examine the contrary to see if it is said of things in many ways and if they disagree either in species or in name. For sometimes their distinctness is immediately visible in their very names—for example, to sharp in sound flat is contrary, whereas in the point of an arrow blunt is. It is clear, then, that what is contrary to sharp is said of things in many ways. But if that is so, sharp is too. For in each of these cases a distinct thing will be what is contrary. For the same sharp will not be contrary to blunt and flat, yet sharp is contrary to each" (*Top.* I 15 $106^{a}9$–17).

"Sharp": Reading ὀξέος with Kassel, Rapp, and Kennedy for OCT and mss. ὀρθῶς ("correctly"). The latter receives no focused discussion in the *Topics*. If we preserve the mss. reading (as ideally we should), we should follow Cope and translate: "as in the *Topics* (we have treated) of the correct use of terms." It does seem, however, that a specific case, such as "sharp," is more in keeping with the {299} examples given to illustrate the other *topics* than does a general reference of this sort. Besides, the discussion of "sharp" in the *Topics* is used precisely to illustrate "the many ways."

Note 721

If everyone does injustice for the sake of three things (namely, for the sake of this, this, or this), and because two of them are impossible in the present case, and because not even the accusers themselves affirm the third . . . : The speaker is defending against a charge of having

done injustice of some sort. The argument is that he cannot have done so because none of the three things for whose sake people do injustice applies to him.

Note 722

Peparethus: The largest of a group of islands off the northeast tip of Euboea.

Mantias: Probably the father mentioned in Demosthenes, *Against Boeotus*, who was forced to acknowledge as his sons, Mantitheus (by one woman), Boeotus and Pamphilus (by another).

Note 723

Ismenias and Stilbon: Theban citizens active in political life.

Thebes: A city in Boeotia in central Greece.

Dodona: In Epirus in northwestern Greece, site of an ancient oracle of Zeus.

Note 724

Theodectes: See II 23 1397^{b}3n. The speech seems to have been against hiring mercenaries.

Note 725

Alcidamas: See I 13 1373^{b}18n.

Parians: Inhabitants of Paros, an island in the central Aegean, west of Naxos.

Archilochus: The famous seventh-cent poet from Paros, known for his harsh criticisms of his fellow men, of women, and of himself.

Chilon: See II 12 1389^{b}3n.

The Chians Homer, although he was not a citizen: A Homeric Hymn, quoted by Thucydides (III.104.5), has Homer describing himself as "the blind man of Chios' rocky isle." But other cities also claimed him as a native son.

Chians: Inhabitants of Chios, the fifth largest of the Greek islands, just over four miles from the Anatolian coast.

Mytileneans: Inhabitants of the city of Mytilene on the island of Lesbos.

Sappho: See I 9 1367^{a}8n.

The Italians, Pythagoras: Pythagoras, a philosopher and mathematician, was born c. 570 BC on the island of Samos in the Aegean and moved to a Greek colony in Croton in southern Italy in c.

530 (hence the reference to the Italians) and later to Metapontum, where he died. Kassel secludes this clause.

The Lampsacenes buried Anaxagoras: Anaxagoras (c. 500–c. 428 BC), one of the greatest of the Presocratic philosophers, was born in Clazomenae on the Ionian coast and moved to Athens in c. 480. Perhaps faced with a trial for impiety in c. {300} 432 (see II 23 1397[b]26–27n), he was exiled to Lampsacus, on the eastern side of the Hellespont in the northern Troad. See DK 59 = TEGP pp. 271–325.

Solon: Athenian statesman and poet (c. 640–560 BC), and architect of the Athenian constitution.

Lycurgus: The (perhaps legendary) architect of the Spartan constitution.

Thebes: Probably a reference to Epaminondas and Pelopidas.

Prosperous (*eudaimonêsen*): See II 16 1391[a]3n.

The Athenians were prosperous while they made use of the laws of Solon, and the Spartans those of Lycurgus; and at Thebes, as soon as the leading men became philosophers the city prospered: Kassel double-brackets this as not fitting in well with the previous argument. Cope and Grimaldi suppose a lacuna before it containing some statement that is to be proved—for example, that wise people are the best lawgivers. In any case, the phrase should not be taken to express Aristotle's own views.

Note 726

Autocles: Athenian ambassador to Sparta in 371 BC (Xenophon, *Hellenica* VI.3.2, 7–9), and in command of a squadron of thirty ships sent to aid Alexander of Pherae in southeastern Thessaly (Diodorus Siculus XV.71.3–4), he later replaced Ergophilus (II 3 1380[b]11n).

Mixidemides: Identity uncertain.

It is [a terrible thing] if it was fine for the Dread Goddesses to stand trial before the Areopagus: Retaining εἰ with Kassel and the mss. and translating with Cope. The Dread Goddesses are the Furies who stand trial before Athena in Aeschylus' *Eumenides*.

Areopagus: See I 1 1354[a]23n.

Note 727

Aristippus: An associate of Socrates, noted for his luxurious lifestyle, and thought to be the first "Socratic" to charge fees for his teaching.

Note 728

Delphi: Site of the famous Delphic oracle of Apollo.

Agesipolis: Reading Ἀγησίπολις with Kassel for OCT Ἡγησίπολις. Agesipolis, king of Sparta (c. 394 BC). His visit to Olympia and Delphi before invading Argos on 387 BC is described in Xenophon, *Hellenica* IV.7.2.

Consulted: Reading ἐπηρώτα (the technical term used in the case of oracles) with Kassel for OCT ἠρώτα ("asked").

The oracle at Olympia: Of Zeus.

Note 729

Isocrates wrote about Helen, that she was good . . . and about Paris: See *Helen* 18–22, 41–48, and, on Isocrates, I 9 1368^{a}20n.

About Evagoras . . . : See *Evagoras*, 51–52. After his defeat by the Spartans at the naval battle of Aegospotami (405 BC), Conon, a distinguished Athenian naval commander, took refuge with Evagoras, king of Cyprus. See Xenophon, *Hellenica* II.1.29.

{301} Note 730

Another is based on the parts, as in the *Topics:* What sort of movement is the soul? For it is this or that: Aristotle recognizes three sorts of movement: movement with respect to quality (alteration); movement with respect to quantity (increase and decrease); and with respect to place (spatial movement) (*Ph.* V 2 226^{a}23–^{b}1). Coming to be and passing away (change with respect to substance), though popularly classed as movements, are not strictly speaking such (1 225^{a}20–34). Thus if we want to show that the soul is not a movement, we first divide movement into each of these three parts or sorts and then show that the soul is not any of them. This is how Aristotle proceeds in the referenced bit of the *Topics*: "For example, that the soul is in movement: one must look to see whether it is possible for the soul to be in movement in accord with any of the species of movement—for example, whether it can increase or decrease, or come to be, or be in any of the other species of movement. For if it cannot move in accord with any of them, it is clear that it is not in movement" (II 4 111^{b}5–11).

Note 731

The *Socrates* of Theodectes: The writ of impiety brought against Socrates read: "Socrates is guilty of corrupting the young, and of not acknowledging the gods the city acknowledges, but new daemonic activities instead" (Plato, *Ap.* 24b–c). The text referred to is apparently a

defense of Socrates against these charges comparable to Xenophon's *Socrates Defense to the Jury*. On Theodectes, see II 23 1397[b]3n.

Note 732

This topic constitutes the craft (*technê*) **of Callippus:** Callipus, an Athenian from the deme of Lamptrai, was a student of Isocrates (I 9 1368[a]20n). He may have written a handbook of rhetoric to which Aristotle is (somewhat disparagingly) referring.

With the addition of the possible and the other things that have been mentioned: In II 19.

Note 733

The way mentioned in the previous case: Reading τρόπῳ with OCT and Grimaldi; Kassel reads τόπῳ ("the topic mentioned . . ."). See also III 15 1416[a]6, 13.

Note 734

"Buying the marsh (*helas*) **with the salt** (*halas*): A proverbial jingle whose source is unknown. The meaning is that if you want the good you must take the bad. In context: if you want to use this sort of argument to make your case (good), you have to also accept the inside-out version (bad).

Note 735

The turning inside out (*blaisôsis*) **consists in this: when each of two contraries is followed by a good and an evil, [apply] each contrary to each:** The adjective *blaisos* means "bandy-legged"—a condition in which the feet and legs bend outward. The noun *blaisôsis* does not occur elsewhere in Aristotle, but seems to mean turning an opponent's argument inside out. The priestess forbids her son to speak {302} in the public assembly because the people will hate him if he says what is just, the gods if he says what is unjust. The opponent, noticing that love is the contrary of hate, as speaking justly is of speaking unjustly, applies "each contrary to each," and replies by telling her son: "You should speak in the public assembly, since if you say what is just, the gods will love you; and if what is unjust, the people will."

Note 736

For the ones that are contradoxical: That is, of the *topics* that reveal a conflict in the opponent's beliefs, [T15], which derives the conflicting beliefs from an open belief and a secret one, is most controlling: "For [getting people] to say contradoxical things . . . argue on the basis of their

wishes and their professed (*phanerôn*) beliefs. For people do not wish for the same things they say they do, but say the words that make them look best, whereas they wish for the things that appear most profitable. For example, they say one should die nobly rather than live pleasantly, and live in just poverty rather than in shameful wealth, but they wish the contrary. A person, then, who speaks in accord with his wishes must be led to state his professed beliefs, while one who speaks in accord with those must be led to state secret ones. For in either case they speak contradoxically. For they will speak contrary either to their professed beliefs or to their non-openly held ones" (*SE* 12 $172^{b}36$–$173^{a}6$). On contradoxical, see II 21 $1394^{b}10$n.

This topic is the most controlling [topic]: See I 1 $1355^{a}7$n. It is most controlling, presumably, because it is widely applicable and shows both that the opponent contradicts himself and has a bad character.

Note 737

Perform public service (*leitourgein*): A *leitourgia* is any public service paid for out of private funds, such as funding a chorus for a play, equipping a trireme for the navy, or providing a feast for the city (*NE* IV 2 $1122^{b}22$–23). Sometimes, though, *leitourgein* comes close in meaning to our notion of charitable giving (VIII 14 $1163^{a}29$, IX 6 $1167^{b}12$).

Iphicrates: See I 7 $1365^{a}28$n.

Note 738

Theodectes in the *Law* speech: See II 23 $1398^{b}6$n (= [T10]) and II 23 $1397^{b}3$n.

Strabax and Charidemus: Both mercenary leaders, the former is mentioned in Demosthenes, *Against Leptines* 84, the latter in *Against Aristocrates* 23, 65, 89.

Will you not make exiles: Reading ποιήσετε with Kassel and the mss. for OCT ποιεῖσθε

Note 739

Xenophanes: See I 15 $1377^{a}19$n.

Note 740

In general, one should take the result of each of the relevant things as always the same: Suppose the question is, should one study with Isocrates (I 9 $1368^{a}20$n)? One should look at the kind to which Isocrates belongs, that of philosophers, and ask should one do

philosophy, on the supposition that the results will be the same in every case.

{303} **Isocrates:** Reading Ἰσοκράτους with OCT and Kassel for mss. Σωκράτους ("Socrates"). The reference seems to be to Isocrates, *Antidosis* 170–175. For Isocrates' views on philosophy, see *Antidosis* 266–267.

Note 741

To give "earth and water" is to be a slave: The Persians demanded earth and water as a symbol of submission to their control. See Herodotus V.18. The idea is that the results of giving it are the same as those of slavery.

"The common peace": Probably the peace forced on Greek cities by Macedon after the battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC, which was not completely ratified until 336. *On the Treaty with Alexander* (c. 335), attributed to Demosthenes, explicitly mentions a "common peace."

Note 742

One should take whichever of the two is useful: Suppose, for example, that the case is a deliberative one: should X study philosophy or not. If A is exhorting X to study it, he should look at the results of doing so, pick a good one and suppose it always to follow; if A is dissuading X, he should do the same, except pick a bad result.

Note 743

"When in exile, [1] we fought to return home, but [2] having returned, are we to go into exile in order to avoid fighting?": Apparently an adaptation of Lysias XXXIV.11. The implicit conclusion is that [2] would be an irrational thing to do, given [1]. This is the nub of [T18].

Note 744

As if someone gave: Retaining ἄν with Kassel and the mss.; OCT secludes.

Note 745

"It is not out of good will . . . evident": Source unknown.

Note 746

The *Meleager* of Antiphon: See II 2 1379^{b}15n.

Note 747

The *Ajax* of Theodectes: See II 23 1397^{b}3n.

Diomedes deliberately chose Odysseus not in order to honor him but in order that his companion might be inferior to him: The play

and the incident are referred to again at II 23 1400[a]28–29, and the incident alone at III 15 1416[b]12–15, where it is explained in greater detail.

Note 748

The incentives (*ta protreponta*) **and the disincentives** (*ta apotreponta*): That is, the things that are useful in exhortation (*protropê*) and dissuasion (*apotropê*).

Note 749

And if not present, then one should not do it (ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχῃ, μὴ πράττειν): This clause, though it appears only in a later codex, is read by all editors, though as an addition set in angle brackets in Kassel, but not OCT.

{304} Note 750

If it is punishable, the punishment is less than the thing at issue: Reading κἄν ἐπιζήμιον ᾖ, ἐλάττων with Kassel for OCT κἄν ᾖ ἐπιζήμιον, εἰ ἐλάττων.

Note 751

Pamphilius and Callippus: Pamphilius is otherwise unknown. On Callippus, see II 23 1399[a]17n.

Note 752

Unpersuasive (*apistôn*): *Apistos* is the contrary of *pistos* (for example, II 1 1378[a]6). Also, "unconvincing," "incredible."

Note 753

"Laws need . . . need oil: Following Kassel's punctuation; OCT makes the whole passage one quotation. Neither example, though, seems to fit the topic, since they do not concern the relation between beliefs and past or present events.

Androcles of Pitthus: A prominent popular leader in Athens (of which Pitthus is a deme) in the latter part of the fifth cent. See Thucydides VII.65.

Note 754

Looking for inconsistencies, to see whether there is any inconsistency among all the times, actions, or words (*logos*): Reading with the mss. and OCT the whole phrase after *skopein* (Kassel reads it after *amphisbêtountos* ("the opponent") in the next clause). But reading πάντων ("all") with Kassel, Grimaldi, and the mss. for OCT τόπων ("places").

Note 755

"He says he loves you (*humas*), **but he conspired with the Thirty":** *Humas* (plural) is the pro-democratic Athenian people, whose control was overthrown by the anti-democratic Thirty.

The Thirty: The oligarchy of the so-called Thirty Tyrants, which was in control in Athens for a brief period in 404/3 BC. Xenophon, *Hellenica* II.3–4 and Diodorus XIV.3–6 portray Critias (the cousin of Plato's mother) as their leader. See also *Ath*. XXXIV–XXXVIII, Plato, *Ap*. 32c–d.

Note 756

"He has never put up any money, but I have ransomed many of you": As formulated, the example is not an inconsistency but rather an opposition. To make it an inconsistency one should assume a statement on the part of the opponent stating that, for example, "I am generous to the city but he is not."

Note 757

The prejudicial belief (*tou paradoxou*): *Paradoxos* is usually translated as "contradoxical" (II 21 $1394^{b}10$n), but here simply means "the belief that goes against"—in other words, the prejudicial belief.

Note 758

A certain woman who had palmed off (*hupobeblêmenês*) **her own child as another's:** The exact significance of *hupoballesthai* is not entirely clear, though {305} it can certainly have the meaning given to it in the translation. See Grimaldi II, p. 329.

When the cause was stated, the accusation was refuted: The accusation—based on her warm embrace of him—was that of having sex with a boy young enough to be her son. It dissolved when she was shown to be the boy's mother.

Note 759

***Ajax* of Theodectes:** See II 23 $1397^{b}3$n.

Note 760

Leodamas was defending himself against Thrasybulus' charge that his name had been inscribed on a column on the Acropolis: The names of traitors were so inscribed. On Leodamas, see I 7 $1364^{a}19$n.

Thrasybulus: An Athenian statesman and military leader who led the opposition to the Thirty, defeated their troops in 404 BC, and restored

the democracy. In 411 he led the democratic opposition to the oligarchic government of the Four Hundred.

Thirty: See II 23 1400[a]18n.

Note 761

The people (*ton dêmon*): That is, the democracy.

Note 762

For it is evident that if this is not so: Reading εἰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει ("if this is not so") with Cope, Grimaldi, and the mss. for OCT and Kassel εἰ οὕτως ἔχει ("if this is so"). On the mss. reading the meaning is: "if this is not so [that is, if the person has not taken the better course], he has not done the action he is alleged to have done." The difference between the two readings is thus one of clarity not of substance.

No one voluntarily and knowingly deliberately chooses the bad things: See I 10 1368[b]9–12, 18–32 and, on deliberate choice, I 1 1355[b]18n.

Note 763

Elea: A city (now Velia) in southwest Italy on the Tyrrhenian Sea. The home of the Eleatic philosophers, Parmenides and Zeno.

Xenophanes: See I 15 1377[a]19n.

Leucothea: Originally Ino, the daughter of Cadmus and wife of Athamas, she was transformed into a sea goddess.

Note 764

The *Medea* of Carcinus: Carcinus was a fourth-cent tragic poet. He is said to have written 160 plays. Apparently, in his version Medea did not kill her children.

Note 765

This topic and kind (*eidos*) **of enthymeme constituted the whole craft before Theodorus:** Or "the whole of the earlier craft of Theodorus" (Cope). Theodorus of Byzantium (c. 400 BC) was a teacher of rhetoric and author of handbooks on the subject. He is mentioned at Plato, *Phdr.* 266e. Some of his views are discussed in III 11 1412[a]26–29.

{306} Note 766

Sophocles: The famous Athenian playwright (c. 496–406 BC), author of *Oedipus Tyrannus*, *Antigone*, and many other plays.

"Clearly you are iron as the name you bear": Fr. 597 Nauck. Reading σαφῶς σιδήρῳ καὶ φοροῦσα τοὔνομα with OCT; Kassel reads,

σαφῶς Σιδήρω καὶ φρονῦσα τοὔνομα ("when [your mother gave you] the name *Sidêrô* she clearly meant it"). *Sidêros* means "iron."

Note 767

Conon: See II 23 1399[a]5n.

Thrasybulus: See II 23 1400[a]33n.

Herodicus: See I 5 1361[b]5n.

Thrasymachus: A sophist and rhetorician (fl. c. 400–430 BC) from Chalcedon in Asia Minor, who makes a memorable appearance in Book I of Plato's *Republic*. Aristotle refers to him on four other occasions: *SE* 34 183[b]32, *Rh*. III 1 1404[a]14, 8 1409[a]2, 11 1413[a]8.

Polus: A pupil of Gorgias and a teacher of rhetoric from Acragas (Agrigentum), he is the central character in Plato's *Gorgias*.

Draco the legislator: Draco set up laws for Athens in 621 BC that were notorious for their harshness. Hence our word "draconian."

Note 768

Hecuba in Euripides says of Aphrodite: Hecuba is Priam's wife and queen of Troy. Aphrodite is the goddess of, among other things, sexual love.

"And rightly . . . foolishness": Euripides, *Trojan Women* 990.

Note 769

Chaeremon: Mid-fourth-cent tragic poet. See also III 12 1413[b]12–14.

"Pentheus, named for his future misfortunes": Supposedly from Chaeremon's *Dionysius*. Pentheus, king of Thebes, familiar from Euripides' *Bacchae*, where he is torn to pieces by the maenads for spying on their rites. The word *penthos* means "misfortune" or "sorrow."

Note 770

A refutative enthymeme is a bringing together of contraries in a small space, and when these are set side by side they are more evident to the listener: Compare III 2 1405[a]11–13, 11 1412[b]21–25, 17 1418[b]1–4.

Note 771

The most applauded are those of the sort the listeners foresee the moment they start, as long as they are not superficial . . . : Compare III 10 1410[b]21–27.

Note 772

It is also possible for a thing to be an enthymeme and for another thing not to be one, but to appear to be one: See I 1 $1355^{b}15$–21, 2 $1356^{a}35$–$^{b}5$. Compare: "A contentious deduction is one that proceeds from what appear to be, but are not, reputable beliefs, or an apparent deduction from what are, or what appear to {307} be, reputable beliefs. In fact, not everything that appears to be a reputable belief actually is one, since none of the things said to be reputable beliefs wears this appearance entirely on its face—which is what actually does happen in the case of the starting-points of contentious arguments. For in their case the nature of their falsity is for the most part immediately clear to those capable of discerning even small things. Let us say, then, that the first sort we mentioned is a contentious deduction and a [genuine] deduction, whereas the other sort is a contentious deduction, but not a [genuine] deduction, since it appears to deduce, but does not deduce" (*Top*. I 1 $100^{b}23$–$101^{a}4$).

Note 773

One is by exploiting the mode of expression (*para tên lexin*): *Para* + accusative, which often means "beyond" or "besides," should here be understood as "by," or "by exploiting." "*Lexis* is communication (*hermêneian*) by use of names (*onomasias*)" (*Po*. 6 $1450^{b}13$–14), but also "speech," "diction," or "style."

Just as in dialectical ones: "The modes of producing an appearance of refutation exploiting the mode of expression are six in number. They are: homonymy, ambiguity, combination, division, accentuation, and form of expression" (*SE* 4 $165^{b}24$–27).

Note 774

Mode of expression (*schêma tês lexeôs*): See III 8 $1408^{b}21$n.

Note 775

The figure (*schêma*) **of the mode of expression:** As in our, "figures of speech." Here, that it is terse and antithetical.

Note 776

Homonymy (*homonumian*): Or "ambiguity." See III 2 $1404^{b}38$. *Zô[i]on* means both "animal" and "figure" or "image."

The Mysteries (*mustêria*): Eleusis—one of the major demes in Athens—was the center of a cult that played a prominent role in Athenian civic religion. Some of its rituals were secret mysteries, known only to initiates,

and were called the Eleusinian Mysteries. Plato uses initiation into these as a metaphor for initiation into philosophy at *Smp.* 209e–210a.

Note 777

The Dog Star: Sirius, the brightest star in the constellation Canis Major.

Pan . . . multifarious (*pantodapon*): Pan was the god of shepherds and the pastoral world. He is *pantodapon*, presumably, because he is half human, half goat.

"O blessed one, whom the Olympians call dog, multifarious of the Great Goddess": Pindar Fr. 86 Bowra. The Great Goddess is Cybele, the mother goddess. Her relationship to Pan is unclear, but he seems to have been regarded as her dog-like companion.

Note 778

To be without a dog (*kun*) **is the greatest dishonor, so it is clear that the dog** (*to kuna*) **is estimable:** The precise meaning is unclear. However, a piece in the game {308} of *poleis*, referred to at Plato, *Rep.* 422e5–6, and thought to resemble backgammon, was called a dog. So that being without a dog would be to have no piece left in the game. The estimable dog may either be a piece in that game or one of the philosophers called Cynics, because their founder Diogenes of Sinope was nicknamed "dog."

Estimable (*timion*): The core sense of *timios* ("estimable") is captured in the remark that ordinary people "commonly say of those they find especially estimable and especially love that they 'come first'" (*Cat.* 12 $14^{b}5$–7). Something is thus objectively *timios* when—like starting-points and causes—it "comes first by nature" ($14^{b}3$–5). To say that something is estimable is thus to ascribe a distinct sort of goodness or value to it: "By what is estimable I mean such things as what is divine, what is superior (*beltion*) (for example, soul, understanding), what is more time-honored (*archaioteron*), what is a starting-point, and so on" (*MM* I 2 $1183^{b}21$–23). Thus happiness is "something estimable and complete . . . since it is a starting-point . . . and the starting-point and the cause of goods is something we suppose to be estimable and divine" (*NE* I 12 $1102^{a}1$–4).

Note 779

Hermes is the most sociable (*koinônikos*) **of the gods (for he alone is called "The Sharing** (*koinos*) **Hermes"):** Hermes is, among other things, the messenger of the gods, and, as here, the god of good luck. If

treasure, or anything else of value, chanced to be found, those present cried *koinos Hermês* as a way of claiming a share of the find.

Note 780

The expression *axion logou* is not said of things in a simple way (*haplôs legetai*): X is said to be Y in a simple way, as opposed to being said to be Y in many ways (*pollachôs legetai*), when Y has just one account. See II 23 1398^{a}28–29n. Here *axion logou* has two accounts, since *logos* means both "speech" and "esteem."

Note 781

Euthydemus: A sophist from the island of Chios (the fifth largest of the Greek islands, just over four miles from the Anatolian coast), and contemporary of Socrates, is a character in Plato's dialogue of the same name.

Claiming to know that there is a trireme in the Piraeus (for he knew each of the [three] things involved): If the things involved are a trireme, in, and the Piraeus, the fallacy is to argue from knowing the parts to knowing their combination. What this omits—as in the case of knowing the word because of knowing the letters—is the order of the parts. If X is in the Piraeus, what he knows he knows in the Piraeus. He knows that there is a trireme (somewhere). But we cannot infer that he knows that there is a trireme (located) in the Piraeus, only that he (located) in the Piraeus knows that there is a trireme (somewhere). A slightly more complex version of the argument is given at *SE* 20 177^{b}12–13 in the form of the conclusion: "Therefore, you know now in Sicily that there are triremes in the Piraeus." You are in Sicily now, so that what you know you know there now. One thing you know is {309} that triremes are in the Piraeus (sometimes). These are illegitimately combined to yield the false conclusion.

Note 782

Polycrates: A fourth-cent rhetorician, whose lost *Accusation of Socrates*, was answered in Xenophon, *Memorabilia* I.2.1–64.

Thrasybulus: See II 23 1400^{a}33n.

For he combines (*suntithêsi*): It is natural to think of the fallacy as one of division: the Thirty Tyrants (II 23 1400^{a}18n) constituted one tyrannical rule; Polycrates divides them, treating them as thirty distinct tyrannical rulers, each one of whom Thrasybulus deposed. But Aristotle's use of *suntithenai* indicates that he is presenting it as a fallacy of

combination: each of the Thirty was deposed by Thrasybulus; collectively they formed one tyranny (one tyrant); therefore, Thrasybulus deposed thirty tyrants.

Note 783

Theodectes: See II 23 1397^{b}3n.

For it is a case of division: It was just for Clytemnestra to be killed for murdering her husband Agamemnon; it was just for Orestes to avenge the murder of his father Agamemnon; but it was not therefore just for both to happen (since that involves Orestes killing Clytemnestra, his mother).

Note 784

This would also be one by omission (*para tên elleipsin*) **(for it leaves out the *by whom*):** It is just for Clytemnestra to be killed. But by whom? Theodectes leaves this out, and so commits a fallacy by omission. For it is just for her to be killed by someone, but not if the someone is her son.

Note 785

Without showing that someone did or did not do something: Accepting the OCT addition of μηδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐποίησεν ("or that it was not done").

Note 786

When the accuser amplifies it: Reading ὅταν ὁ κατηγορῶν αὐξῇ with OCT; most mss., read ὀργίζηται ("is enraged"), as does Grimaldi.

Note 787

Another is based on a sign: More precisely, on a *non-necessary* sign. See I 2 1357^{b}4–5.

Harmodius and Aristogeiton destroyed the tyrant Hipparchus: See I 9 1368^{a}18n.

Note 788

Another is through what is coincidental: The relevant sense of coincidental seems to be that of a coincidental cause: "Further, there are coincidental causes and their kinds (*genos*)—for example, [as a cause of] a statue, in one way Polyclitus, in another a sculptor, because the sculptor coincides with Polyclitus, and, as examples of what includes the coincidental cause, a human is a cause of the statue, or in general an animal, because Polyclitus is human and a human is an animal. {310} And among coincidental causes some are more remote than others, some less—for example, if the pale and the musical were said to be causes of

the statue" (*Ph.* II 1 195^{a}32–^{b}3). Thus the mice did not gnaw the bowstrings because doing so would aid anyone; they did it because the strings were food. That doing so aided someone is a coincidental attribute of their gnawing. Similarly, Achilles was not enraged because he was not invited (to his being enraged his not being invited was coincidental), but because Agamemnon had taken back his war prize Briseus (Homer, *Il.* I.181–187). That is why Aristotle describes fallacies of this sort as follows: "Fallacies that are by coincidence are when any attribute is said to belong in the same way to a thing and to a coincident of it" (*SE* 5 166^{b}28–30).

Polycrates says of mice that they helped by gnawing bowstrings: That is, they helped the Egyptians by gnawing the bowstrings of the invading Assyrians, and indeed "the bows themselves and the handles of their shields" (Herodotus II.141). On Polycrates, who evidently wrote encomia to mice and other unlikely things, see II 24 1401^{a}35n.

Note 789

Was coincidental to not being invited: Reading with ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ κληθῆναι with Cope and Kassel for OCT διὰ τὸ μὴ κληθῆναι.

Note 790

Another is by [affirming] the consequent—for example, in the *Alexandros,* the argument that Alexandros [Paris] was great-souled: The argument is: Paris looks down on social interaction with ordinary people; great-souled people look down on ordinary people; therefore, Paris is great-souled. On greatness of soul, see I 9 1366^{b}17.

The *Alexandros*: See II 23 1398^{a}22n.

Note 791

When someone is well-dressed and wanders around at night, he is an adulterer, since adulterers are like this: "In rhetoric, demonstrations in accord with what is a sign are based on consequences. For when speakers wish to show that a person is an adulterer, they take hold of the consequent—that he is well-dressed or that he is seen wandering about at night. But these attributes belong to many people of whom the accusation is not true" (*SE* I 5 167^{b}8–12).

Note 792

Because these things belong to those who seem to be prosperous, the people to whom these things belong might seem to be prosperous too: The things in question are singing and dancing and being able to live wherever they please.

Prosperous (*eudaimonein*): See II 16 1391[a]3n.

Note 793

There is a difference in how (*to pôs*) **[they belong]:** Beggars sing and dance out of the necessity of getting a handout, exiles live where they like out of the necessity of leaving their homeland. The prosperous do these things because they are free to do them.

Which is why this too falls under omission: See II 24 1401[b]2n.

{311} Note 794

Political policy makers (*hoi en tais politeias*): A *politeia* is often (perhaps usually in Aristotle) a political constitution, but here it has the sense of those active in shaping political policy.

As Demades took the policy of Demosthenes to be the cause of all evils, since it is after it that the war came: Demades (c. 380–319 BC) was an Athenian politician and excellent orator, used by his city to negotiate the so-called Peace of Demades with Philip of Macedon after his defeat of Athens and her allies in the battle of Chaeronea in 338, which ended the war referred to. Demosthenes is pretty certainly not the one mentioned at II 23 1397[b]7 but the great Athenian orator (384–322 BC), and opponent of the ambitions of Philip. See Roisman, pp. 60–67 (Pseudo-Plutarch), 303–315 (Photius), 327–328 (Suda).

Note 795

Contentious arguments (*eristikois*): See I 11 1371[a]1n.

In dialectical arguments, that what is not is: "In the case of what is not (*to mê on*), some people say in a logico-linguistic way that what is not is (not that it is unconditionally but that it is what is not)" (*Met.* VII 4 1030[a]25–26). See also *SE* 25 180[a]36–38, and, on dialectic, I 1 1354[a]1n.

Note 796

Agathon: See II 19 1392[b]7n.

"Perhaps one could say that the thing itself is likely . . . not likely": Fr. 9 Nauck.

Note 797

For what is contrary to likelihood does also occur: Reading γίγνεται γάρ τι <καὶ> παρὰ τὸ εἰκός with Kassel for OCT γίγνεται γάρ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός.

Note 798

Sophistry (*sukophantian*): Here *sukophantia* is "quibbling," or "sophistry," which is the sort of thing characteristic of sycophants. See II

4 1382[a]7n.

Note 799

Corax: A fifth-cent teacher of rhetoric from Syracuse, credited, along with his student Tisias, with founding the craft.

Note 800

It is not likely, because it was going to seem likely: That is, the supposed perpetrator is implicitly taken to know that he would be a likely suspect and, for that very reason, not to have done it. His not being likely to have done it is not unconditional, then, but rather is so on the condition that he knew he would be a likely suspect.

Note 801

In the way mentioned: That is, on the condition that he knew that he would be a likely suspect.

Note 802

Human beings were justly disgusted: See II 23 1397[b]26–27n.

{312} **Protagoras' declaration** (*epaggelma*): Protagoras of Abdera (c. 490–c. 420 BC) was a famous sophist, who was perhaps the first to describe himself as such and to charge fees for his teaching (Plato, *Prt.* 317b, 349a). His best known view is "that 'Man is the measure of all things, of those that are that they are and of those that are not that they are not'" (Plato, *Tht.* 152a2–4), which Aristotle discusses in *Met.* IV 5 1009[a]6–16. *Epaggelma*, which means "declaration" here, also means "profession," and was used in that sense to denote the sophists' profession.

Since it consists in what is false, not true but apparently likely, and is included in no craft, but in rhetoric and contentious argument: See I 1 1355[b]15–21.

Contentious argument: See I 11 1371[a]1n.

Note 803

The next thing to be discussed, after what has already been said, is refutation: See II 23 1396[b]28–1397[a]6.

Note 804

Stating a counter-deduction (*antisullogisamenon*): That is, a refutative deduction. See II 23 1400[b]26–29.

Objection (*enstasis*): "An objection is a proposition (*protasis*) contrary to a proposition" (*APr.* II 26 69[a]37); "Premises from which it is possible to deduce the contrary conclusion are those on the basis of which we try

to state objections" (69^{b}28–29); "A person should make the [dialectical] problem into a premise for himself, and bring an objection to it. For the objection will be a ground of attack (*epicheirêma*) against the thesis [= the problem in propositional form]" (*Top*. II 2 110^{a}10–11).

Note 805

The deductions are based on reputable beliefs (*ek tôn endoxôn*), **and many things that seem to be so** (*dokounta*) **are contrary to one another:** See I 1 1355^{a}17n and notice the connection between *endoxa* and *dokounta* in *Top*. I 1 100^{b}21–23 quoted there.

Note 806

Objections are brought, as also described in the *Topics*, in four ways: Though a division similar to the one here is found at *APr*. II 26 69^{b}38–70^{a}1, no parallel division is found in our *Topics*, although a different fourfold division appears at VIII 10 161^{a}1–15: "There are four ways to prevent an argument from reaching a conclusion: by doing away with the thing through which the falsehood comes about; by stating an objection to the questioner (for often he does not succeed in resolving the thing, yet the one obtaining answers is not able to lead him any further); third, objecting to the questions asked (for it may happen that what the questioner wishes does not come about on the basis of the questions asked, because they have been framed incorrectly, though when something is added the conclusion does come about); the fourth and worst sort of objection is the one relating to the time (for some people raise an objection of this sort, namely, that it would take longer to dialectically argue against than the present discussion allows). Objections, then, as we said, come about in four ways. But only the first of those mentioned is a resolution, whereas the remaining ones are sorts of preventions and impediments to conclusions."

{313} **Based on itself** (*ex heautou*): That is, on the opponent's own enthymeme.

On what is similar (*ek tou homoiou*): See II 19 1392^{a}12.

On what is contrary: See II 23 1397^{a}7–22 (= T1).

On what has been judged: See II 23 1398^{b}21–1399^{a}6 (= T11).

Note 807

All need is bad: And (erotic) love is a kind of need or desire.

"Caunian love": A proverbial expression for forbidden love, of the sort between Byblis and her twin brother, Caunus. To escape it, Caunus

went to Caria and founded the city of Byblis. See Ovid, *Metamorphoses* IX.454–665.

Note 808

By from what is contrary: for example, if the enthymeme was that "the good man does good to all his friends," [the objection is,] "but not even the depraved one does evil to all of his": The opponent's enthymeme is "the good man does good to all his friends." The contrary is "the depraved man does evil to all of his." But this is false, since a depraved man need not do evil to all his friends.

Note 809

Regarding what is similar: Reading ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὁμοίων with Kassel and the mss., for OCT ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ὁμοίου, οἷον.

For example, if the enthymeme was that "those to whom evil is done always hate," [the objection is,] "but not even those to whom good is done always love": A less-than-perfect example, since it is also an example of objection from the contrary. The idea, presumably, is that "those to whom evil is done always hate" is like "those to whom good is done always love," though the latter is false.

Note 810

Pittacus: See II 12 1389^{a}15n.

Legislated greater punishments for someone who commits an error while drunk: "Pittacus too crafted laws but not a constitution. A law special to him requires drunken people to be punished more severely for making a misstep than sober ones. For because more people commit acts of wanton aggression when drunk than when sober, Pittacus looked not to the fact that greater enjoyment should be shown to those who are drunk but to what is advantageous" (*Pol.* II 12 1274^{b}18–23). His treatment of drunken offenses is also alluded to at *NE* III 5 1113^{b}30–33.

Note 811

Those that proceed through induction based on what is like: See Introduction, pp. xliv–lii.

Note 812

For otherwise it would not hold for the most part, and would not be a likelihood, but would hold always and necessarily: Reading οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν <ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ> καὶ εἰκός ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον with Kassel for OCT οὐ γὰρ ἂν ᾖ ἅμ᾽ ἀεὶ εἰκός, ἀεὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον.

{314} Note 813

"The best consideration": See I 15 1357[a]30n.

Note 814

If the objection holds to a higher degree for the most part: And so is more probable than the statement to which it is an objection.

Note 815

An objection of this sort can be brought in two ways: either by the time or by the things at issue: The thing at issue is what the defendant is charged with, for example, assault while intoxicated. If I show that he has committed this same offense repeatedly in the past I show "by the time" that he is more likely than not to have done it this time. If I show that he has committed other violent acts while intoxicated, I show "by the things at issue" that he is more likely to have committed this one.

But in the most controlling way: See I 1 1355[a]7n.

For if things are more often thus, this is more likely: Rejecting with Kassel the OCT addition of πλείω καὶ before πλεονάκις.

Note 816

In the first discussions: See I 2 1357[b]10–14, 17–21.

Note 817

That every sign is non-deductive is clear to us from the *Analytics*: See, for example, *APr*. II 27.

Note 818

But if more cases or more occasions are that way: Reading εἰ καὶ τὰ πλείω ἢ πλεονάκις ἄλλως, ἐάν δὲ τὰ πλείω καὶ τὰ πλεονάκις οὕτω with the mss. and the scholiast for OCT ἐάν τε καὶ τὰ πλείω καὶ τὰ πλεονάκις οὕτω. Kassel reads: εἰ καὶ τὰ πλείω ἢ πλεονάκις [ἄλλως, ἐάν τε καὶ τὰ πλείω καὶ τὰ πλεονάκις] οὕτω, <ἐάν τε μή>, μαχετέον ("even though more cases on more occasions are positive"). Another proposal (attributed to Striker in Allen, p.79) is this: εἰ καὶ τὰ πλείω ἢ πλεονάκις, ἄλλως· ἐάν τε καὶ τὰ πλείω καὶ τὰ πλεονάκις οὕτω, μαχετέον ("if more cases on more occasions [are not so, there is a refutation] in another way; but if more cases on more occasions are that way . . ."). It is important to note that it is the refutation of enthymemes based on paradigms, not enthymemes based on likelihoods that is being discussed. For discussion of the latter, we have to wait till II 25 1403[b]33–1403[a]1. See Introduction, pp. lxxvii–lxxxiii.

Note 819

Proofs, though, and enthymemes based on proofs cannot be refuted as non-deductive (and this too is clear to us from the *Analytics*): See, again, *APr.* II 27.

Note 820

If it is evident that it both holds and that there is a proof of it, the argument at once becomes irrefutable, since the entirety of it becomes at once an evident demonstration: What holds is the thing claimed, and what establishes it is the {315} proof. If both those are evident, then so is the enthymeme demonstrating one from the other.

Note 821

Amplifying and diminishing are not elements of enthymemes: For elements are topics, and amplifying and diminishing, as involved in topics belonging to different kinds of rhetoric, do not themselves constitute a distinct topic. See I 19 $1393^{a}9$–19.

Note 822

I mean the same thing by element and topic: Also II 22 $1396^{b}20$.

Note 823

Amplifying and diminishing are related to showing that something is great or small: Secluding ἐνθυμήματα with Kassel and Grimaldi; if we retain it with OCT and the mss. we have: "Amplifying and diminishing are enthymemes related to showing that something is great or small."

Note 824

Nor are refutative enthymemes some one species of enthymemes: See II 22 $1396^{b}22$–23n. This is followed in some mss. by ἄλλο τῶν κατασκευαστικῶν ("distinct from the ones that establish"). OCT secludes; Kassel does not read.

Note 825

This is not a differentiating feature, since they both use the same [topics]: An enthymeme or deduction D is used to show X. X may be either (1) the thing at issue or (2) its opposite. Therefore, the difference between (1) and (2) is not a differentia (that is, the sort of difference that distinguishes species of enthymemes or deductions from each other), since an argument of the same form as D can be used for (1) and for (2).

Note 826

As in the *Topics*: See II 25 $1402^{a}36$n.

Note 827

The thought (*tên dianoian*): *Dianoia* is often contrasted with the body (*Pol.* II 9 1270^{b}40, VII 16 1335^{b}16), making "mind" seem a natural translation of it. But unlike the mind, which includes perception, imagination, belief, knowledge, desire, virtues of character, and other such things, *dianoia* is contrasted with each of these. It is not perception, because all animals have that, whereas "the majority of animals do not have *dianoia*" (*DA* I 5 410^{b}24). It is not imagination, because, as we might put it, *dianoia* is propositional, or operates on things that can be true or false, affirmed or denied (*Pol.* II 11 1273^{a}22), whereas imagination is a representational state that is more like perception, more "imagistic." Thus "what affirmation and denial are in the case of thought, that, in the case of desire, is precisely what pursuit and avoidance are" (*NE* VI 2 1139^{a}21–22). Unlike belief and knowledge, however, "thought is in fact not yet affirmation" (VI 9 1142^{b}12–13), making it natural to think of it, or some of it anyway, as the process of reasoning that can culminate in a belief or an affirmed proposition (*Pol.* IV 15 1299^{a}30 and {316} V 8 1307^{b}35 are nice examples). And this is further evidenced by the fact that the virtues of thought, which are theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom (*NE* I 13 1103^{a}4–6), are (respectively) those of the scientific sub-part and the rationally calculative sub-part, of the part of the soul that has reason (VI 1 1139^{a}5–12). At the same time, the fact that scientific knowledge includes both demonstrative reasoning and a grasp of scientific starting-points by the understanding implies that not all thinking need be in any sense inferential, since understanding is non-inferential—a grasping of something rather than something process-like (*Pol.* VII 13 1325^{b}20 is a good example). *Dianoia* is not desire, because, while desire can cause animal movement, without thought, as it does in the case of non-rational animals, "thought by itself . . . moves nothing" (*NE* VI 2 1139^{a}35–36). As a result, it is not character (*Pol.* VIII 2 1337^{a}38–39), since the latter, as involving desire, is cultivated by habituation, whereas *dianoia* is cultivated by teaching (*NE* II 1 1103^{a}14–18)—hence the common contrast between thought and character (*Pol.* III 11 1281^{b}7).

It the *Poetics*, where it is included with *lexis* ("style") among the six elements of tragedy, *dianoia* is defined as "the capacity of saying whatever is possible and appropriate, which is its function in the case of political speeches and rhetoric" (6 1450^{b}4–6), and described as "that by which

people demonstrate that something is or is not, or make some universal statement" (1450^{b}11–12). "As for *dianoia*," Aristotle says in Chapter 19, "what is said about it in the *Rhetoric* should be assumed, since it is special rather to that methodical inquiry" (1456^{a}34–36). He is explicit, moreover, that "all [the effects] that have to be produced by speech fall under *dianoia*. The parts of these are, demonstration and refutation, the production of feelings (for example, pity, fear, anger, and whatever is of this sort), and again, greatness and smallness [of things]" (1456^{a}36–^{b}2).

Likewise here *hê dianoia* is the thought that finds expression in the paradigm, maxim, enthymeme, or whatever it is that serves as the truth-evaluable argument either for or against the thing at issue—a thought that might be expressed, however, in another style or in words arranged in a different way. The difference is well captured in the opening of Plato's *Apology*: "[*Socrates*] I don't know, men of Athens, how you were affected by my accusers. As for me, I was almost carried away by them, they spoke so persuasively. And yet almost nothing they said is true. Among their many falsehoods, however, one especially amazed me: that you must be careful not to be deceived by me, since I'm a dangerously clever speaker. That they aren't ashamed at being immediately refuted by the facts, once it becomes apparent that I'm not a clever speaker at all, that seems to me most shameless of them. Unless, of course, the one they call 'clever' is the one who tells the truth. If that's what they mean, I'd agree that I'm an orator—although not one of their sort. No, indeed. Rather, just as I claimed, they have said little or nothing true, whereas from me you'll hear the whole truth. But not, by Zeus, men of Athens, expressed in elegant language like theirs, arranged in fine words and phrases. Instead, what you hear will be spoken extemporaneously in whatever words come to mind, and let none of you expect me to do otherwise—for I put my trust in the justice of what I say" (17a–c).

{317} Note 828

Since, though, there are three things that should be examined in a systematic way where a speech is concerned. . . . It remains to go through style and arrangement: This paragraph is repeated in an expanded form at the beginning of III 1, suggesting that it may have been added to make a connection to a body of material on style and arrangement not intended to be part of the treatise as originally conceived.

Book III

Note 829

The means of persuasion have already been spoken about: See I 2 1356^{a}1–20.

Note 830

All judges: Omitting with Kassel OCT's comma before πείθονται πάντες.

Note 831

For on the one hand there are special topics (*eidos*) **for enthymemes and on the other [general] topics:** See I 2 1358^{a}10–35.

Note 832

Things having to do with delivery (*ta peri tên hupokrisin*): *Hupokrisis* is the Greek word for "acting," so that a *hupokritês* is an "actor." The verb *hupokrinesthai* is used with this meaning in the next sentence (III 1 1403^{b}23). Beyond declamation proper, then, *hupokrisis* also includes body language, gesture, and expression.

Note 833

Poetics: See I 11 1372^{a}2n.

Glaucon of Teos: Probably the rhapsode of the same name mentioned in *Po*. 25 1461^{b}1 and Plato, *Ion* 530d. Teos is an Ionian city on the coast of Asia Minor.

Note 834

Harmony (*harmonia*): *Harmonia* is used to refer to music generally, as consisting of orderly melodic relationships, and as a name for the octave, the analysis of which reveals all the other relations on which melody is based. The *harmoniai* are the melodic counterparts to the rhythms: "The name for order in movement is 'rhythm,' and, again, the order belonging to the voice, when high and low are mixed together, is given the name 'harmony'" (Plato, *Lg*. 665a).

Note 835

So it is too in political debates, due to the depravity of the citizens: Compare: "But since the theater audience is twofold, one free and well-educated, the other vulgar, composed of vulgar people, hired laborers, and other people of that sort, the latter too must be provided with competitions and spectacles with a view to relaxation. For just as their souls are distorted from the natural state, so too there are harmonies

that are deviations and melodies that are strained and involve {318} excessive expressive effects, and what produces pleasure for each person is what is akin to his nature. That is why authorization to use a certain sort of music of this kind (*genos*) should be given to those who compete before a theater audience of this sort" (*Pol.* VIII 7 1342^{a}18–28).

Political debates: Whether deliberative ones before the assembly of citizens or judicial ones in court.

Due to the depravity of the citizens: Reading πολιτῶν with OCT (see τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηρίαν at III 2 1404^{a}8) for Kassel and the mss. πολιτειῶν ("constitutions").

Note 836

[The craft concerned with style] seems to be something vulgar, when correctly (*kalôs*) **considered:** Compare: "About each of these [kinds of wealth acquisition] we have now spoken in universal terms. And whereas an exact accounting of each particular one might be useful for putting them into practice, it would be vulgar (*phortikon*) to spend one's time on it" (*Pol.* I 1258^{b}33–35).

Vulgar (*phortikon*): The opposite of noble (I 3 1358^{b}25n) and free (I 5 1361^{a}16n). As with *banausos* (I 9 1367^{a}32n), an exact English equivalent is hard to find.

Note 837

The whole business of rhetoric is related to belief: See I 1 1254^{a}1–3.

One should pay the requisite attention to delivery, not because it is something just (*ouch hôs orthôs echontos*), **but because it is something compulsory** (*anagkaiou*): As the contrast with compulsory or necessary (*NE* III 8 1116^{b}2–4) and the reference to justice in the next sentence make clear, *orthôs* means "justly" or "rightly" here, not, as often, "correctly."

Note 838

It is just to contend by means of the things at issue themselves, so that other things, which are outside the demonstration, are superfluous: See I 1 1354^{a}11–16. Compare: "Reputation aside, gentlemen, it doesn't seem just to me to entreat the jury—nor to be acquitted by entreating it—but rather to inform it and persuade it. After all, a juror doesn't sit in order to grant justice as a favor, but to decide where justice lies. And he has sworn on oath not that he'll favor

whomever he pleases, but that he'll judge according to law. We shouldn't accustom you to breaking your oath, then, nor should you become accustomed to doing so—neither of us would be doing something holy if we did. Hence don't expect me, men of Athens, to act toward you in ways I consider to be neither noble, nor just, nor pious—most especially, by Zeus, when I'm being prosecuted for *impiety* by Meletus here. You see, if I tried to persuade and to force you by entreaties, after you've sworn an oath, I clearly would be teaching you not to believe in the existence of gods, and my defense would literally convict me of not acknowledging gods. But that's far from being the case: I do acknowledge them, men of Athens, as none of my accusers does. I turn it over to you and to the god to judge me in whatever way will be best for me and for yourselves" (Plato, *Ap*. 35c–d).

{319} Note 839

Delivery's capacity is great, as has been said, because of the depravity of the listener: See III 1 1403^{b}21, 31–35, 14 1415^{b}4-6, 18 1419^{a}18.

Note 840

Teaching (*didaskalia[i]*): See I 1 1355^{a}26n.

Note 841

Although not so great a one (*tosouton*): That is, not as great as it is taken to be by earlier theorists of rhetoric and others.

Appearance (*phantasia*): See I 11 1370^{a}28n.

Note 842

Thrasymachus: See II 23 1400^{b}20n.

In his *Appeals to Pity* (*Eleois*): No one is better than "the mighty Chalcedonian" (= Thrasymachus) we learn in the *Phaedrus*, at "the art of making speeches bewailing the evils of poverty and old age" (267c7–9).

Note 843

[1] What concerns delivery (*hupokritikon*) **is a natural thing, and largely outside the province of craft, while [2] what concerns style is within the province of craft:** The contrast between [1] and [2] is usually (for example, by Cope) taken to regard the craft of delivery in comparison to acting (*hupokritikon* can also refer to the actor's art or craft). But it is better taken as being between [2] the craft-relevant aspects of style and [1] the craft-irrelevant one of delivery. The idea is that the former can substitute for the latter and achieve the same results.

Outside the province of craft . . . within the province of craft: See I 2 1355^{b}35–39 and, on craft, I 1 1354^{a}11n.

Note 844

Thought: See II 26 1403^{b}1n.

Note 845

It was naturally the poets, then, who first got it going: That is, the craft concerned with delivery.

Note 846

Names are imitations (*mimêmata*): "A name is a vocal imitation (*mimêma phônê[i]*) of what it imitates, and . . . someone who imitates something with his voice names what he imitates" (Plato, *Crat.* 423b). Aristotle's own view, however, is quite different: "A name is a voiced sound significant by convention, without [a reference to] time, none of whose parts is significant when separated . . . I say by convention because no name is a name by nature but only when it has become a symbol. Even inarticulate sounds—for example, those of beasts—do indeed make something clear, yet none of them is a name" (*Int.* 2 16^{a}18–29). Nonetheless, even though names considered solely as semantic units are not imitative, names {320} *as delivered in a certain way*, presumably are. And it is these that are under discussion. That is why the voice can be characterized as "most imitative." Compare the following: "[Socrates] As for the other [bad] sort of speaker, the more inferior he is, the more willing he will be to narrate anything and to consider nothing beneath him. Hence he will undertake to imitate, before a large audience and in a serious way, all the things we just mentioned: thunder and the sounds of winds, hail, axles, and pulleys; trumpets, flutes, pipes, and all the other instruments; and even the cries of dogs, sheep, and birds. And his style will consist entirely of imitation in voice and gesture, won't it, with possibly a small bit of plain narration thrown in?" (Plato, *Rep.* 397a–b).

Names (*onomata*): An *onoma* is not always what we call a name, but a word more generally, or—when contrasted with a verb (as at III 2 1404^{b}5)—a noun.

Voice (*phônê*): Aristotle sometimes distinguishes *phonos* ("sound in general") from the *phônê* ("cry" or "voiced sound") of an animate being —"*Phônê* is a sort of sound, one belonging to something animate" (*DA* II 8 420^{b}5–6)—and sometimes distinguishes *phônê* from *logos* ("rational speech," "language"): "A *phônê* is a signifier of what is pleasant or painful,

which is why it is also possessed by the other animals (for their nature goes this far: they not only perceive what is pleasant or painful but also signify them to each other). But a *logos* is for making clear what is beneficial or harmful, and hence also what is just or unjust" (*Pol.* I 2 1253^{a}10–15). Here, however, he seems to be thinking of voice as on a par with animal cries—expressive rather than significant.

Note 847

Rhapsodizing (*rhapsô[i]dia*): A *rhapsôdos* ("rhapsode") is a professional reciter of Homeric epic and an expert interpreter of Homer's poetry. See Plato, *Ion* 533b–535a.

Delivery (*hupokritikê*): See III 1 1403^{b}22n.

Note 848

Gorgias: A famous orator and sophist (c. 483–376 BC) from Leontini in southeastern Sicily, who visited Athens in 427. See DK B82 = TEGP pp. 725–787.

Note 849

Such people discuss things (*dialegesthai*) **in the most nobly beautiful way:** The verb *dialegesthai* is often used to refer to specifically dialectical discussions.

Note 850

Speech: Or "prose."

Note 851

And the ones with which the first poets ornamented their verses: Rejecting the OCT seclusion of δ' with Kassel. On iambic's affinity to everyday speech, see *Po.* 4 1449^{a}24–28.

Note 852

Style in general is spoken about in the *Poetics*: See *Po.* 20–22.

{321} Note 853

Let virtue of a style be to be perspicuous (for speech is a sort of sign and if it does not make things clear it will not perform its function), and neither low nor too elevated, but appropriate: "Virtue of style is to be perspicuous and not low. And the most perspicuous is that composed of the prevalent names, but it is low" (*Po.* 22 1458^{a}18–20).

Virtue: See I 1 1355^{b}5n.

Perspicuous (*saphê*): *Saphêneia* is associated with explanation, which is ultimately from starting-points: "Beginning with things that are truly

stated but not perspicuously, we proceed to make them perspicuous as well. . . . That is why even politicians should not regard as peripheral to their work the sort of theoretical knowledge that makes evident (*phaneron*) not only the fact that but also the explanation why" (*EE* I 6 $1216^{b}32$–39). The same point is made at *NE* I 7 $1098^{b}7$–8 by noting that when we have a correct definition of the starting-point of politics much else will "at the same time become evident (*sumphanê*) through it." *Saphês* and *akribês* ("exact") are often equivalent in meaning (*Top.* II 4 $111^{a}8$–9). On exactness, see I 1 $1355^{a}25$n.

Function: See I 1 $1354^{a}11$n.

Neither low (*tapeinê*) **nor too elevated** (*huper to axiôma*), **but appropriate** (*prepousan*): *Tapeinos* is at one extreme, being *huper to axiôma* at the other, and being *prepon* in the middle. A *prepon* style is contrasted with a poetic style and with *kosmein* ("being ornamented"). The scale then seems to be one determined by *to axiôma* and to have to do with ornamentation. Thus a style is low if it consists entirely of prevalent names (*Po.* 22 $1458^{a}18$–20). This suggests that *to axiôma* is not the "worth" or "value" of the thing at issue, but that of the audience. One should not—the advice is—speak entirely in its language, which, though maximally perspicuous, would make one's speech "low," which is one meaning of *tapeinos* ("humble," "abject," "poor" are others), but neither should one ornament it to the extent that poets do. Instead, bearing one's audience's speech habits in mind, one should ornament it just to the extent needed to keep them interested in, and focused on, one's (ideally) perspicuous argument. Speaking *huper to axiôma*, then, is speaking in a style that is too elevated or lofty for one's audience, given the language they ordinarily use. Thus the two virtues of style that are based on function of speech, namely, being perspicuous and appropriate, are finally reduced to the virtues of being perspicuous and appropriately elevated, that is, appropriately ornamented or "unfamiliar." However, only the pair low-elevated is analyzed in terms of a scale. That means that perspicuity —even the same sort of perspicuity—is to be present both in the case of a low and in the case of an ornamented speech. It is only the excess of ornament or unfamiliarity that undermines perspicuousness.

Note 854

In the case of nouns and verbs it is the prevalent ones (*ta kuria*) **that make a speech perspicuous:** "By prevalent noun (*kurion*) I mean

one a given group would use, and by exotic one that others would. So it is evident that the same name can be both prevalent and exotic, although not for the same groups" (*Po.* 21 1457^{b}3–5).

{322} **Nouns** (*onomatôn*) **and verbs** (*rhêmatôn*): "A noun or name is a composite significant voiced sound, without [a reference to] time, the parts of which are not intrinsically significant. . . . A verb is a composite significant voiced sound, involving [a reference to] time, the parts of which are not intrinsically significant" (*Po.* 20 1457^{a}10–15).

The other names spoken about in the *Poetics*: At *Po.* 21–22.

To deviate from [the prevalent words] gives it an appearance of greater dignity: "The style becomes dignified and out of the ordinary by the use of special or novel words, and by novel I mean exotic, metaphorical, lengthened, and everything beyond the prevalent" (*Po.* 22 1458^{a}21–23).

Note 855

An air of unfamiliarity (*xenên*): *Xenos* also means "strange" or "foreign." At III 2 1404^{b}28 unfamiliar words are called *glôttai* ("exotic names"), which is the term used in the *Poetics*.

Note 856

Now in poetry of all sorts there are many ways . . . or if it were used about very minor things: Reading ποεῖ τοῦτο with Kassel and Cope for OCT ποιεῖται οὕτω, and ἐλάττοσιν for OCT's ἐλάττω. Kassel proposes a different structure of clauses but without impact on the meaning.

Note 857

Of lowering (*episustellomenon*) **or elevating** (*auxomenon*): *Auxanein*, which usually means "grow" or "increase" and—in rhetorical contexts—"exaggerate," is here contrasted with *episustellomenon*, which means to make one's style lower by using only words commonly used by the audience.

Note 858

Spiked wines (*tous oinous tous memigmenous*): Wines whose alcohol content is disguised in order to intoxicate the drinker and take advantage of him. Similarly, by concealing the use of rhetorical means, rather than advertising them by using an artificial style, a speaker allays an audience's suspicions about his intentions and character, making the speech more persuasive.

Note 859

Theodorus: A famous fourth-cent tragic actor. "He said that he never allowed anyone else, not even an incompetent actor, to enter a scene before him, because audiences become accustomed to the voice they hear first" (*Pol.* VII 17 1336^{b}29–31).

Note 860

The kinds of names are those theoretically grasped in the *Poetics*: "Every name or word is either prevalent (*kurion*), exotic, a metaphor, an ornament, a neologism, lengthened, shortened, or altered" (*Po.* 21 1457^{b}1–3).

Exotic names (*glôttais*): *Glôttai* are words that require a glossary entry.

Double ones (*diplois*): "Nouns are of two kinds (*eidos*): simple (and by simple I mean not composed of significant parts—for example, 'earth'), and composite; {323} and in the latter case it may be composed of a significant and a non-significant one (except not significant and non-significant *in the name*) [since a name has no intrinsically significant parts], or of two significant ones. And it is possible also to have triple, quadruple, and higher composite names" (*Po.* 21 1457^{a}31–34).

[Where exotic names should be used] we shall say later: In III 3, 7.

Note 861

In proper form (*to oikeion*): That is, names that are neither lengthened nor shortened, but have the letters and syllables that properly belong to their prevalent forms: "As for lengthened or shortened names, the former is one that uses a longer vowel that one that properly belongs to it (*tou oikeiou*), or an inserted syllable, while the latter is one some part of which has been shortened. A lengthened name is, for example, *polêos* for *poleôs* ["of the city"] and *Pêlêiadeô* for *Pêleidou* ["son of Peleus"]; a shortened name is, for example, *kri* [for *krithê* ("barley")] or *dô* [for *dôma* ("house")]" (*Po.* 21 1457^{b}35–1458^{a}5).

Metaphor (*metaphora*): "Metaphor is the application to something of a name belonging to something else (*allotriou*), either from genus to species, species to genus, species to species, or by analogy" (*Po.* 21 1457^{b}6–9).

Note 862

This, we said, is the virtue of rhetorical speech: At III 2 1404^{b}1–5, though not in precisely these words.

Note 863

The sorts of names that are useful to a sophist, by contrast, are homonyms (for it is through these that he argues unfairly (*kakourgei*)**):** *Kakourgia* is "malice" (for example, at II 12 1389^{b}8) and *kakourgein* usually means "to do evil." But here the latter has the narrower sense of "argues in an unfair or fraudulent way," as at Plato, *Grg*. 489b4.

Sophist: See I 1 1355^{b}20n.

Homonyms . . . synonyms: "Things are said to be *homonymous* when they have only a name in common, but the account of the substance [= essence] that corresponds to the name is distinct—for example, both a human and a picture are animals. These have only a name in common and the account of the essence corresponding to the name is distinct. For if we are to say what-it-is for each of them to be an animal, we will give a special account to each. Things are said to be *synonymous* when they have a name in common and when the account of the essence that corresponds to the name is the same—for example, both a human and an ox are animals. Each of these is called by a common name 'animal,' and the account of the essence is also the same, since if we are to give the account of what-it-is for each of them to be an animal, we will give the same account" (*Cat*. 1 1^{a}1–12). The terms may not have precisely this technical meaning here.

Note 864

Has been stated, as was said before, in the *Poetics*: At III 2 1404^{b}28.

{324} Note 865

Perspicuity plus pleasantness plus an air of unfamiliarity are most of all possessed by metaphor: The idea is not that metaphors most of all possess each one of these virtues, since perspicuity is par excellence achieved by means of a low speech. But metaphors are taken to most of all possess the combination of these three features.

[The use of] metaphor cannot be acquired from anyone else: "The use of metaphorical names is by far the most important thing. For it alone cannot be acquired [that is, learned] from anyone else and is a sign of good natural cleverness (*euphuias*). For to use metaphors well is to see (*theôrein*) similarity" (*Po*. 22 1459^{a}5–8). Thus, if a speaker uses metaphors well, he will, among other things, seem to speak in a natural rather than an artificial way (III 2 1404^{b}19). On *euphuia*—sometimes translated as

"genius" in this context—see I 6 1362^{b}24n. The pleasant character of metaphor has to do both with its leading to knowledge and with its wonder-producing unfamiliarity.

Note 866

Epithets (*epitheta*): See II 24 1405^{b}20–34.

Note 867

This [fittingness] will be based on analogy (*ek tou analogon*): "By analogy I mean when the second is to the first as the fourth is to the third [b : a : : d : c]. For one can then say the fourth [d] in place of the second [b], and the second [b] in place of the fourth [d]" (*Po.* 21 1457^{b}16–19). Examples are given in *Rh.* III 4 1406^{b}27–1407^{a}18, 10 1411^{a}1–^{b}21.

Contraries are most evident when set side by side: Compare II 23 1400^{b}26–29.

Note 868

One should look to see what is appropriate to an old man as a red cloak is to a young one: This is an example of looking for the analogy or proportion: red cloak: young man : : X : old man—what is X?

Note 869

If one wishes to honor (*kosmein*): *Kosmein* here does not mean to "ornament" one's language (as at III 2 1404^{b}7), but to "praise" or "honor" (another meaning of *kosmein*) the subject of one's speech.

Note 870

I mean, for example, since they are contraries in the same genus: "Said to be contraries are: Those things differing in genus that cannot belong to the same thing at the same time. The most different of the things in the same genus. The most different of the things in the same recipient. The most different of the things falling under the same capacity. The things whose difference is greatest either unconditionally or in genus or in species" (*Met.* V 1018^{a}25–31; also X 4 1055^{b}13–17). Thus if F and G are contraries and being F is a very good or honorable thing, being G will be a very bad or blameworthy thing.

Saying of the one who begs that he "prays," or of the one who prays that he "begs," because both are sorts of solicitation: Thus within the genus of {325} solicitation, praying is at the very good extreme, and begging, as its contrary, at the very bad one.

Note 871

As also is when Iphicrates called Callias a "begging priest" (*mêtragurtên*) **instead of a "torchbearer":** Callias, the son of Hipponicus, was one of the richest men in Greece, and a patron of the sophists. Both Plato's *Protagoras* and Xenophon's *Symposium* are set in his house. He was hereditary torchbearer (leader of the procession from Athens to Eleusis) of the Eleusinian Mysteries—on which, see II 24 1401[a]15n. The self-made Iphicrates (I 7 1365[a]28–29n) insults him by assigning him the much lesser role of a begging priest, a role associated with women in the service of Cybele, the mother goddess (whence *mêtra-agurtês*). Callias responds that only an ignorant person, not initiated into the Mysteries, would make so stupid a mistake.

Note 872

"Flatterers of Dionysus": Actors are taken to be devoted to the god Dionysus, as his flatterers by those who disparage them and as skilled in his service by the actors themselves.

Note 873

These epithets are both metaphors: Specifically, metaphors by analogy: "actors : Dionysus : : flatterers : X" and "actors : Dionysus : : artists : Y."

Note 874

Pirates call themselves "purveyors" (*poristas*) **nowadays—which is why one can say that . . . a thief either "received"** (*labein*) **or "carried away"** (*porthêsai*): Reading πορθῆσαι ("carried off") with Kassel and the mss. for OCT πορίσασθαι ("found"). *Labein* can also mean "took," but here it is intended to be a euphemism for "stole." Similarly *porthein* (*porthêsai* is the aorist infinite active) can mean "destroy," "ravage," "rob," "plunder," but also, as is surely intended here, the more neutral and euphemistic "carried away as part of the (legitimate) spoils (for example, of war)." The OCT "found" makes the thought clearer.

Note 875

Euripides' *Telephus*: Telephus was a son of Heracles.

"Holding sway over the oar and landing in Mysia": Fr. 705 Nauck.

Concealment: See II 24 1404[b]24–25.

Note 876

Dionysius the Brazen: An early fifth-cent poet and rhetorician, so called because he first introduced bronze money into Athens. See Athenaeus XV 669.

Calliope: The muse of epic poetry.

The metaphor, by [using] meaningless voiced sounds, is bad: Reading ταῖς ἀσήμοις φωναῖς with Kassel; OCT obelizes as corrupt. A screech is a meaningless voiced sound, a poem a meaningful one, so they do not both belong to the same genus, as is required for a good metaphor. See II 24 1405^{a}15, 1404^{a}22n.

{326} Note 877

The author of the riddle called the application of the cupping instrument "gluing": The riddle is: I saw a man gluing bronze onto a man using fire. What did I see? Answer: You saw a doctor cupping his patient with a bronze cup, heated in a fire, that draws out blood or other fluids as it cools.

Note 878

Metaphors imply riddles (*ainittontai*): A metaphor by analogy is of the form b : a : : d : c, so it implies the riddle: What is to d as a is to b? See II 24 1405^{a}11n.

It is clear that the metaphorical transfer will be a good one (*eu metenênektai*): That is, the transfer from the riddle to the metaphor.

Note 879

Licymnius: A dithyrambic poet and rhetorician from the island of Chios, and teacher of Polus (Plato, *Phdr*. 267c). See also III 13 1414^{b}17–18.

Note 880

Shameful language (*aischrologein*): "The legislator should in general banish shameful language from the city, as he would any other shameful thing, since by speaking lightly of whatever is shameful one comes closer to doing it. He should above all banish it from among children, so that they neither say nor hear anything of this sort. If, however, anyone is found saying or doing something forbidden, and is a free man who is not yet old enough to have been given a seat at the communal messes, he should be punished with loss of honors or with blows, whereas, if he is older than this, he should be punished with those dishonors usually reserved for the unfree, because he has acted in a manner characteristic of slaves" (*Pol*. VII 17 1336^{b}3–12).

Bryson: An early fourth-cent sophist from Heraclea Pontica on the coast of Bithynia in Asia Minor. He is mentioned at *APo*. I 9 75^{b}40 and

SE 11 171^{b}16, 172^{a}3 in connection with a fallacious method of squaring the circle.

Note 881

Setting the thing at issue before the eyes: See III 11 1411^{b}22–1412^{a}10.

Note 882

The nobly beautiful either in voiced sound or in capacity: The voiced sound is that made by speaking a name or word and its capacity—as at *Met*. X 1 1052^{b}7—is that of the name to apply to, and so to signify, various things. Notice the contrast at II 24 1405^{b}7 between voiced sound and signification.

Note 883

"Rosy-fingered dawn": Often found in Homer.

Note 884

In the case of epithets (*epithetois*) **too, the application** (*epithesis*) **is made from what is bad or shameful, for example, "mother-slayer," and from what is better, for example, "father-avenger":** The reference is to Orestes, who in killing Clytemnestra became at once a mother-slayer and a father-avenger. As a result both terms may be applied to him. Epithets, then, are sometimes like metaphors, because they {327} are transferred from something (in this case an action) to something (in this case a person), and can achieve different effects, depending, as in the case of metaphors (II 24 1405^{a}15–16)—hence the "too"—on whether what they are transferred from is good or bad. But, as III 3 1406^{a}18–19 suggests, their main feature is that they are like seasonings not like main courses.

Note 885

Simonides: See I 6 1363^{a}15n.

"Hail daughters of storm-footed mares": Fr. 10 Page = Fr. 515 Campbell.

And yet they were daughters of the asses too: Simonides focuses on their "bad" fathers in calling them "half-asses" and on their "good" mothers in calling the "daughters of storm-footed mares."

Note 886

The use of diminutives, though, is what makes: Reading ὅς with Kassel for OCT ὅ.

Aristophanes: The famous Athenian comic playwright (c. 455–c. 386 BC).

The *Babylonians*: Only fragments have survived. Fr. 90 Kock (= Edmonds v. I, p. 597).

And "disease-let" instead of "disease": Reading καὶ ἀντὶ νοσήματος ("instead of disease") with OCT; Kassel omits.

Note 887

Frozen effects (*ta psuchra*), **on the other hand:** Inflated, stilted, bombastic phraseology that leaves the audience cold. Thus *psychra* refers to the effect of that sort of language on the audience, not a quality of the language itself. III 2 analyses the virtues of style, III 3 its defects or vices.

Double names: See III 2 1404^{b}29n.

Lycophron: The expressions attributed to him here and at III 3 1406^{a}7–9 suggest that he was a follower or imitator of Gorgias. He is also mentioned at *SE* 15 174^{b}32–33, *Ph.* I 2 185^{b}27–28 and *Pol.* III 9 1280^{b}10.

Gorgias: See III 1 1404^{a}26n.

"Oath-breaking and oath-keeping beggar-mused-flatterers": DK B15 = TEGP 55 F14. Reading ἐπιορκήσαντας καὶ κατευορκήσαντας with Kassel for OCT ἐπιορκήσαντας κατ᾽εὐορκήσαντος ("oath-breaking beggar-mused-flatterers against someone oath-keeping").

Alcidamas: A fourth-cent rhetorician and sophist from Elaea in Aeolis, who studied with Gorgias and taught in Athens. Famous for his comment on slavery: "God set all people free; nature has made no one a slave" (*CAG* XXI: 2, p. 74, 31–32 = Gagarin & Woodruff, p. 276).

Note 888

Exotic names: See III 2 1404^{b}28n.

Xerxes: See II 20 1393^{b}2n.

A "*pelôron* man": *Pelôron* is an archaic—and so in the relevant sense exotic—name, meaning something huge and, hence, approriate for a monster (*pelôr*).

Sciron a "*sinis* man": Both Sciron and Sinis were famous robbers. *Sinis* is also an exotic word meaning "destroying."

{328} Note 889

Epithets: See III 2 1405^{b}20n.

Note 890

It puts it to the test (*exelegchei*) **and makes it plain that it is a poetic production** (*poiêsis*): The verb *exelegchein* means "convict," "confute," and "refute," and is used in this sense at II 23 $1398^{a}12$. Here though it seems to have another of its meanings, which is "put to the test." In doing so it violates the requirement of concealment (III 2 $1404^{b}18$). Hence *poiêsis* here has more the meaning of a poetic production or creation.

Note 891

Epithets must of course be used to some extent: Reading αὐτῇ with Cope for OCT αὐτοῖς. Kassel reads αὐτῷ.

They deviate from what is customary and give the style an air of unfamiliarity: See III 2 $1404^{b}5$–11.

Note 892

Babbling (*adoleschian*): *Adoleschia* in a more technical sense is unending repetition of the same thing. See *SE* 3 $165^{b}15$–17, 13 $173^{a}31$–$^{b}16$, 31 $181^{b}25$–$182^{a}6$. But in this sense too it is associated with lack of perspicuousness. See *Top*. V 2 $130^{a}33$–34.

Note 893

Dithyrambic poets: A dithyramb is a hymn to the god Dionysus (Bacchus), and shared in the frenzy that characterized his worship. On the effects of such poetry, see *Pol*. VIII 7 $1342^{a}1$–11.

Metaphor to iambic poets (for they [tragic poets] now use iambics, as was said): Reading ἡ δὲ μεταφορὰ τοῖς ἰαμβείοις (τούτοις γὰρ νῦν χρῶνται, ὥσπερ εἴρηται) with OCT; Kassel secludes. At *Po*. 24 $1459^{b}35$–36, it is epic—not iambic—poetry that is most receptive of metaphors.

As was said: At III 1 $1404^{a}31$–33.

Note 894

Gorgias' [1] "things green and bloodless," or [2] "you have shamefully sown and badly reaped" (for these are overly poetic): DK B16 = TEGP 56. In [1] *Chlôra* literally means "pale green," or "yellowish-green" and is metaphorically extended, without reference to color, to unripe wood, fresh fish, and so on, and non-literally, though with reference to color, to pale people. The combination with *aniama* —"bloodless," "shedding no blood"—makes the whole lack perspicuousness. Are the things fresh or dead (drained of blood) or pale and anemic? In [2] we have a metaphorical transfer from literal sowing

and reaping to (presumably) a man shamefully impregnating a woman and fathering an illegitimate child. A stale metaphor, no doubt, but perspicuous enough and hardly far-fetched—an Athenian father gave his daughter in marriage with the words: "I give you this woman for the plowing of legitimate children." It may be, though, that Aristotle's objection to [1] and [2] is to the metaphors and to the rhyming words in which {329} they are expressed: [1] *chlôra kai anaima ta pragmata*; [2] *su de tauta aischrôs men espeiras kakôs de etherisas*.

Note 895

Alcidamas called philosophy [1] "a fortress (*epiteichisma*) **against the law," and [2] the *Odyssey* "a nobly beautiful mirror** (*kalon katoptron*) **of human life" and [3] "introducing no such toys** (*athurma*) **to poetry" (for all these are unpersuasive because of what was stated):** Aristotle's specific objections to [1–3] are not identified, but are perhaps these: [1] Philosophy is not an *epiteichisma*, which is always an offensive fortification against something, since it can just as well be a defense of the law as an attack on it. So by reaching for an exotic or unusual term to increase the dignity of the phrase, Alcidamas has sinned against perspicuousness. [2] The *Odyssey* cannot be at once *kalon* and a *katoptron*, since a mirror reflects what is in front of it, whether nobly beautiful or shamefully ugly. So again we have an offense against perspicuousness. [3] The objection is presumably again that raised at III 3 1406^{a}8: *athurma* is an exotic word, and so overly dignified and tragic for use in speeches that ideally should conceal the fact of their composition. *Epiteichisma* may share in that fault.

Note 896

It was in the best of tragic styles (*tôn tragikôn*): Or, "in the best way of tragic poets." Aristotle is being ironical. The metaphor, which results from transferring the name of a young maiden to a bird, is comic rather than tragic—in any case, unsuited to a speech.

[Gorgias] said, "Shame on you, Philomela." For, though shameful for a maiden, if a bird did it, it was not shameful: DK A23 = TEGP 23. Philomela was transformed into a swallow. See Ovid, *Metamorphoses* VI 653–674. By metaphorically transferring her name to an ordinary swallow, Gorgias offends again perspicuousness. The next sentence explains why: what he says is false of an ordinary swallow, though true of a maiden.

Note 897

Simile (*eikôn*): An *eikôn* more generally is a likeness.

Note 898

"He rushed on like (*hôs*) **a lion":** Homer, *Il.* XX.164.

Note 899

Similes are to be got (*oisteai*) **in just the way metaphors are:** See III 2 1405^{b}17 (notice *oisteon*).

Note 900

[Similes] are metaphors, but differing in the way they are stated: The lion example might give the false impression that what differentiates the simile from the metaphor is just the word "like" (*hôs*). But this cannot be the case since the examples subsequently given use a variety of comparative terms. The difference seems rather to be that a metaphor is compound and brief, involving a fusion of {330} two terms, while a simile is expanded by separating the terms. Aristotle may have in mind Homeric examples, where the simile is extended through a number of verses. See also, III 10 1410^{b}15–19.

Note 901

Androtion . . . Idreus: Androtion was an Athenian politician (c. 410–340 BC), who studied under Isocrates. He was sent on an embassy to Mausolus prince of Caria in western Anatolia (377–351 BC), where he presumably met Idreus, Mausolus' brother. Since Idreus acceded to the throne on his brother's death, Mausolus is perhaps the chain from which he was released.

Note 902

Theodamus likened Archidamus to a "Euxenus without a scientific knowledge of geometry": These three people are otherwise unknown.

This is by analogy: See III 2 1405^{a}11n.

Note 903

Those who strip the dead [of their weapons] are like mongrels: See Plato, *Rep*. 469d–e. Aristotle uses the contemptuous diminutive *kunidiois* ("curs," "mongrels"), Plato uses *kunôn* ("dog").

The one applied to the people, that it is similar to a ship owner who is strong but deaf: See Plato, *Rep*. 488a–b.

The one applied to the verses of the poets: See Plato, *Rep*. 601b.

Not 904

The one of Pericles about the Samians, that they are like children who take the tasty morsel but go on crying: Samos was conquered by the Athenians in 440 BC. The tasty morsel they received was the establishment there of a democracy instead of an oligarchy. See Thucydides I.115–117.

Holm oaks . . . are felled by holm oaks, and the Boeotians by fighting each other: The wood of the holm oak (*Quercus ilex*) is hard and tough and was used in making plough beams (Hesiod, *Works and Days* 429) and other tools, such as axes, which were then used to cut down other holm oaks. This is the most plausible way to understand the simile. That holm oaks knock each other over in the wind (another proposed interpretation) seems less so.

Boeotians: Inhabitants of Boeotia in central Greece.

Note 905

Demosthenes' one about the people, that they are similar to those who get seasick on ships: Demosthenes is pretty certainly the one mentioned at II 23 $1397^{b}7$, not the great Athenian orator. The idea, presumably, is that the people vote for a policy (get on board a ship) and then get squeamish or cold feet (seasick) when the going (the sea) gets rough.

Note 906

Democritus: Two people of this name are mentioned, one of whom was known for his biting and offensive sayings. The one Aristotle records is also found (unattributed) in Aristophanes, *Knights* 715–718.

{331} Note 907

Antisthenes likened the thin Cephisodotus to incense, because he gives pleasure by wasting away: SSR V A 51 = Prince 51A.

Antisthenes: Probably the follower of Socrates, who was present at his death. He wrote widely, including on topics in what we would now call the philosophy of language, and in many genres, including Socratic dialogues.

Cephisodotus: Probably the orator, referred to in Demosthenes, *Against Leptines* 146 as an excellent speaker.

Note 908

Similes are metaphors in need of a ratio (*logou deomenai*): Underlying a metaphor is a proportion or ratio: b : a : : d : c. See III 2 $1405^{a}11$n. A simile shows the ratio, a metaphor does not, so that the

listener needs to supply it. This is true of all metaphors, not just the obscure ones. See III 10 1410^{b}15–19.

Note 909

If a wine-saucer (*phialê*) **is the shield of Dionysus, the shield can be fittingly said to be the wine-saucer of Ares:** A *phialê* is a broad, flat bowl or cup, used for pouring libations and drinking. Its shape is what makes it like a shield. Dionysus is the god of, among other things, wine; Ares the god of war. See also III 11 1413^{a}1.

Note 910

A speech, then, is composed of these things: I follow Kassel in reading this sentence here rather than, with OCT, at the beginning of III 5.

Note 911

***Ho men* and *ho egô men* require *de* and *ho de*:** *Men* ("on the one hand") requires an answering *de* ("on the other hand"). *Egô men* ("I on the one hand") implies a contrast with someone else (*ho*) on the other.

Note 912

"But I, on the one hand (*men*), **since** (*epei*) **he spoke to me, for Cleon came begging and** (*te kai*) **praying, set out, taking them with me." In cases like this, many connectives are thrown in [before] the correlative one:** This is one of the rare examples contrived by Aristotle himself. The *men* calls for an answering *de*, which is expected (though it does not appear in the text), with *epei* and *te kai* intervening.

And if what is intermediate includes many [connectives] before the conveyed one (*tou eporeuomên*): Reading τοῦ ἐπορευόμην with Ross and the mss.; Kassel secludes.

Cleon: Athenian politician, son of a wealthy tanner, and opponent of Pericles, and to Diodotus in the famous Mytilenian Debate in 427 BC. See Thucydides III.36–50.

Note 913

A second consists in calling things by their special (*idiois*) **names and not by encompassing** (*periechousin*) **ones:** If N_1 is a name special to X, and N_2 is a name that encompasses X (or applies to X and to other things), use N_1 rather than N_2.

{332} Note 914

A third is not to use ambiguities, unless by using them, you deliberately choose achieve the contrary effect [namely, obscurity]:

Reading ταῦτα with Kassel and the mss. for OCT τοῦτο.

Empedocles: See I 13 1373^{b}14n. "If we were to follow and grasp the *thought* and not the inarticulate words of Empedocles, we would find that love is the cause of good things and strife of bad ones" (*Met.* I 4 985^{a}4–7).

Note 915

"Croesus, by crossing the Halys, will dissolve a great empire": This was the famous Delphic oracle to Croesus, king of Lydia (c. 560–546 BC), in response to his question, "Should Croesus make war on the Persians." Croesus took this to mean that he would dissolve the Persian empire, in fact the empire he dissolved was his own. See Herodotus I.53, 91.

Halys: The longest river in Turkey; now called the Kizilirmak (or "Red River").

Note 916

A game of odd-or-even: A game played with any kind of counters. One player held a certain number of them hidden in his hand. His opponent had to guess how many they were, or whether the number was odd or even.

Note 917

Masculine, feminine, and neuter (*arrena kai thêlea kai skeuê*): Literally: "Male, female, and inanimate."

Note 918

"She (*hê*), **having come** (*elthousa*) **and having spoken** (*dialectheisa*), **went away":** Participles (verbal nouns, and so "names") have genders. Here, in agreement with *hê*, they are feminine.

Note 919

A fifth consists in the correct naming of many, few (*oliga*), **and one:** That is, plural, dual (two), and singular, which are expressed by the correct endings. Kassel secludes καὶ ὀλίγα, on the grounds that it could not mean "two." But see, "Unconditionally, though, the two are few, since they are the first plurality with a deficiency" (*Met.* X 6 1056^{b}27–28).

"**They, having come, beat me** (*hoi d'elthontes etupton me*)": *Hoi*: masculine plural; *elthonetes*: masculine participle agreeing with *hoi*; *etupton*: third-person plural, again agreeing with *hoi*; *me*: accusative singular.

Note 920

Heraclitus: Heraclitus of Ephesus (fl. c. 500 BC) was one of the greatest of the Presocratic philosophers and originator of the doctrine that everything flows or is in flux. See DK 22 = TEGP pp. 135–200.

Note 921

"Of this *logos'* being forever do human beings prove to be uncomprehending": DK B1 = TEGP 8 F1.

{333} **It is unclear whether "forever" goes with what proceeds [or what follows]:** Rejecting the OCT addition of <δεῖ>, secluding διαστίξαι with Kassel, and understanding πρόσκειται from III 5 1407^{a}15. Is it of the *logos'* being forever that human beings prove uncomprehending, or is it of the *logos'* being that they prove forever uncomprehending?

Note 922

Solecism (*soloikizein*): That is the sort of speaking or writing characteristic of pretentious and vulgar people (*soloikoi*). See II 16 1391^{a}4.

Not introducing, when you join words, what is appropriate for both: Reading ἐὰν [μὴ] ἐπιζευγνύῃς, ὃ ἀμφοῖν ἁρμόττει with Kassel for OCT ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιζευγνύῃς ὃ ἀμφοῖν ἁρμόττει (". . . when you don't join words . . .").

If [you are introducing] sound and color: Reading εἰ ψόφον καὶ χρῶμα with Kassel for OCT [ἤ] ψόφῳ καὶ χρώματι.

Note 923

The weight (*ogkon*) **of a style:** *Ogkos* means "bulk," "size," "mass," "dignity," "pride," and, in a pejorative sense, "self-importance," "pretension"; as applied in particular to a style, it means "loftiness," "majesty," or "bombastic," "inflated." Here, though, it seems to have a relatively neutral meaning, as its contrast with *suntomia* ("terseness," "conciseness") suggests. A cognate term—*euogkon* ("weighty")—is applied to things, rather than to style, at III 7 1408^{a}12.

Note 924

"To the Achaean harbors": Source unknown. F83 Nauck.

"Here are my tablet's many-leaved (*poluthuroi*) **folds":** Euripides, *Iphigenia in Taurus* 727. Iphigenia is referring to her letter, made up of joined leaves—literally, "doors (*thurai*)"—of wood coated with wax.

Note 925

Ungrammatical asyndeton (*asundeta*): Asyndeton is the absence of conjunctions or connective particles in a series of coordinate words or phrases. Here it refers to doing so in a way that offends against good grammar. See also III 12 1413^{b}29–1414^{a}7.

Note 926

Antimachus: A poet and scholar from Colophon (fl. 400 BC).

"There is a windy little hill . . .": The beginning of a passage from his *Thebais*, which survives only in fragments, that continues to praise the hill by enumerating all the qualities that do not belong to it.

Note 927

Proportional metaphors: See III 2 1405^{a}11n.

The trumpet is "lyre-less music": Reading εἶναι with Kassel and the mss. for OCT ἰέναι ("sends forth").

Note 928

The style will have appropriateness (*to prepon*) **if it expresses feeling** (*pathêtikê*) **as well as character and is proportional to the underlying things at issue:** The {334} proportionality referred to thus has two sides: proportionality between the style and the thing at issue (III 7 1408^{a}11–16) and between the thing at issue and the feelings and character displayed in or provoked by the style (1408^{a}16–36). Appropriateness itself was mentioned in passing in III 2.

Note 929

A worthless name (*eutelei onomati*): A name (*onoma*) for Aristotle signifies an account or (in some cases) a definition (*Met.* IV 7 1012^{a}22–24, VIII 6 1045^{a}26), which is of the form (VII 10 1035^{a}21) or essence (4 1029^{b}20) of the thing named. So it will be worthless if the thing it names is essentially worthless.

Note 930

Cleophon: Presumably, the Athenian tragic poet, mentioned at *Po.* 2 1448^{a}12, where his characters are said to be on the same level as ordinary people, and at 22 1458^{a}20, where his style is criticized as being "low (*tapeinên*)."

"**Milady fig** (*potnia sukê*)": *Potnia* is a poetic title of honor, used chiefly in addressing females, whether divine or human. A *sukê* is a fig tree, the fruit of which is a *sukon*, which is a vulgar name for a woman's (or a man's) genitals, which no doubt added to the comic effect. See Henderson, pp. 118, 135.

Note 931

In fact, the listeners always feel the same things as a speaker who speaks with [appropriate] feeling, even if he says nothing: In the previous section appropriateness was a relation between things at issue, style, and feeling, now it is matter of how to produce a sort of feeling in the audience without regard to the things at issue, simply by the rhythm and tonality of speech, as in the case of music and rhythm in *Pol.* VIII 5–6.

Note 932

Shouting (*thorubountes*): The verb *thorubein* means "make a noise," "cause a disturbance," "shout in approval or disapproval," or "confuse by noise," or "cause excitement among." It usually describes a crowd or assembly of people. Here the idea seems to be something like this: the speaker, by doing something (shouting) that is taken to be expressive of strong feeling by his audience, causes them to share in his feeling.

Note 933

States (*hexeis*): See also I 6 $1362^{b}13$n.

Note 934

Well-educated person: See II 6 $1384^{a}33$n.

Note 935

All the kinds (*eidos*): The reference may be to the three kinds of rhetoric distinguished in I 3. But it seems more likely that it is to the kinds of things under discussion in the present chapter.

Note 936

The speaker himself should add criticism of it: Reading προσεπιπλήττειν with OCT, Burkett (pp. 183–184), and the mss.; Cope and Kassel read προεπιπλήττειν {335} ("the speaker himself should preempt criticism"). The "it" is the speaker's own excess or hyperbole, which he moderates by showing his own awareness of it.

Note 937

This way the listener is deceived (*kleptetai*): That is, the use of the relevant rhetorical devices is well-concealed. See III 2 $1404^{b}24$. Kassel secludes ὁ ἀκροατής ("the listener"), which makes the meaning clearer.

Note 938

The other appropriate things: Retaining καὶ, which OCT secludes, and τοῖς, which Kassel secludes along with it.

Note 939

If, then, gentle things are said [too] harshly and harsh things [too] gently, it becomes unpersuasive: Reading ἀπίθανον with Kassel and the mss. for OCT πιθανὸν ("persuasive"). The idea is to achieve a mean, which a speaker can fail to do by adding a harsh voice or countenance to a harsh name, but also by adding too harsh a voice or countenance to gentle things.

Note 940

Sympathetic consideration: See I 12 1373^{a}28n.

Note 941

Ecstasies of feeling (*enthousiasai*): *Prob.* XIX 48 922^{b}22 describes the Phrygian mode in music as "ecstatic (*enthousiastikê*) and Bacchic (*bakchikê*)," while in a fragment *enthousiasmos* (1340^{a}11) is combined with "powers of divination (*tas manteias*)[in sleep]" (F10 R^{3} = Barnes, p. 2391). It seems likely, then, that the verb *enthousiazein*, which derives etymologically from *theos* ("god"), means in particular being in a state similar to the feeling of ecstatic possession by a god experienced by a participant at the orgiastic feasts of Dionysus (Bacchus), and other such gods, at which intoxicating music, like that of Olympus, figured. Notice *entheon* ("god-inspired") at III 7 1408^{b}19. See also *Pol.* VIII 5 1340^{b}4–5, 6 1341^{a}21–22, 7 1342^{a}2–16.

The *Panegyricus*: Written c. 380 BC, and perhaps never delivered, its aim is to encourage the Athenians and Spartans to forget their differences and become allies again against the Persians.

"**Fame** (*phêmên*) **and name** (*mnêmên*)": OCT and Kassel correct the mss. "name and judgment (γνώμη)," as a misquotation from memory on Aristotle's part of *Panegyricus* 186, in which Isocrates is describing the glory that will belong to those who join the Athenians and the Spartans in the fight against the Persians. The example does not correspond to any of the previously mentioned cases (double names, epithets, and so on). Instead, as Cope notes, it is a well-known case of *homoioteleuton,* of words with the same ending.

"In that they endured (*etlêsan*) **. . .":** *Panegyricus* 96. Isocrates is describing the Athenians, who abandoned their city to the Persians in 480 BC, and then had to endure its being laid waste. See Herodotus VIII.40–109. This example refers to unfamiliar words, since the verb *tlein* (*etlêsan* is the aorist indicative active) is poetic and is rarely used in prose.

{336} Note 942

With self-deprecation (*met' eirôneias*): Compare III 5 1408^{b}1–4, and, on *eirôneia*, see II 2 1379^{b}31n.

As Gorgias did: "Gorgias of Leontini, half perhaps to raise a real puzzle and half ironically, said that just as mortars are things made by mortar-makers, so Larisaeans too are what are made by official craftsmen (*dêmiourgôn*), since some craftsmen are Larissa-makers" (*Pol.* III 2 1275^{b}26–30). In Larissa, and other places, the word *dêmiourgos*, which means "craftsman," is also the title of a certain sort of public official. A Larisaean was both a citizen of Larissa and a kind of pot made there.

In the *Phaedrus*: See, in particular, Socrates' response to Lysias' speech as read by Phaedrus: "It's so *daemonically* done, in fact, my friend, that I'm beside myself (*ekplagênai*) . . . and I joined in the Bacchic ecstasy (*sunebakcheusa*) with your god-inspired self" (234d); "Haven't you noticed, my blessed friend, that I'm already uttering epic verses and not dithyrambs [in praise of Bacchus] now, even though I'm blaming the lover. What do you think I'll produce if I begin praising the non-lover. Don't you realize that Nymphs to whom you deliberately exposed me will cause ecstasies of feeling in me (*enthousiasô*) for all to see?" (241e).

Note 943

The scheme (*schêma*) **of the style:** In the sense in which we speak of the "meter scheme" of a poem—in other words, its rhythm. III 8 and III 9 address two aspects of the same issue.

Note 944

Just as children anticipate (*proslambanousi*) **the answer:** The verb is present indicative, suggesting that Aristotle is describing what children do at the time he is writing, though Cleon—who died in 422 BC—was long dead by then.

Emancipated slave . . . sponsor (*epitropon*): By law an emancipated slave could not plead his own case in court; he needed a citizen sponsor to do it on his behalf. Cleon evidently played this role very often.

Cleon: See III 5 1407^{a}27n.

Note 945

The unlimited is displeasing: A consequence of the nature of pleasure, which requires enjoyable objects to be cognitively graspable in a way that unlimited things are not. See I 11 1369^{b}3n. Compare: "Why does everyone enjoy rhythm and melody and, in general, all concords? Or is it because we enjoy in accord with nature movements that are in accord

with nature? A sign of this is that children enjoy this straightaway from birth. And we enjoy different modes of melody due to habituation. But we enjoy rhythm because it has a knowable and orderly number and moves us in an orderly way. For orderly movement is by nature more properly our own than disorderly movement, and so is more in accord with nature" (*Pr.* XIX 38 920^{b}29–36); "Nature avoids the unlimited. For the unlimited is without an end (*ateles* [= incomplete]), and nature always seeks an end" (*GA* I 1 715^{b}14–16).

And unknowable: See I 2 1356^{b}30n.

{337} Note 946

All things, though, are limited by number: Namely, by the number of units by which they are measured and known: "A measure is that by which quantity is known, and a quantity insofar as it is a quantity is known either by a one [or a unit] or by a number, and all number by a one, so that all quantity insofar as it is quantity is known by the one, and what quantities are primarily known by, this is itself one. That is why the one is the starting-point of number insofar as it is number. And, by extension from this, so too in the other genera what is said to be a measure is the primary thing by which each is known, and the measure of each thing is a one [or a unit], in length, in breadth, in depth, in weight, in speed" (*Met.* X 1 1052^{b}20–27); "The one [or unit] is a certain nature in every genus and that in no case is its nature just this, the one, rather, just as in colors the one itself that must be investigated is one color, so too in substance the one itself is one substance" (1054^{a}9–13). Notice: "*schêma* is a sort of magnitude" (*DA* III 1 425^{a}18).

Note 947

Of which the meters are segments: "It is evident that the meters are parts of the rhythms" (*Po.* 4 1448^{b}21–22). Reading τμήματα with OCT; Kassel reads τμητά ("divisible").

Note 948

But not meter (for then it will be a poem): When Aristotle refers to meter, he has in mind three meters in particular, namely, dactylic hexameter, iambic, and trochaic, which he is about to discuss. See also *Po.* 24 1459^{b}32–1460^{a}2.

Note 949

The heroic: That, is dactylic hexameter.

But deficient in the harmony suited to speaking: Reading σεμνὸς καὶ λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας δεόμενος with Cope for OCT σεμνῆς ἀλλ᾽ οὐ λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας δεόμενος; Kassel reads σεμνὸς καὶ <οὐ> λεκτικὸς καὶ ἁρμονίας δεόμενος ("dignified, not appropriate to the prose, and deficient in harmony").

Harmony: See III 1 1403^{b}31n.

Note 950

Ordinary people: See I 1 1354^{a}6n.

Removed from common usage (*ekstêsai*): The verb *existanai*, used at III 8 1408^{b}23 to mean "divert attention" in a bad way, here has the related meaning of diverting attention in a good way by not being the style of everyday speech.

Note 951

Thrasymachus: See II 23 1400^{b}20n.

Note 952

The paean is a third rhythm, . . . since it has the ratio three to two, whereas the others are one to one or two to one: Though the paean is actually the fourth meter mentioned, it represents the third alternative regarding ratio, since iambus {338} and trochee involve the same ratio: paean: ˘˘˘ ¯ (3 : 1); heroic: ¯ ˘˘ (1 : 1); iambus: ˘ ¯ (1 : 2); trochee: ¯ ˘ (2 : 1). Where ¯ = ˘˘.

Note 953

One-and-a-half is closely connected to these, and this is what the paean is: One-and-a-half is the ratio 3 : 2, which is the mean ratio between 1 : 1 (heroic) and 1 : 2 (iambus) or 2 : 1 (trochee).

Note 954

For it alone of the rhythms mentioned is not a meter, so that it most of all escapes notice: As an inconspicuous rhythm it conforms to the rhetorical requirement of concealment.

Note 955

***Dālŏgĕnĕs eite Lukian*:** "Delos-born or Lycian."

***khrūsĕŏkŏma Hekate pai Dios*:** "Golden-haired Archer, son of Zeus." Both are hymns to Apollo, attributed to Simonides.

Note 956

***mĕtă dĕ gān hŭdată t᾽ ōkĕănŏn ēphănĭsĕ nūx*:** "After earth and waters, night obscured ocean." Also attributed to Simonides.

Note 957

Docked (*kolobon*): The adjective *kolobos* means "docked" (as in docking a puppy's tail, or docking someone's salary), "curtailed," "stunted," "truncated"—the central idea is that of cutting off a projecting part, typically a non-essential one. None of these English terms fits all the cases Aristotle cites in his discussion of the notion in *Met.* V 27 in an entirely natural way. "Mutilated" is the traditional rendering but suffers the disadvantage of not capturing the central idea: mutilation need not involve the cutting off of a part; cutting off a part need not result in mutilation. At *SE* 17 176^{a}40, a question asked *kolobôs* is contrasted with one asked *saphôs* ("perspicuously").

Note 958

A marginal mark (*paragraphên*): In Aristotle's time, written punctuation marks were undeveloped. A marginal mark was added to indicate, for instance, the change of speaker in a dialogue. See Burkett, p. 197.

Note 959

That the style . . . has been stated: Reading this sentence here with Kassel and Cope; OCT reads it at the beginning of III 9.

Note 960

Continuous (*eironomenên*): Or "loose and concatenated" (Cope), "free-running" (Roberts), "strung on" (Kennedy).

Preludes (*anabolai*): An *anabolê* is a postponement (I 12 1372^{a}35, III 10 1411^{b}15), but here it refers to the prelude on the lyre preliminary to singing.

Compact (*katestrammenên*): Or "close and compact" (Cope), "compact and antithetical" (Roberts), "turned-down" (Kennedy).

{339} Note 961

The continuous style is the ancient one: Following this sentence the mss. have: "Ἡροδότου Θουρίου ἥδ' ἱστορίης ἀπόδειξις" ("Herein is set forth the researches of Herodotus of Thurii"), which OCT and Kassel both seclude.

Note 962

It is displeasing because it is unlimited: See III 8 1408^{b}26–28n.

Note 963

When they reach the end (*epi tois kamptêrsin*): The *kamptêres* is actually the turning-point in a *diaulos* or two-stadium-length race

(roughly 400 meters), but here it is the end-point of a stadium-length race.

Note 964

A magnitude easily surveyed as a whole (*eusunopton*): Compare: "It is clear, therefore, that the best defining mark for a city is this: it is the greatest excess of multitude with a view to self-sufficiency in living that can be easily surveyed as a whole (*eusunoptos*)" (*Pol.* VII 4 $1326^{b}22$–25). See also *Po.* 7 $1451^{a}3$–6.

Note 965

A periodic style has a number: See III 8 $1408^{b}29$.

Note 966

And the period should also be completed in thought and not broken off: This additional requirement presupposes that the periodic style is already compact. The continuous style meets the former requirement, but not the latter.

Also . . . in thought: Reading καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ with Kassel; OCT obelizes.

As in the iambic line of Sophocles, "Calydon is this land, of Pelops' soil . . .": This is in fact the opening line of Euripides' *Meleager*, which is why Kassel secludes Σοφοκλέους.

Note 967

Calydon is in the Peloponnese: In fact it was in Aetolia.

Note 968

Clauses (*kôlois*): A *kôlon* is a limb of a body and, by transference, an element, such as a phrase or clause, that functions as a grammatical unit.

Smooth (*aphelês*): "Without a stone," "even," or (applied to persons) "artless," "simple," or (bad sense) "bold," brazen," or (in rhetoric) "artless," "simple."

Note 969

Not by means of arbitrary division: Following this clause the mss. have ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ περίοδος ("like the period"), which OCT obelizes and Kassel secludes. Cope reads ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ εἰρημένη περίοδος with some mss., and understands it as a reference to the quotation attributed to Sophocles two lines above (III 9 $1409^{b}10$).

Note 970

A clause is one of the two parts of this: The assumption that a period has two clauses (or, in the case of a "smooth" period, only one) is

presumably a simplification.

{340} Note 971

He is necessarily made to stumble: Reading προσπταίειν with Kassel and the mss. for OCT πρόσπταισιν ("a stumble takes place").

Note 972

Like walkers who go past the turning-point: We are to imagine a walk with a point at which walkers usually turn. Those expecting to turn there are left behind by those who keep walking past it.

Since they too leave behind their fellow walkers (*sumperipatountas*): Reading ἀπολείπουσι γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι τοὺς συμπεριπατοῦντας with OCT and the mss.; Kassel secludes. A *peripatos* was a covered walkway or colonnade. It gave its name to Aristotle's school (its members were Peripatetics) because there were such walkways in the Lyceum.

Note 973

Democritus of Chios: A contemporary of his more famous namesake, Democritus of Abdera, and a well-known musician. See DL IX **[49]** 236.

Melanippides: A dithyrambic poet from Melos (second half of fifth cent BC). See Xenophon, *Memorabilia* I.iv.3.

Antistrophes: That is, compact and regular stanzas.

"But a long dithyrambic prelude does the worst one to the composer himself": A parody of Hesiod, *Works and Days* 265.

Note 974

To those who speak in long clauses: Reading τοὺς μακροκώλους with Kassel, Cope, and the mss. for OCT τὰς μακροκώλους ("periods with long clauses").

Note 975

They drag the listener stumbling along (*propetê*): "If animals moved their forelegs at the same time and first, their walking would be broken up and they would stumble along (*propetês*), with their hind legs as it were dragged behind" (*IA* 14 712ª28–30).

Note 976

"I have often admired those who organized assemblies . . . contests": The opening of Isocrates, *Panegyricus*.

Note 977

It is opposed when in each clause contrary is brought into relation with contrary or when the same [word] is yoked together

with the contraries: The discussion begun at III 9 1409[a]24 is now complete: The style of expression is necessarily either (1) continuous or (2) compact, periodic. A period is either (2a) divided into clauses or (2b) smooth. A period divided into clauses might be either (2a-i) simply divided or (2a-ii) opposed. The structure by opposites might be either (2a-ii-a) when in each clause contrary is brought into relation with contrary or (2a-ii-b) when the same [word] is yoked together with the contraries.

{341} Note 978

"They profited both, both those who stayed and those who followed . . . behind": *Panegyricus* 35 (misquoted).

Note 979

"So both to those needing [to get] things and those wishing to enjoy them . . .": *Panegyricus* 41 (misquoted).

Note 980

"It often happens . . . succeed": *Panegyricus* 48 (misquoted).

"They were straightaway thought worthy . . . the sea": *Panegyricus* 72.

"To sail through the land . . . Athos": *Panegyricus* 89.

"And though citizens by nature . . . city": *Panegyricus* 105 (misquoted).

"For though some of them miserably perished . . . saved": *Panegyricus* 149.

"Privately using [only] barbarians as household slaves . . . allies": *Panegyricus* 181 (misquoted). The point seems to be that the Athenians have one rule among themselves but another elsewhere—not enslaving Greeks at home, but allowing them to be enslaved elsewhere: "The poets say 'it is reasonable for Greeks to rule barbarians,' on the supposition that a barbarian and a slave are by nature the same" (*Pol.* I 2 1252[b]8–9); "Barbarians are by nature more slavish in their characters than Greeks" (III 14 1285[a]20–21).

"Either to possess when alive . . . dead": *Panegyricus* 186 (misquoted). About fame and glory.

Note 981

Peitholaus and Lycophron: Brothers of Thebe, wife of Alexander of Pherae, whom they murdered at her instigation and succeeded in the dynasty. They were defeated by Philip of Macedon in 353/2 BC. The

circumstances of the trial Aristotle mentions are unknown. The quoted remark was probably made to the jurors: "Peitholaus and Lycophron used to sell you [Athenians?] as slaves, but now they have come to court to buy you off."

Note 982

Contraries are more knowable when side by side, and are like deductions, since refutation consists in a bringing together of opposites: See II 23 1400^{b}26–29.

Note 983

***Agron gar elaben argon par' autou*:** "A field he took from him, a fallow field." Aristophanes, Fr. 649 Kock (= Edmonds v. I, p. 749). An example of *paromoiôsis*, because *agron* and *argon* are whole names that sound similar.

***Dôrêtoi t' epelonto pararrêtoi t' epeessin*:** "They were ready to accept gifts and to be persuaded by words." Homer, *Il.* IX.526.

Note 984

***Ô[i]êthês an auton <ou> paidion tetokenai, all' auton paidion gegonenai*:** "You would have thought him not to have begotten a child, but to have become one himself." Source unknown.

{342} ***En pleistais de phrontisi kai en elachistais elpisin*:** "In the midst of the greatest cares and smallest hopes." Source unknown.

Note 985

***Axioi de stathênai chalkous, ouk axios ôn chalkou*:** "Worthy of a bronze statue, but not worthy of a bronze coin." Source unknown.

Note 986

***Su d' auton kai zônta eleges kakôs kai nun grapheis kakôs*:** "When he was alive you spoke badly about him and now you write badly." Source unknown.

Note 987

***Ti an epathes deinon, ei andr' eides argon*:** "What terrible thing would you have suffered, if you had seen an idle man?" Source unknown.

Note 988

Similarity of ending (*homoeoteleuton*): Unison at the end.

Note 989

The *Theodectes*: Probably a lost work of Aristotle's devoted to Theodectes—on whom, see II 23 1397^{b}3n.

Note 990

Epicharmus: I 7 1365^{a}16n.

***Toka men en tênôn egôn ên, toka de para tênois egôn*:** "At one time I was in their house, at another I was with them." Epicharmus Fr. 147 Kaibel.

Note 991

Elegant (*asteia*): The urban center of a *polis* is the *astu* or town, in contrast to the surrounding countryside (I 1 1354^{a}19n). Someone is *asteios*, then, when he is "urbane" and "well-educated" rather than *agroikos* ("rustic," "boorish"). On the other hand, someone who is *asteios* is contrasted with someone who is nobly beautiful, and likened to one who is well-proportioned: "small people are *asteioi* and well-proportioned (*summetroi*) but not nobly beautiful (*kaloi*)" (*NE* IV 3 1123^{b}7–8). This makes "elegant" rather than "urbane" seem like the right sort of translation.

And (*kai*) **popular expressions** (*eudokimounta*): Not just expressions that are already popular, but those that will catch on and become so. See also I 15 1375^{b}9n.

Note 992

Natural cleverness (*euphuous*): See I 6 1362^{b}24n, II 15 1390^{b}28n.

Note 993

Exotic names: See III 2 1404^{b}28n.

Prevalent ones: See II 2 1404^{b}6n.

Note 994

Metaphor: See III 2 1404^{b}32n.

{343} Note 995

Learning and knowledge through the genus: See I 1 1354^{a}3n(5). But learning and knowledge do not have here the sense of scientific knowledge of causes and starting-points. The listener just gets some new information about the subject matter.

When he says that old age is "stubble": Homer, *Od.* XIV.214.

Stubble (*kalamên*): *Kalamê* is "stubble," in the sense of "cornstalk" or "straw."

Note 996

A simile, as was said earlier: At III 4 1406^{b}20–22.

Is a metaphor differing in how it is set out: Reading προθέσει with OCT and Kassel; Freese reads προσθέσει ("by addition"). The two

readings come to much the same, since the way the simile is set out may simply be by the addition of a word such as *hôs* ("like").

Note 997

It does not say that this *is* that, and so the [listener's] soul does not inquire into it: A metaphor says this *is* that—old age *is* stubble or an arbitrator *is* an altar (III 11 1412^{a}14). Hence the soul has to look for the genus to which both this and that belong, and so learns or comes to know. Whereas with a simile, it settles for the existence of some likeness between the things. On learning, see I 1 1355^{a}26n.

Note 998

That is why superficial enthymemes are not popular . . . and neither are those that are unknown when stated: The contrast between superficial and unknown mirrors the one between exotic (unfamiliar) names and prevalent names. It also pairs up with I 2 1357^{a}7–21, which discusses enthymemes that, being at the other extreme, are too difficult to follow or grasp.

Those that are unknown: Reading ἀγνοούμενά ἐστιν with Kassel; for OCT ἀγνοοῦμεν. There is no change in meaning.

Note 999

The ones that are popular . . . : Compare II 23 1400^{b}29–33.

Note 1000

In the other case neither [sort of learning] takes place: Reading with ἐκείνως δὲ οὐδέτερον with Kassel and the mss. for OCT ἐκείνων δὲ οὐδετέρου.

Note 1001

In terms of the style, on the other hand, it is popular because of its scheme: See III 8 1408^{b}21–22.

"Considering that the peace common to the others . . . interests": Isocrates, *Philippus* 73 (misquoted).

Names, if these contain a metaphor, provided it is neither strange (*allotrian*) **(for then it is difficult to comprehend):** "Metaphor is the application to something of a name belonging to something else (*allotriou*)" (*Po.* 21 1457^{b}6–7). *Allotrios* has one of its meanings in this definition and another of its meanings in our text.

{344} Note 1002

Setting things before the eyes [is popular]: Compare III 2 1405^{b}11–12, 11 1411^{b}22–1412^{a}10.

Things should be seen as being done (*prattomena*) **rather than as being in prospect** (*mellonta*): Aristotle contrasts what is in prospect but may not actually happen with what will in fact happen, or the actual future: "What will be (*estai*) and what is going to be (*to mellei*) are distinct. . . . For if it is true to say of something that it will be, it must at some time be true to say of it that it is, whereas, though it may be true to say of something now that it is going to be, nothing prevents it from not coming to be—for though someone is now going to take a walk he might not in fact take a walk" (*GC* II 11 337^{b}4–7). Moreover, he also contrasts what was going to happen with what is happening now: "In general, indeed, what was going to happen (*to mellêsan*) is not in every case what is now happening (*ginetai*)" (*Div. Somn.* 463^{b}28–29). Thus we should understand the contrast between *prattomena* and *mellonta* in our text not as one between present and future, but as one between what is vividly present to the mind and what is merely in prospect and so not vividly present—maybe happening but not actually happening. Thus "[the Athenians] 'had drained' (*exechean*) their city into Sicily" sets a past event before our eyes (III 10 1411^{a}25) not by using a present tense, but by using an aorist indicative to make what actually happened vividly present.

Note 1003

Activity (*energeias*): See I 5 1361^{a}24n and, for its application to a style, III 11 1411^{b}24–1412^{a}8.

Note 1004

The four sorts of metaphor: See III 2 1404^{b}32n.

Pericles said . . . year: See I 7 1365^{a}31–33n, where it is cited in a slightly different form.

Note 1005

Leptines: An Athenian orator, whose law about exemption from public service (II 23 1399^{a}37n) was opposed by Demosthenes, *Against Leptines*.

He would not allow [the Athenians] to look on: Reading ἐᾶν περιδεῖν with Kassel, Cope, and the mss. for OCT ἄν περιδεῖν ("that one [should] not look on").

While Greece "became one-eyed": Sparta being one of the eyes, Athens the other.

Note 1006

Chares . . . the Olynthian war: Chares (I 15 1376^{a}10n) was general in charge of the mercenaries sent by Athens to aid Olynthus (in Chalcidice) against Philip of Macedon in the Olynthian war (349 BC).

Was eager to have his accounts inspected (*euthunas dounai*): Inspection (*euthuna*) was a device designed to ensure (typically) democratic control of officials (*Pol.* II 12 1274^{a}15–21, III 11 1281^{b}32–34, 1282^{a}25–32, VI 8 1322^{b}6–12). In Athens a board of ten inspectors and ten assistants were elected by lot. Officials were {345} subject to inspection to see whether they had taken bribes, embezzled public funds, or been guilty of maladministration. See *Ath.* LIV 2.

He was trying to have his accounts inspected while "squeezing the people's throat": That is, while still having mercenaries under his control who posed a threat to the people.

Note 1007

"By the decree of Miltiades": A decree issued at the time of the Persian invasion of 390 BC, proverbial for the speed with which it was carried out.

Note 1008

Epidaurus: A city on the Argolid peninsula at the Saronic gulf.

Iphicrates: See I 7 1365^{a}28n.

"They had stripped themselves of provisions [for the journey] of the war": The war is that against the Spartans, in which Iphicrates scored a significant victory in 390 BC (II 23 1397^{b}30n). Epidaurus, which prior to the truce had been allied with Sparta, could easily have been plundered by the Athenian navy.

Note 1009

Peitholaus: Presumably the one mentioned at III 9 1410^{a}17.

The Paralian: A vessel kept in reserve at the Piraeus for Athenian state purposes, such as embassies.

Sestus "the corn seller's board (*têlian*) **of the Piraeus":** Sestos, a town on the Hellespont, was a place where Athens bought its corn—an important staple. A *têlia* was a board with a raised edge to prevent cornmeal or pastry from falling off.

Note 1010

Moerocles: An Athenian orator from Salamis. He was a contemporary of Demosthenes and, like him, and opponent of Macedon.

He was charged with extortion on one occasion and represented in comedy as taking bribes (Athenaeus VIII.27).

Note 1011

Anaxandrides: A poet of so-called middle comedy.

"**The maidens, I find, are past their marriages' due date** (*huperêmeroi*)": Fr. 68 Kock (= Edmonds v. II, p. 79). *Huperêmeros* is a term for a debt that is overdue.

Note 1012

Polyeuctus: Another Athenian orator and contemporary of Demosthenes, this time from the deme Sphettos in Athens itself.

He could not keep quiet, though "shackled by fortune in a five-holed pillory of disease": The head went in one hole, the hands and feet in the other four. Despite being thus immobilized, Speusippus could not hold his tongue.

Note 1013

Cephisodotus called triremes "multi-colored millstones": Because they crushed and ground down those on whom they were brought to bear, whether enemies, or allies forced to pay tribute in return for protection.

{346} **The Cynic:** Diogenes of Sinope (c. 412/403–c. 324/321 BC), founder of the Cynic school.

"Communal messes (*phiditia*) **of Attica":** *Phiditia* were a political institution, which Aristotle himself favors, that served both to feed citizens and to promote bonding between them: "As for communal messes, everyone agrees that it is useful for well-established cities to have them. . . . All the citizens should share in these, even though it is not easy for the poor to contribute the required amount from their private resources and manage the rest of their household as well" (*Pol.* VII 10 1330^{a}3–8).

Note 1014

Aesion: Another Athenian orator and contemporary of Demosthenes.

The Athenians had "drained" their city into Sicily: The Athenian forces sent to invade Sicily in 415–413 BC were so enormous that they left scarcely anyone behind in Athens.

Note 1015

Race meetings (*sundromas*): A *sundromê* is literally a "running together." Here it is used as a derogatory metaphor for the Athenian

assembly of the people, representing the people competing as in a horse or dog race, and also as racing together into some disaster or other.

Note 1016

"Race together" (*suntrechontas*): *Suntrechein* means "run together," so that the metaphor is similar to the previous one.

Note 1017

"It is fitting for Greece . . . buried": Lysias II.60 (misquoted). The original refers to the battle of Aegospotami (405 BC), in which the Spartans defeated the Athenians, not Marathon (490 BC), in which the Greeks defeated the Persians. On Lysias, see Roisman, pp. 46–48 (Pseudo-Plutarch), 297–301 (Photius), 331–331 (Suda). The metaphor consists in the personification of Greece.

Note 1018

If the speaker had said that . . . their virtue was being buried together with them, it would have been a metaphor . . . , but "with virtue freedom" involves an antithesis: The antithesis is not between freedom and virtue but between freedom and buried.

Note 1019

Chares: See I 15 1376^{a}10n.

Note 1020

"Summoning dangers to help with dangers": Author unknown. The metaphor lies in the transfer of "summoning" from people to impersonal dangers.

Note 1021

Lycoleon: Otherwise unknown, but, by inference from the present reference to him, an orator in operation in 366 BC (the date of Chabrias' trial). He is to be imagined pointing to the statue of Chabrias, visible from the court.

{347} **Chabrias:** A professional soldier from Athens (c. 420–357/6 BC). The statue of him kneeling was erected to celebrate his victory against the Spartans in 378 BC, in which his troops knelt with their shields on their knees and their spears protruding. His trial, was for misconduct, leading to the loss of Oropus (in eastern Attica). He was restored to power shortly before the battle of Mantinea (362 BC). He died, fighting for Athens, in the battle of Chios.

Note 1022

"The inanimate yet animate" memorial of his works for the city: Reading ἄψυχον δὴ ἔμψυχον with Kassel and the mss. for OCT ἔμψυχον δὴ ἄψυχον ("living yet lifeless"), and <ὑπὲρ> with Kassel before τῆς πόλεως.

Note 1023

"In every way practicing smallness of soul": Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 151. The metaphor looks like a transfer from species to genus, but must in fact be one by analogy (see III 10 1411^{b}22). The subject's smallness of soul may have been increasing, but he was hardly practicing it with that end in view. See II 6 1384^{a}4n. Thus as increasing is to X so practicing is to smallness of soul.

Note 1024

"The god kindled the understanding as a light in the soul": Source unknown.

Note 1025

"For we are not putting an end to our wars, but rather postponing them": Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 172.

For both postponing and a peace of this sort are [species of] putting off: The peace, which is intended to put off the wars in the sense of putting an end to them, in fact puts them off only in the sense of postponing them. The metaphor is one from species to species, from one kind of "putting off" to another kind.

Putting off (*mellonta*): At III 10 1410^{b}35 *mellonta* are things that are in prospect but that, unlike actually future things, may not happen. Here they are things that are always about to be done but are always put off or delayed.

Note 1026

"Treaties are a much nobler trophy . . . war": Based on Isocrates *Panegyricus* 180.

Note 1027

"Cities pay a heavy inspection-based fine (*megalas euthunas didoasin*) **with the blame** (*tô[i] psogô[i]*) **of human beings" (for an inspection-based fine** (*euthuna*) **is a sort of legal** (*dikaia*) **blame):** *Euthuna* is the inspection of officials (III 10 1411^{a}7), but also, as we see here, the fine or penalty imposed for a failure to pass it—hence "inspection-based fine." Since the "blame of human beings" is the fine, we should take *tô[i] psogô[i]* as an instrumental dative. The metaphor thus

transfers *euthuna* from its proper legal setting to a more general non-legal one, and is thus a metaphor from species to genus.

{348} Note 1028

That elegant expressions . . . : Reading this sentence at the end of III 10 with Kassel rather that at the beginning of III 11 with OCT.

Note 1029

Things are set before the eyes by whatever signifies them being active (*energounta*): When X is in fact before A's eyes, it activates A's sight, so that A is actively seeing X. At the same time X's color, the intrinsically visible feature of X, is itself activated (*DA* II 7). Likewise, for an expression E to set X before A's eyes, it must itself be active and activate not A's eyes, but rather A's imagination (I 11 $1370^{a}28$n). When A recalls actually seeing X, he actively imagines it, so we can think of E as having to do a relevantly similar thing, namely, as having both to activate and to be active. Metaphors can do this, because they "imply riddles" (III 2 $1405^{b}4$–5), and so make the mind or imagination active. But only good metaphors activate the mind in the way required to bring the thing before the eyes. So, for example, describing a good man as (1) "foursquare," while a metaphor, does not do this, whereas describing him as (2) "having his prime of life in full bloom" does. For while (1) activates the mind and imagination, it does not activate the object: instead of animating the inanimate, indeed, as Homer's metaphors are praised for doing (III 11 $1411^{b}32$), it does the opposite by representing an animate human being as an inanimate geometrical object. (2), by contrast, both activates the mind and is active itself.

"Foursquare": Simonides Fr. 37 Page = Fr. 542 Campbell.

"Having his prime of live in full bloom": Isocrates, *Philippus* 10.

"**You, like a sacred animal roaming at will** (*hôsper apheton*)": *Philippus* 127. Flocks of sacred animals were allowed to roam freely within temple precincts. Isocrates is representing Phillip as such an animal, with the whole of Greece as his precinct, in order to encourage him to lead the Greeks to war against Persia.

"**Thereupon, the Greeks darting forward with their feet** (*posin*)": Euripides, *Iphigenia in Aulis* 80 (misquoted). The original has *dori* ("with their spears").

Note 1030

"Downward again to the plain rolled the ruthless stone": Homer, *Od.* XI.598. The stone is the one Sisyphus is condemned to roll up the hill in perpetuity.

"The arrow flew": Homer, *Il.* XIII.587.

"[The arrow] was eager to fly": Homer, *Il.* IV.126.

"[The spears] stuck in the ground . . .": Homer, *Il.* XI.574. The spears fall short of their target, but remain quivering in the ground, as if with eagerness.

Note 1031

"Arched, foam-crested, in ranks, one upon another": Homer, *Il.* XIII.799.

Note 1032

Activity is movement: Reading ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια κίνησις with OCT and Kassel for mss. ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια μίμησις ("activity is imitation").

{349} Note 1033

Metaphors, as was said earlier, should be drawn from things that are closely related but not evidently so: For the thought, though formulated somewhat differently, see III 2 $1405^{a}34$–36, 10 $1410^{b}31$–33.

Good guesswork (*eustochou*): The relevant sort of *eustochia* is the sort that hits on "the middle term in an imperceptible amount of time," once "the extreme terms are recognized" (*APo.* I 34 $89^{b}10$–15).

Note 1034

Archytas: Pythagorean mathematician and philosopher from Tarentum (c. 400–350 BC), who sent a ship to rescue Plato from Dionysius II of Sicily. The examples given to illustrate his views on definition (*Met.* VIII 2 $1043^{a}21$–24) are used to illustrate the usefulness of similarity in developing definitions: "Getting a theoretical grasp on what is similar in things that differ greatly is useful for definitions—for example, that a calm in the sea and a stillness in the air are the same (for each is a quietness)" (*Top.* I 18 $108^{b}23$–26).

Arbitrator and altar are the same thing: Fr. A12 Hoffman (pp. 505–507).

Arbitrator: See I 13 $1374^{b}21$n.

Note 1035

An anchor and a pothook are the same (for they are the same thing, but they differ with respect to the above and the below): The same hook, when attached to a ceiling above it, can anchor a pot

(imagine it as a very large pot), as, when attached to the seabed below it, can anchor a ship. Hence a pothook differs from an anchor "with respect to the above and below."

Note 1036

The "re-equalization" of cities: Perhaps a reference to Isocrates, *Philippus* 40. The verb *anômalisthai* is not the contrary of equalization but a re-equalization. See *Pol.* II 7 $1266^{b}3$, 12 $1274^{b}9$.

Note 1037

Accompanying deception (*prosexapatan*): The metaphor should lead us to solve its implicit riddle in the wrong way, so that the correct one comes as a pleasing surprise.

Note 1038

"Their cicadas will sing to themselves from the ground": See II 21 $1395^{a}1$–2n.

Note 1039

For learning is involved and they are said by means of a metaphor: Reading μάθησις γὰρ, καὶ λέγεται μεταφορᾷ with Kassel for OCT μάθησις γὰρ ἐστι καὶ μεταφορὰ ("for it involves learning and metaphor"). Kassel follows the mss. (as does Cope) but reads μεταφορᾶι for μεταφορὰ, on the basis of *Top.* $123^{a}33$–36.

Theodorus: See III 2 $1404^{b}22$n.

Note 1040

Contradoxical: That is, contrary to the audience's belief or expectation (versus, in accord with it, as Theodorus thinks). See also II 21 $1394^{b}10$n.

{350} Note 1041

The plays on words (*parapepoiêmena*) **in jokes:** *Parapoiountes* are forgers (coiners), who adulterate the metal content of coins, or falsify weights and measures. Thus the verb *parapoiein*, as applied to words and expressions, means to make a change in them, either in their spelling, or by using the same word with different senses, and so on. "Plays on words" seems to convey the (not entirely clear) idea reasonably well. An example is given at III 11 $1412^{b}1$.

Note 1042

Jibes involving a change of letter (*ta para gramma skômmata*): A *gramma* is both a written letter and the articulate sound made when it is uttered. Many puns are like this.

Note 1043

"He strode on, having on his feet—*chilblains*!": Source unknown. The rhyme led the listener to expect *pedila* ("sandals"), the author substituted *chimethla* ("chilblains").

Note 1044

It should be clear as soon as it is uttered: See II 21 1394^{b}14–16.

Note 1045

Theodorus saying to Nikon the lyre player, *thratt' ei* (for he pretends to mean *thrattei se* and deceives us, since he means something else): Reading θράττει with Cope for OCT Θρᾷξ εἶ σύ and Kassel and the mss. θράττει σε. Theodorus says "you are a lyre strummer," or "you are confounded," but means "you are a Thracian strumpet or female slave." In other words: a whore, a slave, and a poor lyre player.

Note 1046

That is why it is pleasing to the one who learns it, since if the listener does not know that Theodorus is a Thracian, it will not seem elegant: The person who does know, and so gets the joke, feels superior to those who don't get it, because they don't know.

Note 1047

***Boulei auton persai*:** The verb *mêdizein* ("Medize") means "side with the Medes (= the Persians)." If there were a cognate verb *persein* ("Persianize"), the real or intended meaning would be "you wish him to Persianize," whereas the literal meaning is, "You wish to destroy him." There is no such verb, but perhaps the pun relies on the audience's ability to imagine that there is. Cope has this to say: "The solution I have finally arrived at is that the alteration of letters which makes the pun, resides in *boulei*. This would probably be pronounced nearly, if not quite, like *boulê[i]*, and the word could be rendered 'will you?' or 'the Council': in the latter sense the words would mean 'may the council destroy him'" (II, pp. 133–134).

Note 1048

Both must be said in the way that is fitting: See III 11 1412^{b}11–14. But here this may in part depend on emphasis and pronunciation.

{351} Note 1049

Likewise too with elegant expressions: The discussion of these begins at III 11 1412^{a}19, but is interrupted by discussions of epigrams,

riddles, and jibes. It is now resumed.

Note 1050

The *archê* of the sea was not the *archê* of the evils: *Archê* means both "rule," or "command," and "start," or "beginning."

As Isocrates said: *Philippus* 61, *Panegyricus* 119, *De Pace* 101.

Note 1051

Homonymy: See II 24 1401^{a}13n.

Note 1052

"*Anaschetos ouk anaschetos*": *Anaschetos*, as an adjective, means "endurable," but is also a proper name. Thus the two are homonyms. An English equivalent would be, "There is no bearing Baring."

Note 1053

"Do not make yourself more *xenos* than a *xenos*," or not more than you should be: Reading "οὐκ ἂν γένοιο μᾶλλον ἤ [σε δεῖ] ξένος ξένος," ἢ οὐ μᾶλλον ἤ σε δεῖ with Kassel for OCT "οὐκ ἂν γένοιο μᾶλλον ἤ σε δεῖ ξένος· "ξένος" <γὰρ> "οὐ μᾶλλον ἤ σε δεῖ." *Xenos* means "strange" (adjective) and "stranger" (noun).

Note 1054

"The *xenos* should not always be *xenos*": Fr. 209 Kock (= Edmonds v. IIIa, p. 289). Author unknown.

Note 1055

Anaxandrides: See III 10 1411^{a}19n.

"It is noble to die before doing anything that deserves death": Fr. 64 Kock
(= Edmonds v. II, p. 79).

Note 1056

Learning come about more because of opposition: See II 23 1400^{b}26–29.

And faster because of brevity: See III 10 1410^{b}21.

Note 1057

And what is said should always [1] apply in addition to the person addressed and [2] be correctly expressed, if it is going to be [3] true and [4] not superficial: Reading δεῖ δ' ἀεὶ προσεῖναι [ἢ] τὸ πρὸς ὃν λέγεται [ἢ] ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι, εἰ τὸ λεγόμενον ἀληθὲς καὶ μὴ ἐπιπόλαιον <ἔσται> with OCT. This makes [1] go with [3] and [2] with [4] as sense seems to require.

Since these (*tauta*) **may be separate:** [1] Superficiality is a matter of clarity or obviousness (III 10 1410^{b}22–23), and [5] elegance, used in the illustrative examples, is due most of all "to metaphors and to accompanying deception" leading the listener to expect the contrary of what the speaker goes on to say (11 1412^{a}19–21). Being [3] true is a requisite feature in good metaphors. Thus *tauta* refers to [1] {352} superficiality and its absence (= [5] elegance) and to [3] truth in metaphors, which elegance requires.

Note 1058

But it is not elegant: Rejecting the OCT seclusion of ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀστεῖον.

Note 1059

"A deserving man should marry a deserving woman": Fr. 206 Kock. Author unknown. True but obvious, and so superficial rather than elegant.

Note 1060

A metaphor of the relevant sort: That is, based on accompanying deception. See III 11 1412^{a}19–20.

Equalization (*parisôsis*): See III 9 1410^{a}24n.

Activity: See III 11 1411^{b}24–1412^{a}8.

Note 1061

Popular (*eudokimousai*) **similes too, as has already been said above, are also in a way popular metaphors:** At III 4 1407^{a}11–15, 10 1410^{b}15–18. The claim, as these references show, is not that popular similes are in a way metaphors, or that similes are in a way popular metaphors (though grammar permits either meaning), since they tell us that *all* similes are in a way metaphors. Instead, we should take *eudokimousai* as applying to both similes and metaphors.

Note 1062

They are always stated on the basis of two [relations], just like metaphor by analogy: Similes and metaphors by analogy are of the following form: (1) b : a : : (2) d : c. Hence they are based on (1) the relation between b and a, and on (2) the relation between d and c. See III 2 1405^{a}11n.

"The wine-saucer of Ares": See III 4 1407^{a}17–18. Timotheus, Fr. 21 Page. As a wine-saucer is to an ordinary person, so a shield is to Ares.

"The bow is a stringless": Fr. 33 Page. Author unknown. "Stringless," in that it does not make music: "a chordless lyre." As a bow is to a stringless bow, so a lyre is to a stringless lyre—neither can perform their function.

Note 1063

To say that the bow is a lyre or the shield a wine-saucer is simple: They involve only one relation, that between bow and lyre in the first case, that between shield and wine-saucer in the second.

Note 1064

Likening a flute player to an ape: Because the stance adopted while playing the flute is like that of an ape.

Or a shortsighted person to a spluttering (*psakazomenô[i]*) **oil-lamp (for both contract):** The verb *psakazein* means to "drizzle." So the spluttering oil-lamp behaves as if water is drizzling on it and it is contracting to avoid it, in the way that we squint to keep rain out of our eyes, and a shortsighted person squints (contracts his eyelids) in order to see better.

{353} Note 1065

Niceratus: Most likely Niceratus of Cydantidae, son of the Athenian general, Nicias, and a victim of the Thirty Tyrants (404 BC). He is among the *dramatis personae* of Plato's *Republic*, but does not speak.

"Philoctetes stung by a Pratys": Philoctetes (the hero of Sophocles' *Philoctetes*) was (in one version of his story) stung by a snake, which caused a festering wound in his foot. He is stranded on the island of Lemnos by the Greeks, so as to avoid his unbearable screams. The implicit metaphor is: Pratys is a snake.

Pratys: A professional rhapsodist.

Long haired and parched (*komônta de kai auchmêron*): The participle *komônta* means "having long hair"; the adjective *auchmêros*, "dry," "parched," "rough," "squalid." Of these, "squalid" seems inappropriate. Perhaps the idea is that just as Philoctetes had long, uncut hair, and was parched because of his wound, so Niceratus' hair is still wild from his passionate recitation and his throat dry.

Note 1066

When they would introduce (*apodidôsin*) **a corresponding [metaphor]:** The verb *apodidonai* in rhetoric and poetics means to introduce an apodosis for a corresponding protasis, where these may (as

at III 5 1407[a]21) be particles, or other elements, such as a metaphor corresponding to the other element in a simile. Thus here the second term should be a metaphor.

"Like curly celery (*selinon*) **the legs he wears":** Fr. 207 Kock (= Edmonds v. IIIa, p. 389). *Selinon* is properly "celery," though also "parsley" (= *petroselinon*, or "rock celery"). Because of its curly labia-like leaves it is used in comedy and elsewhere as a slang term for the female genitals. See Henderson, p. 136, 144, 151. It is this, in fact, that makes *selinon* not just an element in a simile corresponding to legs, but also a metaphor. He wears his own twisted legs; he is "wearing" a woman's genitals on his penis. The next example also involves a sexual *double entendre*.

"Like Philammon punching his leather bag (*kôrukô*)": Fr. 208 Kock (= Edmonds v. IIIa, p. 389). A *kôrukos* is both a leather punching bag, and a slang term for the male scrotum or ball sack. Again, it is apparently this that makes it a metaphor: punching his leather bag = masturbating.

Philammon: A famous Athenian athlete and Olympic victor.

Note 1067

That similes are metaphors has been stated often: Most recently at III 11 1412[b]34–35.

Note 1068

Metaphors from species to species: See III 2 1404[b]32n.

Note 1069

As "the Carpathian says of the hare": Hares were introduced into the island of Carpathus (between Crete and Rhodes) as a benefit, but did more harm than good.

{354} Note 1070

[1] Like Philammon punching his leather bag, and, [2] You would have thought that *he* was Philammon punching his leather bag: [1] is a simile, but if we change the mode of expression, as in [2], it is also an hyperbole: *that* little guy is like the great athlete, Philammon.

Note 1071

That is why they are most used . . . works of Athena: Double-bracketed by Kassel as a later addition by Aristotle.

"Not even if he gave me as many gifts . . . Athena": Homer, *Il.* IX.385, 388–390.

Note 1072

This [figure of speech] is especially used by Attic orators: This sentence is secluded by Kassel and doubted by Cope. In the mss. it appears before, "That is why it is unfitting for an older person to use it."

Attic orators: See Roisman, pp. 41–70 (Pseudo-Plutarch).

Note 1073

The writing style and the debating style are not the same, neither are the style of public oratory and judicial style: The division, so formulated, gives the impression that the writing style corresponds to epideictic oratory, the debating style to deliberative and judicial oratory (this is how Cope sees things). But we should rather understand the opposition between writing and debating (oral) as one to be drawn all three kinds of rhetoric. Nothing in Book I seems to confine epideictic rhetoric to written speeches—even Book III makes reference to the "listener" to an epideictic speech (III 14 $1415^{b}29$). Besides, in Aristotle's time, professional judicial speech writers (for example, Lysias) were writing speeches for their clients to deliver and political orators (for example, Demosthenes) were publishing written deliberative speeches.

Debating style (*agônistikê*): An *agôn* is a contest or competition of any sort. Thus at I 5 $1360^{b}22$ *agônistikê dunamis* is "athletic capacity," or a capacity for athletic competition. A judicial trial too is an *agôn* between prosecutor and defender to see which one justice favors, while a debate is an *agôn* between speakers to determine the better speech or argument.

Note 1074

A scientific knowledge of how to speak correct Greek: See III 5 $1407^{a}20$.

Compelled to keep anything silent that one may wish to communicate to others: That is, others that one is not in a position to speak to directly.

Note 1075

Most exact: See I 1 $1355^{a}25$n.

Most suited to delivery: See III 1 $1403^{b}22$n.

Note 1076

Chaeremon: See III 23 $1400^{b}25$n.

Professional speechwriter: See II 11 $1388^{b}21$n.

Licymnius: See III 2 $1405^{b}6$.

{355} Note 1077

Thin (*stenos*): If we take a speech that is intended to be read and imagine it being used in a debate, it will seem to lack something in comparison to a speech intended to be delivered—namely, the element of delivery itself—and so will seem *stenos* by comparison.

Those of the orators (*rhêtorôn*) **appear prosaic in the hands:** Some mss., read by OCT, have εὖ λεχθέντες ("though well-spoken") post ῥητόρων; others have ἢ τῶν λεχθέντων, which I read but seclude with Kassel.

Prosaic (*idiôtikoi*): The adjective *idiôtikos* means "private," but also "amateurish" or "unprofessional." Here, though, as at *Po.* 22 1458^{a}21, 32, it means "prosaic" or "commonplace," since what made the speeches seem otherwise was the element of delivery that they are deprived of "in the hands" (that is, in reading).

Note 1078

The cause of this is that their fitting place is in debates . . . : Reading αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι ἁρμόττει· διὸ καὶ τὰ ὑποκριτικὰ ἀφῃρημένης τῆς ὑποκρίσεως οὐ ποιοῦντα τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον φαίνεται εὐήθη with Kassel and the mss. for OCT αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι ἁρμόττει τὰ ὑποκριτικά· διὸ καὶ ἀφῃρημένης τῆς ὑποκρίσεως οὐ ποιοῦντα τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον φαίνεται εὐήθη.

Note 1079

Cases of asyndeton (*asundeta*): See III 6 1407^{b}38–1408^{a}1.

But not in debating style: Reading ἀγωνιστικῇ with OCT and Kassel; τῇ ἀποδεικτικῇ ("demonstrative style") is read in other mss., and is relevant to III 13 1414^{b}1n.

Note 1080

"This is the one who stole from you, this is the one who cheated you, this is the one who last of all attempted to betray you": Source unknown. The last clause may also be translated: "this is the one who attempted the most serious betrayal."

Note 1081

What Philemon the actor used to do in Anaxandrides' ***An Old Man's Madness,*** **when he says "Rhadamanthus and Palamedes":** Fr. 10 Kock (= Edmonds v. II, p. 49). The idea, presumably, is that when Philemon came to the point in the play at which he says "Rhadamanthus and Palamedes," he then used to repeat various lines in different formulations.

Rhadamanthus: One of the judges in the Isles of the Blessed. See Plato, *Ap*. 41a.

Palamedes: A proverbially clever Greek hero who at Agamemnon's behest tricked Odysseus into joining the forces against Troy. Odysseus in revenge later hid gold in his tent, forged a letter that compromised him, accused him of treason, and had him stoned to death. Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides all wrote tragedies named after him, and Gorgias wrote a defense of him.

***The Pious Ones*:** Also by Anaxandrides.

Note 1082

A case of "the man carrying a beam": The phrase is often taken to refer to a stiff and awkward speaker, but the point seems to be about the effects of repetition, {356} which is like the uniform steps taken by someone carrying a beam, well captured in the following anecdote: "To the one who hit him with a beam and then cried, 'Look out,' he [Diogenes the Cynic] replied, 'Why? Are you going to hit me again?'" (DL VI **[41]**, 243–245).

Note 1083

These must be delivered, and not spoken as if one [phrase], in the same character and tone of voice: Not in a monotone voice and uniform tempo.

Note 1084

Special attribute: See I 1 1355^{b}1n.

Note 1085

I "came, discussed, beseeched" (what is said seems to lean on many things): Cope and Freese read [1] πολλὰ δοκεῖ ὑπεριδεῖν ὅσα εἶπεν ("[the listener or reader] seems to overlook or survey many things that he said"). OCT and Kassel read [2] (πολλὰ δοκεῖ), ὑπερεῖδεν ὅσα εἶπον ("[this seems like many things], but he looked down on [took no notice of, overlooked] whatever I said"). The relevance of [2] is difficult to see, but it has the clear advantage over [1] of assigning ὑπεριδεῖν the more standard meaning that it has at II 24 1401^{b}21 and at *Cael*. II 8 290^{a}32, the only other occurrences in Aristotle. A third possibility, which I have adopted, is to read [2], punctuated as πολλὰ δοκεῖ ὑπερεῖδεν ὅσα εἶπον, and as involving not the verb ὑπεροράω (of which ὑπεριδεῖν in [1] is the present infinitive and ὑπερεῖδεν in [2] the aorist indicative) but

the verb ὑπερείδω (of which ὑπερεῖδεν in [2–3] is the present infinitive). Aristotle uses this verb at *PA* IV 12 695^{a}7 and at *IA* 11 710^{b}30.

Note 1086

"Nereus . . .": Homer, *Il.* II.671–673.

Note 1087

Public oratory (*dêmêgorikê*): The same as deliberative speech.

Illusionistic-painting (*skiagraphia[i]*): *Skiagraphia* or "shadow-painting" was painting that employed shading to create an illusion of solidity, especially at a distance.

Note 1088

Exactness is superfluous and gives a worse appearance in [[1] both public oratory and illusionistic-painting.] [2] Judicial oratory, on the other hand, is more exact: Reading with ἡ δὲ δίκη ἀκριβέστερον with Kassel and the mss. for OCT ἡ δὲ δικανικὴ ἀκριβεστέρα. Begin with the thing at issue T (what is most advantageous to do in [1], what actually happened in [2]). The question for the speaker is, with what level of exactness should T be presented to an audience of kind K (large, small), so as to best achieve the desired outcome O. This in part depends on T, but also, of course, on K and O: "We must . . . not look for the same exactness in everything but, in each case, the one that is in accord with the subject matter and the degree sought by the method of inquiry that properly belongs to it" (*NE* I 7 1098^{a}26–29). In general, what T is in [1] is less clear, and so admits of less exactness, than what T is in [2]: things that should be done (possibilities) are {357} less determinate than things done (actualities). Too much exactness in [1] is thus a failure to match a speaking style (the relevant analog of a method of inquiry) to the thing at issue (the subject matter). The fact that the audience in such cases is typically large (a popular assembly of citizens) then enters the picture: T must be presented in a way that a large group, made up of people with, for example, different levels of knowledge, different personal goals, and different attention spans, can grasp. Their collective (average) point of view on the speech is the analog of the distant point of view presupposed in illusionistic painting. As a painter must use illusionistic effects to so represent T that from a distance it will look exactly like T, so the public speaker must use rhetorical effects so that from the perspective of his audience it will look exactly like the most advantageous thing to do. Add to this the fact that public speaking often involves debate, as judicial

speaking, anyway where there is only one judge, does not (III 12 1414^{a}14), and it is easy to see how complex these effects may need to be. Contrast this with [2] before a single judge. Here the facts, exactly represented, more-or-less speak for themselves, and the need for rhetorical effects is at a minimum. Thus minimal use of rhetorical effects and maximal exactness achieves in [2] what maximal use of rhetorical effects and minimal exactness achieves in [1], namely, T represented in a fitting way.

Note 1089

Its function (*ergon*) **is reading:** Or, since "the function is the end" (*Met*. IX.8 1050^{a}21), "Its end is reading." See also, I 1 1354^{a}11n.

Note 1090

Now the style of public oratory seems altogether like illusionistic-painting. . . . The epideictic style is most like that of writing, since its function is reading. The judicial style, though, comes second: Aristotle's focus here is on the matter of exactness. Hence he adopts idealizations, such as thinking of judicial speech as addressed to a single judge (rather than, as in real life, to multiple ones), or treating the function of epideictic speech as exclusively related to reading (see III 12 1413^{b}4–5n). What we have, in other words, is a ranking of styles simply in terms of their tolerance of exactness, or similarity to writing.

Note 1091

To make the further distinction that style should be pleasant and magnificent: According to Quint. IV.2.63, Theodectes made this distinction.

Magnificent (*megaloprepê*): See I 9 1367^{b}1n.

Note 1092

If indeed the virtue of style has been correctly defined: See III 2 1404^{b}1–5.

Note 1093

If it is babbling, it is not perspicuous, nor if it is concise: See III 3 1406^{a}33–34 (babbling) and 6 1407^{b}28 (concision).

Note 1094

The former is the statement of the case: The so-called *prothesis*.

{358} **The latter the means of persuasion:** See I 1 1354^{a}13n.

The problem (*problêma*) **. . . the demonstration:** "A dialectical problem (*problêma*) is a subject of inquiry . . . about which [1] people

have no belief either way, or [2] on which the many have a belief contrary to that of the wise, or [3] the wise contrary to that of the many, or [4] about which the members of either of these classes disagree among themselves. . . . Problems also occur [5] where deductions conflict, since there is a puzzle about whether the thing holds or not, because there are strong arguments on both sides. They occur too [6] where we have no argument because they are so vast, and we find it difficult to give an explanation—for example, is the universe eternal or not? For one may also inquire into problems of that sort" (*Top.* I 11 $104^{b}1$–17). The demonstration, then, is of the proposed solution to the problem.

Note 1095

People make a ridiculous division: The standard division is: introduction (*prooimion*), narration (*diêgêsis*), means of persuasion (*pistis*), epilogue (*epilogos*). The people are the writers on rhetoric. See I 1 $1354^{b}15$–19. The division seems to go back to Isocrates or to his school.

Note 1096

Demonstrative ones (ἀποδεικτικῶν): This is the reading of almost all the mss., and is followed by OCT, Kassel, Cope, and Freese. But the meaning of the phrase is unclear, since there is no such category of speeches. Several solutions have been proposed. (1) Reading τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν ("epideictic ones") with Welldon and Rapp: some mss. read ἐπιδεικτικόν. (2) Understanding the term as a reference to the "demonstrative" part of speeches. But there is no other similar use of the term. (3) A third idea is that Aristotle is referring to judicial speeches as they are required to be in cities that are in good legislative order (see I 1 $1354^{a}18$–26). And in fact the anonymous Byzantine commentator reads ἀποδεικτικῶν with the explanation: "that is, of the judicial ones (ἤτοι τῶν δικανικῶν)" (*CAG* XXI.2, *Anonymi in Rhetor* 226.20). (3) seems, in any case, to nicely anticipate the reference to judicial speech in the conclusion of the present section ($1414^{b}5$). See also III 13 $1413^{b}20$n.

Note 1097

Reply by comparison (*antiparabolê*): A reply to an opponent by comparing the argument he has given with the one the speaker himself has given.

Note 1098

In fact both accusation and defense often occur there, but not insofar as it is deliberative: Reading ᾗ with Cope and Kassel for OCT ἡ.

The idea is that while accusation and defense do often occur in deliberative speeches they are not essential parts of them.

Note 1099

The special ones: That is, the ones that follow from the essence of a speech, as shown at III 13 1414^{a}31–32. See I 1 1355^{b}1n.

{359} Note 1100

There will be a distinct narration, a post-narration, and a pre-narration, as well as a refutation and an additional refutation: The Greek terms are *epidiêgêsis* ("post-narration"), *prodiêgêsis* ("pre-narration"), *elegchos* ("refutation"), *epexelegchos* ("additional refutation"). See also Plato, *Phaedrus* 266d–268a.

Note 1101

A name should be assigned [only] if speaking of a species and a differentia: Reading διαφορὰν with Kassel and the mss. for OCT διαφορᾶι. See III 1 1404^{a}21n, also 7 1408^{a}13n.

Licymnius: See III 2 1405^{b}6n.

Note 1102

Introduction (*prooimion*) **. . . prologue** (*pro-logos*) **. . . prelude** (*pro-aulion*): *Pro-* has both a temporal meaning and indicates preparation, a preliminary step.

Note 1103

For as flute players: Reading γὰρ with Kassel; OCT secludes.

Keynote (*endosimô[i]*): An *endosimon* is sometimes a prelude or an introduction and sometimes, as here, what establishes the pitch (sets the tone) for musicians at the beginning of a performance.

Note 1104

Isocrates: See I 9 1368^{a}20n.

There is nothing in common between those who employ contentious arguments and Helen: In the introduction of his *Helen* (1–15) Isocrates discusses many things that have no connection to Helen of Troy, and attacks the sophists who use contentious arguments, including Gorgias (a sophist), who wrote an *Encomium of Helen*. This leads into the body of the speech.

Contentious arguments: See I 11 1371^{a}1n.

Note 1105

Gorgias in his *Olympic Speech,* says, "You are worthy of the admiration of many, men of Greece . . .": DK B7 = TEGP 45 F7.

Virtues of the body: See I 5 1360^{b}21–22 and, on virtue, I 1 1355^{b}5n.

Note 1106

Aristides: See II 23 1398^{a}9n.

Good though living in obscurity, like Paris the son of Priam: In reaction to a prophecy Paris' parents gave him to a herdsman to expose on Mount Ida. But Paris was found and suckled by a she bear, and so was still alive eight days later when the herdsman went to check. Therefore, the herdsman took him home to rear as his own. Hence the obscurity in which Paris was living, when he was later invited by the gods to judge which goddess was most beautiful.

Note 1107

Contradoxical: See II 21 1394^{b}10n.

{360} **Choerilus:** A late fifth-cent BC epic poet from Samos, famous for his *Persica*, an epic on the Persian war. The fragment Aristotle quotes asks for sympathetic consideration for writing a poem about something so much discussed: all the other subjects had been allocated to other poets.

"Now when all subjects have been allocated . . .": Fr. 1 and F1a Kinkel. See also III 14 1415^{a}17–18.

Note 1108

On exhortation, on dissuasion: The two sorts of deliberative speeches. See I 3 1358^{a}8–9.

Note 1109

Either unfamiliar or closely related to the keynote of the speech: We expect "unfamilar, not closely related," and so should perhaps read ἢ ξένα οὐκ οἰκεῖα with Spengel for OCT, Kassel, and the mss. ἢ ξένα ἢ οἰκεῖα.

Note 1110

"Due to you and your gifts or your battle spoils": Attributed to Timotheus, a famous lyre player and lyric poet from Miletus (c. 450–360 BC), who lived and worked in Athens. Fr. 18 Page.

Note 1111

In the speeches: Reading τοῖς λόγοις with Kassel and the mss. for OCT προλόγοις ("prologues"). Judicial speeches are meant.

A sample of the account (*logou*): I have used "account," since this *logos* is common both to speeches and epic poems.

Their thought (*hê dianoia*) **not kept in suspense:** Alternatively, the thought may be the one expressed in the account. See II 26 1403^{b}1n.

Note 1112

What is unlimited makes a listener's thought wander: See III 8 1408^{b}27n.

Note 1113

"Sing, goddess, the wrath . . .": The opening line of the *Iliad*.

"Tell me, Muse, of the man . . .": The opening line of the *Odyssey*.

"Bring me another account . . . war": From the introduction to Choerilus' *Persica*. Fr. 1a Kinkel. See III 14 1415^{a}3n.

Note 1114

If not straightaway, as Euripides does, at any rate somewhere in the prologue, as Sophocles does: Reading κἂν μὴ εὐθὺς ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ γε που [δηλοῖ], ὥσπερ καὶ Σοφοκλῆς with Kassel for OCT κἂν μὴ εὐθὺς ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ, ἀλλά πού γε, ὥσπερ [καὶ] Σοφοκλῆς.

"My father was Polybus . . .": Sophocles, *Oedipus Tyrannus* 774. Not the actual starting-point of the play, although it is the starting-point of the story of Oedipus. Kassel double-brackets.

Note 1115

Special function of the introduction: See I 1 1355^{b}1n (special), 1354^{a}11n (function).

{361} Note 1116

That is why if the thing at issue is clear or [the speech] short, there is no use of an introduction: See III 13 1414^{b}5–6.

Note 1117

All those: Reading ὅσα with Kassel for OCT οἷα ("of the sort").

Accusation: See I 1 1354^{a}16n.

Note 1118

When he is about to introduce (*eisaxein*) **his own case** (*hauton*): Literally: "when he is about to introduce himself." But the in legal contexts the verb *eisagein* means "to bring a case into court."

And so must first refute the accusation: See Plato, *Ap*. 18a–20d.

Note 1119

Appeals to the listener [in the introduction] are based on producing goodwill and sometimes on making him attentive: Reading [καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀργίσαι] καὶ ἐνίοτε [τὸ] προσεκτικὸν [ἢ τοὐναντίον] with

Kassel for OCT καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀργίσαι, καὶ ἐνίοτε τὸ προσεκτικὸν ἢ τοὐναντίον ("Appeals to the listener [in the introduction] are based on producing goodwill or on making angry, and sometimes on making him attentive or the contrary").

Note 1120

Ease of learning (*eumatheian*): See III 9 1409^{b}1–6, 18 1419^{b}29–30, also I 6 1362^{b}24.

Note 1121

Outside the argument . . . outside the thing at issue . . . a body: See I 1 1354^{a}11–31n.

Note 1122

Prodicus: A fifth-cent teacher of rhetoric from the island of Ceos in Cyclades with an interest in fine distinctions of meaning (Plato, *Prt.* 337a1–c4, *La.* 197d3–5) and the correctness of names (*Euthd.* 277e4, *Crat.* 384a8-c2). Socrates is described as attending some of his lectures (*Chrm.*163d3–4), although not the de luxe fifty-drachma one mentioned in our text, (*Crat.* 384b2–c1), and as being educated by him (*Men.* 96d7).

"To throw in some of the fifty-drachma lecture when the listeners nod": DK A12 = TEGP 14.

Note 1123

It is clear that this is not addressed to the listener insofar as he is a *listener*: That is, the speaker's intention is to make a base listener pay attention; a good listener would not force the speaker to use such tricks.

Note 1124

Accusing or relieving fears: Accusing the speaker's opponent or relieving the fears that he has aroused in the audience about the speaker himself, or—as in the examples—the speaker's own fears about what the audience's reaction to him will be.

{362} **"My lord, I will not say that eagerly . . .":** Sophocles, *Antigone* 223. The messenger is reluctantly reporting the burial of Polyneices to Creon, and relieving his own (quite justified) fears of the anger that his news will arouse.

"Why this introduction? . . .": Euripides, *Iphigenia in Taurus* 1162. Thoas is afraid of what Iphigenia is about to tell him. Kassel double-brackets the quotation, since some mss. omit it.

Note 1125

The sources from which one should produce goodwill and each of the other things of that sort have already been stated: See II 1 1378[a]18–19n.

Note 1126

"Grant that on reaching the Phaeacians . . . pity": Homer, *Od.* VII.327.

Note 1127

Or in some other way: Reading ἢ ἄλλως γέ πως with OCT and the mss. Kassel reads ἢ ἀμῶς γέ πως ("in some way or other").

Note 1128

What Socrates says in the funeral oration: See I 9 1367[b]8–9n.

Note 1129

"Elis, happy city": DK B10 = TEGP 48 F9.

Elis: A city in the northwestern Peloponnese, connected with the origin and the organization of the Olympic Games.

Note 1130

[T1] One [topic] concerning accusation is based on anything with which one might remove offensive prejudice: The question of how one might defend oneself against An issue already touched upon in III 14 1415[a]25–34 and in II 23 1400[b]9–16 (= [T23]).

Note 1131

Another topic: Reading τόπος with OCT, Kassel, and some mss. Other mss. have τρόπος ("way"), but all mss. have τόπος at III 15 1416[b]1, making it the better reading here as well. See also II 23 1399[a]19.

[1a] They did not occur, or [1b] they were not harmful, or not harmful to this person, or [1c] not harmful to this degree; or [2b] they were not unjust, or [2c] not very, or [3b] not shameful, or [3c] not hugely so: [a] what is the case (*ti*), [b] of what quality (*poion*), [c] in what degree (*poson*); [2] deliberative, [3] judicial, [4] epideictic speech. See also III 17 1417[b]21-30.

Note 1132

Nausicrates: A student of Isocrates. See Quint. III.6.3.

Note 1133

Another topic: Again reading τόπος with OCT, Kassel, and some mss. for τρόπος with other mss.

{363} **That it was an error, or a stroke of bad luck, or necessary:** Compare *NE* V 8 1135[b]11–25, quoted in I 13 1374[b]4–6.

Sophocles: See I 14 1374[b]36n.

Note 1134

Another: if the accuser is also involved [in similar actions], either at the present time or previously, either himself or one of those close to him: The defendant can threaten to countercharge the accuser if he is a position to point out that he, or someone close to him, is in the same position as the defendant himself.

Note 1135

If the accuser or someone else has accused others, or if—without a formal accusation—they were under the same suspicions as the defendant is now, and were shown not guilty: The speaker can argue that the attacker is likely to have made the same error in prosecuting him.

Note 1136

Hygiaenon: Otherwise unknown. His argument, presumably, is that you cannot trust the oath of someone who has encouraged perjury.

An exchange of property trial (*antidosei*): A person A assigned a public service (II 23 1399[a]37n) could argue that another B was better able to pay its cost. He challenged B in court either to carry out the service in his place, if B admitted he was richer, or to exchange his wealth for A's, and then A would carry it out. See MacDowell, pp. 162–164.

"The tongue swore, but the mind is unsworn": Euripides, *Hippolytus* 612.

Note 1137

[Euripides] said that Hygiaenon was doing an injustice by bringing a judgment into the law-courts that belonged in the court of Dionysus: The trilogy of plays of which Hippolytus was a part won first prize when it was performed in the theater of Dionysus in 428 BC. This, Euripides claims, was the proper venue in which to judge a play.

Note 1138

Because it produces different judgments: That is, because it affects and distorts or corrupts the judgment of the judges. But it could also mean, "because it produces other judgments," that is, provokes endless trials.

Note 1139

Symptoms (*sumbola*): *Sumbolon* may be equivalent in meaning to *sêmeion* ("sign") here and III 16 1317[b]2.

Note 1140

The *Teucer*: See II 23 1398^{a}4n. Teucer was sent by the Greeks to spy on the Trojans. Apparently he was later accused of having betrayed the spies to them. Both Odysseus (the accuser) and Teucer (the defendant) make use of [T10].

{364} Note 1141

Speakers of this sort are most crafty (*technikôtatoi*) **and most unjust:** Alternatively: "Topics of this sort are most crafty and most unjust." *Technikos*, which has its positive connotation at I 2 1355^{b}34, here clearly has its negative one.

Note 1142

Diomedes deliberately chose Odysseus . . . rival: See II 23 1399^{b}29n.

Note 1143

And concerning accusation let this much be said: I follow Kassel in reading this sentence here; OCT reads it at the beginning of III 16.

Note 1144

Narration in epideictic speeches is not continuous but part by part, since one should go through the actions on which the speech is based: Narration (*diêgêsis*) as a part of rhetorical speech is first presented in III 13 1414^{a}37 and associated with judicial speech. The fact that there are no introductory remarks regarding its general use might indicate that narration has a different role to play in each kind of rhetorical speech. In epideictic speech, for example, narration is not continuous, since the main structure of the speech is organized according to the virtues of the person we wish to praise or blame. Hence, narration of his actions—if needed at all—should be included within the presentation of each separate virtue.

Note 1145

The speech is composed on the one hand from what is outside the province of craft (for the speaker is in no way the cause of the actions) and on the other from what comes from the craft: See I 2 1355^{b}35–39.

Of a certain quantity (*poson*): A certain magnitude or importance.

Note 1146

Critias: See I 15 1375^{b}34n.

. . . : There may be a lacuna in the text here, which some mss. fill by repeating I 9 1367^{b}28–1368^{a}9.

Note 1147

They say—ridiculously—that the narration should be rapid: That is, writers on rhetoric. See Plato, *Phdr*. 267a–b, which mentions Evenus, Tisias, and Gorgias.

The narration: Not now in epideictic speeches but in judicial ones.

Note 1148

And one should narrate by the way (*paradiêgeisthai*) **whatever it is bears on one's own virtue:** Up to now narration concerned how to cogently present the facts and their quality, now it is viewed from the perspective of the character of the speaker (or of the opponent) and of the feelings of the audience.

What Herodotus tells us the Egyptians who had revolted replied [to the king who had invited them to return]: Herodotus II.30 (paraphrased). What Herodotus actually says is both more graphic and more intelligible. {365} Two-hundred-and-forty-thousand Egyptian fighters had revolted and joined the Ethiopians. Psammetichus, the Egyptian king, urged them not to "desert their household gods, their wives and children." One of them "showed him his penis and said, 'Wherever I have this, I will have wives and children.'"

Note 1149

One should speak of the actions as being done in the past, except for those that, when presented as being done in the present, conduce to pity or indignation: See III 11 $1411^{b}23$–$1412^{a}10$.

Pity (*oiktos*) **or indignation** (*deinôsis*): The term *oiktos* does not appear elsewhere in the *Rhetoric* but is obviously a synonym for *eleos* (II 8). On *deinôsis*, see II 21 $1395^{a}9$n.

Note 1150

A paradigm is the story of Alcinous: Told in Homer, *Od*. IX–XII, and proverbial for a long-winded story. See Plato, *Rep*. 614b.

As it is told to Penelope in sixty lines: In *Od*. XXIII.264–284, 310–343, Odysseus compresses the story into (actually) fifty-five lines of verse.

Phaÿllus: Otherwise unknown.

The epic cycle: The events of the Trojan war.

The *Oeneus*: A lost play of Euripides. On its eponymous hero, see II 23 $1397^{b}22$n.

Note 1151

The narration should be expressive of character: That is, of the speaker's character, though the text makes reference only to the character of the narration, that is, of the speech itself. Interestingly, the analysis does not follow the distinctions made in II 1 1378^{a}6–18.

Note 1152

It is by the quality of this that the character is of a certain quality, and it is by its end that the deliberate choice is of a certain quality: See I 8 1366^{a}14–16n and, on deliberate choice, I 1 1355^{b}18n.

Note 1153

Mathematical arguments . . . do not involve the for-the-sake-of-which: "In mathematics too nothing is shown through this [final] cause, nor is there any demonstration where the cause is this: 'because it is better or worse'" (*Met*. III 3 996^{a}29–31).

But the Socratic arguments do: "The work Socrates did was concerned with ethical issues, not at all with nature as a whole" (*Met*. I 6 987^{b}1–2); "Socrates busied himself about the virtues of character, and in connection with these was the first to inquire into universal definition" (XIII 4 1078^{b}17–19); "Socrates the elder thought that the aim was to know virtue, and he used to inquire what justice is, and what courage is, and each part of [virtue]. And it was reasonable for him to do this. For he thought that all the virtues were sciences, so that to know justice and to be just would happen at the same time" (*EE* I 5 1216^{b}2–8).

{366} **(For they speak of things of this sort):** Reading περὶ τοιούτων γὰρ λέγουσιν with OCT; Kassel secludes.

Note 1154

Insolence (*thrasutêta*): *Thrasutês*, which is "rashness" at II 14 1390^{a}30, here has its other meaning, "insolence" or "effrontery."

Boorishness: See II 21 1395^{a}6n.

Note 1155

Of a practically-wise person (*phronimou*) **what is characteristic consists in the pursuit of what is beneficial, and of a good one in that of what is noble:** This contrast relies on an ordinary understanding of *phronêsis*, not that of Aristotle himself. For most people think that "the practical wisdom concerned with oneself as an individual is most of all practical wisdom" (*NE* VI 8 1141^{b}29–30), and so think that the virtues of character, which aim at what is noble, are not the same as *phronêsis*, which aims at what is beneficial to oneself. Aristotle, by contrast, thinks

that while the natural or habituated virtues can be possessed without *phronêsis*, full virtue requires it, and vice versa: "It is neither possible to be fully good without practical wisdom nor practically-wise without virtue of character" (13 $1144^{b}31$–32).

Note 1156

"But when mother and father have gone to Hades . . . born": Sophocles, *Antigone* 911–912 (slightly misquoted).

Note 1157

Aeschines: A fourth-cent BC teacher of oratory and writer of speeches for the law-courts. He was a devoted follower of Socrates and was present at his death (Plato, *Phd.* 59b). He also wrote Socratic dialogues, only fragments of which are extant. See Roisman, pp. 53–55 (Pseudo-Plutarch), 282–284 (Photius), 324 (Suda).

Cratylus: "[Plato], having been from his youth familiar first with Cratylus and the Heraclitean beliefs that all perceptibles are always flowing, and that there is no scientific knowledge concerning them, these views he also held later" (*Met.* I 6 $987^{a}32$–$^{b}1$); "This was also the sort held by Cratylus, who in the end thought that he should say nothing, but instead only moved his finger, and criticized Heraclitus for saying that it is not possible to step into the same river twice, since he thought that we could not do so even once" (*Met.* IV 5 $1010^{a}11$–15). Little is known about this Cratylus beyond what Aristotle tells us about him in these two passages, and what we can glean from Plato's *Cratylus*. Other sources tell us that Plato's association with Cratylus occurred after the death of Socrates in 399 BC. See DL III **[6]** 57–60.

"Furiously hissing and furiously shaking his fists": Fr. 92 SSR.

Note 1158

"Thus she spoke, and the old nurse covered her face with her hands": Homer, *Od.* XIX.361.

{367} Note 1159

And this should be easy to see from messengers: Reading ὅτι δὲ ῥάδιον ὁρᾶν δεῖ with ms. F (anon.) for OCT ὅρα; Kassel reads ὁρᾶν δεῖ. Especially, from messengers in tragedies.

Note 1160

Narration, though, should occur at many places, and sometimes not at the start: This conclusion does not apply to narration in judicial

speech in particular, but to narration in general. Narration, accordingly, does not constitute a separate part of a rhetorical speech.

Note 1161

The listeners—either accusing or praising [them]—will deliberate better about things to come, or in order to accuse or praise: Reading ἢ διαβάλλοντες ἢ ἐπαινοῦντες with the mss.; Kassel reads but double-brackets; OCT reads ἢ διαβάλλοντος ἢ ἐπαινοῦντος. In Greek ἢ διαβάλλοντες ἢ ἐπαινοῦντες comes at the end of the sentence, but I read it as applying to the listeners, who reacting to past events with accusation or praise carry over these feelings to the future events of the same sort that are being deliberated about.

Note 1162

[In accusing or praising], however, the speaker does not perform the function of an advisor: Accusation and praise are backward looking; advice is forward looking.

Note 1163

And to set it out with as many details as the listeners wish: Reading καὶ διατάττειν οἷς βούλονται with Kassel and the mss. for OCT καὶ διατάττειν ὡς βούλονται. The meaning is not entirely clear. The anonymous Byzantine commentator gives διακοσμεῖν ("arrange") as an equivalent for διατάττειν (*CAG* XXI.2, *Anonymi in Rhetor* 248.22). So it could refer to the arrangement (*taxis*) of the speech. It could also—as in Freese and Kennedy—mean something like "and submit it to the judgment of anyone the listeners may wish or approve."

Carcinus' *Oedipus*: P. 798 Nauck. On Carcinus, see II 23 1400^{b}10n.

Sophocles' Haemon: The reference, apparently, is to *Antigone* 683–723, where Haemon explains to his father Creon, why he, rather than someone else, must question Creon's decision to put Antigone to death. The fit with Aristotle's description, however, is less than perfect.

Note 1164

Likewise: Reading a period after ὡσαύτως with Kassel; OCT reads a comma, with a period after ἀμφισβήτησις ("dispute") (III 17 1417^{b}27).

Note 1165

Ignorance is not a cause [that can excuse], as it might be if the dispute were about justice: "When someone acts, then, we can ask who? what? and concerning what? or in what? and sometimes with what? (for example, with what instrument?), {368} for the sake of what? (for

example, preservation), and in what way? Now no one who is not a madman could be ignorant about all of these nor, clearly, about who is doing it. For how could he be ignorant about *himself*? But about what he is doing, he might be ignorant" (*NE* III 1 $1111^{a}3$–8). See also V 9 $1135^{b}26$–$1136^{a}1$ (quoted in II 2 $1378^{a}30$–32n) on actions done as a result of spirit.

Note 1166

In epideictic speeches amplification is mostly for [arguing] that things are noble or beneficial, since the things at issue should be taken on trust: See I 9 $1368^{a}27$–29.

Note 1167

In the speeches of public oratory one may dispute that something will be, or that though the things he [that is, the opponent] recommends will be, they will not be just, or beneficial: Benefit is the primary goal; justice the ancillary one. See I 3 $1358^{b}21$–25.

The things he [that is, the opponent] recommends: Reading ἅ κελεύει with Kassel and the mss. for OCT <ποιοῦσιν> ἅ κελεύει ("will produce the things the opponent recommends").

Note 1168

Such things appear to be (*phainetai*) **proofs** (*tekmêria*) **that the other ones are falsely stated too:** Which does not mean, of course, that they are in fact proofs—necessary signs (I 2 $1357^{b}3$–4)—of this.

Note 1169

Paradigms are more suited to public oratory, enthymemes are more suited to judicial oratory: See I 9 $1368^{a}29$–33, II 20 13 $1394^{a}2$–8.

Note 1170

The past has a necessity about it: "What is past does not admit of not having happened. That is why Agathon is correct: 'Of one thing alone is even a god deprived, to make undone what is done and finished'" (*NE* VI 2 $1139^{b}8$–11). Hence the past has something necessary about it. But it is not unconditionally necessary: "What is, necessarily is, when it is. . . . But not everything that is, necessarily is. . . . For to say that everything that is, necessarily is, when it is, is not the same as saying that is *unconditionally* necessary" (*Int.* 9 $19^{a}23$–26).

Note 1171

There is a defining mark (*horos*) **of their quantity:** A common meaning of the noun *horos* is "term," in the logical sense, in which a syllogism has three terms. But often, as at II 8 $1385^{b}18$, a *horos* is a definition or, as here, a defining mark or limit (a boundary marker is a *horos*) that gives definition to what would otherwise lack it (*Pol.* I 9 $1258^{a}18$, II 8 $1267^{a}29$, VII 4 $1326^{a}35$).

"My friend, since you have spoken *as much as* a wise man should": Homer, *Od.* IV.204.

Note 1172

You will do just what some of those doing philosophy do, who deduce things that are more knowable and more persuasive than the things on the basis {369} **of which they state them:** "But to investigate the claim that being is unlimited and immovable at all, to seek an argument in a case where we are too well-off to require argument, implies poor discernment of what is better and what is worse, what commends itself to belief and what does not, what is a starting-point and what is not. It is likewise impossible that all things should be changing or that some things should always be changing and the remainder always at rest. For against all these, this one thing provides sufficient assurance: we *see* some things sometimes changing and sometimes at rest" (*Ph.* VIII 3 $254^{a}30$–$^{b}1$); "We have just taken it to be impossible for anything at the same time to be and not to be, and by means of this we have shown that this is the most stable of all starting-points. Now some people do demand that we demonstrate even this, but this is due to lack of educatedness. For it is lack of educatedness not to know what things we should look for a demonstration of and what things we should not. For it is in general impossible to demonstrate everything (for it would go on without limit, so that even then there would be no demonstration). But if there are things we should not look for a demonstration of, these people would not be able to say what starting-point they think has more of a claim to be such" (*Met.* IV 4 $1006^{a}3$–11).

Note 1173

An enthymeme either knocks out (*ekkrousei*) **feeling or is spoken pointlessly, since simultaneous movements knock out each other and either extinguish** (*aphanizousin*) **each other or make each other weak:** "An indication that movement from A to B is contrary to movement from B to A is the fact that they stop or check each other if they occur at

the same time" (*Ph.* VIII 8 262^{a}6–8); "Of two [contrary] movements the stronger always knocks out (*ekkrouei*) the weaker" (*Sens.* 4 447^{a}14–15); "We say that the soul is pained, enjoying, feeling confident, feeling afraid, and, further, feeling angry and also perceiving and thinking. And all of these seem to be movements" (*DA* I 4 408^{b}1–4); "If the appetites are large and intense, they even knock out (*ekkrouousin*) rational calculation" (*NE* III 12 1119^{b}10).

Note 1174

Demonstration involves neither character nor deliberate choice: This means that a speaker does not express his character, or reveal his deliberate choice, in demonstrating something, not that demonstrations cannot deal with ethical, legal, or political matters (notice, for example, *apodeixin* at III 17 1418^{a}27). In this respect they differ from mathematical arguments. See III 16 1417^{a}19–21.

Note 1175

Maxims should be used both in a narration: Because narration should be expressive of character. See III 16 1417^{a}16.

And in a means of persuasion: Because one very important means of persuasion operates through character. See I 2 1356^{a}1–13.

Since they are expressive of character: See II 21 1395^{b}11–17.

{370} Note 1176

Epimenides the Cretan: A holy man of the late seventh-cent BC.

He used to "prophesize": DK B4.

Note 1177

The law is a given (*hupothesis*) **in judicial speeches:** That is, something that can be taken as given, and so does not itself need proof.

And having a starting-point it is easier to find a demonstration: Because, "hypotheses are the starting-points of demonstrations" (*Met.* V 1 1013^{a}16).

Note 1178

Leisurely digressions (*diatribas*): From which we get the word "diatribe," which, unlike *diatribê*, has an exclusively negative or hostile connotation. The verb *diatribein* means "to spend or pass one's time."

For example, against the opponent, or about oneself, or to arouse feelings: See II 1 1377^{b}28–31.

Note 1179

Unless one wanted to divert attention (*existê[i]tai*): Reading ἐξίστηται with Kassel and ms. F for OCT ἐξιστῇ; other mss. have ἐξίστησιν, ἐξίστη. The use of the verb *existanai* is the same as at III 8 1408^{b}23.

Note 1180

When at a loss (*aporounta*): In dialectic, an *aporia* is a puzzle, since it leaves one at a loss.

The orators in Athens: See III 11 1413^{b}2n.

Note 1181

What Gorgias used to say, namely, that he was never left without a word (*logos*): DK B17 = TEGP 57.

Note 1182

If he is speaking about Achilles, he praises Peleus, then Aeacus, then the god: Peleus is Achilles' father, Aeacus is Peleus' father, and the god (Zeus) is Aeacus' father.

Note 1183

To appear good fits a decent person more than an exact argument (*logon akribê*) **does:** *Akribologia* is characterized as "niggardly" (*mikroprepês*) at *NE* IV 2 1122^{b}8.

Note 1184

Refutative enthymemes are more popular than demonstrative ones . . . known: See II 23 1400^{b}26–33.

Note 1185

Ones directed against the opponent are not a distinct species: See II 26 1403^{a}24–33.

{371} Note 1186

Some refute by objection others by [counter-]deduction: Reading <τὸ> τὰ μὲν λῦσαι ἐνστάσει τὰ δὲ συλλογισμῷ with OCT; Kassel secludes. See II 25 1402^{a}29–^{b}12.

Note 1187

As Callistratus did in the Messenian assembly: The reference is probably to the embassy on which Callistratus (I 7 1363^{a}19n) was sent to the Messenians in 362 BC. See Fr. 1 (p. 218) Sauppe.

Note 1188

A human being against whom accusations have been made beforehand (*prodiabeblêmenon*): See II 23 1400^{a}23–29.

Note 1189

"The goddesses I will be allied with first . . . Hera": Euripides, *Trojan Women* 969, 971. The missing line is: "And shall show that she [Helen] does state what is just." Hecuba advised Menelaus to put Helen to death. Helen defends herself at length. She is answered by Hecuba in the passage of which these lines are a part.

Note 1190

Hecuba seizes first on what is most easily refuted: She argues that the three goddesses involved were not foolish enough to allow Argos or Athens to become subject to Troy as the result of the judgment of Paris. See I 6 $1363^{a}19$n.

Note 1191

Archilochus: See II 23 $1398^{b}12$n.

Iambus: A poem, not necessarily in iambic meter, that blames or abuses someone, often in scurrilous terms.

"Nothing is unexpected or declared impossible on oath": Fr. 122 West. Archilochus was engaged to Neobule, whose father, Lycambes, broke off the engagement.

"Not for me the wealth of Gyges": Fr. 19 West.

Gyges: King of Lydia (c. 680–645 BC).

As Sophocles does, when he makes Haemon speak to his father about Antigone as reporting what others say: At *Antigone* 688–700.

Note 1192

Sometimes one should also change one's enthymemes into maxims: Because maxims, unlike enthymemes, are expressive of character. See III 18 $1417^{a}17$–18, $^{a}38$–$^{b}1$, $1418^{a}12$.

Note 1193

"People with understanding should bring about reconciliation when fortunate, since that way it would be conducive to getting or having most": Compare, Isocrates, *To Archidamus* 50.

Conducive to getting or having most (*megista pleonektoien*): *Pleonektein* means to "get or have more," usually in the sense of more than one's fair share—although {372} *Pol.* V 2 $1302^{b}1$–2 makes it clear that it is possible to get more in a just way: "they see others, whether justly or unjustly, getting more of these." The corresponding disposition, or character trait, is often greed (*pleonexia*), which, even if not always a vice, has a substantial potential to lead to vicious action.

Note 1194

Questioning (*erôtêsis*): Questioning by the defendant of the accuser and vice versa, as well as of witnesses was usual practice in Athenian courts both at the preliminary hearing and during the trial itself.

When the opponent has stated one of the two (*to heteron*) **[premises]:** As more clearly in the second example (III 18 1419^{a}5–12), the interrogator is trying to elicit the premises of a refutative enthymeme from his opponent. In this case, one has been stated, and a question will elicit the other.

Note 1195

Lampon: A prophet mentioned in Aristophanes, *Birds* 521 and Plutarch, *Pericles* VI.

The savior goddess: Demeter, goddess of corn, grain, harvest, and fertility.

Note 1196

It is opportune [to ask an additional question] when one point is evident and it is clear to the questioner that the opponent will grant the other. For having learned that [second] premise, he should not additionally ask about the evident one but should state the conclusion: We have premise P_1 (clearly will be granted), P_2 (evident), and conclusion C. The advice here seems to be: (1) once P_1 is granted, do not state P_2, since even though it is evident, the opponent may shake his head at it, but instead state C. But it is also possible that P_2 is the conclusion, which, as such, should not be put as a question, but stated as proved: "One must not make the conclusion into a question. Otherwise, if the answerer shakes his head in refusal, it seems that no deduction will come about. For often, even when one does not ask the conclusion, but puts it forward as what follows, people refuse it, and by doing this they will seem not to be refuted to those who do not discern what follows from what has been accepted. When, then, one asks it without even saying that it follows and he refuses it, it seems as if no deduction has come about at all" (*Top*. VIII 2 158^{a}7–13). See also *Rh*. I 2 1357^{a}17–18.

Note 1197

When Meletus stated that Socrates did not acknowledge the gods: See Plato, *Ap*. 27b–28a.

Meletus: The person who brought a charge of impiety against Socrates in 399 BC, on behalf of himself, Anytus, and Lycon: "He

belongs to the Pitthean deme—if you recall a Meletus from that deme, with straight hair, not much of a beard, and a slightly hooked nose" (Plato, *Euthphr*. 2b). If he is the Meletus who brought a charge of impiety against Andocides in 399 BC (Lysias, *Against Andocides*), he was not only one of the people who participated in the arrest of Leon of Salamis under the Thirty Tyrants (II 23 1400^{a}18n), he was also a religious fanatic. It may be too {373} that he is the son of the poet of the same name, which would help explain why he is described as having brought his indictment because he was aggrieved on behalf of the poets Socrates examines (Plato, *Ap.* 23e).

***Daimonion*:** Socrates describes it as follows: "A divine thing, a *daimonion* (*theion ti kai daimonion*), comes to me—the very thing Meletus made mocking allusion to in the indictment he wrote. It's something that began happening to me in childhood: a sort of voice comes, which, whenever it does come, always holds me back from what I'm about to do, but never urges me forward" (Plato, *Ap*. 31d).

Note 1198

Contradoxical: See II 21 1394^{b}10n. These sorts of questioning are similar to topics [T14] and [T15] (II 23 1399^{a}19–34).

Note 1199

The listeners shout out (*thoroubousin*): See III 7 1408^{a}25n.

Note 1200

One should compress enthymemes as much as possible: See I 2 1357^{a}16–17.

Note 1201

Ambiguous questions (*amphibola*), **on the other hand, [should be answered] by dividing them by account** (*logos*) **and not concisely** (*suntomôs*): At III 6 1407^{b}37 speaking *suntomôs* is contrasted with "joining two names under one article," here it seems to have the related sense of joining two accounts under one name—that is, failing to notice the ambiguity in the question. On the connection between names and accounts, see III 7 1408^{a}13n.

Note 1202

This (*touto*) **though, and the means of refutation may be taken as evident to us from the *Topics*:** The reference of *touto* seems to be the whole issue of how to question someone, which is discussed in *Top*. VIII 1–4; how to answer (or refute) questions is discussed in 4–14.

Note 1203

Sophocles: One of the people appointed by the Athenians to develop a constitution after the disastrous defeat in Sicily in 413 BC. See Thucydides VIII.1 and Xenophon, *Hellenica* II.3.2.

Preliminary councilors (*proboulois*): "There must be some body to convene the controlling element in the constitution. In some places, these are called preliminary councilors (*probouloi*), because they make preliminary deliberations (*probouleuein*) for the assembly" (*Pol.* VI 8 $1322^{b}15$–17).

The Four Hundred: The oligarchy that replaced the democracy in Athens in 411 BC. See Thucydides VIII.45–98.

Note 1204

Jokes (*geloiôn*): Jibes, jests, comments, remarks, and so on that are intended to cause laughter (*gelôs*). See also I 11 $1372^{a}1$–2n.

{374} **Gorgias rightly said that one should "destroy the opponents' seriousness with laughter and their laughter with seriousness":** DK B12 = TEGP 51 F12. See also, Plato. *Grg.* 473e: [Socrates:] "What's this, Polus. You're laughing? Is this some new kind of refutation, to laugh when someone makes a point, but not refuting him?"

We have stated in the *Poetics* how many kinds (*eidos*) **of jokes there are:** This is not in our text of the *Poetics*, but was presumably part of its lost second book.

Note 1205

Self-deprecation: See II 2 $1379^{b}31$n.

Is more suited to a free person: Because the free person tells jokes for the sake of himself, and so is not constrained by the sense of humor of his audience: "the amusement of the free person differs from that of the slavish one, and that of the well-educated person from that of the uneducated one" (*NE* IV 8 $1128^{a}20$–22). On freedom, see I 5 $1361^{a}16$n.

The buffoon (*bômolochos*): "A buffoon cannot resist what causes laughter—sparing neither himself nor anyone else if he can produce a laugh and saying the sorts of things that a sophisticated person would never say and some he would not even listen to" (*NE* IV 8 $1128^{a}33$–$^{b}1$). See also II 4 $1381^{a}32$–35n.

Note 1206

Epilogue (*epilogos*): The last part of the speech.

Minimizing (*tapeinôsai*): See II 6 $1384^{a}3$n.

Note 1207

Unconditionally: See I 1 1355[a]7n.

Note 1208

The topics on the basis of which he should establish them as being of these sorts have been stated: Reading τοιούτους with Kassel for OCT τοῦτο, secluding [δεῖ] with both, and εἴρηνται οἱ τόποι πόθεν σπουδαίους δεῖ κατασκευάζειν καὶ φαύλους with the first ("the topics from which one should establish that someone is excellent or base"). These topics were stated in I 9.

Note 1209

The growth (*auxêsis*) **of bodies too is from something pre-existing:** Aristotle takes this as evidence of the naturalness of constructing the epilogue in the way he describes.

Note 1210

The topics from which amplifying and minimizing should be set forth were stated earlier: See I 9 1368[a]10–26 and II 19 1393[a]9–19, which explains how these topics are to be derived from previously discussed ones.

Note 1211

Indignation (*deinôsis*): See II 21 1395[a]9n.

Strife (*eris*): *Eris*, which has not been previously mentioned, is not obviously a feeling, and in this respect resembles *diabolê* ("accusation"), for which it may well {375} be serving as proxy (this would explain its unheralded mention at this late stage). See I 1 1354[a]16–17n.

Note 1212

Their topics too were stated earlier: At II 1–11.

Note 1213

To do in the way: Reading οὕτως ὥσπερ with Kassel and some mss. for OCT οὐχ ὥσπερ ("not in the way").

Note 1214

"What has not been shown?": Reading τί οὐ δέδεικται with Kassel and the mss. for OCT τί οὖν δέδεικται ("what then has been shown?").

Note 1215

Asyndeton is fitting for one's final utterance (*lexeôs*): See III 6 1407[b]39n.

"I have spoken; you have listened; you have the facts; render judgment": A reference to Lysias, *Against Eratosthenes* 12.100: "*akêkoate,*

heorakate, peponthate, echete; dikazete" ("you have listened, you have seen, you have suffered, you have the facts; judge").

{377} Further Reading

Detailed and regularly updated bibliographies of works on Aristotle's rhetoric (compiled by Christof Rapp) on his ethics (compiled by Richard Kraut), political theory (compiled by Fred Miller), and on his philosophy generally (compiled by Christopher Shields) are available online at:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-politics/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle/

Thesaurus Linguae Graeca (http://www.tlg.uci.edu) has excellent searchable Greek texts and English translations of Aristotle's writings, with linked dictionaries and grammars.

Editions of the *Rhetoric*, translations of it, and commentaries on it are listed under Abbreviations at the beginning of the present volume.

The surviving works of many of the Greek orators Aristotle mentions are available in good annotated translations in the series, The Orators of Classical Greece, edited by Michael Gargarin for University of Texas Press.

The following are works that I have found especially worthwhile.

Aristotle Life and Works

Natali, C. *Aristotle: His Life and School* (Princeton, 2013).

Shields, C. ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle* (Oxford, 2012) .

Books and Collections of Papers

Dow, J. *Passion and Persuasion in Aristotle's* Rhetoric (Oxford, 2015).

Furley, D. and A. Nehamas, ed. *Aristotle's* Rhetoric (Princeton, 1994).

Rorty, A., ed. *Essays on Aristotle's* Rhetoric (Berkeley, 1996).

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Worthington, I., ed. *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric* (Oxford, 1990).

{378} Relevant Works of Mine

"Philosophy, Politics, and Rhetoric in Aristotle." In A. Rorty, ed., *Essays on Aristotle's* Rhetoric (Berkeley, 1996), pp. 191–205.

"Aristotelian Education." In A. Rorty, ed., *Philosophers on Education* (London, 1998), pp. 51–65.

Practices of Reason: Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford, 1992).

"Aristotle's Method of Philosophy." In C. Shields, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle* (Oxford, 2012), pp. 150–70.

Action, Contemplation, and Happiness: An Essay on Aristotle (Cambridge, Mass., 2012).

Aristotle on Practical Wisdom (Cambridge, Mass., 2013).

Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics (Indianapolis, 2014).

Aristotle: Politics (Indianapolis, 2017).

Aristotle: De Anima (Indianapolis, 2017).

Aristotle: Topics & Sophistical Refutations (Indianapolis, 2020).

{379} Index of Names

Note: Page numbers beginning with 13 and ending with 54[a]–99[b] omit the 13—for example, 1379[a] = 79[a]. Those beginning with 14 and ending with 00[a]–20[a] omit the 14. Line numbers are to the Greek text, but are closely approximate in the translation. Names are identified at their first occurrence.

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